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Introduction
In the last five decades, increasing attention has been paid by scholarship inter-
ested in medieval logical literature to the genre of obligations, a chapter of the
logica moderna whose understanding has proved to be a problem of very di!cult
solution. It is quite common, in the opening lines of most contributions devoted
to obligations, to come accross quick characterizations made by means of adjec-
tives such as ‘puzzling’, ‘vague’, ‘obscure’ or ‘mysterious’,1 whose tone is generally
meant to express the di!culty one should be prepared to face in the attempt to
find satisfactory explanations or, maybe, even to warn the newcomer about the
risk of sudden frustration prompted by the intricacy of the doctrine as opposed to
the sparsity of feasible solutions.
The measure of this disappointment, I suspect, has been proportional to ex-
pectations. Scholars have experienced much trouble in the attempt to explain all
aspects of the obligational literature in one single consistent framework; as a re-
sult, the only consensus that has arisen among them is centred on the fact that we
are still in search for an answer, possibly the Answer, to the question as to what
obligations really are. Curiously enough – though I can’t help seeing pretty much
of the irony of history having a hand in it – What obligations really are is the
title of a paper by A. Perreiah that should have, but in fact has never,2 appeared
in Medioevo, 5 (1979). This odd circumstance might evocatively seem to imply
that our search for the truth about obligations has been, so far, fatally doomed to
encounter insurmountable obstacles to its own realization and that we should still
be waiting for a definitive answer. The trustworthiness of this picture is, however,
1 A few examples, among many others, of this kind of rhetorical ouvertures are found in
[Spade, 1992, p. 171], [Martin, 2001, p. 64], [Yrjönsuuri, 2001a, p. 7], and [Dutilh Novaes, 2007,
p. 145].
2 The paper is quoted by Spade and King in two influential papers on the topic, cf.
[Spade, 1982b, p. 2] and [King, 1991, p. 64], respectively. Anyway, no spell has been cast
on the question: the mistery has a simple solution. I have come to know, thanks to the in-
formation prof. Perreiah provided me in a private comunication, that the paper was originally
supposed to appear in Medioevo, but in fact did come out, later on and under a di!erent (per-
haps less emphatic) title, in Analecta Augustiniana, cf. [Perreiah, 1982]. Presumably, an earlier
draft, circulated beforehand, is at the origin of both misquotations.
iii
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highly questionable insofar as it strongly depends on how much importance we put
on the real need of one answer, especially when it comes to weighing the achieve-
ments that have undoubtedly been made in the past, both in terms of historical
research and in terms of conceptual analysis.
Let us start with a list of problems that have puzzled historians of logic working
in this field:
1. genesis of the genre
2. aims
3. understanding of its historical development (with special attention to the
revision of rules occurring in the first half of the XIV century)
4. the place of obligations in the context of medieval logic
5. concrete vs. fictitious character of disputations
6. application to other fields of medieval thought (e.g. theology, metaphysics,
natural philosophy, moral philosophy, law)
7. attempts to formulate interpretations that can help identify and describe at
best the logical structure of obligational disputations
8. attempts to formulate interpretations that can establish a connection to con-
temporary research in the philosophy of logic and language
My suggestion is that several of these issues have been often unsuitably con-
flated together, thereby generating a problem which, in such terms, turns out to
be ill-formed and vitiated from the outset by a close relation of the fallacy of many
questions. All the above issues, if taken individually, are indeed perfectly sensi-
ble (e.g. the origins of the obligational literature, its vicinity to modern, more
or less overlapping, areas of research in logic or the philosophy of language, the
actual purpose of medieval authors of this kind of treatises, namely what they
might have had in mind or what they might have thought they were doing; or,
again, the possible extension and application of techniques developed in the realm
of obligations to other branches of medieval thought). Yet, out of many legitimate
questions, that at least to some extent might well be investigated independently
of one another, one single Question has been forged which is hardly possible to
find an answer to. This attitude quite easily explains why dissatisfaction has been
for long widespread and new interpretations have often conveyed the impression of
being nothing more than additional hypotheses destined to miss the target: schol-
ars have indeed answered, in some cases with brilliant solutions, over a span of
almost fifty years, to a series of individual problems, but they have never been able
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to work out the Answer as such. The question has earned, in a sense, the status
of a mythologized problem: instead of narrowing the focus on specific issues and
on the clarification of individual aspects – historical or theoretical – there seem
to have been, sometimes, a sort of general worry about the fact that we still do
not know everything (or worse: anything) about obligations. But I think we are
in a better condition than that. In the light of the di!culties in finding an answer
to the Question (which should be reduced, in fact, to a plurality of questions), I
suggest it might be reasonable, in terms of methodology, to forget about it and
look at things the opposite way around, namely by taking the results that we have
for what they can tell us (and I reckon they can tell us much in various respects)
and start therefrom to pursue further research in the field. In this connection, it
is worth recalling that we have now several editions of major texts, we know quite
a lot about the logical structure of disputations, we have learned something about
the application of obligational techniques in the field of theology or medieval ‘sci-
ence’ and to some extent even the vexata quaestio of the historical origin of the
genre (as a distinct issue from that of other aims that might have interevened at
later phases of its historical development) has been the object of interesting in-
sights. Not to speak of the variety of proposals that have been put forward with
the aim of finding a plausible explanation for the purpose(s) of the genre. To cut
a long story short, research has made great progress and all these e"orts should
be considered and evaluated, individually, in terms of their historical accuracy,
faithfulness to the texts, and explanatory value.
Besides, it will be useful to single out specific problems or issues that still
wait for deeper inspection. Just to mention one, an especially important further
line for future research would be the investigation of the long lists of sophismata
that feature in treatises on obligations. We have a relatively high amount of good
analyses of what I would call the conceptual bulk of the theory (namely definitions,
classification of types, general rules, specific rules and so on), but a study of the use
of sophisms in a given treatise, the presence of some of them in a given tradition
or group of authors, has been rarely undertaken in a systematic form.
In addition to that, since the study of medieval logic is intrinsically bipedal, as
long as our knowledge depends not only on the ability to elaborate good interpre-
tations, but also on the general perception of a given tradition, which rests in turn
on the availability of texts, I think there is a strong need to ampliate the domain of
accessible sources. Although several good editions of major treatises are now avail-
able, in order to draw a fuller and richer picture of the context and of the network
of influences, textual research should keep up with conceptual analysis. Yet, as far
as I know, the last treatise belonging to the obligational tradition that has become
available as an independent text provided with some sort of contextualization or
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comment3 is Brinkley’s, which dates back to the mid 1990s.4
With this background in mind, in the present work, I intend to adopt an
empirical approach to the matter and undertake the study of a text which is still
inedited. I will be concerned with the treatise on obligations by Peter of Mantua
(d. 1399) and propose a preliminary analysis of the main issues it raises. Although
the aim is giving a contribution in the direction of both historical and conceptual
understanding, I should say from the very beginning that I shall not come up
with a new general interpretation of obligations. My hope, however, is that the
materials deal with in this dissertation will contribute, in some way, to enrich our
knowledge of the obligational tradition in the late XIV century, in the attempt to
make the general picture, in the long run, as complete and accurate as possible.
Here is the divisio textus, i.e. how I intend to organize the materials of my
research. The work is divided into two parts. The first part is an introduction to
the theme of obligations, while in the second the focus shifts on Peter of Mantua
and his treatise.
In Part I, I will deal with a number of general aspects. Since there are now
several studies that provide good characterizations of the genre, in both historical
and theoretical respect, I will selectively focus only on what I regard as the most
problematic issues. I will first sketch a minimal account of obligations (Part I, sec.
1.1). I will then cursorily outline the evolution of the genre in historical perspective
(Part I sec. 1.2). In the third section I will zoom into the basic logical features
that come into play in such disputational structures (Part I, sec. 1.3) to set the
stage for some developments, that will be the object of a separate analysis (Part
I, sec. 1.4). I will then provide a sketchy example of how the model is supposed to
work (Part I, sec. 1.5) and finally outline a survey of the literature on obligations,
focusing especially on the question of the purpose (Part I, sec. 1.6).
All of that will be made with an eye to the object of the second part of the
thesis. In the latter, which should count, at least in my intentions, as the relevant
one in terms of original research, I will first provide some information about Peter’s
life and works and outline the structure of his treatise on obligations, before coming
to the study of the text, which is accompanied by some notes. These do not have
the form of a systematic commentary insofar as they are intended both as a tool for
the clarification of the most intricate conceptual issues raised in the text and as an
inventory of suggestions for the reconstruction of a network of historical influences.
In this respect, I wish to stress that I have not been primarily concerned with a
systematic identification of Peter’s sources – that would have meant biting o"
3 Save for a chapter on obligations featuring in Spruyt’s edition of the Logica Morelli, a XV
century Spanish logical tract, cf. [Spruyt, 2004] and Perreiah’s edition of Paul of Venice’s Logica
Parva, cf. [Paul of Venice, 2002]. These two texts, however, do not contain articulated analyses
devoted to obligations.
4 Cf. [Spade and Wilson, 1995].
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more than I could chew, on the present occasion. Rather I have tried to point out
several textual connections, relying on the outcome of my independent research
and, much more, on the significant results achieved by others, the most relevant
example for the purposes of this work being Ashworth’s commentary on Paul of
Venice’s obligations contained in the Logica Magna.
The main goal is making a dense and sophisticated text available to the com-
munity of scholars. It is a text that occasionally gives its reader a hard time.
Its analysis does not modify the general framework of the obligational tradition
in the late XIV century; Peter turns out to be pretty much adherent to the re-
sponsio antiqua account and does not put forward breakthrough views. Still, he
is a refined logician capable of remarkable insights. A deeper assessment of Pe-
ter’s contribution to the history of late medieval logic will require the study of
the Logica in its entirety and would really be an advance in our knowledge of the
context of Italian logic before Paul of Venice, also in connection with the reception
of both the continental and the British tradition. In this connection Peter seems
to be a figure of relevant stature. Some partial results have already been achieved
in the last fourty years5 but in order for a reliable picture to emerge from this
archipelago they will have to be put together and evaluated in a more extensive
perspective; with respect to the last point, I want to recall, before concluding these
introductory remarks, the words of Boh, who in a number of contributions over
the past fifteen years, has repeatedly stressed the importance, in Peter of Mantua,
of the theory of obligations as a background for the understanding of other logical
doctrines:
The context in which suppositions, beliefs, and assumptions are most
prominent is that of formal disputation. Understanding of the contents
is not always there “in virtue of one’s own insight”, but it must be
there in virtue of beliefs based on authority and especially in virtue
of stipulations; these last are all-pervasive in obligational disputation
and it appears as if Mantuani wrote his Consequentie, De scire, and
in a sense his whole Logica with obligatio situations in the back of his
mind.6
On the basis of such inspiration, it is now time to get to the heart of the matter.
5 In chronological order, specific contributions related to Peter of Mantua’s Logica are
[Maierù, 1972] on various topics, [Maierù, 1974] on the meaning of propositions, [Bos, 1982]
on appellatio, [Bos, 1985a] on ampliatio and restrictio, [Bos, 1985b] on the truth of propositions
and, finally, [Bertagna, 2000] on the theory of consequences. In [Paul of Venice, 1978] Peter is
identified as one of the sources that Paul of Venice quotes almost verbatim in his treatise on the
meaning of propositions.
6 Cf. [Boh, 1990, p. 83].
PART I
1. Obligations at a glance
1.1. A minimal account of obligations
A problem it is reasonable to start with is the following: what are obligations
about? A precise answer to this apparently simple question would require from
the very beginning a number of distinctions and might turn out to be quite com-
plicated, because there are many alternative accounts available over more than
three-hundred years in the Middle Ages and not all of them reduce to a single
pattern. Nevertheless, there is a safe point of departure which fits the texts on the
topic without implying any preliminary strong theoretical commitment to this or
that interpretation: obligations, in a rough, generic sense, are about disputations.
More precisely, they are about a series of constraints that someone has to stick
to in the context of a disputation. The nature and features of these constraints
will be clarified later on; for the moment we just need to be acquainted with some
structural elements that characterize the notion of a disputation in the technical
sense which is presupposed in the obligational framework. The di"erent accounts
and types of obligations acknowledged by medieval authors, all include a bunch of
invariant core-elements, whose mutual relationships I shall now briefly describe. In
this section, I will procede with a certain degree of extrapolation and abstraction
with respect to actual theories of obligations and try to keep the description as
schematic as possible.
Treatises on obligations, as we know them from the beginning of the XIII
century to the end of the XIV century and beyond, all deal with one and the
same problem: they codify a highly stylized and regimented format of dialectical
disputation. The notion of a dialectical disputation which is at stake in this kind
of literature has a technical meaning. It presupposes (i) a pair of agents who play
two distinct roles, i.e. opposing and responding (whereby the denomination of
opponent and respondent). The acts of opposing and responding are carried out
by (ii) performing certain speech acts relative to (iii) sentences. The opponent picks
out the moves that are available to him from the set {posit,7 propose}, whereas
the respondent picks out his moves from the set {admit, reject, concede, deny,
7 In these terms the formulation might look equivocal: I do not intend the act of positio proper
2
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doubt}. The acts performed on sentences by the respondent might be translated
into tantamount ascriptions of truth values to the sentences in question.
How to reply to a given sentence in a disputation depends on its logical status.
Two mutually related notions are crucial in this respect, namely (iv) relevance and
irrelevance. The identification of sentences as relevant or irrelevant is the basis for
the formulation of (v) rules that govern the speech acts that must be performed
by the respondent.
Relevance in a disputation can be intuitively characterized in terms of the
notion of ‘following from or being inconsistent with something ’. What the ‘some-
thing’ occurring in this description is like depends on the obligational set of rules
that we endorse.8 The idea of ‘following’, by contrast, is problematic since it de-
pends on the underlying intuition of what we take a logical consequence to be. A
precise characterization of the properties of this notion in the framework of me-
dieval logic is far from being uncontroversial.9 Be this as it may, it makes sense at
this preliminary stage to speak of relevance in such general terms: what at some
point is relevant is what follows or what is incompatible with something that is
already part of the disputation. On the other hand, the notion of irrelevance is
generally understood in terms of logical independence and requires the introduc-
tion, in our model, of a last core element, i.e. (vi) a set of background assumptions
that comes into play when the respondent has to reply to irrelevant sentences.
A disputation is a well-formed, ordered sequence of sentences that are sub-
mitted by the opponent and evaluated by the respondent, over a limited span of
time, according to certain rules. The theory deals with the set of rules that are
supposed to govern the respondent’s replies to the sentences put forward by the
opponent. What it specifically provides are norms, prescriptions or instructions10
but rather the assertion of a sentence as a thesis to be upheld in some way that is determined by
the environment in which the two agents are operating (if it is a positio the initial hypothesis is
supposed to be upheld as true, if it is a dubitatio the initial hypothesis is supposed to be upheld
as doubtful and so on).
8 The main distinction is between two approaches that are commonly referred to in the
literature with the labels responsio antiqua and responsio nova: on the former account the
‘something’ roughly coincides with the sequence of previously conceded and denied steps of the
disputation, whereas on the latter account it coincides solely with the initial hypothesis.
9 Basically in virtue of two facts: first, the taxonomy is variable and it does usually allow
for several notions of ‘following from’ even in the work of a single author (all the more so if we
look at the development of the theory of consequences in historical perspective); second, it is
not altogether clear what ‘modern’ notion(s) of logical consequence would be the most suitable
candidate to capture the medieval notion(s) of consequentia. For an overview of the main issues
related to this topic, cf. [Boh, 1982].
10 The nature and extent of this constraints is debated. Generally speaking, they seem to have
a normative character that prevents any form of arbitrary choice. This interpretation seems to be
largely predominant in the tradition. In some cases, however, a weaker interpretation that allows
for some degree of freedom in the criteria of response to a particular class of sentences (irrelevant
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telling the respondent how to answer to sentences that are submitted to his eval-
uation. A variety of types of obligations are accepted by medieval logicians, the
classification usually depending on the kind of thing that is subject to the norms.11
Nevertheless, two agents, a set of speech acts to be performed, in order, on set
of sentences within a disputational context (to be understood as a temporal en-
vironment limited at one extreme by the assertion and acceptance of the initial
sentence and at the other extreme by the utterance of the sentence ‘let the time
come to an end’), the distinction between relevance and irrelevance, as well as a
shared background functional to the evaluation of irrelevant sentences – these are
all structural ingredients that are always presupposed in any kind of disputation
conducted in this framework.
ones) seems to be fitting, too. In this connection cf. in particular [Dutilh Novaes, 2007, p. 157].
The idea of a non-deterministic interpretation of the rule for irrelevant sentences is intriguing,
since it allows for strategic moves on the respondent’s side. In Peter’s treatise, however, it seems
not to apply, since there are several occasions in which he clearly holds that when one grants a
falsum non sequens or denies a verum non repugnans, he responds badly. On the other hand,
there seems to be something like a ranking of the di!erent types of outcomes, in some cases, as
when one grants the sentence ‘you respond badly’, a move which does not make the respondent
lose, but which is probably to be avoided as much as possible. In this respect, the idea of a point
system might turn out to be very fruitful.
11 A popular classification, held for instance by Burley, distinguishes between six species of
obligations, that are grouped in two classes according to whether the respondent is committed
to a disposition or to an act. Obligations relative to dispositions are among the most commonly
discussed. They focus on the type of reply that the respondent is supposed to give to an initial
hypothesis (a sentence): at this level the classification usually further distinguishes between
three types of commitments with respect to the truth value of that sentence, namely to its
truth (positio), to its falsehood (depositio) or to neither (dubitatio). That amounts, in turn, to
the requirement that the respondent concede, deny or doubt, throughout the disputation, the
initial sentence, and reply accordingly to proposed sentences that are logically related to it (for
instance, in the case of depositio the respondent should never concede a sentence if it implies the
depositum). Institutio (also known as impositio) is the obligation relative to a disposition which
requires the acceptance of the stipulation of a new meaning for a word or a sentence. Obligations
relative to the performance of acts are petitio and sit verum. Petitio requires the performance
of a given speech act relative to a sentence in a slightly di!erent way which does not imply a
commitment to its truth value (in other words, the respondent commits himself to the concession
of sentences like ‘I concede p’, ‘I deny p’ or ‘I am in doubt about p’, without thereby conceding,
denying or doubting p itself. Sit verum mainly involves the presence of propositional attitudes.
It should be said that the last two types have received very little attention in contemporary
literature, save for occasional exceptions like [Spade, 1997].
The taxonomy, however, is flexible and there are authors who admit a restricted number of
types of obligations. Peter of Mantua, for instance, accepts only positio and depositio, even if
in fact his classification turns out to be less rigid than it seems. Peter modifies the hierarchy
and retrieve some traditionally independent types as further subdivisions of those he accepts.
As a result, in his treatise, several examples of petitio and, above all, impositio turn out to be
discussed at considerable length, even if they are not recognized as independent species. In this
respect, cf. infra, Part II, sec. 4. and 5.
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Let us now turn to a more detailed account of how these elements contribute
to build up the structure of a disputation. According to a common practice in the
literature,12 I will switch from general considerations to a specific paradigmatic
type of obligation, the so-called positio, in order to characterize and describe the
development of a disputation and the application of rules in its context.
The opponent puts forward a series of sentences one by one. Among these, the
first one has a prominent role since it is the hypothesis that influence most of what
happens next. The first sentence is said to be posited as opposed to the subsequent
ones which are said to be proposed. Before laying down the positum (i.e. outside
the context of the disputation) additional information might be provided through
the statement of a casus. If we assume that our background assumptions about
the actual world have propositional content and thereby regard them collectively
as a set of sentences, then the casus simply modifies the truth value of one or more
elements in that set.
When a sentence has been posited, it is the respondent’s turn to make his move.
With respect to the positum, the respondent picks out his choice from a subset
of the set of speech acts listed above. He can either admit or reject the positum,
according to whether the latter is a possible sentence or not.13 If the respondent
refuses to admit the positum, the disputation stops.14 If the respondent admits
the positum, then the disputation goes along with a back-and-forth structure. At
each subsequent round the opponent proposes a sentence to which the respondent
replies by either conceding, denying or doubting it. The respondent’s replies are
not arbitrary, because they are always determined by the rules, in function of their
logical status. The disputation thus takes the shape of a sequence of rounds each
of which presupposes an act on the opponent’s side, a sentence, and an act on the
12 This is often done not only for the sake of clarity and simplification: it might be not entirely
inappropriate to claim that, in a sense, medievals themselves tend to regard positio, if not as the
format all kinds of obligations actually reduce to, at least as a strong paradigm to which they
structurally conform.
13 Again, a caveat is in order: in the standard case of the so-called positio falsa (or falsi),
the criterion is the consistency/possibility of the positum, but in another type of obligation,
known as positio impossibilis, impossible posita can be admitted too, provided that they are not
formal contradictions. In this connection, an interesting use of the distinction between ‘possible’
and ‘possibly-true’ is found in Peter’s treatise, cf. infra, Part II, sec. 3.40, to the e!ect that
a possible positum, even if it can never be true, should be admitted by the respondent. As for
positio impossibilis, there seems to be good evidence that Peter utterly rejects it, cf. infra, Part
II, sec. 2.7.
14 It is not fully clear whether the disputation stops or does not even take place. At least in
Peter of Mantua’s treatise, the rejection of a given positum is not a matter of arbitrary choice but
depends on the fact that it has been identified as a contradictory or as an impossible sentence.
For this reason, I am more inclined to think that the rejection is indeed part of the disputation,
and of one that the respondent wins because he exactly performs the act that he is required to
perform according to the rule for admission, cf. infra, Part II, sec. 2.1.
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respondent’s side.
The outcome of a disputation, in terms of sentences, can be metaphorically
regarded as a list or as a box. After each round, the sentence that has just been
evaluated is recorded on a list or ‘put in a box’ with a label which tells us how the
respondent has replied to it. At the end of the disputation the list (or the box)
will contain the ordered sequence of all sentences put forward by the opponent and
evaluated by the respondent.
So far we have still made no assumption as to what criteria the respondent must
follow in providing his replies/evaluations to the proposed sentences. Two are the
leading principles, and this is where the notions of relevance and irrelevance come
into play. First, the respondent is required to concede any sentence that follows and
deny any sentence that is repugnant. Second, he is required to reply to irrelevant
sentences according to their own status (as determined by the aforementioned set of
background assumptions). Now, one might reasonably ask at this point: anything
that follows from or is repugnant to what? The obligational tradition of positio
is basically divided into two camps over the correct answer that should be given
to this question. In a nutshell, we may say that according to the most common
account, often labelled by modern interpreters responsio antiqua,15 the notion of
relevance should be understood with respect to the whole set of sentences that have
been evaluated at the previous steps. According to the so-called responsio nova,
on the other hand, relevance is defined only with respect to the positum. Thus,
as regards the normative criteria of construction of the set of sentences that make
up a disputation, the di"erence lies almost entirely in the extension of the classes
of relevant and irrelevant sentences, respectively. In the first case, the two notions
can (and usually do) evolve during a disputation and they can be be said to have
a dynamic character. In the second case, the two notions are static and identify
two classes of sentences that remain the same throughout the disputation.16 The
first view is largely predominant (it is indeed the only one available before the
second quarter of the XIV century and even thereafter it turns out to be held by
a majority of authors), and is often associated with the presentation that Walter
Burley gave of it, whereas the second view is the outcome of a revision of the rules
introduced around 1335 by Roger Swyneshed.
When the disputation has come to an end, what we are left with is the list
recording the ordered sequence of evaluated sentences (or the box cointaining all
labelled sentences).17 At this stage, the two participants are supposed to assess
15 After a famous distinction found in [Robert Fland, 1980, pp. 45–46].
16 The distinction is discussed in [Dutilh Novaes, 2007, pp. 164–167]. Of course there are
some complications that would involve additional considerations (for instance about the role of
time, or the presence of multiple posita), but for a very simplified reconstruction the fundamental
di!erence is the one I have mentioned.
17 A disputation can end in several ways. The most tragic circumstance one can envisage is
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these materials and establish who wins and who loses.18 The phase of assessment
is driven by the following idea: the opponent wins, if in the list or in the box
there is stu" that, according to the rules, should not be there. If, by contrast, we
go through the sequence by a fine-tooth comb, and do not come accross anything
undesired with regard to the chosen logical criteria (the test depending upon the
theory we endorse), then it is the respondent who wins.19
probably the death of one of the two parties. The warning is in Paul of Venice “si opponens vel
respondens infra disputationem desineret esse, et obligatio desineret esse” [Paul of Venice, 1988,
p. 22]. Literally, Paul refers to the end of the obligatio as to the end of the logical constraint,
but I think the remark can be obviously understood as referring to disputations as well.
In this connection [Dutilh Novaes, 2007, p.159] argues that to guarantee the practical feasibility
of a disputation we need to presuppose a time stipulation. Although the suggestion appears to
be very well grounded, there seems to be no explicit trace of this kind of background assumption
or agreement between the two disputants, at least in Peter’s case. My impression is that the
disputations that are actually represented in his treatise simply go on until the opponent decides
to call the whole thing o!, usually because he thinks he has already made the respondent grant
an inconsistency.
18 The idea is intriguing: obligations might be seen as two-person zero-sum games. There are
always a winner and a loser, and there are exactly one winner and one loser (who cannot be the
same individual).
19 In both cases the test is intended to detect whether the respondent has granted some kind
of inconsistency: with respect to what the inconsistency is evaluated, depends on the account
we decide to follow. The inconsistency can be with one or more members of the whole set of
sentences that have been granted, denied or doubted up to the final step, by the rules of responsio
antiqua; or just with a more restricted class of sentences, i.e. the positum or posita and their
logical consequences, regardless of whatever else has been put forward during the disputation,
by the rules of responsio nova.
Finally, an additional aspect is worth noting. With respect to the notion of inconsistency,
there seems to be a distinction between circumstances in which the respondent implicitly falls
in contradiction and circumstances in which he is forced to grant a contradiction, cf. especially
[Dutilh Novaes, 2007, p. 169]. The issue is extremely interesting and I suggest it lends itself
quite well to be read in terms of a game metaphor (cf. also infra, sec. 1.6 for discussion and
references). Take for example the game of chess and two players that know the rules but are not
quite expert.
White to mate in three moves
There is a sense in which White has already won, in this position, but it might be not entirely
clear to him how to mate in three. Conversely, Black has already lost the game, in principle,
because it is entirely up to White to make the right moves (guess for the interested reader) and
win. The above position stands to Black in the same way as a set of bad replies stands to the
1. OBLIGATIONS AT A GLANCE 8
Before taking up a more detailed analysis of the features of the rules of responsio
antiqua, I will just briefly sketch an outline of the development of the obligational
literature to set up the background.
1.2. Historical perspective
In the reconstruction of the historical development of the theory of obligations20
there are two categories of things that should be considered: a number of serious
questions that are still open and a nucleus of facts of which we can claim to have
some solid knowledge.21 The history of obligations can be roughly divided into
three periods:
1. an early phase (encompassing the developments in the XIII century)22
respondent. The opponent might be asked to force the latter to grant an explicit contradiction,
exactly in the same way as White is supposed to bring the game to an end by making the
appropriate moves. For both pairs of players – opponent and respondent, White and Black – the
accomplishment of these tasks requires a good deal of expertise, in logic just as in chess.
20 In the present section I am not aiming at a full reconstruction of the history of obligations.
I simply wish to provide some coordinates that may come in useful to locate problems in their
historical perspective and to highlight some controversial issues that still wait for an answer.
General accounts of the history of the genre are [Stump, 1982a] and [Spade, 1982a] which cover
the essential developments in the XIII and XIV centuries. It must be noted, however, that
both papers are slightly outdated, since several editions of major treatises have come out in the
subsequent years and many exegetical e!orts have contributed to clarify the theoretical content
even of the texts that are taken into account by Stump and Spade in those articles. A good
way to update these contributions is looking at more recent specific studies of various sorts. An
excellent general guide is [Yrjönsuuri, 1994, especially pp. 18–35]. Other specific studies will be
mentioned in the following pages.
21 In the first category, we may include, for instance, the problem of the historical origin of
the genre or the explanation of the disappearance of positio impossibilis from the scene in the
XIV century. As far as the second category is concerned, on the other hand, several elements
are now available for a general reconstruction of the history of false positio, especially in the
XIV century, some major authors have been thoroughly studied, and there is also a variety of
interesting results on the evolution of the late literature.
22 In fact, the history “may be traced as far back as the late twelfth century” [Ashworth, 1988a,
p. x] for “even in the twelfth century, there is some use of terminology associated with obligations
in discussion of disputation, and in some treatises from this period either disputation or obliga-
tions themselves are connected with fallacies or sophismata” [Stump, 1982a, p. 315]. The relevant
literature relative to this period includes a number of pioneering contributions by De Rijk with
the edition of four short anonymous treatises: the Obligationes Parisienses, cf. [De Rijk, 1975b];
the Tractatus Emmeranus de falsi positione and the Tractatus Emmeranus de impossibili posi-
tione, cf. [De Rijk, 1974]; and finally, the Tractatus Sorbonensis de petitionibus contrariorum, cf.
[De Rijk, 1976]. Again, De Rijk has contributed to cast some light on theoretically contiguous
areas, involving the study of techniques of opposing and responding, in his edition of the treatises
De modo opponendi et respondendi, cf. [De Rijk, 1980]. More recently, strong evidence has been
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2. a phase of consolidation of the standard account and of significant revisions
in the first half of the XIV century (prominent figures in this period being
Walter Burley, Richard Kilvington and Roger Swyneshed)23
3. a late phase from the second half of the XIV century on (the tradition will
survive for a long time as is attested by the presence of treatises on obligations
in logic textbooks well into the beginning of the XVI century).24
The central phase is the one that has been studied in greatest detail. Despite
some di!culties that remain, such as the clarification of the reasons behind the
emergence of alternative account(s) in the first half of the XIV century,25 we now
have various characterizations of the theoretical bulk of Burley’s and Swyneshed’s
theories that provide satisfactory explanations of their fundamental logical fea-
tures.26
produced in support of the claim that the theory already had an articulated level of elaboration
in the first half of the XIII century, cf. [Braakhuis, 1998].
23 Burley’s text has been edited in [Green, 1963] and has played for a long time an influential
role also in the historiography on obligations, since it “presents the theory in a fully developed
form, and [...] sets the stage for later developments” [Ashworth, 1988a, p. x]. Besides the fun-
damental presentation found in [Green, 1963, pp. 91–119], early accounts of Burley’s obligations
are [Spade, 1982b, pp. 4–9 and 14–19], and [Stump, 1985]. For a more recent and systematic
discussion of the logical aspects, cf. [Yrjönsuuri, 2001a, pp. 12–16] and [Dutilh Novaes, 2005].
Kilvington’s views on obligations have been the object of some speculation since they do
not amount to not a full-blown theory but rather are confined to a number of remarks in his
Sophismata, cf. [Kretzmann and Kretzmann, 1990, pp. 126–137]. Nevertheless, on the basis
of various attempts to reconstruct his theory, a wide consensus has arisen about the fact that
it can be safely regarded as a kind of revision of the standard rules of positio, possibly the
only one that might be really related to some form of counterfactual reasoning. The most
systematic intepretation of Kilvington’s hints remains [Spade, 1982b, pp. 19–28], but cf. also
[Yrjönsuuri, 2001a, pp. 16–20] and [D’Ors, 1991a].
Swyneshed is the author of an important treatise on obligations, written between 1330 and
1335, that proposes a strong revision of the standard rules, cf. the edition in [Spade, 1977].
The impact of his reform is remarkable not much in terms of the number of people who actually
became convert to the cause but rather for the discussion it prompted in the subsequent tradition,
especially in the second half of the XIV century, even among supporters of the old account. Its
relevance (and, to some extent, even the brute fact that what goes on in Swyneshed’s treatise
should actually count as a revision) has been put into question on a number of occasions by
D’Ors, but the matter has been settled on the basis of decisive evidence in [Ashworth, 1996]
which also contains the most detailed account of the influence of Swyneshed’s views on the
subsequent generation of logicians. His views are also specifically discussed in [Spade, 1982b, pp.
28–31], [Stump, 1981], [Yrjönsuuri, 2001a, pp. 20–24] and [Dutilh Novaes, 2006b].
24 The persistence in the XV and XVI centuries is documented in [Ashworth, 1982, pp. 793–
794], [Ashworth, 1988b, pp. 146–153], and especially [Ashworth, 1999] .
25 This di"culty is closely related to the obnoxious question of the aims of the genre.
26 By contrast, much is still to be done to reach a systematic account of the history and
the logical complications involved in the plethora of sophisms that are found even in these two
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Both the early and the late phase are still waiting for a systematic charac-
terization. The former, in particular, raises a number of problems. On the one
hand, we have a relatively small amount of sources and, for a long time, there has
been some controversy over the datation of the earlier texts. This issue has to do
not only with the need to draw an accurate historical picture, but also with that
of establishing a reliable terminus post quem for the existence of the doctrine in
an elaborate form. The consensus used to converge on the beginning of the XIV
century (Burley’s treatise is dated 1302), but there are good arguments to claim
that the threshold should be pushed back to the first half of the XIII century.27
The major problem concerning the beginnings of this literature, however, is
that at first sight it seems to have come out of nothing. There have been various
attempts to identify prefigurations and early uses of the obligational vocabulary;28
important texts, not to speak of those featuring in the works on obligations of other less studied
authors.
27 Cf. the discussion in [Braakhuis, 1998]. The anonymous treatises edited by De Rijk show
that, already in the first half of the XIII century, a rather mature form of these texts was
available, but it is still far from the level of elaboration found Burley. After Braakhuis’ edition of
the putative Nicholas of Paris’ treatise, the debated question on the form of obligational treatises
in the XIII century seems to have reached a decisive turn. Before this edition, much depended on
the position one would take with respect to the authorship of the treatise edited in [Green, 1963]
and ascribed to William of Sherwood (for an analysis of its contents, cf. [Green, 1963, pp. 51–90]
and [Stump, 1980]). This work shows a strong similarity to Burley’s treatise and has indeed been
regarded as a preliminary version by Burley himself rather than as an indipendent treatise by
Sherwood, cf. [Spade and Stump, 1983]. As a result of the ascription of that treatise to Burley,
the only obligational texts dating to the XIII century would be those edited by De Rijk, which
actually present less articulated doctrines. Yet, if Braakhuis is correct in dating the treatise
attributed to Nicholas of Paris, then no matter what decision we take about the Sherwood-
Burley dilemma, we would turn out to have at least one articulated and structured treatise (in
many respects not inferior to the one by Burley) as an independent witness of the obligational
literature already in the first half of the XIII century (cf. [Braakhuis, 1998, pp. 166-167] “it
is clear that our treatise provides substantial proof that the state of the art of the theory of
obligations was already fully developed in the first half of the thirteenth century in Paris”). And
that changes the picture in no small measure, because the following legitimate question becomes
urgent: how come this literature is already so full-fledged at such an early stage of its history?
28 It has been claimed that there is a strong link between the early development of obligations
and the treatment of self-referential paradoxes such as the Liar. For instance cf. [Martin, 1993, p.
373] “I would thus suggest not only that twelfth century logicians first became aware of insolubles
via obligations but also that they developed their first solution in terms of them.” Martin devotes
his analyses in particular to such early treatises as the Tractatus Emmeranus de falsi positione,
the Tractatus Emmeranus de impossibili positione, and the Obligationes Parisienses. In the
discussions on positio that are found in those texts, Martin recognizes a connection to what he
calls ‘Eudemian hypotheses and procedures’, a method of reasoning described by Boethius in the
De hypotheticis syllogismis, cf. [A. M. S. Boethius, 1969, I, ii, 5-6] “hypothesis namque, unde
hypothetici syllogismi accepere vocabulum, duobus, ut Eudemo placet, dicetur modis: aut enim
tale adquiescetur per quamdam inter se consentientum conditione!m" quae fieri nullo modo possit,
ut ad suum terminum ratio preducatur; aut in conditione posita consequentia vi coniunctionis
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it has often been insisted upon a connection with the dialectical framework outlined
especially in the eighth book of the Topics (the tradition of medieval commentaries
on the latter has been explored too, with the aim of finding additional evidence
to corroborate the idea of such a remote dependence).29 Finally, if one looks at
texts like the Excerpta Norimbergensia30 or the Ars Emmerana,31 a link can be
found also with the study of fallacies. But let us briefly consider the connection
with Aristotle. In the secondary literature on obligations a handful of textual
references to his works are often regarded, if not as direct sources, at least as a
general background for understanding the origin of the genre. A relevant text,
found in the eighth book of the Topics, insists on the conflicting tasks of the
disputants and on the distinction between two di"erent mistakes, which are not
logically on a par, namely that of assuming a wrong thesis and that of being unable
to defend it properly (the former being not just as bad as the latter).32 Besides, two
additional aristotelian remarks would count, as it were, as a theoretical foundation
for the theory, namely a passage featuring in the first book of the Prior Analytics
and one in the ninth book Metaphysics.33 Now, how to regard these elements
vel disiunctionis ostenditur”. Besides, the application of this procedure is also witnessed in
Boethius’ Quomodo substantiae, in Garlandus Compotista’s Dialectica, in Abelard’s Dialectica
(cf. [Peter Abelard, 1970, p. 471] “Per consensum et concessionem hypothesis propositio illa
dicitur quae non in se vera recipitur, sed gratia argumentandi conceditur, ut quid ex ea possit
extrahi videatur”), and in XII century texts by Gilbert of Poitiers, Clarembald of Arras and
Thierry of Chartres who explicitly employs the expression ‘positio impossibilis per consensum’.
For more detailed references cf. [Martin, 1993, p. 360 f. 11].
To what extent these materials can contribute to a reliable reconstruction of the origins of the
obligational literature is still di"cult to say, but they certainly enrich our knowledge of how this
vocabulary was used in a much earlier phase of medieval logic than the one in which obligations
actually flourished and took the shape that has come down to us.
29 Cf. in particular [Yrjönsuuri, 1993a].
30 Cf. [De Rijk, 1967, p. 131] “Disputationis sunt duae partes: alia scientia arguendi, alia
scientia redarguendi, idest opponendi et respondendi”. In this respect, it is notheworthy that
a much later treatise such as Strode’s sets out by saying what it means for a respondent to be
redargutum, cf. [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 78ra], i.e. reproached for being forced to change his
response to a sentence, in virtue of the inability to conduct an argument in the appropriate way.
Moreover, as [Ashworth, 1988a, pp. 34–35 f. 6] has pointed out, the word redargutio is used to
translate ‘refutation’ in the Latin versions of Aristotle’s De Sophisticis Elenchis.
31 Cf. especially [De Rijk, 1967, p. 148].
32 Cf. Top. VIII, 4, 159a 17–24 “The business of the questioner is so to develop the argument
as to make the answerer utter the most implausible of the necessary consequences of his thesis;
while that of the answerer is to make it appear that it is not he who is responsible for the
impossibility or paradox, but only his thesis; for one may, no doubt, distinguish between the
mistake of taking up a wrong thesis to start with, and that of not maintaining it properly, when
once taken up” (translation from [Aristotle, 1984, vol. 1, p. 268]).
33 Cf. An. Pr. I, 13, 32a 18–20 “I use the terms ‘to be possible’ and ‘the possible’ of that which
is not necessary but, being assumed, results in nothing impossible” (transl. from [Aristotle, 1984,
vol. 1, p. 51]), and Met. IX, 4, 1047b 10–12 “if we actually suppose that which is not, but is
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is quite problematic. On the one hand, there is certainly a relation of some sort,
especially with the disputational setting of the Topics and the Elenchi. But on the
other hand, references in medieval obligations treatises to this kind of background
are extremely rare and, for the most part, chronologically late, to the e"ect that
the connection appears loose and looks more like a retroactive justification of the
purpose of obligations rather than an explanation of their origin.34
Although this problem should be kept distinct from the question of the aim
(or of the di"erent aims) that might have arisen or intervened later on in the
historical development of the theory, one thing is worth noting. These aristotelian
references point in two quite di"erent directions, even if both can be called into
play with equal legitimacy to suggest what obligations could serve for. Assuming
the text from the Topics as a background, means being more oriented to regard
obligations as a test of sound reasoning in a disputational context. The passages
from the Prior Analytics and the Metaphysics, on the other hand, lend themselves
to an interpretation that identifies the purpose of obligations in the examination of
what follows from a given hypothesis. This fact, in itself, would not be particularly
interesting, but I have the impression that the few remarks found in obligational
treatises about the purpose of the art, are often oriented exactly in one of these
two directions. And this is probably why the aristotelian background has attracted
so much attention: it has o"ered a choice for modern interpreters to pick out a
capable of being, to be or to have come to be, there will be nothing impossible in this” (transl.
from [Aristotle, 1984, vol. 2, p. 1654]).
34 Cf. in this respect [Ashworth, 1988a, p. 33 f. 3] “commentators on Aristotle did not refer
to the subject of obligationes, with the single exception of Boethius of Dacia in his commentary
on Topics 8 [...] Nor did writers on Obligationes make reference to the relevant Aristotle texts”.
Ashworth’s contention remains substantially true, even if an early text, that has been published
in the meanwhile, may count as an exception, since in fact it contains an explicit reference to the
eighth book of the Topics (including the passage quoted above), cf. [Nicholas of Paris (?), 1998,
p. 171]. Among some late exceptions, we find a reference for instance in the Copulata super omnes
tractatus parvorum logicalium Petri hispani ac super tres tractatus modernorum. ...([Cologne],
1493) fol. lxxxiv (the quotation is taken from [Ashworth, 1986, p.25 f. 56]): “... principium
ex quo iste tractatus obligatoriorum elicitur, sumitur ex nono Metaphysicae et primo Priorum,
ut dicit Aristoteles quod possibili posito inesse, nullum sequitur impossibile. Et ideo tota sci-
entia ista in illo principio fundatur quia scientia obligatoriorum in hoc consistit quod aliquis
concedat multa possibilia secundum conditionem obligationis, et illa sic defendat ne cogatur ex
illis concedere aliquod impossibile, licet aliquando et saepe cogatur concedere aliquod falsum”.
In the same place, Ashworth points out that an early reference (to the Analytics) is found in
[John of Holland, 1985, p. 94]. Spade has rightly suggested that the connection may be dubious
since the early development of the obligational literature is prior to the ready availability of
the Latin translation of the Metaphysics and no mention of these passages is found in the most
ancient treatises. Be this as it may, the presence of such remarks in later treatises is interesting
in its own right because it tells us something about the reception of the tradition of obligations
and possibly reveals that the need of finding a philosophical motivation for their purpose was
felt already then as a relevant issue.
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preferred reading.35 There might be a problem, however. Among those explicit
references to the purpose of obligations, there seems to be an asymmetry:36 for
the most part, they insist on the first of the two alternatives presented above, i.e.
the idea that obligations are devised to test or to teach logical skills. That would
correspond to the background of the first aristotelian reference from the Topics
rather than to the more philosophically-oriented suggestion derived from the Prior
Analytics (or from the Metaphysics). Why then explicit references are so rare?
For instance in Peter of Mantua’s treatise there are only two textual passages
that might be regarded as ‘mission statements’.37 Both suggest, that he is more
inclined to conceive of obligations in terms of the first interpretation rather that
in terms of the second. In other words, the underlying idea is that obligations
might be viewed as an environment designed to assess the respondent’s ability to
maintain consistency (or as an art devised to teach such an ability), rather than
as a method employed to see what follows from an initial assumption. And in his
case just as in that of several other authors, this standpoint is assumed without
feeling the need to call into play an aristotelian justification that might have been
after all quite easy to produce.
The variety of hints that have been proposed to account for the emergence of
the theory undoubtedly seems to have a high degree of interest and some plausi-
bility, but on the whole, I think a genuinely convincing solution to the problem of
the origins has not been sorted out yet, because all these results are the outcome
specific researches that still need to be put together and assessed in a more gen-
eral perspective.38 All in all what Spade wittily remarked a few years ago about
35 Evidence of this influence is reflected especially in Spade’s counterfactual interpreta-
tion and in Yrjönsuuri’s account in terms of thought experiments who both base many
of their considerations on some scattered remarks in the early treatises to stress the idea
that obligations are set up to see what follows from a given assumption, cf. for instance
[Tractatus Emmeranus de falsi positione, 1974, p. 103, ll. 16-23] “Et notandum quod hec obli-
gatio non dicitur falsi positio propter hoc quod tantummodo falsa ponantur, sed quia sepius
ponantur quam vera. Cum enim omnis positio fiat propter concessionem et vera propter sui ver-
itatem habea!n"t concedi non indigent positione. Sed cum falsa non in se causam concessionis
!habeant", indigent positione ut concedantur et videatur quid inde accidat”.
36 A very interesting example of interplay between the two levels is found in
[John Tarteys, 1992, p. 671] “sciendum quod finis principalis huius artis est scire connexionem
veritatum, scilicet quid sequitur posito tali casu aut tali, et quid eidem repugnat et quid est ei-
dem impertinens. Taliter enim homines communiter consiliantur. Finis secundarius est dirigere
sermonem respondentis ne in eodem tamquam falsidicus capiatur”.
37 Cf. infra, Part II, sec. 4.1, “[...] sepe vult opponens obligare ad falsum sustinendum
respondentem, ut videat qualiter sciat se a contradictione defendere” and, Part II, sec. 5.10, “iste
conclusiones in hac arte non sunt sustinende, quia tota intentio est convenientem responsionem
instruere respondentem”.
38 Take for instance the promising line of research that points to the tradition of the commen-
taries on the Topics. This is a place it seems very natural to look for attestations of the vocabu-
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our inability to find a good explanation or compelling evidence for a satisfactory
reconstruction of the roots of this genre remains still true.39
As far as the late phase of the history of obligations is concerned, the terms of
the problem seem to be inverted. The situation becomes more complicated both
in quantitative terms (number of treatises and at least in some cases, like that of
Paul of Venice, their remarkable length) and in qualitative terms (interaction and
contamination between di"erent logical doctrines, complexity of the collections of
sophisms), but the stage for further research has been set by some fundamental
contributions.40 There is no space here to discuss the complexity of these devel-
lary, techniques or at least for embryonic progenitors of the obligational literature. Yrjönsuuri in
a number of contributions, cf. especially [Yrjönsuuri, 1994] and [Yrjönsuuri, 1996], has provided
quite interesting analyses of two texts that mention obligations, namely Boethius of Dacia’s and
Albert the Great’s commentaries. The problem is that both of these texts are posterior to the
early development of the theory. Therefore, they presumably cannot tell us much about its
origin, but rather about its reception in a closely related context.
Further research in this field might reveal earlier attestations, although Green Pedersen’s work
on this tradition seems not to be very encouraging as regards the possibility of finding substantial
evidence to supplement Yrjönsuuri’s reconstruction, cf. [Green-Pedersen, 1984, p. 342] “ the
doctrine of obligations (de obligationibus) must almost inevitably owe something to Aristotle’s
Topics, book VIII. As yet, however, we cannot say how much, and at any rate the development of
the doctrine of obligations has left very few traces in the commentaries on Aristotle’s book, with
the anonymous commentary Aristoteles distinguens as the only exception”. The text Green-
Pedersen refers to is MS Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 344/540, fols. 216ra–219rb
“the entire text deals with the obligationes, a subject about which almost nothing is otherwise
found in the commentaries on the topics. If the headline had not been there we should not
have considered the text to be a commentary on the Topics at all. Anyway it is at best only
a fragmentary text connected with book VIII”. This work is also recorded by Ashworth in her
comprehensive catalogue, cf. [Ashworth, 1994, p. 119].
39 Cf. [Spade, 2000, pp. 13-14] “This is something I find extremely mysterious. Other branches
of mediaeval philosophy still have their murky areas and unanswered questions – yes. That goes
without saying, there as in any other branch of scholarship. But it is only here, in this one area
of mediaeval philosophy, in late mediaeval logic and semantic theory, that I repeatedly find this
fundamental murkiness about even the most basic starting points. This isn’t the case with all
the topics that come up in late mediaeval logic and semantics, to be sure. But it’s true of an
astonishing number of them. In case after case, these theories [obligations are one of the examples
discussed in detail by Spade] seem to have sprung full-grown from the head of Zeus – without
explanation, without motivation, without preparation, without anything to help us figure out
what was really going on. The earliest texts we possess already presuppose a well-understood
agenda that we are simply not privy to”.
40 I will just recall some cornerstones in this field. For the most general aspects, cf.
[Ashworth, 1981] which provides a first characterization of the state of the art in the late XIV
century. [Ashworth, 1985] outlines the British tradition after Swyneshed and some of the results
are extended in an even more comprehensive picture in [Ashworth, 1996] which takes into account
a whole lot of texts that in di!erent ways have to do with the responsio nova. [Ashworth, 1994]
remains the essential catalogue for orientation: a quick glance at it is su"cient to realize how
much work is still to be done, especially in terms of textual research. Finally, for a reconstruction
1. OBLIGATIONS AT A GLANCE 15
opments, which would lead us far beyond the purpose of this work. But at least
two things must be recalled. First and foremost, a distinctive feature of treatises
classified in this category is the standard presence of traces of Swyneshed’s revi-
sion of the rules of positio (either to endorse or to reject it). Second, there are
two main clusters of authors, grouped on the basis of geographical provenance. In
connection to the English scene the following relevant sources should be recalled:41
Martinus Anglicus,42 Robert Fland,43 Richard Lavenham,44 Richard Billingham,45
the Logica Oxoniensis,46 (printed version in the Libellus Sophistarum ad Usum Ox-
oniensium47), the Logica Cantabrigiensis,48 (printed in the Libellus Sophistarum
ad Usum Cantabrigiensium49), John Tarteys,50 John Wyclif,51 Richard Brinkley,52
and John of Holland.53 Finally, a text that proves to be of greatest interest for the
purpose of the present work is Strode’s treatise.54
of the developments of the obligational literature in the XV century and beyond, the point of
departure are the three references quoted above, namely [Ashworth, 1982], [Ashworth, 1988b],
and [Ashworth, 1999] (the latter is more specifically oriented to obligations texts from 1400 to
1530 in the English context).
41 I follow here the synthetic account given by [Ashworth, 1988a, pp. x-xii].
42 Cf. [Schupp, 1993]. This treatise is very similar to Fland’s text, to the e!ect that “it is
impossible to say who influenced whom” [Ashworth, 1988a, p. xi]. Martinus is sympathetic with
Swyneshed’s views.
43 Fland’s treatise is edited in [Spade, 1980]. To this author we owe the most renowned, albeit
by no means unique, distinction between di!erent accounts of positio.
44 Cf. [Spade, 1978]. Lavenham’s short treatise summarizes and accepts Swyneshed’s views.
45 Billingham, who was closely related to Merton College, Oxford, in the 1340s, turned out to
have considerable influence especially on the English tradition since his “lengthy section on positio
was reproduced almost without change in a series of obligations texts which belong to the Logica
Oxoniensis” [Ashworth, 1988a, p. xi]. A printed version of the latter features in the Libellus
Sophistarum ad Usum Oxoniensium. Billingham’s set of definitions and rules are also employed
in [John Wyclif, 1893] and feature in the section on obligations of the Logica Cantabrigiensis
(printed version in the Cambridge counterpart of the Oxford text-book, namely the Libellus
Sophistarum ad Usum Cantabrigiensium, cf. [Ashworth, 1988a, p. xi]. A general reconstruction
of the history of these manuals is found in [Ashworth, 1979], whereas in [Ashworth, 1999] sharper
focus is on obligations.
46 Cf. [De Rijk, 1977].
47 Cf. [Anonymous, 1524].
48 Cf. [De Rijk, 1975a].
49 Cf. [Anonymous, 1510].
50 Cf. [Ashworth, 1992].
51 Cf. [John Wyclif, 1893].
52 Cf. [Spade and Wilson, 1995].
53 Cf. [John of Holland, 1985].
54 Cf. [Ralph Strode, 1517]. Two essential interpretations of this text are [Ashworth, 1993]
and [Dutilh Novaes, 2006a]. I will come the influence of Strode on Peter of Mantua, in due
course, namely in the commentary on Peter’s treatise. Let it be said here that besides the
textual evidence that will be produced below, there are probably also suggestive (and grounded)
arguments to contend that copies of Strode’s text were available in the early 1390s within the
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As far as the Parisian tradition is concerned, the most outstanding figures are
Albert of Saxony,55 William Buser,56 and Marsilius of Inghen.57 Besides these
central figures, interesting developments are found on the continent much later in
the work of Josse Clitchove.58
Both traditions turn out to be quite relevant for the Italian context of the
late XIV century. Here we find at least four authors: Peter of Candia, Peter of
Mantua, Paul of Venice59 and Paul of Pergula.60 As regards Peter of Mantua,
the presence of a link with Albert of Saxony’s and Marsilius of Inghen’s logical
doctrines had been already noticed by Prantl and has been confirmed by more
recent studies devoted to specific chapters of the Logica.61 The relationship is
attested in the treatise on obligations, too. In addition to that, several elements
in his text suggest a direct acquaintance with Strode’s work.62
To conclude the remarks of this section, one final comment is in order. This
sketchy presentation of some basic issues related to the history of obligations has
been outlined from a very general perspective. However, this was by no means
unavoidable. On the contrary, I think it should be stressed that, given the present
Paduan circle of students Peter used to belong to before moving to Bologna, at latest in 1392.
55 Albert’s obligations are still inedited. There are basically two versions of it, one in the
Perutilis Logica and the other in the Sophismata (I have used the latter for some textual parallel
with Peter’s obligations). To the best of my knowledge, the only study explicitly devoted to this
work is [Braakhuis, 1993].
56 The two basic sources of information on Buser are [Federici Vescovini, 1981] and
[Kneepkens, 1982]. An edition of Buser’s treatise on obligations is found in [Pozzi, 1990]. In the
light of the attribution of the treatise in Ms. Paris, B. N. lat., 11.412 to Nicholas of Paris it has
been argued in favour of the existence of an independent Parisian tradition, cf. [Braakhuis, 1998,
p. 167, f. 83] “In view [...] of the internal similarity with the Obligationes Parisienses on the
one hand and some aspects of the Obligationes by William Buser on the other [...] our treatise
[i.e. the treatise attributed to Nicholas of Paris, datable to the first half of the XIII century]
may be considered as evidence for an autonomous continuous tradition in logical theory in the
thirteenth and early fourteenth century at Paris” (cf. also, in this respect, [Braakhuis, 1993, pp.
325-6]).
57 Marsilius’s work is strongly influenced by Buser. The treatise is still inedited and there
is no specific study on it. The state of research on the Parisian line appears relatively poor
in comparison with the English tradition, that has been investigated more extensively. As a
compensation, an essential point of departure are the numerous remarks, referring to the Parisian
triad, that can systematically be found in Ashworth’s notes to Paul of Venice’s treatise, cf.
[Ashworth, 1988a, passim].
58 A suggestive study of this figure is [Ashworth, 1986].
59 Cf. the edition in [Ashworth, 1988a].
60 Paul of Pergula was a pupil of Paul of Venice, cf. the edition of his treatise in
[Paul of Pergula, 1961].
61 Cf. [Prantl, 1870, pp. 176–180], [Bos, 1985a], [Bos, 1982], and [Bos, 1985b].
62 Cf. also [Ashworth, 1988a, p. xii and passim in the notes to the text]. The double connec-
tion, with Strode and some Parisian authors, is apparent not only in the work on obligations but
also, for instance, in the treatise on consequences, cf. [Bertagna, 2000].
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state of research, ‘local’ accounts of the history of specific problems, or of the
internal development of less studied subtypes of obligations (like impositio or du-
bitatio), or again of the geography of reception of a given doctrine, might turn
out to be extremely relevant for an accurate reconstruction of the tradition as a
whole.63
1.3. The logical structure of a disputation
After the preliminary account introduced in sec. 1.1, we can now turn to the logical
structure of a disputation as it is conceived of in the obligational framework. We
will see more in detail how rules are supposed to govern the construction of the
set of sentences of which a disputation is constituted. As has been said above,
what we obtain at each step (and cumulatively at the end) of a disputation is an
ordered sequence of sentences. The rules of both the responsio antiqua and the
responsio nova specify what should or should not be in that sequence. In this
section, I will outline the rules relative to the former account – which is the one
endorsed by Peter – according to the formal presentation proposed in recent years
by Dutilh Novaes, which represents a very straightforward way to characterize its
logical features.64 In the next section, I will propose an equivalent version which
presents some notational di"erences and a provisional conservative extension, in
order to account for an aspect of Peter’s theory that would otherwise be left out
of the picture.65 The characterization of the responsio nova results very naturally
from a simplification of the rules of the standard account, but I will just allude to
its basic features in the notes to Peter’s treatise.66
A disputation can be regarded as a quadruple:67
Ob = < Kc, #, $, R (!n) >
63 Parts of such local histories have begun to be written in recent times, cf. for instance
[Ashworth, 2000] on the use of dubie positio in Domingo de Soto, [D’Ors, 2000] on Andrés Limos,
or [Uckelman et al., 2008] which provides some interesting elements for a formal characterization
of the properties of dubitatio in the Obligationes Parisienses.
64 A first description of the logical properties of Burley-style obligations is already found in
[Spade, 1982b] (I will give a sketch of it below), but I have decided to follow here the more recent
account, because of its clear and systematic character which has also helped me figure out the
extension required to describe some features of Peter’s approach.
65 Although the logical structure of a disputation played according to the responsio antiqua
rules is roughly the same for most authors adopting this account, there are significant di!erences
concerning singular aspects, and my focus here is on what is going on in Peter’s treatise.
66 Cf. in particular infra, Part II, sec. 3.20–3.25.
67 Unless noted otherwise, the main content of what comes next in this section is due to
[Dutilh Novaes, 2007].
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Kc is the set of background assumptions (a common state of knowledge) shared
by opponent and respondent which comes into play for the evaluation of irrelevant
sentences. It can be regarded as a set of sentences providing a partial description
of the world (sentences which are neither known to be true nor known to be false
are not included in Kc).
# is the ordered set of sentences that are actually put forward by the opponent
during the disputation. In general, !0 will always stand for the (first) positum,
while !n will stand for the sentence put forward at step n.
$ is an ordered set whose elements are sets of sentences, such that the following
relation holds: $i # $i!1. At each stage i, the corresponding set $i displays the
cumulative outcome of the disputation up to that point, that is the set of all
sentences that have been conceded or denied by the respondent. As a result, $
literally is the list or the box that I have metaphorically used above to describe
the record of a disputation. The criteria of construction of this set depend on the
rules and will be illustrated in a moment.
R(!n) is a function that maps each proposed sentence !n onto a member of
the set {1,0,?}. This function simulates, from the logical point of view, the speech
acts that the respondent is supposed to perform, according to the rules, on the
sentences that are submitted to his evaluation. 1, 0 and ? correspond to the acts
of accepting (i.e. admitting or conceding), denying (or rejecting) and doubting a
given sentence, respectively.
Within this framework, it is very easy to define the rules for admission and
rejection of posita as well as the rules for concession, denial and doubt relative to
proposita. Let us first define the former:




!n = !0 and !0 !$
or
!n %= !0, !n !$ and $n!1 ! ¬!n
R (!n) = 0 otherwise
The standard condition that the positum be consistent must be supplemented
in Peter’s theory, by the condition that, whenever at some step of a disputation
the opponent posits a new sentence, this extra positum be consistent not only in
itself, but also with the previous steps of that disputation.68
As far as the rules for proposita are concerned, the criteria of response can be
expressed as follows:
68 Cf. infra, Part II, sec. 2.1.
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$n!1 ! !n, $n!1 ! ¬!n and Kc ! !n






$n!1 ! !n, $n!1 ! ¬!n and Kc ! ¬!n
R (!n) = ? i" $n!1 ! !n, $n!1 ! ¬!n, Kc " !n and Kc " ¬!n
This formulation tells us on the basis of what conditions the respondent should
concede, deny or doubt a sentence, when it is proposed. A sentence ought to be
conceded either if it follows from the set of sentences previously evaluated or if
it is irrelevant and known to be true; a sentence ought to be denied either if it
is inconsistent with the set of sentences previously evaluated or if it is irrelevant
and known to be false; a sentence ought to be doubted otherwise, i.e. if it is logi-
cally independent from the set of sentences previously evaluated and it is neither
known to be true nor known to be false. Usually, in obligations treatises, rules
are presented in a slightly di"erent, albeit logically equivalent way, since they are
laid down in function of the logical status of sentences.69 In the present terms,
69 Spade’s reconstruction of the rules is meant to express in an explicit way exactly these
relations. I give below a formulation with slight modifications of the notation that do not a!ect
the general structure in any substantial way:
1. Let we first define the notion of relevance and irrelevance:






Xn implies ¬ pn+1
pn+1 is irrelevant at step n+1 i! it is not relevant at step n+1
A sentence is sequentially (or incompatibly) relevant at step n + 1 if it follows (or if its
negation follows) from a particular set of sentences Xn. How is this set constructed? In
the following way:
2. Xn is the smallest set containing the positum such that, for all sentences p and for all
i < n,
a) if p was proposed at step i and had to be conceded there according to the rules in
(3) below, then p ' Xn, and
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if $n!1 & !n, then !n is said to be sequentially relevant (pertinens sequens); if
$n!1 & ¬!n, then !n is said to be incompatibly relevant (pertinens repugnans).
Any relevant sentence is either sequentially relevant or incompatibly relevant. A
sentence is irrelevant (impertinens) if and only if it is not relevant. It holds in
general that any sequentially relevant sentence ought to be conceded, any incom-
patibly relevant sentence ought to be denied and any irrelevant sentence ought to
be evaluated according to the external criteria that in our model are supplied by
Kc.70
On the basis of these notions, we can now see how the development of a dispu-
tation can be reconstructed. This reduces to laying down the criteria of formation
for the cumulative set $ which includes the ordered sequence of steps of the dispu-
tation. At the very beginning of the disputation, if R (!0) = 1, i.e. if the positum
is admitted, the following will hold:
$0 = {!0 }
At an arbitrary step n, $n is formed as follows:
if R ( !n ) = 1 then $n = $n!1 ( {!n}
if R ( !n ) = 0 then $n = $n!1 ( {¬!n}
if R ( !n ) = ? then $n = $n!1
The reconstruction is thus complete and accounts for the progressive addition
of sentences according to the qualitative description given in sec. 1.1 above. At
b) if p was proposed at step i and had to be denied there according to the rules in (3)
below, then ¬ p ' Xn.
3. pn+1 is to be conceded, denied or doubted at step n + 1 according to the following rules:
a) if pn+1 is sequentially relevant at n + 1, it is to be conceded there;
b) if pn+1 is incompatibly relevant at n + 1, it is to be denied there;
c) if p + 1 is irrelevant at n + 1 and
(i) the respondent knows pn+1 to be true, it is to be conceded at n + 1
(ii) the respondent knows pn+1 to be false, it is to be denied at n + 1
(iii) otherwise pn+1 is to be doubted at n + 1
Cf. [Spade, 1982b, p. 6]. This formulation is altogether equivalent to the one proposed by
Dutilh Novaes. As will be clear below, both accounts leave open the issue of how we are supposed
to account for sentences about which the respondent should be in doubt.
70 Cf. infra, Part II, sec. 2.2 and 2.3 for the rules governing the replies to relevant sentences,
sec. 2.5 for the rule relative to irrelevant ones.
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each round, a sentence is put forward, evaluated and put in the record of the
disputation. Round after round, the cumulative set gets bigger and determining
the logical status of sentences proposed at later steps may become comparatively
more complex.
At the very beginning, the respondent must simply check the status of the
positum !0 and establish whether it is a consistent sentence or not. In the former
case he should admit it. As a result, !0 ends up in the list. When the opponent puts
forward his first propositum !1, the respondent is supposed to procede as follows:
(i) first, he should check whether !1 or its negation follow from $0. If one of the two
does, he will concede or deny !1, respectively. If neither does, the respondent is
supposed to (ii) have recourse to set Kc, pick out an evaluation for !1 and concede
it or deny it accordingly. In case Kc does not provide any information about !1,
the sentence will have to be doubted. According to whether !1 is conceded, denied
or doubted, it will be recorded, or its negation will be recorded, or neither will
be recorded in the list. After this procedure has been completed, the disputation
can go along. The opponent proposes another sentence !2 at the next step, and
the respondent runs the same ‘algorithm’ with only one di"erence, namely that he
must now check the logical dependence of !2 with respect to $1.
Two things must be noted. First, from the logical standpoint, real changes
take place only when irrelevant sentences are added to $. Suppose the opponent
puts forward throughout the disputation nothing but sequentially or incompatibly
relevant sentences: the set with respect to which the respondent is required to
check the logical status of a given propositum will be, at any step of the dispu-
tation, logically equivalent to $0. This means that the class of relevant sentences
is ampliated only through the addition, from a given moment of the disputation
on, of sentences that are logically independent with respect to the previous steps.
The respective extensions of the classes of relevant and irrelevant sentences change
only in this case.71
Second, in the present framework, it is as if doubtful sentences were discarded,
since no record is kept of their being proposed and doubted in the course of the
disputation. This might be a problem with respect to Peter’s theory, because
he allows for rules explicitly devoted the treatment of such sentences which by
definition do not feature in any $i. That will be the object of some remarks in the
next section.
71 An elegant proof based on a model-theoretic approach is found in [Dutilh Novaes, 2007,
p. 166]. Irrelevant sentences represent the only increments of information in a disputation,
because when they are introduced, they are by definition logically independent with respect to
the outcome of the disputation up to that point.
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1.4. Glimpses beyond
The leading idea of this section is reworking some of the notions introduced above
and add some elements to the picture in order to capture at least in a provisional
way the idea of keeping track of doubted sentences. This will amount to a slightly
di"erent presentation of the results just discussed and to a conservative extension
devised for that purpose.72
Let us first define the set of logical consequences of an arbitrary sentence ",
where " and # are metavariables standing for any well-formed sentences of Latin,
and by well-formed sentence we mean (i) a categorical sentence or (ii) anything
obtained by applying negation, conjunction, disjunction and conditional form to
categorical sentences, and (iii) nothing else:
Cn( ") = { # | " &F # }
The relation of logical consequence to be used in this context, as I recalled in
sec.1.1, is highly problematic. I would like to avoid the problem, because it is
not clear, even if we confine ourselves to the case of Peter, what an appropriate
candidate would be to simulate his notion of consequentia in modern terms. The
symbol &F is just a shortcut to express the fact that, whatever it may mean,
according to Peter, that something formally follows from something else, this is
the notion that is at stake in the definition of relevance which comes into play in
the context of his obligations.73
The only assumption that we need to make on the resulting set is that we
72 The notational change is introduced with the aim of highlighting the notions of relevance
and irrelevance in terms of sets of logical consequences. As for the di!erence with regard to the
above results, it entirely depends on whether sentences that ought to be doubted are proposed
or not. If they are not, the account I will present here works exactly in the same way as Dutilh
Novaes’ one. Otherwise, it is supposed to do a job that the other account seems not originally
intended to do.
73 I am inclined to favour, at least as a preliminary solution, the use of Lewis’ strict conditional.
The reason is that Peter’s definition of a valid consequence explicitly requires that the conjunction
of the negation of the consequent with the antecedent be an impossible sentence, cf. Tractatus
de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3ra]. Material conditional is therefore ruled
out. Relevant entailment should be excluded too, because Peter explicitly accepts the validity of
consequences having a formal contradiction as antecedent or a tautology as consequent, no matter
whether there is no relation of meaning or containment between antecedent and consequent. This
last notion seems to come in to play in several places as a condition of the formal character of
a consequence but it is unclear to me how the claim that relevance of meaning is a condition of
the formal character of a consequence can be consistent with the claim that anything formally
follows from a contradiction (or that anything formally implies a sentence like !)¬!). It would
be too wholesale, however, to be content with these criteria: a more detailed analysis of Peter’s
theoretical claims and examples will be required to sort out the issues involved in his definition
and use of the notion of consequentia.
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are allowed to iterate the operation that generates it without gain or loss (i.e.
the logical consequences of the logical consequences of " are, at least, already
contained in the logical consequences of "):
Cn (") # Cn ( Cn ( ") )74
Once we have introduced this basic notion for an arbitrary sentence, we can use
it to define, more generally, the notion of relevance – which is most important for us
in this context – at an arbitrary step of a disputation. The set of relevant sentences
at step n is defined as the set of logical consequences of the cumulative sequence
of previous steps. The latter, in turn, is equal to the set of logical consequences
of the conjunction of all sentences that have been conceded and of the negations
of all sentences that have been denied up to that point. Let us see more in detail
how the model is supposed to work.
Consider the sequence "0, . . . ,"n!1 of n sentences that are put forward in a
disputation (as above, "0 is the positum). Let us call %"n!1 the set containing all
"i, with 0 * i * n+1, such that "i is either conceded or denied in the disputation.
%" is, as a matter of fact, the same kind of set as Dutilh Novaes’ $, i.e. an ordered
set whose elements are sets of sentences such that %"i # %"i!1 holds by definition.
If we represent the whole outcome of a disputation, i.e. the set of all evaluated
sentences – including those that are doubted – by means of % (unstarred), then
%" represents the (proper) subset of sentences that are either conceded or denied.
As in the original model, it will hold in general that, if "0 is the positum and
it is admitted, then
%"0 = {"0 }
Similarly, the criteria of formation for %"n mirror the process of progressive
addition of sentences to the cumulative outcome of the disputation previously
outlined (see below for the notation):















Now, on this basis, we can define the set of relevant sentences at the first step
of the disputation in the following way:
Rel!!0 = Cn("0)
74 This reduces to the minimal requirement that the notion of ‘formally following from some-
thing’ be transitive: if ! &F " and " &F #, then ! &F #.
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Once the positum has been admitted, the set of relevant sentences – i.e. the
set of logical consequences of the cumulative outcome of the disputation up to
that point – coincides with the set of logical consequences of the positum alone.
How can we generalize it? A straightforward way is assuming that the following







which means that the notion of relevance at an arbitrary step is defined in
terms of the set of logical consequence of the whole conjunction of sentences that
have been either conceded or denied at the previous steps.
Rel!!n"1 is the set of sentences that are relevant at step n. In particular, it
is the smallest set containing (a) the positum, (b) all conceded sentences and all
the negations of denied sentences, (c) the logical consequences of each step taken
alone, and (d) the logical consequences of all conjunctions of such steps. In this
framework, it is very easy to figure out what it means for a sentence "n to be
relevant or irrelevant at step n:







"n is irrelevant at step n i" it is not relevant at n
In particular, "n is said to be sequentially relevant at step n if and only if
"n ' Rel!!n"1 , whereas "n is said to be incompatibly relevant at step n if and
only if ¬"n ' Rel!!n"1 . In addition to that, we obtain a characterization of the
class of irrelevant sentences at step n in set-theoretical terms, since the latter can
be regarded as the complement of relevant ones:
Irr!!n"1 = Rel!!n"1
Thus, "n is said to be irrelevant at step n if and only if "n ' Irr!!n"1 . On the
basis of these definitions, we can now (re)formulate the rules for concession, denial
75 I.e. for all conceded or denied sentences in the ordered sequence #n!1 of the n steps
that make up our disputation. It must be noted that usually #"n!1 , #n!1 unless there are
no doubted sentences at all in the disputation. If there are indeed no doubted sentences then
#"n!1 = #n!1. Therefore the appropriate way to describe the relation between the two sets is
#"n!1 - #n!1, i.e. the set of all evaluated sentences either properly includes or is equal to the
set of conceded or denied sentences.
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and doubt.76 The three alternatives are available only in the case of irrelevant
sentences, because relevant ones can only be either conceded or denied, according
to whether they (or their negations) belong to Rel!!n"1 . As for irrelevant sentences,
moreover, we still need to include in our model set Kc, to guarantee the required
independent informational basis for their evaluation.
Let us start, once again, with the rule governing the admission of the positum.
As we have already seen, its eligibility depends on the fact that it is not a con-
tradiction or an impossible simpliciter sentence, and in case of disputations with






"n = "0 and "n !$
or
"n %= "0, "n !$ and ¬"n /' Rel!!n"1
O¬A ("n) otherwise
As to the sentences that are proposed at subsequent steps, the corresponding
rules for concession, denial and doubt can be formulated as follows:
76 I have decided to adopt for the formulation of rules a di!erent notation based on the
operators A, C, N , D (standing for admission, concession, denial, and doubt) and the obligational
operator O expressing the duty of responding in the way explicited by the operator that falls
within its scope. The negation of O is understood as the duty not to perform a given speech
act, rather than as the permission not to perform it, cf. infra, Part II, sec. 2.1. The resulting
picture is substantially equivalent to the use of the function R introduced above which mapped
sentences onto the values {1, 0, ?}. I think this approach lends itself to express more clearly
the sharp distinction between the normative status of rules, that are such precisely insofar they
formulate duties, and, on the other hand, the descriptive character of the record of responses that
are actually given in the course of a disputation. This development falls beyond the scope of the
present work, but I believe it may be useful to have a sightly more fine-grained language at our
disposal in the attempt to reconstruct the structure of many sophisms discussed in obligational
treatises, since very often they involve a complex interaction between the two levels which we
should be able to express in our formalizations. To make it explicit: the use of expressions like
OC(!) and C(!) enables us to render more clearly the important di!erence between sentences
like ‘! est concedenda’ and ‘! conceditur’ or ‘! est concessa’.














"n ' Irr!!n"1 and Kc ! ¬"n
OD ("n) i" "n ' Irr!!n"1 , Kc " "n and Kc " ¬"n
This formulation, save for notational variants, is substantially equivalent to the
one presented in the previous section. It is fitting in all situations in which we
discard doubted sentences and do not keep track of their presence. In other words,
it is as though we had been considering, so far, only the ‘portion’ of a disputation
in which conceded and denied sentences come into play to determine the correct
responses to proposita put forward at subsequent steps. There are, to be sure,
good reasons to do that, since the logical structure we have described has to do
with mechanical aspects of the business of conceding, denying or doubting, to the
e"ect that the algorithm unconditionally provides fully determined replies: at each
step there always exists a correct answer and it is unique.77
There is, however, something lacking in this picture, since we completely lose
track of doubted sentences. Yet, their presence can in fact influence the correct
replies to sentences that are proposed at subsequent steps in a disputation. On
the one hand, there are negative duties, as it were, which determine only what
replies the respondent should not give to certain proposita. Although such duties
have a weaker character, if compared to the general structure outlined so far, they
should be taken into account. In particular, if a sentence "i has been doubted,
then nothing that is formally entailed by "i should be denied at any subsequent
step.78 And, on the other hand, there are also positive duties (i.e. determining
the correct reply), such as the duty of doubting the contradictory of any sentence
77 A very interesting issue is how to interpret the rules for irrelevant sentences, namely as
deterministic or non-deterministic, cf. [Dutilh Novaes, 2007, p. 157-158] I am inclined to favour
the first interpretation, at least in Peter’s case, because in a few passages of his treatise he seems
to argue in explicit terms that if the respondent grants an irrelevant falsehood or denies an
irrelevant truth, he replies incorrectly (which would make him lose the disputation) cf. infra,
Part II, sec. 3.28 and sec. 5.19.
78 The reason becomes immediately apparent if one thinks that the denial of the antecedent
!i of a valid consequence follows by contraposition as long as we deny the consequent. If the
antecedent is doubted, we can either concede or doubt the consequent, but we cannot deny it.
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that has been already doubted at a previous step. I will now try to propose a way
to account for these aspects and include them in our model. The solution I have
tried to figure out is very simple and should count just as a provisional point of
departure for further developments. Let us introduce an additional ordered set &
whose members are sets of sentences, with the usual requirement that &i # &i!1.
& is devised to supplement the information supplied by %., whenever doubtful
sentences come into play.
Since we are discussing positio, the initial obligatum, say "0, provided that it
fulfills the appropriate consistency requirements, is always admitted and recorded
in %"0. Therefore, we can assume that the following relation holds by definition:
&0 = /
As far as the criteria of formation of &n are concerned, they are exactly the
mirror image of those governing the formation of %"n (or Dutilh Novaes’s $n):
if C ( "n ) then &n = &n!1
if N ( "n ) then &n = &n!1
if D ( "n ) then &n = &n!1 ( {"n }
The idea is to have & perform the same function as %" but in the case of
doubtful sentences. In this way the picture becomes complete, because we have
found a way to save from oblivion an entire class of sentences that do indeed have
a role in the obligational framework. Take for instance a disputation consisting
of six steps (i.e. positum plus five proposita). Let the positum "0 be admitted,
the first propositum "1 be denied, the third and fourth proposita "3 and "4 be
conceded and the second and fifth proposita "2 and "5 be doubted. The record of








It can be easily seen that this construction (a) allows for a complete record of all
evaluated sentences (conceded, denied as well as doubted) and (b) preserves the
ordering. The final stage of this extension consists in putting together the two sets
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and obtain a ‘label’ for the whole outcome of the disputation. Let us introduce an
additional set %, which is again an ordered set whose elements are sets of sentences
such that %i # %i!1. This set is simply defined as follows:
% = %" ( &
By such definition, % contains all evaluated sentences of a disputation:79 those
that have been conceded or denied are recorded in %", whereas doubted sentences
feature in &. That permits us, on the one hand, to be conservative with respect
to the previous formulation (since the ‘starred’ portion of the disputation behaves
exactly in the same way as has been described in sec. 1.3) but it also enables us
to expand the original model. We can now characterize the additional duties that
are relative to the set of doubted sentences, and this allows us to capture some
moves of the game that in the model we started with were not considered.80
79 Notice that, in a disputation of n steps, for all steps i (with 0 * i * n+ 1) it holds that #"i
and $i (1) have empty intersection and (2) their union coincides with the sequence of evaluated
steps up to i, i.e. with set #i.
80 As I have already stressed, this extension is just an embryonic proposal. There are two
important things that must be figured out to make it work at a general level and I am not sure
about both points at the moment.
(1) We need to understand what the appropriate semantics of doubted sentences is. Much
depends on whether we consider them as sentences that are evaluated once and for all in a
disputation, or as sentences that, after being doubted, can receive a di!erent evaluation at a
later step of the disputation. In the former case, doubting a sentence is likely to turn out
to be equivalent to the ascription of a third, independent, truth value, whereas in the latter
case, the resulting picture might be more similar to a procedure of revision (there seem to be
more evidence in support of the first claim, cf. the obligational rules from Peter’s treatise on
consequences presented below). Be this as it may, there are at least two explicit things that
we should include in our representation since they are firmly held by Peter: (i) a sentence that
has been doubted is such that whenever something that follows from it is proposed at a later
step, that ‘something’ should not be denied (negative duty that leaves open the possibility of
conceding it or doubting it) because otherwise the denial of the the doubted sentence would
immediately follow by contraposition; (ii) the contradictory of a doubted sentence should always
be doubted too.
(2) The idea that I propose here (i.e. the addition of a set $ to record doubted sentences) is
a first step which lends itself to the characterization of additional rules involving only doubted
sentences. Yet, to make sure that the model works, it is indispensable to verify what may result
from combining doubted sentences with conceded or denied sentences, i.e. what happens if we
pick out elements of $ and #", combine them and put them forward as proposita in a disputation.
Special care and attention is required also for the following situations: both a doubted sentence
and its contradictory can be in $, but what happens if their disjunction or conjunction is in $ as
well? For instance, does the rule that prohibits the denial of the consequent of a valid consequence
whose antecedent has been doubted hold even in case the antecedent is a contradiction?
Peter gives us a hint, I reckon, in his treatise (cf. infra, Part II, sec. 4.6, ORObj.6), where he
seems to accept the idea of a valid consequence with a doubted contradiction as its antecedent.
This situation might look weird, because (i) anything whatsoever formally follows from such an
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By applying the same the notion of a set of logical consequences of a given sen-
tence introduced above, we can for example formulate such negative requirements
as the duty not to deny anything that is proposed in a disputation if it follows
from a sentence that has already been doubted in the same disputation. This will
be expressed by the following weak rule:
O¬N ("n) if "n ' Cn ("j) and "j ' &n!181
Again, by allowing for a record of doubted sentences in our model, there is a
straightforward way to express the duty of doubting the proposed contradictory
of a sentence that has been doubted at a previous step:
OD ( "n ) if "j ' &n!1 and "n = ¬"j
antecedent, and (ii) whatever we plug into the consequence as its consequent, it should never
be denied, even if it is an impossible sentence. Peter, however, proves to be aware of this fact
and clearly seems to be willing to accept it. In any case, until these kind of restrictions have
been fully spelled out on the basis of a closer inspection of the texts, it will be di"cult to make
entirely safe statements about the features that the underlying logic of doubtful sentences should
have.
81 One might wonder whether it is possible to generalize this notion to the conjunction of
doubted sentences, as in the case of conceded or denied sentences, by assuming that the set of









This set would include everything that follows from the sequence of doubted sentences. Nev-
ertheless, as I have just pointed out, there is a serious theoretical question about the constraints
that should be put on specific cases (like for instance when contradictions are explicitly recorded
in $).
In addition to that, one thing is worth noting. The negative condition that prohibits the denial
of anything that follows from a doubted sentence might be supplemented by an additional rule
requiring that anything from which a doubted sentence follows ought not to be conceded:
O¬C (!n) if !j ' $n!1 and !j ' Cn (!n)
Notice that, as a result of this additional requirement, the class of doubted sentences would
turn out to be characterized in terms of a third independent truth value, which is ascribed once
and for all in the context of a disputation exactly in the same way as truth and falsehood are
ascribed once and for all. The reason is the combined e!ect of the duty not to deny anything
that follows from a doubted sentence and of the duty not to concede anything from which a
doubted sentence follows: in this framework, when a sentence has been doubted then no matter
what is put forward next, its evaluation will remain the same. The former duty prevents any
negative revision (by contraposition) while the latter prevents any positive revision (by modus
ponens) of any sentence that has been doubted.
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The use of both rules is explicit in Peter’s treatise on obligations82 and their
relevance is also confirmed by the treatment found in his treatise on consequences.
I will give below a sketch of the obligational rules found in the latter, since they
will come into play quite often in the analysis of Peter’s text on obligations.83
On the basis of our definitions of the obligational duties, it follows immediately







There can be no conflicting duties, like for instance the duty to concede and
deny, or to doubt and deny the same sentence. For any sentence that ‘ought-to-
be-X’, no matter whatever X stands for, it rules out the other alternatives.
The following rule and its corollary are simple applications of obligational con-
cepts to the standard rule of modus ponens :
( p 1 q ) 0 OC p
OC q
84
82 Cf. infra, Part II, sec. 3.1 and 4.4 for the prohibition to deny the consequent of a conse-
quence whose antecedent ought to be doubted; and sec. 3.5, 3.9 and 4.6 for the rule involving
contradictories.
83 In this respect, cf. also [Boh, 1990], [Boh, 1993] and [Boh, 2000] which all stress the presence
of epistemic concerns and draw an interesting parallel with Strode.
84 This principle is the object of some discussion in Peter’s treatise on consequences. Peter
contends that it is not su"cient that the antecedent of a valid consequence ought to be granted
in order to claim that its consequent ought to be granted too. This is true only if we adopt
the general principle that from what ought to be granted nothing but what ought to be granted
follows. The complication has to do with epistemic concerns. Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis,
[Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3va-vb] “Alia regula est quod si consequentia est bona, a"rma-
tiva, denominata etc., significans etc., habens antecedens et consequens expressa, quorum nullum
est multiplex, scita esse formalis, et antecedens est concedendum ab aliquo, et consequens est
intellectum propositum, et cum his bene scitur quod ex concedendo non sequitur nisi conceden-
dum, tunc consequens ab eodem est concedendum. Sed non sequitur ‘hec consequentia est bona
[scita] scita esse talis et antecedens est ab aliquo concedendum et consequens est intellectum,
igitur consequens est concedendum’, quia forte creditum est quod antecedens sit falsum aut forte
creditum est quod ex concedendo sequatur non concedendum”. [emphasis mine]
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( p 1 q ) 0 OC p
O¬D p 0O¬N p)
85
The same extends also to the case of contraposition:
( p 1 q ) 0 ON q
ON p
86
( p 1 q ) 0 ON q
O¬C p 0O¬D p
87
Finally, three rules are supposed to govern doubtful responses:
( p 1 q ) 0 OD p
O¬Nq
88
( p 1 q ) 0 OD q
ON p )OD p
89
85 As Peter rightly points out, this rule follows from the former, cf. Tractatus de consequentiis,
[Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3vb] “Ex qua regula sequitur alia, scilicet quod si sit aliqua
consequentia bona, denominata etc., significans etc., habens antecedens etc., quorum nullum est
multiplex, scita esse formalis, et antecedens est concedendum, et consequens !est" intellectum
propositum, et cum his bene scitum est quod ex concedendo non sequitur nisi concedendum et
quod ex vero non sequitur falsum, consequens non est dubitandum nec negandum”.
86 Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3vb] “Alia regula est quod
si consequentia est bona, denominata etc., significans etc., habens antecedens etc., quorum nullum
etc., scita esse formalis, et consequens est negandum ab aliquo, et antecedens !est" intellectum
propositum, et cum his bene scitum est quod negandum non sequitur nisi ex negando, tunc est
antecedens ab eodem negandum”.
87 Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3vb] “Ex qua sequitur
alia, quod si consequentia est bona. a"rmativa, denominata etc., significans etc., habens an-
tecedens etc., quorum nullum etc., scita esse formalis, et consequens est intellectum propositum,
et cum his bene scitur quod ex vero non sequitur falsum, et est consequens negandum, tunc
antecedens non est ab eodem dubitandum nec concedendum. Et capitur hic dubitandum pro eo
cui debet dubie responderi ab aliquo”.
88 Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3vb] “Alia regula est
quod, si consequentia !est" bona etc., significans etc., habens etc., quorum nullum etc., scita esse
formalis, et antecedens est dubitandum, et consequens !est" intellectum propositum, et cum his
scitum est quod ex nullo vero sequitur falsum, tunc consequens non est negandum”.
89 Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3vb] “Alia regula est
quod, si consequentia est bona etc., significans etc., habens etc., quorum nullum etc., scita esse
formalis, et consequens est dubitandum, et antecedens est intellectum propositum, et cum his
bene scitum est quod ex nullo vero sequitur falsum, tunc antecedens est negandum vel dubitan-
dum”. The presence of this rule speaks against positive revision in the context of obligational
disputations, because we are not permitted to concede whatever entails a doubtful sentence.




The application of these rules is ubiquitous in Peter’s treatise, but we will
come to this in due course. Now, to conclude this cursory analysis of the logical
structure of obligational disputations, let us briefly see how these notions turn out
to be applied in an oversimplified example.
1.5. An example of disputation
I shall illustrate in this section how the above reconstruction is supposed to work.
Consider the following disputation: the opponent posits a sentence "0 = ‘every
man is running’ while the respondent is sitting. This apparently pointless remark
about the respondent’s being seated plays, in fact, an important role which is
quite analogous to the statement of a casus in the sophismata literature, where the
amount of information relevant for the discussion is passed on to the participants
in a preliminary phase. This piece of information, in particular, will become from
now on part of Kc. The sentence ‘every man is running’ will play the role of
positum during the disputation. Since this sentence is not incompatible with any
previous step (actually, there is none in this disputation since "0 is the first and
only positum) nor is it inconsistent in itself, the respondent must admit it according
to the first rule given in Peter’s treatise.
Once the positum "0 has been admitted, the opponent proposes the sentence
"1 = ‘you are running’. The respondent must first determine the status of this
sentence in terms of logical dependence or independence with respect to the pre-
vious steps of the disputation. At this stage, he should take set Rel!0 and check
whether "1 or its negation ¬"1 belong to it.
This happens not to be the case since, whatever a precise account of the notion
of ‘following from’ may turn out to be like, it will certainly have the property to
invalidate both the inference ‘every man is running, therefore you are running’
and the inference ‘every man is running, therefore you are not running’. In other
words, "1 /' Rel!0 and ¬"1 /' Rel!0 . The respondent must therefore classify
"1 as irrelevant. The rule relative to irrelevant sentences forces him to answer
according to Kc. We have assumed, in the preamble, that the respondent was
Suppose that the consequent of a valid consequence has been doubted at some point and that
later on the antecedent of that consequence is put forward. If we were allowed to concede it,
then by modus ponens we would immediately infer that the previously doubted sentence (= the
consequent) ought to be conceded too.
90 For this last rule, which is not discussed in the treatise on consequences, cf. infra, Part II,
sec. sec.3.5.
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sitting, therefore Kc tells him that the propositum ‘you are running’ should be
denied. The set that represents the cumulative outcome of the disputation thus
becomes: %1 = %"1 = {"0,¬"1 }.91
The opponent will then propose a second propositum, namely "2 = ‘you are
a man’. Now, what is the logical status of this sentence? Is it a relevant or an
irrelevant one? If the respondent wants to answer correctly, again, he will have first
to identify what kind of relation "2 bears to the previous steps: the choice of the
rule by which he must reply will be determined accordingly. In the present case,
sentence "2 = ‘you are a man’ is a relevant one. That is because its negation follows
from the conjunction of the positum and the negation of the first propositum. Let
us see what that means in terms of the cumulative sets of logical consequences
defined above. The disputation at this stage contains two sentences: "0 = ‘every
man is running’, and ¬"1 = ‘you are not running’. The first propositum had to
be denied because it was irrelevant and false (which was equivalent, in turn, to
the concession of its negation). At step 2, the respondent is expected to evaluate
sentence "2, which means by the above stipulations that he needs to run through
set Rel!!1 and see whether "2 or ¬"2 belong to it. The algorithm requires him to







= Cn ("0 0 ¬"1)
Now, since "0 = ‘every man is running’ and ¬"1 = ‘you are not running’, it is
easy to see that ¬"2 (= ‘you are not a man’) follows by contraposition. On the
basis of the above definitions, "2 is incompatibly relevant at step 2, because its
negation ¬"2 belongs to the set Rel!!1 of logical consequences generated by steps
0 and 1. We can display the structure of this simple disputation as follows:92
P Every man is running A possible
1. You are running N irrelevant and false
2. You are not a man N incompatibly relevant
So much for a first assessment of the underlying logical structure of an obliga-
tional disputation conducted according to the responsio antiqua rules. A cursory
91 Recall that no sentence has been doubted so far, therefore $1 = /, i.e. the set of doubted
sentences at this stage is still empty, to the e!ect that #1 = #"1 ($1 = #"1.
92 From left to right: the first column labels each single step starting from the positum (=P );
the second column is the list of sentences; the third one is the record of the respondent’s reply;
the fourth one provides the identification of the status of each sentence and the explanation of the
respondent’s replies (sometimes, in the analysis of complex sophisms, it also displays objections,
remarks or the symbol $ when at a given step an inconsistency arises.
1. OBLIGATIONS AT A GLANCE 34
look at any treatise on obligations immediately shows, however, that things almost
never turn out to be so simple and the complications that may arise because of var-
ious factors (e.g. the complexity of proposed sentences, an intentionally ambiguous
use of language on the opponent’s part, the presence of pragmatic paradoxes, or
the application of other problematic principles involving the use of obligational
operators) put the respondent under considerable stress. The analysis of sophisms
discussed in Peter’s treatise will give a measure of this di!culty.
1.6. Survey of modern interpretations
As has been already recalled in the Introduction, there have been many attempts in
the secondary literature on obligations to put forward interpretations with the aim
of explaining various aspects of the genre, and the historiography on this tradition
constitutes an interesting phenomenon in its own right. In this section, however, I
will not be concerned with a general assessment of such developments but rather
try to outline a pocket map for orientation. I shall briefly recall and describe a
number of modern interpretations and point to their distinctive features, because
I think that several extremely interesting and valuable insights are available and
may contribute to the reconstruction of a comprehensive picture.
The greatest controversy is centred on the problem of determining the pur-
pose of obligations. In this respect, two main families of interpretations can be
identified: the first focuses on the practical and pedagogical function of the ars
obligatoria, while the second embraces an articulated series of attempts to find in
it some genuinely philosophical intent and to investigate its fundamental logical
properties. The distinction of course has a merely heuristic value and is by no
means intended to draw sharp boundaries. There are often borderline cases of
exegetical proposals in which di"erent motives add up in a composite picture.
The history of historiography on obligations can be roughly split into two pe-
riods, the dividing point being a controversial paper by Spade appeared in 1982.93
In that paper, Spade proposed the idea that obligations might be seen as an ex-
ample of counterfactual reasoning. This idea has been challenged, ever since, in
93 Cf. [Spade, 1982b]. This paper provides a first systematic analysis of the three fundamental
versions of the theory that are available in the first half of the XIV century (Burley, Kilvington
and Swyneshed). Strictly speaking, Spade had proposed his reading in terms of counterfactuals
already in [Spade, 1977], in the introduction to his edition of Swyneshed’s tract. Nonetheless it is
in 1982 that the proposal is grounded and develpoed in detail, and it is that paper that is mostly
referred to in subsequent literature as the target of an impressive battery of objections. An
interesting fact is that Spade himself, before working out the counterfactual interpretation, had
suggested, in the attempt to identify one of the sources of Heytesbury’s treatment of insolubilia,
that the vocabulary and techniques developed in obligations treatises quite naturally qualify as
a useful tool for that context too, cf. [Spade, 1976].
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various ways and can be regarded as a kind of watershed in the literature: it has
set the stage for further conceptual e"orts to understand the philosophical import
of obligations (fostering, in this sense, an interest in the topic that goes beyond
purely historical motives) and most interpretations that have been put forward
thereafter have felt the need to discuss Spade’s views. We will turn to it in a
moment.
The first explicit mention of obligations in a study on medieval logic is, to my
knowledge, Boehner’s claim that obligations are a rudimentary prefiguration of a
theory of logical deduction.94 This hypothesis has not received much appreciation
and is usually dismissed on the basis of two main objections commonly accepted
in the literature: first, a theory of logical deduction or inference, as it were, is
presupposed rather than developed in treatises on obligations (the appropriate
context being discussion of consequences)95; second, this interpretation does not
account in any plausible way for the need to introduce irrelevant sentences.96
In 1960s the first editions of texts see the light97 along with a prevailing senti-
ment that obligations fulfill primarily the pedagogical function of an exercise or a
test.98 This view seems to have strong historical plausibility for at least two rea-
94 Cf. [Boehner, 1952, p. 14] “It would, however, be incorrect to see in these tracts only a
collection of rules for school exercises, since they contain a nucleus of rules for an axiomatic
method, though in a rather crude form”.
95 In this respect an interesting remark is found in [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 32] “omnes
regulae superius adsignatae in Tractatu Consequentiarum de consequentia bona vel non bona
sunt hic fundamentaliter sustinendae. Et ratio quia materia obligationum non est nisi materia
consequentiarum stilo subtiliori procedens, et an respondens sit sani capitis gressu deceptorio
temptativa; nam per huiusmodi casus, sive veri sint sive falsi, stabilem sustentationem docetur
infallibiliter et invariabiliter sustinere”.
96 Curiously, if it is true that the objection holds if we regard obligations as an attempt to
build an axiomatic method for, say, an ancestor of propositional logic, it is less evident that
Boehner’s suggestion is entirely misplaced if we consider the theory as providing an axiomatic
basis governing the assertability of sentences in disputational contexts. In that sense obligational
rules might be viewed as axioms governing the behaviour of certain speech acts, i.e. conceding,
denying and doubting.
97 Cf. [Paul of Pergula, 1961] and [Walter Burley, 1963].
98 Cf. [Brown, 1966, p. 27] “Of all the mediaeval treatises on logic, none demanded more
application on the part of the student than the treatises on obligations [. . . ] each treatise had
the same general purpose: to train the student to argue correctly within a stringently regulated
framework of argumentation”; [Green, 1963, p. vii] “In general terms, De Obligationibus is
a medieval logical treatise designed to initiate students into the practice of logical reasoning,
especially with a view to taking part in disputations”; [Weisheipl, 1966, pp. 163-164] “This
treatise of logic was designed to give the beginner basic rules of inference in purely logical
exercises [..] These were strictly ingenious exercises among school boys and had little objective
value”. This view is also accepted by D’Ors, cf. for instance [D’Ors and Garćıa-Clavel, 1994,
p. 54] “En razón de los fines didácticos de estos tratados, éstos se completan de ordinario
con ejemplos – ejercicios resueltos –, mediante los que se llama la atención del lector, futuro
respondens, sobre las dificultades más caracteŕısticas con las que se puede tropezar en la práctica
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sons. The first is that obligations codify in a highly stylized form the ubiquitous
disputational character of many medieval intellectual and academic activities.99
Secondly, there are very few remarks in such treatises that tell us something about
their purpose, and almost all insist on the idea of training or testing logical skills.100
The main objection that is usually raised against this interpretation is that it
might fail to be exhaustive. In particular, the function of obligations as a tool
for teaching or examining logical abilities would not explain, on the one hand,
the e"orts of medieval logicians to develop doctrines that often reach a level of
remarkable complexity and, on the other hand, the controversy arising in the XIV
century about the right set of rules to be adopted. The latter, especially, would
appear “entirely unmotivated if one thinks of obligational disputations merely as
exercises or examinations and [...] suggests instead that the focus of this literature
was on theoretical matters, not exclusively on pedagogical ones”.101
A first philosophical interpretation, centred on the idea of obligations as a game,
has been put forward, in the context of independent discussions, by Angelelli and
Hamblin at the beginning of the 1970s.102 The former has insisted on the game-
like character of obligations as a disputational technique. The latter, in particular,
has suggested a link with the treatment of fallacies, arguing that the regimented
de tales diálogos”. The idea of an even stronger form of entrenchment in practical contexts has
been put forward by Perreiah who on several occasions has insisted that obligations where devised
for oral examinations in logic, cf. especially [Perreiah, 1978, pp. 152-156], [Perreiah, 1982, p .
113–116], and [Perreiah, 1984].
99 In this respect, cf. [Green, 1963, pp. 1–15] and bibliography therein.
100 Cf. the passage quoted above from Paul of Venice, which refers to the art as ‘temptativa’,
i.e. directed to test the logical skills of the respondent. A similar sentiment is found in Peter
too, cf. infra, Part II, sec. 4.1 and 5.10, although his terms are slightly less explicit. Another
relevant source in this respect is [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 78ra]. According to him, the purpose
of obligations is “both to provide exercise for beginning students in handling logical inferences;
and to prepare them to reason from truths in real-life situations” [Ashworth, 1993, p. 362].
101 Cf. [Spade, 1982b, p. 2] Spade’s claim is well grounded, and I agree that some theoretical
interest certainly comes into play (though it would probably be advisable to investigate the emer-
gence of theoretical interests author by author). Yet, I suspect the argument is not necessarily
conclusive. Take for instance the case of positio: di!erent sets of rules might well have been de-
vised to test di!erent logical abilities. In particular, in case Swyneshed’s, the focus would be on
the ability to recognize what follows from one single hypothesis and keep it distinct from the rest
(i.e. inferences involving irrelevant sentences); in the case of the responsio antiqua instead, the
focus would be on the ability to manage more complex interactions between an initial hypothesis
and subsequently proposed sentences. This would also explain the role of irrelevant sentences.
In Swyneshed’s framework they would count as ‘disturbing factors’, put forward to generate
confusion and divert the respondent’s attention from the safe domain of the logical consequences
of the positum, whereas on the responsio antiqua account, they would be regarded as auxiliary
assumptions that make the identification of the logical status of proposed sentences increasingly
di"cult as the disputation goes along.
102 Cf. [Angelelli, 1970, pp. 800–806 and 813–815] and [Hamblin, 1970, pp. 260–263].
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context of obligations could serve as an artificial environment for the assessment
of invalid reasoning.
In more recent years, the interpretation of obligations as a game (of consistency
maintenance) has been revisited with originality, in a strongly revised form which
makes it much more elaborate and systematic, by Dutilh Novaes, especially in
connection with the responsio antiqua account.
Appealing to the notion of a game has undoubtedly proved to be an interest-
ing way to provide a philosophical characterization of obligations: in particular it
singles out a distinctive feature, namely the fact that they can be viewed as regi-
mented activities governed by rules that can be studied as structures with certain
logical properties (regardless of actual applications). There are, however, some
issues that remain open. First, if we understand the game metaphor in connection
with game-theoretical semantics and, especially, dialogical logic,103 the link with
obligations seems problematic, because there seem to be quite di"erent purposes
at stake.104 In the case of obligations, their formalization might well lend itself to
a characterization in terms of game properties (like for instance the use of the no-
tion of a winning strategy to describe the guarantee that, whenever the respondent
complies with the rules, the resulting sets of sentences will always be consistent),
but this being said, there still seems to be as little concern over foundational issues
as there could be.
Second, a di!culty that the game interpretation is required to solve is the
question of the degree of freedom with which the players make their moves.105
In the context of obligations it seems that the only genuinely free actor is the
opponent. In principle, the only thing the respondent is free to do is choosing
whether or not to apply the rules. Yet, for the respondent there is always a winning
strategy because the rules (at least in the responsio antiqua) are constructed in
order to enable him to maintain consistency. This results in an odd conclusion:
the one who seems to have the greatest freedom, i.e. the opponent, is the one
who unconditionally loses the game, at least in an ideal world. On these grounds,
one might wonder whether the sort of thing we are talking about here can still be
103 Cf. [Dutilh Novaes, 2007, p. 145]. Relevant references, in this connection, are
[Lorenzen and Lorenz, 1978], [Hintikka and Sandu, 1997], and [Rahman and Tulenheimo, 2006].
104 This fact was already recognized by Angelelli – who by the way is the first to think of
obligations in terms of games. I will quote his passage in full because it clearly expresses the
fundamentally di!erent nature of the two enterprises, cf. [Angelelli, 1970, p. 813] “in Lorenzen’s
approach, the dialogue serves to define the meaning of the connectives; the logical constants are
introduced by attack and defense rules. [. . . ] it seems safe to assert that there are no signs of
using disputation as source of meaning for the logical particles. The ars disputatoria [. . . ] is
very important [. . . ] but as an application or extension rather than as a foundation of logic”.
105 This issue is discussed at some length in [Yrjönsuuri, 1994]. The view that obligations can
be understood in terms of games has been also strongly opposed by [Perreiah, 1982, pp.115–116].
Finally, some additional and more logically-oriented reservations are made by [Hodges, 2009].
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called a game.106 Be this as it may, this interpretation is at present presumably
the most interesting one in terms of philosophical analysis and it will likely set the
stage for further developments.
Let us now turn back for a moment to the historical reconstruction of the evo-
lution of studies. In the 1970s several progresses are made also from the standpoint
of textual knowledge. The first critical editions of texts referable to the early phase
(such as the Tractatus Emmeranus de falsi positione, the Tractatus Emmeranus
de impossibili positione, the Obligationes Parisienses and the De petitionibus con-
trariorum, which are all connected to the development of the literature in the XIII
century) come out, along with much later productions, like Swyneshed’s treatise,
followed a year later by the edition of Lavenham’s short tract. At the end of the
decade, a first significant bulk of materials has become available and that is prob-
ably one of the reasons behind the great flourishing of studies in the 1980s. In this
period, besides the edition of other fundamental texts,107 great e"orts start to be
made with the aim of clarifying more systematically the conceptual framework of
the theory in the central phase of its development (with special attention to Bur-
ley’s and Swyneshed’s doctrines which are the object of numerous contributions).
In 1981 a fundamental article by Ashworth comes out in Medioevo, providing a first
106 The question is not whether the game is worth playing, nor does the fact that it is a
determined game play any significant role. Chess might be a determined game (to the best of
my knowledge, there is no proof at present of this being or not being the case). Now, suppose
it actually is a determined game, i.e. a game such that there is a winning strategy for either
white or black. For this reason the game would not lose any appeal, because it would still remain
di"cult to play. The reason is that when a game is determined, it becomes scarcely interesting
to play only when the player for whom a winning strategy is theoretically available, also knows
what that strategy actually is like. In other words, one would hardly accept to play chess with
black pieces if one knew that (1) chess is a determined game with winning strategy for white,
and (2) that there is a feasible and easy way for white to compute it. Since the second condition
does not generally obtain, at least when players with similar abilities are involved and especially
at the beginning of a match, chess preserves all of its interest and fun.
In the case of obligations the situation is not dissimilar. Obligations are a determined game,
because there is always a winning strategy for the respondent (i.e. there is always a way to
maintain consistency) and they are also interesting to play since it often turns out that the
winning strategy is di"cult to figure out in factual situations (because sentences are complex or
ambiguous, because as long as the disputation procedes the recognition of inferential relations
might gets more and more di"cult, and the like).
107 I will just mention here the treatises of the so-called anonymous Merton author and Paul of
Venice, cf. [Kretzmann and Stump, 1985] and [Ashworth, 1988a], respectively. The first provides
some original insights and is relevant for the developments of the theory in the second quarter
of the XIV century in England. The second is of greatest importance for various reasons: it is a
lengthy text characterized, on the whole, by a clear style of exposition (as opposed, for instance,
to the somewhat elliptical language of Peter’s treatise); it contains a considerable amount of
sophisms that clarify how the rules should be applied and (sometimes) interpreted; finally it
draws heavily on the tradition, thereby providing the basis for a reconstruction of a network of
influences in the late phase of the history of obligations, cf. in this respect [Ashworth, 1990].
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systematic outline of the relationships between the two crucial notions of relevance
and order in several late XIV century authors.108 The list could go on for several
pages, but discussing every entry of this catalogue is not my intention here: su!ce
it to say that the history of studies, in the last three decades, is characterized by
an increasing complexity in terms of interpretations and from the beginning of the
1980s onwards, we are confronted with a multi-voice dialogue with probably more
than an entry per year that would deserve a separate discussion.109 As I have
said above, an important watershed in this story is [Spade, 1982b]. Among the
arguments that Spade provides in support of the thesis that obligational disputa-
tions are to be viewed as a model of counterfactual reasoning,110 some are worth
recalling because they focus on relevant issues that might serve as a test also for
other interpretations. Let us briefly see them one by one.
(1) According to some passages found in the early literature, what is conceded
or denied in an obligational disputation is said to be ‘following’ from the positum,
in the sense that it expresses what would be the case if the positum were to be the
case. Since this kind of connection cannot be interpreted as logical implication,
the best candidate are counterfactual conditionals (subjunctive conditionals). The
sense in which one should understand the notion of ‘following from’ is ‘being the
consequent of a true or assertable counterfactual conditional with the positum as
antecedent’.
(2) The counterfactual interpretation would account for the seemingly odd
treatment of irrelevant sentences, explaining their presence and their role (“obli-
gational disputations are meant to explore what whould happen if the positum
were true but everything else stayed as much as possible the same” [Spade, 1982b,
p. 12]). Irrelevant sentences, that are evaluated according to their own status,
i.e. according to their truth value in the actual world, are supposed to fulfill this
condition, namely that of picking out the closest possible world with respect to
the actual world.
(3) It would justify the admission, in certain authors, of the positio of impossible
per accidens sentences or of true sentences that are not known to be true.
108 Cf. [Ashworth, 1981]. This is an example of what, in the heuristic perspective suggested
above, would turn out to be a case of mixed exegetical approach, motivated by both historical
interests and the need of a systematic conceptual analysis of the logical relations involved in the
theory.
109 In this respect, the essential source remains [Ashworth, 1994] which presents a catalogue of
(a) medieval authors, (b) manuscripts, (c) early printed editions, (d) edited texts and (e) studies
and translations. With regard to the past fifteen years, the last section can be supplemented
with a bibliography compiled by Uckelman which has recently become available on the web, cf.
[Uckelman, 2009].
110 The claim – that is partially reconsidered in [Spade, 1992] – is even stronger: disputations
are sequences of sentences which can be represented in the form of counterfactual (subjunctive)
conditionals with the positum as antecedent.
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(4) Obligational disputations would share with counterfactual conditionals the
failure of some important logical properties such as strengthening the antecedent,
transitivity and contraposition.
(5) The counterfactual interpretation would provide an account of the revision
of the rules that the theory undergoes in the first half of the XIV century, especially
in Kilvington and Swyneshed.
All these arguments have been challenged strenuously – and I think with good
reasons – on a number of occasions.111 Yet, no matter whether or not one agrees
with Spade’s proposal, the relevant fact is that he has undoubtedly isolated a
checklist of some important parameters, that should be taken into account by
any serious attempt to understand the features and development of the genre
(particularly, of positio).
A strong reaction to Spade’s interpretation has been proposed already in the
early 1980s by Stump, who has argued that di"erent philosophical concerns are
found in Burley’s and Swyneshed’s theories. In particular, as far as the latter is
concerned, a recognition of the lists of obligata that are found in his treatise would
show a concern with “epistemic logic, indexicals, propositional attitudes, and other
issues in the philosophy of language”.112 In Burley’s case, on the other hand, the
focus would be on certain kind of “logical or semantic paradoxes based on some
sort of reflexivity which resemble but are generally weaker than the self-referential
111 Cf. for instance [Stump, 1981, pp. 170–171, especially p. 171 f. 45], [Martin, 1993, pp.
363–367], and more recently, [Dutilh Novaes, 2005, pp. 142–148]. One point, in particular,
is crucial. Spade appeals to possible world semantics to claim that the sequence of sentences
evaluated in an obligational disputation picks out the closest possible world to the actual world
and can be interpreted as a true or assertable counterfactual conditional statement having the
positum as its antecedent and the last evaluated propositum as its consequent. It has been
shown, however, that such sequences can be taken at most as might-counterfactuals, but not as
would-counterfactuals, cf. [Martin, 1993, p. 363]. This depends on a distinctive feature of the
responsio antiqua, namely that replies to the proposed sentences (and consequently the outcome
of disputations) are determined in function of the order in which those sentences are put forward.
It turns out, thus, that conceded and denied sentences progressively specify a class of possible
worlds that make their conjunction true, but the theory is unable to pick out a single world as
the closest to the actual world. Moreover, in this respect, the idea that Swyneshed’s revision
is prompted by the inadequacy of Burley’s account as a theory of counterfactuals proves to be
hard to defend, since Swyneshed’s own account doesn’t work any better, for this purpose, than
the one it would supposedly be intended to correct. By contrast, there is some consensus about
the possibility of regarding Kilvington’s remarks in the light of a counterfactual reading, cf. for
instance [Stump, 1981, p. 169] “Kilvington’s innovation in the rules for obligations does appear
to make obligations resemble a logic of counterfactuals”.
It should be noted, finally, that Spade, in addition to that, has proposed a parallel interpre-
tation based on the idea that obligations are a prefiguration of the modern academic practice
of thesis defense. The view is discussed in [Spade, 1993] and has been strongly opposed by
[King, 2004].
112 Cf. [Stump, 1981, p. 172].
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paradoxes of insolubles in that they depend on the disputational context for their
paradoxical character”.113 According to Stump, moreover, these aspects are better
understood if they are considered in the framework of a close connection to the
literature of sophismata and insolubilia.
Besides prompting much controversy, the counterfactual interpretation has also
loosely inspired two accounts that have been developed in the early 1990s. The first
is Yrjönsuuri’s view that obligations are devised for the construction of thought
experiments.114 The second is King’s suggestion that they should be regarded as
a general metamethodology of medieval scientific discourse that finds applications
in various fields of medieval thought (especially physics and theology).115 Both
interpretations are to some extent related to the counterfactual reading, for they
all share a basic assumption: reasoning in a disputation conducted within the
obligational framework means assuming a hypothesis to see what – in some sense
– ‘follows’ from it. According to Yrjönsuuri and King, this should be interpreted
in terms of the construction of consistent sets of sentences describing (for the most
part) contrary to fact state of a"airs. In this connection, obligational disputations
would serve very naturally as an environment to perform reasoning secundum
imaginationem.
The problem with the thought experiment solution lies, I think, in the kind of
examples and sophisms that are actually found in obligations treatises. One would
maybe expect more substantive theoretical issues to test the theory, if the theory
were intended to provide a tool for the construction of thought experiments. Yet
we are rather confronted with typical examples of semantic conflicts, pragmatic
paradoxes and the like, i.e. with issues related to the relations between logic and
language. If it is true, on the one hand, that most practices of philosophical reflec-
tion and scientific reasoning, in the late Middle Ages, take place at this level,116
it still remains hard to escape the impression that what is primarily at stake, in
obligations treatises, is not to be understood in terms of the development of a tool
to be used for the investigation of what follows under a given assumption. Obli-
gational disputations might well lend themselves to such a use, and the presence
of their vocabulary in contexts other than that of logic text-books, speaks for this
113 Cf. [Stump, 1981, pp. 172–173].
114 Cf. especially [Yrjönsuuri, 1994, p. 13] “As I see it, rejection of Spade’s interpretation
has been too wholesale. Spade’s interpretation has been taken as the only way of applying
modal logic to obligations. [. . . ] Indeed, even if it seems to be clear now that the issue is not
counterfactual conditionals, there seems to be no way around the fact that the typical positum
of an obligational disputation is an assumed contingently false sentence. In one way or another,
obligational disputations consider non-actual possibilities”. Another relevant source for this
discussion is [Yrjönsuuri, 1996].
115 Cf. [King, 1991, especially pp. 49-56].
116 Classical arguments in support of this view are found, for instance, in [Murdoch, 1975] and
[Murdoch, 1981].
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reading. But I think we should keep the two issues distinct from each other. The
application of disputational techniques outside the context of obligations treatises
is probably not to be regarded as the only (or the main) key to the understanding
of what is going on in those treatises.117 Apart from the general issue whether the
frequency of application of a theory in a given context that is extrinsically related
to it, is su!cient reason to infer that the theory is intentionally construed for that
purpose, the question would still remain open: if obligations are a metamethodol-
ogy or a theory devised for the construction of imaginary cases, why then are the
typical examples and sophisms, that we encounter in the texts that are primarily
concerned with obligations (i.e. the treatises where the theory is elaborated and
tested) not of this sort, for the most part? Obligations seem to be more closely
related to the idea of constructing a logic that governs disputational exchanges and
the assertability of sentences in that setting. In standard examples of disputations
that are to be found all over the place in such treatises, when the time of the
obligation is over, and it comes down to assessing the sequence of proposed and
evaluated sentences, it is much more frequent to come accross situations in which
the disputants discuss whether one or more sentences have been correctly granted
or denied, rather than situations in which they check what sentences have been
granted or denied and infer, on this basis, how the actual world or an imagined
situation would be like.118 In other words, the prevailing focus is on the logical
relations between sentences rather than on the identification of particular sets of
sentences endowed with some special philosophical interest. To some extent, no
matter what sentences are proposed, the important thing is the underlying logical
problem they exemplify: this suggests also a way to look at collections of sophisms
as representing certain classes of problems that advocate in turn certain classes
117 The vocabulary of obligations is not uncommon in theology. Interesting examples of this
kind of application are found for instance in Robert Holkot, cf. [Knuuttila, 1993]. An outline
of the “emergence of an obligational theology” is o!ered in [Gelber, 2004, pp. 151–190] where
several figures like Arnold of Strelley, Holkot again, and John Duns Scotus are discussed at some
length. The latter’s use of obligations is also investigated by [Vos, 1998]. Cf. also [Martin, 1990]
for an analysis of Bradwardine’s use of positio impossibilis. The opposite tendency, namely the
presence of theological examples in treatises on obligations, is by contrast extremely rare, cf.
[Ashworth, 1992, p. 654]. And I have the impression that physical examples tend to be quite a
find, too.
118 It must said, however, that at least one strong piece of evidence in support of Yrjönsu-
uri’s view is to be found in the so-called anonymous Merton treatise. Besides the purposes
of testing (“ut temptetur respondens numquid artem habeat”) and exercise (“ut dispensa-
tio habeatur, ut accidit inter conferentes ob exercitii causam”), a third relevant purpose is
assigned to the art, namely “ut falsum possibile admittamus inquirendo quid sequitur, ut
cum res ita de facto se habeant ut falsus casus denotat, sciamus per prius suppositum et
rationem quid sumus acturi et responsuri. Iuristae enim et morales philosophi per possi-
biliter casus antequam in re accidat de observandis inquirentes veritatem exercitiis explorant”,
[Anonymous Merton College MS. 306, 1985, pp. 243-244].
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of stock-in-trade solutions. There is a restricted number of recurrent archetypes
of logical issues that medieval authors on obligations seem to be interested in and
there is a corresponding restricted number of techniques devised to resolve them.
Another related problem for the thought experiment account, is represented,
in my opinion, by the kind of sentences that are often involved in the examples.
Consider the following distinction: let us call sentences such as ‘the king is seated’,
‘you are in Rome’, ‘every man is running’ and the like, basic sentences; on the
other hand, let sentences with a more complex structure – involving the presence
of obligational operators such as ‘concessum’, ‘concedendum’, ‘negandum’ and
the like – be called higher-order sentences. It seems that much of the discussion
occurring in obligations treatises is devoted in great measure (if not actually for
the most part) to explore the conflicts arising by virtue of the combination of basic
sentences with higher-order sentences. For instance, take a case of a disputation
in which it turns out that a sentence p ought to be conceded but also that the
sentence ‘p ought to be conceded’ ought to be denied, which we can express by
means of OCp and ON(OCp).119 It seems di!cult to regard a case like that as
being designed to perform any form of reasoning secundum imaginationem. Rather
the point is to establish what should and what should not be asserted in a given
disputational context.
And here, again, the question is in virtue of what mutual relations certain sen-
tences should be conceded, denied or doubted, rather than a matter of determining
what (states of a"airs) can be consistently said to obtain in the imaginary situ-
ations described by those sentences. The two levels di"er in no small measure.
The insistence on the evaluation of the respondent’s behaviour with respect to the
speech acts he performs in a given disputation takes the shape of a struggle over
sentences and the presence of so many cases in which the evaluation takes place
within the context of the disputation, i.e. infra tempus, by means of iterated oper-
ations of concession, denial or doubt suggest little concern, as it were, with partial
descriptions of possible worlds. That being said, if a disputation contains only sen-
tences of the basic type, it lends itself very well to be read in Yrjösuuri’s terms: in
a disputation of such a sort conducted according to the rules of responsio antiqua,
the conjunction of all evaluated sentences always turns out to be the description
of a possible situation (or of a class of worlds in which that situation is true).120
119 By the way, this often happens to be the case in obligational disputations. For an example
of this kind of problem in Peter of Mantua, cf. infra, Part II, sec. 4.17 !. This circumstance has
to do with the failure of the principle OCp 2 OC(OC(p)) which, along with a number of other
similar theses, is not universally accepted. An interesting discussion concerning Strode’s treat-
ment of such topics is found in [Dutilh Novaes, 2006a, pp. 368–373] and [Dutilh Novaes, 2007,
pp. 209–213].
120 That the conjunction of all evaluated steps be a possible sentence is Peter’s fourth rule, cf.
infra, Part II, sec. 2.4. I am not claiming that in disputations involving higher-order sentences
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But if we consider more complex situations involving not only basic sentences but
also application of the obligational operators as above, then it seems less plausi-
ble to claim that at stake is an assessment of co-tenability or the investigation of
possible state of a"airs. Usually it also looks like a way to make the exercise more
di!cult by describing, from the inside, what is going on in the disputation, like
for instance by proposing sentences like ‘tu concedis istam’, ‘ista est concedenda’,
‘tu male respondes’.121 In sum, these accounts are quite useful and illuminating
when they deal with a restricted sub-class of disputations (involving only basic
sentences), but I think they leave out those that are centred on semantic problems
involving higher-order sentences.
To end, two other contributions that are both related to the notion of consis-
tency should be finally mentioned . The first is Martin’s suggestion that obligations
be connected to the treatment of insolubles insofar as they are based on the idea
of checking the co-tenability of sets of sentences.122 The second is a more recent
interpretation of Burley’s obligations as a prefiguration of modern theories of belief
revision.123 To sum up, here is a synoptical look at interpretations focusing on the
question of the purpose:124
are involved it is no longer required that the whole conjunction of steps be a possible sentence
too (and hence a ‘description’ of a possible situation). I am just claiming that the kind of
possible situations described by such disputations are not philosophically as appealing as the
ones Yrjönsuuri’s model relies on.
121 On the same basis, it might also be accounted for the existence and features of other subtypes
of obligations, especially petitio which focuses on duties relative to the performance of certain
speech acts (the obligatum directly involves the application of an operator to a basic sentence,
to the e!ect that a petitio to concede p is often equivalent to a positio where the positum is
Cp, i.e. a sentence like ‘tu concedis p’ or ‘p est a te concessum’) and institutio or impositio,
where, again, the point is making stipulations on language (and not, primarily, the assessment
of whether something might or might not be the case).
122 Martin insists especially on the connection with the procedure of cassatio, cf. [Martin, 1993,
p. 373] “The solution to the problem of propositions ungrounded with respect to positio or depo-
sitio found in [Obligationes Parisienses] and [Tractatus Emmerani ] is thus cassatio, apparently
the earliest of the solutions to the Liar. [. . . ] It seems to me that it makes much more sense to
speak of cancellation or annulment with respect to a positio than it does apart from that context.
I would thus suggest not only that twelfth century logicians first became aware of insolubles via
obligations but also that they developed their first solutions in terms of them”.
123 Cf. [Lagerlund and Olsson, 2001]. Although the analogy might be at first sight suggestive,
decisive objections to this view are presented in [Dutilh Novaes, 2007, pp. 148-149] on the basis
of the fact that there is definitely no possibility for the respondent to revise the evaluation of
sentences to which he has already replied and that the belief revision account would hardly be
able to explain the competitive dimension of disputations; moreover, there seem to be no textual
evidence in support of this view.
124 The list has no pretensions to being exhaustive. When a proposal has been developed
by the same author on a number of di!erent occasions, I have selected only the most relevant
contributions.
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This picture speaks for the coexistence of a variety of motives: the question
of the purpose(s) of obligations is not an irredeemable problem as long as we
accept that various needs, tendencies and aims might have prompted medieval
authors to encompass in their treatises di"erent issues and bring them together
in a conceptual framework that, moreover, turns out to evolve over time. Even
a superficial consideration of the variety of di"erent classifications of subtypes of
obligations, or of the historical development of positio alone, is su!cient to justify
the claim that we need to be somehow eclectic.
Once we have picked out a preferred interpretation (on the grounds, for in-
stance, that it fits at best a class of texts or problems), we need not exclude, in
1. OBLIGATIONS AT A GLANCE 46
principle, that an alternative reading might capture in a better way a distinct class
of problems. My claim, to be sure, is not that anything goes. Nor does it reduce
to a generic statement of methodological caution. Rather, I think we should be
ready to take into account the hypothesis that there might have been indeed dif-
ferent purposes, say, in the treatment of positio impossibilis in the first half of the
XIII century and in that of impositio in a late XIV century treatise like Peter of
Mantua’s.
In this literature there is an undeniable practical component oriented to the
aim of teaching or testing one’s ability in handling logical inferences. This basic
underlying thread should not be overlooked, especially because for the most part
the scant textual evidence that medieval authors have left us with, confirm this
hypothesis, if any. On the other hand, there are plausibly a lot of additional issues
that come into play, but they should be contextualized when appropriate evidence
speak for their presence. The most well-balanced judgement on these matters still
remains the one pronounced by Ashworth twenty years ago in her introduction to
Paul of Venice’s edition.125.
125 Cf. [Ashworth, 1988a, pp. xiii-xiv]“A contentious and as yet unresolved issue has to do
with the purpose of obligations treatises. The treatises themselves do not o!er much discussion
of this point being content to remark that the opponent in a disputation is to try to push the
respondent into accepting a contradiction, whereas the respondent has to resist this [. . . ]. In the
process both participants would have their knowledge of valid inferences thouroughly tested [. . . ].
It should be also emphasized that the bulk of almost all treatises on obligations consisted of a
series of sophisms which [. . . ] formed an integral part, at least in fourteenth century Oxford, and
were designed to develop a student’s subtlety and skill in handling logical rules. These remarks
suggest that obligational disputations (if such were ever in fact held) had the primary function
of providing oral exercise in formal logic, and hence were of mainly pedagogical significance”. In
addition to that, after mentioning Spade’s and Stump’s views, Ashworth maintains that “there
is probably something to be said for all these accounts [and that remains true, I think, of most
accounts that have been put forward thereafter]. Insofar as these treatises described a routine
to be followed in class-room disputations, the purpose could only have been that of testing a
student’s skill in formal logic, since truth was explicitly not an issue; but the authors and readers
of such treatises obviously welcomed the opportunity to discuss other matters in some depth [. . . ]
One must also bear in mind the often-noted link between treatises on obligations and treatises
on insolubles. [. . . ] This suggests a general interest in discussing all kinds of paradoxes, both
semantic and non-semantic” cf. [Ashworth, 1988a, p. xiv].
PART II
Peter of Mantua’s obligations
Life and works
Presumably, the first relevant reference to Peter of Mantua in modern times is
due to Prantl, who devotes some space to the description of Peter’s Logica in his
Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande.126 His name also features among those of a
number of medieval authors considered by Duhem in his Études sur Léonard de
Vinci.127 Both Prantl and Duhem wrongly take him to be a XV century author.128
More systematic attention to his figure began to arise, only in the mid XX century,
within the environment of historians of Renaissance philosophy and intellectual
milieu.129 Although De Libera’s claim that Peter is the only great Italian logician
of the Trecento130 might stand in the need of further corroboration on the basis of a
deeper assessment of his logical doctrines, “Peter’s influence on his contemporaries
and succeeding generations of scholars seems to have exceeded any merely parochial
limits”.131 First and foremost, Peter’s profile is that of a full-blown scholastic, his
renown being justly due to the depth and length of his Logica as well as to the
original ideas exposed in his treatise De primo et ultimo instanti.132 Among his
126 Cf. [Prantl, 1870, pp. 176–180]. As far as other general histories of logic are concerned,
[Kneale and Kneale, 1962] does not mention him at all, whereas a short reference is found in
[Bochenski, 1961, p. 219] that cursorily brings up Peter’s treatment of the fourth syllogistic
figure.
127 Cf. [Duhem, 1913, pp. 495 and 535].
128 The first to identify the error was Kristeller, who suggested that both had confused the
dates of publication of Peter’s work (in the late XV century) with the dates of his life, cf.
[Kristeller, 1956, p. 577 f. 67].
129 Cf. [Garin, 1948], [Dionisotti, 1955] and [Vasoli, 1963].
130 Cf. [De Libera, 1982, p. 254]. From the historical standpoint, moreover, it should be pointed
out that recent research has cast light on a much earlier figure such as Franciscus de Prato, cf.
[Amerini, 2006], and that Paul of Venice’s most relevant logical works, the Logica Parva and
Logica Magna, have both been dated to the last decade of the XIV century, cf. [Bottin, 1983,
pp. 87–93].
131 Cf. [James, 1974, p. 167].
132 An unpublished study with the edition of this text is [James, 1968]. Cf. also
[De Libera, 1982] for a discussion of Apollinare O!redi’s reaction to Peter’s doctrine of tem-
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connections, however, we also find a prominent humanist like Coluccio Salutati
and there is enough evidence to claim that he was familiar with the intellectual
tendencies that were emerging in his time.133
The state of our knowledge about Peter’s life is fragmentary, to say the least,
and it is confined, in all likelihood, only to the last ten years that preceded his
death. A bunch of facts are witnessed by historical sources that inform us about
his name and geographical provenance.134 What we know basically relies on the
university records of Padua and Bologna, on two letters,135 and on scattered sources
of heterogeneous sorts that mention his name or his works. Peter is recorded
among the ‘Scolari della filosofia, logica dal 1355 al 1390’ at the university of
Padua, in September 1389, under the name of ‘Pietro Alboini da Mantova, figlio di
Giovanni’.136 Unfortunately, however, we do not have any additional information
poral limits. It should be noted, finally, that an intriguing reference found in [Garin, 1960, p.
389] might prompt the belief that to the record of Peter’s work we should add a commentary
on the Physics, possibly lost, which was mentioned in the Catalogue de la Bibliothèque de M. le
C.mte D. Bouturlin, Florence 1831, p. 20. The codex to which the catalogue refers still exists
in fact (Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Cod. 1348, Fondo Ashburnham), but unfor-
tunately it is not a commentary on the Physics. It is a composite manuscript containing Peter’s
De instanti, the Questiones on the latitude of forms by Blasius of Parma, and a long section
with Buridan’s commentary on the Parva naturalia.
133 The two essential contributions to the reconstruction of Peter’s life are [Vasoli, 1963] and
[James, 1974]. My exposition is mainly based on the latter, who has also published, on a separate
occasion, a fragment of an exposition of the first letter of Seneca to Lucilius which is attributed to
Peter, cf. [James, 1976] and also [Buonocore, 2000, p. 36]. Kristeller has also insisted on Peter’s
relevance to the curriculum of the Italian universities, cf. [Kristeller, 1996, p. 83] “ [...]“the
sophistic” logic which flourished in the fourteenth century at Oxford [...] began to spread in
Italy and found its first influential representative in Peter of Mantua who studied at Padua but
taught in his later years at Bologna and died before 1400”, as well as on his connection with the
humanist trends, cf. [Kristeller, 1985, p. 83–84].
134 The connection with Mantua is confirmed by a curious example of profiteering and human
greed. Novati mentions (unfortunately without providing the archive signature) a letter from the
Archivio storico Gonzaga in Mantua , addressed to the secretary of the Lord of the Mantua from
a law student called Rainerius de Fanctellinis, who pleaded with him that a benefit previously
allotted to Peter be assigned to him after Peter’s death: “cum sit quod excellentissimum artium
doctor magister Petrus de Mantua decesserit, quo multum doleo et deflendum est quodlibet
in morte tanti viri, qui habuerat Mantue unum beneficium aut clericam vel archisacerdatum
(sic), considerata paupertate quam magna [...] instantissime vos deprecor, ut prefato eidem [...]
domino nostro scribatis quod me vellit de hoc beneficio subvenire” [Novati, 1911, p. 319].
135 The first letter is dated from Bologna, November 5, 1392 and is addressed by Peter to his
former friend Pietro Tomasi, in Padua. The second letter is dated from Florence, August, 26
1398 and is addressed by Coluccio Salutati to Peter, in Bologna, cf. [Cessi, 1913, pp. 130–131]
and [Novati, 1911, pp. 318–322], respectively. As far as the former is concerned, [James, 1974, p.
161 f. 2] points out that Cessi’s article (along with another source) are based on a manuscript of
the Archivio di Stato in Venice (Procurator di S. Marco di Citra, Atti Congregazione di Carità,
Busta 120) but that according to Kristeller the letter is no longer to be found there.
136 Cf. [Gloria, 1888, p. 512] “Pietro Alboini da Mantova figlio di Giovanni, (sett. 1389) a
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about his studies there. After three years, in 1392, we find him in Bologna, where
the o!cial rolls of the university tell us that he was a teacher of natural philosophy
in 1392-1393. His name appears in the same source also for the years 1395-1396,
1397-1398 as a teacher of moral philosophy, whereas in 1398-1399 he is appointed
to teach both natural and moral philosophy.137 As for the years 1393–1395, we have
no information to rely on from the extant rolls. For this period, however, we can
conjecture, that Peter was still teaching in that university on the basis of a reference
found in the life of Ugo Benzi of Siena, a famous physician and commentator of
Galen and Avicenna, who first studied and later taught at Bologna.138 Peter
seems therefore to have pursued a continuous academic activity in the prestigious
Studium from 1392 to 1399.139 As far as the date of his death is concerned, James
has proposed convincing arguments in support of the claim that it is likely to have
occurred before the end of 1399.140
There are no elements for a solid datation of Peter’s Logica. It has been conjec-
tured, however, that since his teaching activity is uniquely concerned with natural
and moral philosophy from 1392 onwards and, on the other hand, Peter was still
engaged in the study of logic in 1389 at Padua, it is in that span of years that he
might have written his treatise.141
Despite the brevity of Peter’s academic career, which is all enclosed in a
decade, his influence on the Italian university environment should not be underes-
S. Margherita nella casa di Giovanni da Marliano milanese abate di S. Cipriano di Murano e
dottore dei decreti: n. 9 Mon. 1389, 3 Settembre”.
137 Along with Jacobus de Armis and Franciscus de Camerino, cf. [Dallari, 1889, pp. 16–
17]. Peter himself in the letter to Tomasi mentions the two colleagues and boasts about the
number of students attending his classes and about his salary, cf. [Cessi, 1913, p. 131] “hic
tamen me legentem scias naturalem philosophiam concurrentem cum magistro Jacobo de Armis
et cum magistro Francesco de Camerino, quorum uterque succumbit. Magister vero Jacobus de
Armis me minor nunquam maior in scolaribus fuit, nisi duobus primis diebus [...] Habeo etiam
sesqualterum salarium ad illorum utrumque”.
138 Ugo was in Bologna in the year 1393 and “became a devoted follower of the illustrious
dialectician, Peter of Mantua, and attended him with such veneration that Ugo addressed him
as ‘father’ ” [Lockwood, 1951, p. 23].
139 Cf. [James, 1974, p. 163].
140 Cf. [James, 1974, pp. 166–167].
141 Cf. [James, 1974, p. 163]. In the same place, James proposes 1392-1395 as the years of
composition of the De instanti. Caution is always in order when it comes to geographical refer-
ences in medieval logic texts, but I think it is worth noting, at this point, that two manuscripts
of the Logica, O and M, have ‘credas regem esse Bononie’ in a place where the other manuscripts
have the more common ‘credas papam esse Romae’ (even if referring, by end of the XIV century,
to the Pope’s being in Rome as an example of uncontroversial truth looks pretty much like a
mockery). The presence of such a reference might depend on various factors: the place where the
manuscript was copied being a strong candidate. But it cannot be excluded, in principle, that
the geographical reference was already in the original. In that case, one might wonder whether
Peter had already in Bologna when he wrote the Logica (or at least the treatise on obligations).
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timated.142 The Logica is read and commented upon in the prominent intellectual
environments of Padua, Bologna, and Pavia.143 One of the extant witnesses of the
work was copied by a student of the university of Ferrara, Johannes de Medallis of
Brescia, in 1420.144 Peter is explicitly referred to in the Recollectae super sophis-
matibus Hentisberi by Caietan of Thiene and Simon of Lendenaria,145 who both
discuss some of his logical doctrines (with a stunning example being taken from
the treatise on obligations).146 Moreover, Peter’s reputation in the XV and XVI
centuries is witnessed by the number of manuscripts and printed editions of his
Logica and De primo et ultimo instanti, by four commentaries on the latter and
by numerous references made to those texts in the works of later authors.147
142 A manuscript with Peter’s Logica features in the will of Benedetto Greco, cf. [Garin, 1960,
p. 204]. A copy of the text was also owned by Giovanni Marcanova, a XV century humanist and
friend of Andrea Mantegna, cf. [Vitali, 1983, p. 151 f. 51]. Marcanova’s library was bequested
in 1443 to the convent of San Giovanni in Verdara in Padua, and became, eventually, part of the
funds of the Biblioteca Marciana, where the manuscript is still preserved (it is the witness that
I have called V).
143 Cf. [Vasoli, 1963, p. 5].
144 It is the manuscript now at the Biblioteca Comunale of Mantua that I have labelled M.
Johannes also made a copy of Strode’s obligations which is found in the same manuscript. A
marginal note, possibly in a di!erent hand, from the latter, explicitly points to a convergence
of opinions between Peter and Strode on a certain technical problem: “Nota quod Petrus de
Mantua insequitur istam opinionem quam hic insequitur Strot” [Ralph Strode, Obl., Mantua,
fol. 131vb in margine]. The note then goes on like this “scilicet quod quando modus finaliter
subsequitur illa est distinguenda: si autem determinat totum dictum est in sensu composito; si
autem li ‘est’ solum, est in sensu diviso, quod non” [the page is cut o! at bottom edge].
145 For detailed references cf. [James, 1974, p. 169 f. 41] which mentions the early printed
versions of both texts. They are found also in a manuscript at Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana,
L.VI.128 (2559). I have used this source to check the passages where Peter is mentioned and I
will refer to it again below.
146 Cf. infra, Part II, sec. 3.39–3.40. The source for the sophism seems to be quite definitely
Heytesbury’s Regulae.
147 The Logica has survived in six manuscripts plus a seventh long fragment. I have already
mentioned two of them, M and V, and the complete list will be given below. The fragment is in
the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2189 and consists only of the chapters De terminis
o!ciabilibus and De equipollentiis, cf. [Maier, 1961, p. 161]. Four printed editions in the XV
century are known (not five, as [De Libera, 1982, p. 52] has claimed, on account of a misinterpre-
tation of Copinger 4724 which is in fact now commonly recognized as the editio princeps printed
in Padua, by Johannes Herbort, probably in 1477). The De instanti enjoyed an even greater
fortune. There are fifteen extant manuscripts, and five manuscripts containing three commen-
taries on the work (three of the commentary by Apollinare O!redi, one of the commentary by
Giovanni Marliani and one by an anonymous commentator. The last known commentary is the
one by Mengo Bianchelli: it survives only in an edition printed in Venice in 1507. References
to Peter’s work are found also in Ermolao Barbaro (according to the identification made by
Dionisotti, of a purported ‘filosofastro mantovano’ with Peter, cf. [Dionisotti, 1955, p. 232 and
234]). A dedicatory letter by Bassano Politi da Lodi to Rodrigo Carvajal in the 1505 edition
of a collection of works of Swyneshed (the calculator), Bradwardine, Blasius Pelacani of Parma
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To end, I would like to point out one thing that might be relevant to confirm the
hypothesis of Peter’s direct acquaintance with Strode’s (and Buser’s) obligations.
It is an unfortunate circumstance that we know almost nothing about Peter’s early
education and about his university career as a student, apart from the solid link
with Padua. That might be su!cient, however, if we combine it with a piece of
information that comes, again, from the letter that Peter wrote in 1392 to Tomasi,
to strongly argue in favour of a direct acquaintance with both authors, even besides
the textual evidence that will be presented below.
There is one especially interesting fact about this letter.148 Peter mentions a
number of people of the Paduan circle to which he used to belong before moving to
Bologna and sends his regards, among others, to a ‘m. Almericus’.149 It happens
to be the case that two manuscripts in the Bodleian Library in Oxford contain the
treatises on obligations of Strode and Buser, respectively: and the name of the
copyist is in both cases Almerico da Serravalle, student of Arts at Padua in the
early 1390s.150 Moreover, it turns out that the Almericus mentioned by Peter in
his letter to Tomasi certainly is an Almericus da Serravalle (his last name occurs
several times in other letters transcribed and discussed in Cessi’s article). It is
highly plausible that they are in fact one and the same person. This hypothesis is
corroborated by an additional piece of evidence, i.e. another name which occurs
in both contexts. In his letter, Peter sends his regards also to a ‘m. Anthonio
de Monte’. And again, an Antonio da Monte151 is involved in the history of
Canon. misc. 219, because he is the copyist of a number of slightly later treatises
(referable to the year 1395) that are contained in that manuscript. Antonio the
copyist is also more directly related to Strode’s and Buser’s obligations, because
he comes into possession of the two manuscripts that are both passed on to him
by Almerico. Now, it is possible, in principle, that there have existed two distinct
pairs of people (a) with the same names, (b) coming from the same geographical
area (where area has a precise meaning: Padua), (c) living and studying in the
same span of years, i.e. the early 1390s, (d) having some kind of direct or indirect
relation to two particular logical treatises: in one case via the two manuscripts
and in the other case via the acquaintance with someone (= Peter) who knew
and others, mentions the De instanti and the commentary on it by Giovanni Marliani, cf. again
[Dionisotti, 1955, p. 238].
148 To my knowledge, the connection has been first proposed by [Maierù, 1982b, p. 90].
149 Cf. [Cessi, 1913, p. 131].
150 Cf. [Ashworth, 1988a, p. 393]. Strode’s text is found in ms. Canon. misc. 219, fols.
37ra–47ra, there is no date, but Almerico copied the preceding tract on consequences in 1393.
Buser’s text is found in ms. Canon. Class. Lat. 278, fols. 72ra-78rb and the copy is dated 1391.
151 We apprehend, from two explicit in ms. Canon. misc. 219, that Antonio was a student of
Arts in the mid 1390s (expl. of Henricus Anglicus’ insolubilia on fol. 11vb), and that he was from
Padua (expl. of Heytesbury’s De sensu composito et diviso on fol. 6rb); cf. also [Maierù, 1982b,
pp. 98–99].
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both texts. That these four conditions have simultaneously obtained is a possible
circumstance, indeed; but it is very unlikely.
Whatever the exact terms of these interesting historical relations, the most
striking fact is that the environment Peter had left at the beginning of the 1390s in
Padua was remarkably up-to-date with respect to the developments of logic North
of the Alps. Peter’s Logica, in this connection, is another significant element for
the history of the influence of English logic in Italy. If it is true that this history
did not start as late as the end of the XIV century,152 it is also true that Italy is
the area in which this tradition survived and flourished best, especially after the
beginning of the XV century.153
Whether Peter has been up to Salutati’s expectations154 and has succeeded
in reviving the splendours of philosophy in Italy at the turn of the century is a
question that the study of his obligations will not resolve once and for all. Yet, it
looks much less relevant to the history of logic than it might be to the history of
the humanist obsession with the spectre of the barbari britanni.155
152 Cf. for instance the general survey in [Courtenay, 1982].
153 Cf. [Ashworth and Spade, 1992, p. 60].
154 In this respect it is worth quoting in full the opening passages of Salutati’s letter to Peter,
which should count “Iam pridem, vir insignis, te fama perceperam virum admirande scientie
de physices altitudine inauditis speculationibus eminere. Quod quidem gaudebam et gaudeo,
ne videretur hec, quam hodie philosophiam dicimus, a Grecis quondam, nunc ab Italis ad toto
divisos orbe Britannos omnino fugisse. Nimis enim molestum est, quod tantum sua cum dis-
sidentia Latium laboret, quod, cum armorum super omnes gentes gloria floruerit, hac nostra
etate langueat et de vincente victum turpiter obtorpescat. Habemus enim in excusatione huiusce
pudoris discordie nostre culpam; sed vinci litteris, quibus etiam vigente Grecia florebamus, adeo
turpe iudico, quod nichil excusationis inveniam, nisi turpem desidiam, scilicet voluptates, et,
radix malorum omnium, cupiditatem; nam discordia in maximis civitatibus et in regnis quoddam
quasi necessarium malum est. Gaudebam igitur apud nos emergere, qui barbaris illis quondam
gentibus saltem in hoc palmam eriperet, qualem me tibi [read: te mihi] fama et multorum relatio
promittit” [Novati, 1911, pp. 318-320].
155 Cf. [Garin, 1960] and [Vasoli, 1952].
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Structure and contents
Some comments are in order, before finally coming to the text. Since the basic
logical features of Peter’s account have already been described above and I will
discuss below in the notes to the treatise the fundamental issues it raises, I shall
confine myself, in this section, to a brief outline of its structure. Peter’s treatise
on obligations features in the Logica as its last or as its penultimate chapter (de-
pending on the witness). In the 1492 printed edition on which my transcription
is based,156 the treatise on obligations is actually the penultimate, preceded by
the treatise De scire et dubitare and followed by the treatise De insolubilibus.157
156 Cf. [Peter of Mantua, 1492a].
157 Here is the comprehensive list of contents of the Logica, as is found in
[Peter of Mantua, 1492a]:
1. Tractatus de suppositionibus sig. Aiira – Aiiiira
2. Tractatus de relativis sig. Aiiiira – Aiiii+3vb
3. Tractatus de ampliationibus sig. Aiiii+3vb – Bra
4. Tractatus de appellationibus sig. Brb – B3rb
5. De probatione propositionis universalis sig. B3va – Biiii+1ra
6. De probatione propositionis exclusive sig. Biiii+1ra – Biiii+3vb
7. De expositione reduplicative sig. Biiii+3vb – Cra
8. De expositione illius termini ‘infinitum’ sig. Cra – Cva
9. De probatione propositionis exceptive sig. Cva – C+1vb
10. De expositione de li ‘totus’, ‘tota’, ‘totum’ sig. C+1vb – Ciirb
11. De expositione illius termini ‘eternaliter’, ‘ab
eterno’ et ‘semper’
sig. Ciiva – Ciiva
12. De expositione illius termini ‘di"ert’, ‘aliud’ et
de ly ‘non idem’ et de terminis positivis
sig. Ciiva – C3rb
13. De comparativo sig. C3va – C3+1rb
14. De expositione gradus superlativi sig. C3+1rb – C3+2ra
15. Tractatus de ‘incipit’ et ‘desinit’ sig. C3+2ra – C3+4va
16. De ly ‘immediate’ sig. C3+4va – C3+4vb
17. Tractatus de veritate et falsitate sive de taliter
et qualiter
sig. C3+4vb – Diiii+1rb
18. Tractatus de terminis privativis sig. Diiii+1rb – Diiii+3ra
19. Tractatus syllogismorum sig. Diiii+3ra – Diiii+4vb
20. De syllogismo expositorio sig. Diiii+4vb – Eiira
21. De syllosigmo resolutorio sig. Eiira – Eiiiira
22. De terminis o!ciabilibus et o!ciatis et de de-
scriptibilibus
sig. Eiiiira – Eiiiiva
23. De equipollentiis sig. Eiiiiva – Eiiii+1va
24. De conversionibus sig. Eiiii+1va – Eiiii+2va
25. Tractatus de consequentiis sig. Eiiii+2va – Fiiii+1rb
26. Tractatus de scire et dubitare sig. Fiiii+1rb – Giira
27. Tractatus obligationum sig. Giira – Giiii+4vb
27. Tractatus de insolubilibus sig. Giiii+4vb – Hiivb
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Leaving aside independent treatises, i.e. treatises that do not feature in more
comprehensive works on logic either because of some event in the transmission of
the text that has make it come down to us separately or because of the original
intention of the author, the location of obligations in the final part of logical works
is by no means an unusual characteristic.158 As to the internal structure, Peter’s
treatise can be divided into six main sections.
1. Preliminary assumptions
2. Rules
3. Sophisms on positio
4. Further subdivisions of positio and other sophisms
5. Impositio
6. Depositio
The distinction between the six sections (save in the case of the fourth one
which might be a little far-fetched since it contains heterogeneous materials) is
quite sharp. The first two sections provide the conceptual basis of the theory. In
the first one Peter gives his definition of obligatio, a characterization of the notions
of positio and admissio, he lays down the principle according to which outside the
time of the disputation one is always supposed to tell the truth, and finally he
supplies a clarification of the meaning of the crucial properties ‘concedendum’ and
‘negandum’ (= such that it ought to be granted or denied, respectively). In the
second section, five obligational rules (for positio) are laid down. The first rule
governs the admission of the positum; the second rule norms the concession and
denial of what follows or whose negation follows from the positum alone; the third
rule extends the regimentation to sentences that follow or whose negations follow
from whatever belongs to the set of previously granted or denied sentences; the
fourth rule stipulates that the conjunction of all members of the set of sentences
that constitute the outcome of the disputation must be a possible sentence; even-
tually, the fifth rule provides instructions for replying to irrelevant sentences. The
first two sections (especially the second) may be regarded as the theoretical bulk
of the whole treatise and, in a sense, a great deal of what comes next is func-
tional to an articulated assessment of their features and applications. The set of
rules is complete, insofar as it provides in principle an algorithm to determine in
158 As Angelelli has claimed, with regard to the position of the treatise in Paul of Venice’s Logica
Magna and Logica Parva, “this is not by way of exotic appendix; on the contrary, obligations
are a sort of culmination of logic”, cf. [Angelelli, 1970, p. 803].
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a mechanical way the correct response to any sentence whatsoever that might be
posited or proposed in a disputation.159
The third section contains five groups of arguments, centred in turn on the
analysis of several clusters of sophisms. Although, again, the distinction is drawn
primarily for the sake of clarity and it is not my intention to claim that Peter
necessarily had such a division in mind, it is hard to escape the impression that
in the treatise there emerges an implicit agenda of problems in which he seems
to be particularly interested.160 All sophisms in the third section focus on positio
and should hold as tantamount objections raised against the adopted set of rules
(especially against the first two).
According to the type of logical issue that, each time, is being taken into
account, I have grouped them as follows: (I) underdetermined sentences (they
cause problems, when posited, because the respondent does not actually know
what he is replying to); (II) contradictions;161 (III) time and context of utterance;
(IV) pragmatic paradoxes; (V) other materials (two sophisms on the notion of
sequens and the distinction between possible and possibly-true, respectively).
The fourth section opens with a classification of further subtypes of positio
which cannot qualify as independent species of obligations (the only two that
Peter acknowledges being positio and depositio). It then goes on with examples
illustrating the features of such subtypes and finally displays a battery of sophisms
dealing with more complex instances of positio.162
159 As I have already stressed above, the distinction between what I call basic sentences and
higher-order sentences might prompt us to water down this claim. But still, when the theory
is put on trial in sophisms, the practice suggests that Peter makes no real distinction between
plain and complex cases, and regards the rules as applying at a general level and in a consistent
way: for the most part, when something goes wrong (as only the construction of an appropriate
tailor-made artificial example can show), the respondent has the duty to reject the casus and
this move does not count as an easy escape, since it is built in the rules.
160 I will just mention here some relevant issues that we will encounter in the treatise: (a)
careful rejection of any objection that might be raised to charge his set of rules with even
the slightest form of inconsistency, (b) the use of certificatio to remove cases of ambiguity or
indeterminacy, (c) a detailed account of the properties of impositio, with a stunning number of
sophisms on suppositio (involving anaphoric expressions, quantifiers and so on), (d) rejection of
positio impossibilis, and (e) the use of a strategy of response per ordinem (especially when the
respondent finds himself in troubled waters).
161 This group of sophisms is particularly interesting because Peter proves to be clearly deal-
ing with the problem of Spade’s (4f)-inconsistency, cf. [Spade, 1982b, p. 9]. The conclusion
Peter draws coincides in a nutshell with the backbone of the relativized interpretation, cf.
[Ashworth, 1981, pp. 183–186]. There is no inconsistency whatsoever in the rules of respon-
sio antiqua, because, at most, contradictory sentences are admitted or conceded with respect to
di"erent disputations.
162 In this context, Peter partially retrieves a traditional taxonomy involving for instance positio
cadens and positio renascens. In the discussion of the last sophism of this section, he also proves to
be aware of a standard corollary of responsio antiqua which is often referred to in the literature
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The fifth section is extremely dense. The topic it deals with is impositio which
Peter does not regard as an independent type of obligation, but that turns out to
be of great interest to him, at least if we judge by the amount of space he devotes
to its treatment and by the complexity of the sophisms he discusses. Impositio is
the obligation by virtue of which a respondent commits himself to responding in
conformity with the stipulation of a (new) meaning for a word or a sentence. The
internal division of this part of the treatise includes two opening sections where
Peter makes some cursory remarks about the distinction between mental language
and spoken or written language and about the relation between stipulations, rele-
vance (in the technical sense of obligations) and truth. After spelling out some his
philosophical presuppositions, Peter seems to have four main points to make. He
first deals with the case in which a spoken or written term that did not previously
signify is assigned a meaning for the first time. In the central part of the section,
he then turns to the case of real variations of meaning, which take place when the
ascription of meaning is relative to a word or to a sentence that did previously
signify. Third, he engages in a lengthy analysis of sophisms involving, in various
non-standard ways, the standard modes of suppositio (which seems quite sensi-
ble, since the ‘meaning’ of syncategorematic terms are strictly related with the
latter).163 Fourth and last, he takes up the issue of logically (or metaphysically)
incompatible sentences that are assumed to convert.
The treatise ends with a relatively short section on depositio.164 Peter regards
depositio as an independent species of obligation and introduces some basic rules
that are the mirror image of those of positio, with the di"erence that in this case
the obligatum must be denied whenever it is put forward during a disputation,
as well as anything which entails it. There are two interesting facts about the
kind of sophisms that Peter discusses in this section. First, it is only here that he
makes use of a standard form of argument – based on the assumption that two or
more sentences have the same vs. di"erent truth values – which is otherwise very
common in treatises on obligations.165 Second, there is a prevailing recourse to
on obligations, namely the fact the respondent can be in principle forced to grant any false
sentence which is logically compatible with a contingently false positum.
163 I use inverted commas here, since it might be not entirely appropriate to speak of meaning
when it comes to syncategorematic terms. In any case, the important fact is that Peter, in this
discussion, plays with the logical properties of quantified terms or anaphoric expressions and
modifies the inferences that are usually associated with them.
164 This seems a common practice as well, cf. for instance [William Buser, 1990, pp. 234–237],
[Paul of Venice, 1988, pp. 369–391].
165 This technique, involving the so-called similars and dissimilars, is very well-suited, for
instance, to prove the aforementioned corollary of the set of rules of responsio antiqua. Typically,
one would posit a false sentence p and then propose that p and another arbitrary false sentence
q are similar (= have the same truth value). Usually this step would be regarded as irrelevant
and true, since p and q have indeed the same truth value (they are both false). But then, no
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sophisms involving truth and falsehood combined with some kind of self-reference.
If we take the ordering of chapters that is reflected in the incunable as the right one,
this circumstance – I would venture to say – might be not entirely unconnected
with the need of introducing in some way the imminent treatment of insolubles.
matter what q stands for, if it is proposed it would have to be granted, because it would follow
from the two preceding steps.
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NOTE TO THE TEXT
The text presented here is a transcription of the treatise on obligations included
in the typographical edition of Peter of Mantua’s Logica, printed in Venice in
April 1492 by Bonetus Locatellus (from the microfilm of the exemplar conserved
in Oxford, Bodleian Library, Auct.2 Q V I). It goes without saying, therefore,
that it is by no means a critical edition. Rather, it should count as a preliminary
study in preparation of it. The reason of this choice is that an essential step
toward the accomplishment of such a task is the need of reaching at least a first
comprehensive understanding of the content of the treatise, which is quite dense
and complex. Moreover, Peter’s Logica has survived in six manuscripts (four of
them are complete – M, O, P and V – while two – B and L – preserve a large
portion of the work, including the treatise that is object of my study) and has
been printed in four editions during the XV century: Padua 1477, Pavia 1483,
Venice 1492 (April) and, finally, Venice 1492 (December). Due to the complexity
of the work and to the obvious necessity of a rigorous establishment of the stemma
(with a view to a future edition of the text) I have opted for a first presentation
of it with a partial collation of the manuscripts. I have a rough, preliminary
hypothesis on the relations among the witnesses and some hints are given by
[James, 1968] with regard to the treatise De instanti. James’s stemma, however,
is not fully convincing, for at least in the case of the treatise on obligations, his
conclusions appear to be not always consistent with the preliminary results of my
collation. Be this as it may, a good deal of further research will be needed to reach
a satisfactory starting point for the edition. For the moment I assume that the
text of E, B and V are related to one another, while L, M, O, P possibly belong
to a distinct family. In many respects, O seems to be a good witness and this
is the reason why I have picked it out as control-text for my study. In absence
of a critically established text, I have decided to adopt, at least, a criterion of
strong homogeneity and internal coherence: the text presented here is therefore
strictly adherent to that of the 1492 (Apr.) edition. This means in turn that,
save for rare occasions, the transcription faithfully reproduces that text, including
its errors and imprecisions. An awkward feature of it, for instance, is a certain
stylistic inconsistency, which results particularly in a somehow loose use of the
demonstratives ‘ille’ and ‘iste’, that are employed interchangeably, throughout the
treatise, often within the context of the same sentence to refer to the same term
or sequence of terms. Despite the sense of uneasiness that this may cause to the
reader, I have opted for a non-intervention policy. On the other hand, in the
apparatus, the outcome of a complete collation of manuscript O is found, and for
some loci critici, variants documented in some or all of the witnesses are registered,
especially in case of conceptual di!culties. Moreover, the text of the edition
is sometimes mistaken or needs to be supplemented to become understandable:
in those cases too, I have made no direct intervention in the text, but decided,
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rather, to discuss all problems in the footnotes, where the necessary references
are also given to the variants recorded in the apparatus. I have also kept the
spelling of the edition, which for instance always has ‘e’ instead of the classical
diphthong ‘ae’ in words like ‘consequentie’, ‘ille’ (for ‘illae’) and so on. On the other
hand, manuscript O has often characteristic Italian spellings – e.g. ‘-x’ for ‘-ss’
like ‘admixum’ for ‘admissum’ – or the termination ‘-cio’ for ‘-tio’ like ‘obligacio,
sensacio’ for ‘obligatio, sensatio’. When a variant of such a kind is reported in
the apparatus, I have always standardized the spelling by supplying the received
classical form. Punctuation and the insertion of all inverted commas in the text
for mentioning words and sentences are mine.
I am aware that this approach su"ers from some defects, for a critical edition
would have resolved many problems from the outset, but still, given the present
state of textual research on Peter’s Logica, I have tried at least to be homogeneo-
us and consistent in providing a text with minimal interventions and discussing
separately all textual issues.
Finally some remarks on the overall typographical layout of this thesis are in
order. First, I have used a double vertical stroke || in the text to indicate the change
of column or folio in the edition and in the manuscripts. The indication is always
reported on the right-hand margin. In case there is more than one occurrence of
|| on the same line, the corresponding labels in the margin are ordered top-down.
Second, I obviously take full responsibility for all typos that may have slipped into
the text. But there is a number of things that I have literally not been able to
do and which are both related to the LATEX packages that I have used to write
the thesis. First, I have not found a sensible way to force the software to include
all section titles (numbered and in uppercase body) and subsection numbers (in
bold) between !. . . " as I have done for all other ‘external additions’ that feature
in the text. Second, there are cases of awkward pagebreaks which are due to the
interaction between the text, the length of footnotes and the apparatus: I have
tried to fix them all, but I have not always succeeded, disappointingly. Third,
the software determines automatically the spacing between words on a line. This
happens to conflict with the presence of several references on the same line, because
they are generated independently. As a result, there may be odd blank spaces in
the footnotes. To minimize this e"ect, I have sometimes been forced not to respect
the chronological order of references (especially for medieval authors). Fourth
and last, hyphenation may also turn out be incorrect on some occasions, because
the software does not unconditionally recognize the di"erence between Latin and
English rules and to do it manually was virtually unfeasible.
I apologize for these unpleasant flaws, which might look as signs of negligence.
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E = Editio typographica Venetiis, XI Kal. Maii 1492, [Bonetus Locatellus],
Oxford, Bodleian Library, Auct.2 Q V I, sig. Giira–Giiii+4vb (Hain 12855)
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fols. 116vb–126rb (saec. XV ?)
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Maria della Fava, 457, fols. 66ra–75ra (saec. XV)
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quem ipse est obligans. Ex quo sequitur, primo, quod si obligatio logica est,
obligans est; || et si obligans est, aliquis obligatur; igitur, a primo ad ultimum,
O 117ra
si obligatio est, aliquis obligatur. Patet consequentia quia sequitur ‘calefactio est,
igitur calefaciens est’, ‘visio est, igitur videns est’.1 5
1 The first preliminary assumption provides Peter’s definition of obligatio. An obligatio is, on
his view, the act by virtue of which someone plays the role of obligans in a disputation, insofar
as he is an obligans. Taken as such, the definition seems to be quite uninformative and conveys
an impression of circularity. However, at least two features must be singled out, namely the use
of the term of actus and the specification of its logical character.
(i) Definition patterns: looking at the historical development of obligations, it is possible to
identify a range of alternative definitions for the notion of obligatio and its subtypes. It is worth
pointing out from the very beginning, however, that despite the variety of patterns available,
definition is, to some extent, not the right place (or at least not the most relevant one) to look
for criteria of distinction between alternative approaches to obligations: this function is much
better accomplished by rules, since rules are the core of the process that governs responses in a
disputation. But rules can be – and in the actual practice definitely are – chosen regardless of
the adopted definition of obligation which seems to have little influence on the logical properties
of the theory (in support of the view that the two problems should be treated independently,
cf. [Schupp, 1993, p. 53]). Several patterns of definition can be identified in the obligational
literature, as is shown in the list below (I have neglected slight variations that can be found in
di!erent authors adopting the same pattern):
(1) Obligatio est praefixio alicuius enuntiabilis secundum aliquem statum:
cf. [Tractatus Emmeranus de falsi positione, 1974, p. 103], [Obligationes Parisienses, 1975,
p. 27], [William of Sherwood (?), 1963, p. 1], [William of Ockham, 1974, pp. 731–732],
[Walter Burley, 1963, p. 34], [Marsilius of Inghen, 1489, sig. Aiira], [William Buser, 1990, p. 68].
(2) Obligatio est [. . . ] alicuius ad aliquid ex petitione opponentis et concessione respondentis
astrictio. Et obligare est: aliquem ad aliquid concedendum vel negandum quod non concederet
vel negaret, in petendo opponentem et respondentem consentiendo, astringere, voluntarie autem
et remota coactione: cf. [Nicholas of Paris (?), 1998, p. 171].
(3) Obligatio est oratio composita ex signis obligationis et obligato: cf. [Albert of Saxony, 1490,
sig. Niiiira], [Roger Swyneshed, 1977, p. 252], [Paul of Venice, 2002, p. 104], and
[Paul of Pergula, 1961, p. 102].
(4) Obligatio est quaedam ars mediante qua aliquis opponens potest ligare respondentem ut
ad suum bene placitum respondeat ad obligationem sibi positam; vel obligatio est oratio me-
diante qua aliquis obligatus tenetur a"rmative vel negative ad obligationem respondere: cf.
[Richard Lavenham, 1978, p. 226], [Martinus Anglicus, 1993, p. 2], [John Tarteys, 1992, p. 671].
In addition to these authors, Ashworth has identified a significant number of English treatises
that hold this definition, which is formulated in its fullest version in Richard Billingham, cf.
1 Volo ] hic add. O 2 primo ] om. O 3 ad ultimum ] om. O 4 Patet ] et praep. O




1.2. Secundo, accipiamus quod obligatio logica habet istas species, scilicet posi-
tionem et depositionem. Et si plures videndum erit. || Ex quo || sequitur quod M 82va
E Giirbomnis positio, in hac arte logica, est obligatio et, consequenter, quod omne pone-
re est obligare. Ex quibus sequitur istam consequentiam valere ‘ego po-||no tibi P 66rb
istam, igitur ego obligo te ad istam’. Et valet ista ‘ego bene pono tibi istam, igitur 10
tu obligaris ad istam’. Et ideo bene sequitur ‘ego bene posui tibi istam, igitur tu
fuisti obligatus ad istam’.2
[Ashworth, 1985, p. 2].
(5) Obligatio est enuntiatio cui consentit se respondens esse obligatum vel se debere respon-
dere qualitercumque penes usum communiter disputantium per notam exigitur praecedentem:
[Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 78ra].
(6) Obligatio est actus obligantis: this is the definition that Peter adopts in his treatise. Cf.
also [Marsilius of Inghen, 1489, sig. Aiira] (the full passage is reported a few lines below) and
[William Buser, 1990, p. 68]. In addition to that, a significant discussion can be found in the
first part of Paul of Venice’s treatise (especially relevant to this point is the seventh descriptio,
providing Paul’s definition of obligatio), cf. [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 6].
(7) Obligatio est relatio limitans ad aliquod enuntiabile vel sibi consimile aliqualiter sustinendum:
cf. [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 6]. The terms of the relation are explained as follows: “obligatio est
in praedicamento relationis, et est formaliter relatio fundata in obligante et obligato: in obligante,
ratione positionis vel depositionis; in obligato, vero ratione admissionis” [Paul of Venice, 1988,
p. 10].
(ii) With respect to the qualification of the kind of obligation under consideration as obligatio
logica, it is noteworthy that such a lexical accuracy is not common in medieval treatises on the
topic, and suggests the existence of other kinds of obligations beyond logical ones. In this connec-
tion, scattered remarks are found in the literature, cf. for instance [Marsilius of Inghen, 1489, sig.
Aiira] “Primo notandum est quod obligatio multis modis capitur; uno modo pro actu quo quis obli-
gatur alteri in aliquo bono, quod multis modis contingit, puta ex pacto vel sine pacto, sicut habet
videri sexto Ethicorum; de hac obligatione nihil est ad presens. Secundo capitur logicaliter, puta
pro actu obligantis aliquem ad sustinendum pro certo tempore aliquam propositionem secundum
aliquem statum et sic capitur hic”. Another account is in [William Buser, 1990, p. 66] who men-
tions three characterizations of the notion of obligation beyond the domain of logic: realis, iuridica
and practica. In connection with this topic, noteworthy remarks are also found in [Schupp, 1993,
p. 51] who, in his commentary on Martinus’ treatise, suggests that the term ‘obligatio’ might
stem from the juridical context and refers to an anonymous text Circa tractatum obligatoriorum.
Two additional sources are a passage found in [Anonymous Merton College MS. 306, 1985, pp.
243-244] and one in [John of Wesel, 1996, p. 11] (which probably depends on the latter).
As a final remark it should be recalled that the example of heat used by Peter to clarify the
definition of obligation as an actus obligantis occurs also in [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 10] and
might be regarded as a source for the latter.
2 The second preliminary assumption declares how many species of obligations are to be
accepted.
(i) As to the number of subtypes discussed throughout the development of the obligational li-
terature, su"ce it to recall that the taxonomy, and sometimes the terminology, i.e. the labels
6 accipiamus ] inv. accipiendum O 6 obligatio logica ] hoc genus praep. O 6 istas ] has O
6 scilicet ] om. O 7 plures ] habeat add. O 7 erit ] est O 9 sequitur . . . consequentiam ]
patet hanc formam O 9 ego ] om. O 10 ego ] om. O 10 valet ista ] hanc O 11 bene ]
etiam O
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employed to refer to one and the same type, vary from author to author, cf. [Spade, 1982b, p. 1],
and also over time (with a certain tendency to simplification in the second half of the XIV centu-
ry). A maximum of six species (positio, depositio, dubitatio, petitio, sit verum and institutio, also-
called impositio, as in Peter’s tract, among many others) are accepted by [Walter Burley, 1963,
p. 35], [Albert of Saxony, 1490, sig. Niiii+2vb], [Obligationes Parisienses, 1975, p. 27], and
[William of Ockham, 1974, p. 732]. The same number is found in [William Buser, 1990, p. 116]
and [Marsilius of Inghen, 1489, sig. Aiiii+2ra] (the latter in fact accepts only the first three).
[Roger Swyneshed, 1977, p. 250 and 253], [Robert Fland, 1980], [John of Holland, 1985, p. 91],
[Richard Lavenham, 1978, p. 226] accept three species, namely positio, depositio and impositio
(notice that the terminology for the type concerned with variations of meaning apparently shifts,
roughly from the third decade of the XIV century onwards, particularly within the English
tradition after Swyneshed, from institutio to impositio). [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 36] gives a
somehow original list of three, by substituting impositio with suppositio (a kind of obigation in
which the obligatum must be upheld as necessary or true per se). [Brinkley, 1995, pp. 15–16],
too, regards these three subtypes as the most relevant ones, although he explicitly recognizes
that they do not embrace the whole domain of obligations (in the very same place he makes the
interesting remark that every case of insoluble is a species of obligation).
Two species (positio and depositio) are accepted by [Paul of Venice, 2002, p. 105],
[Paul of Pergula, 1961, p. 102], [John Wyclif, 1893, p. 69], [Peter of Candia, Obl., Mantua, fol.
163ra], [Martinus Anglicus, 1993, p. 2], [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 78ra-rb], and Peter of Mantua,
but it must be kept in mind that, as in the case of definition, setting a limit to the number of
species admitted does not prevent an author from inserting in his work a number of sophisms or
discussions concerning a type that traditionally has an independent status and that the author in
question reduces to one of the species he accepts. This is for example what Peter does in section
5. of his treatise, where he has a lengthy discussion on impositio, which deserves a significant
independent treatment (with its own theoretical import, as we will see) although Peter regards
it as a subtype of positio. The move is not dissimilar from what we find in [Ralph Strode, 1517,
fol. 78ra], who also seems to take impositio as a subtype of positio. Strode also mentions, in
the same passage, two other types of obligation: suppositio and certificatio; both of them are
discussed by Peter, cf. infra, sec. 4.2, whose list is probably influenced by the English author.
(ii) A second aspect is worth mentioning: even within the context of a single subtype, di!erences
of taxonomy can be registered in di!erent authors and, more importantly, at di!erent moments
of time. Take the emblematic example of positio impossibilis. This subtype of positio in the XIII
century has a certain fortune which fades away (a gentle way to say that it disappears almost
abruptly) in the first decades of the XIV century, particularly after Ockham who seems to be
the last XIV century author to encompass it (cf. [Spade, 1982b, p. 5 f. 15]; for some attempts
to explain the phenomenon, cf. [Martin, 1992], [Martin, 1997] and [Gelber, 2004]). Other di!e-
rences in the historical evolution can be found also in the case of dubitatio, cf. [Spade, 1982b,
p. 5 f. 17] and [Uckelman et al., 2008]. In addition to that, di!erences of classification and
vocabulary in obligations treatises can be found also within the standard paradigm of positio:
for instance, authors like Burley, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen lay down an articu-
lated subdivision according to the type of positum: e.g. positio simplex and composita, positio
cathegorica, hypothetica and dependens (cf. also infra, sec. 4.13). Peter includes a variety of
these problems in his treatise, as when he discusses a number of subtypes of positio (questio,
certificatio, dubitatio, sit verum, suppositio and presuppositio, cf. infra, sec. 4.1) or devotes an
entire section of the work to the analysis of sophisms on impositio.
As to the corollaries to the second assumption, Peter appeals to a procedure which is remini-
scent of a technique sometimes proposed by Aristotle in the Topics, consisting in the evaluation
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1.3. Tertio, ultra, accipitur quod sequitur ‘tu bene admittis A propositionem,
igitur obligaris ad A propositionem’. Et de preterito ‘tu bene admisisti A propo-
sitionem, igitur tu fuisti obligatus ad A propositionem’, quia admittere A propo- 15
sitionem non est nisi promittere se responsurum ad istam secundum exigentiam
eius cui promittitur; sed promittere aliquid est obligare se ad illud; igitur etc.3
1.4. !Obj.1" Sed contra ista forte arguitur, quia aliqua est obligatio qua nullus
obligatur: quia scribatur ista oratio ‘pono tibi istam ‘tu curris” || vel aliqua talis, V 71vb
nullo admittente; et patet quod est obligatio, quia illa est oratio composita ex 20
signis obligationis et obligato.
!Obj.2" Item, possum ponere tibi istam ‘tu curris’ te inuito et non admittente,
igitur potest esse quod ponatur tibi ista absque hoc quod obligem te ad istam.
Patet consequentia. Et antecedens arguitur quia possum proferre tibi istam sic
significantem ‘pono tibi istam ‘tu || curris”, te non admittente; igitur potest esse L 68ra25
quod ponam tibi illam.
!Obj.3" Item, etiam tu potes admittere illam absque hoc quod obligeris, quia tu
potes proferre istam sic significando ‘ego admitto istam’, igitur potest esse quod
tu admittas istam absque hoc quod obligeris ad istam.
!Obj.4" Item si ponere est obligare, igitur poni est obligari. Igitur solum quod 30
ponitur obligatur. Sed solum propositio ponitur. Igitur solum propositio obligatur.
Consequens est falsum, igitur etc.4
of the validity of an argument form, if it is invariant with respect to the tenses of the verbs
employed in its formulation. Peter makes use of this approach twice in the treatise, the first time
here, and the second one in the next section.
3 The third preliminary assumption stipulates the validity of the inference from ‘bene admit-
tere A propositionem’ to ‘obligari ad A propositionem’ and of its version de preterito (with a
possible influence of the Topics, as has been just recalled). The significance of this move lies in
that it explicitly states the role played by correct admissio in the context of an obligational di-
sputation. As will be clear shortly, while examining the objections and replies that immediately
come after this passage, admissio is a necessary step (along with positio, or to say it better, with
the act by means of which something is actually posited), indispensably required in order for an
obligation to arise.
4 A sequence of four objections is raised against the first three assumptions.
Obj.1 is based on an alternative definition of obligatio. If we adopt the definition of obligation
as ‘oratio’, then the link between positing and admitting, which are two conditions that must
always be fulfilled in order for an obligation to arise, is lost. Thus, a sequence of written signs,
provided that it contains the right elements (obligational operators such as ‘pono’ or ‘depono’
13 Tertio, . . . quod ] etiam O 16 istam ] A propositionem O 17 igitur ] ideo O 18 Sed ]
forte add. O 18 ista ] om. O 18 est obligatio ] inv. O 20 quod ] illa add. O 22 non
admittente ] tu potes eam non admittere, igitur potest esse quod ponatur tibi illa praep. O
23 ponatur . . . ista ] ponam tibi illam O 24 antecedens arguitur ] inv. O 24 possum proferre ]
potest esse quod ego proferam O 26 ponam . . . illam ] te non admittente add. O 27 Item ] ita
O 27 tu potes ] inv. O 27 obligeris ] obligaris O 27–28 tu potes ] inv. O 28 proferre ] per-
ficere O 28 significando ] significantem 28 istam ] absque hoc quod obliger add. O 29 quod ]
tu add. O 29 ad istam ] om. O 30–32 Item . . . igitur etc. ] BEV om. MOP
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1.5. !RObj.4" Sed huic dicitur quod equivoce possunt sumi illi termini.5
!RObj.1" Et ad primum illorum dicitur quod illi termini ‘oratio’, ‘propositio’
pro maiori parte apud logicum capiuntur prout non sunt nomina verbalia. Et ita 35
conceditur quod propositio est absque proponente et oratio est absque orante. Sed
capiendo ista nomina prout || verbalia sunt, valet hoc argumentum ‘propositio est, M 82vb
igitur proponens est’, ‘oratio est, igitur orans est’. Et ita sequitur ‘obligatio est,
igitur obligans || est’. Et hoc modo in di!nitione locuti sumus. Unde, isto modo, O 117rb
obligatio est illud per quod responsalis obligatur. Et sic iste terminus ‘obligatio’ 40
est de predicamento actionis.6 Et secundum istum modum patet responsio ad
primum.
and obligata-sentences) would count as an obligation, even if there is no one who admits what is
posited.
Obj.2 and 3 are directed against the arguments presented in sec. 1.2 and 1.3. The inferences
in sec. 1.2 justifiy the conclusion (i) from ‘ponere’ to ‘obligare’ and (ii) from ‘bene ponere’ to
‘obligare (i.e. if a posits p to b, then a obligates b and so on), whereas in sec. 1.3, likewise,
the inference is assumed to hold as well in the case of ‘admittere’ (if b correctly admits p, then
b is obligated). The two objections claim, on the contrary, that positio without admissio, and
vice versa, can stand alone without giving rise to an obligation, which amounts to denying that
the inference from ‘ponere’ to ‘obligare’, on the one hand, and from ‘admittere’ to ‘obligari’, on
the other hand, are sound. The problem at stake is the relation between positio, admissio and
obligatio. As is shown by the replies to these objections, the idea that seems to lead Peter in
these passages is that of a strong link between the three notions, in such a way that correct
position implies admission (properly speaking, nothing can be said to be posited, if it is not
admitted; otherwise it is only an utterance that is performed, not an actual position), correct
admission implies position (again, properly speaking, nothing can be said to be admitted if it is
not posited by someone, cf. infra, sec. 1.7 “cum admittere sit promittere et non sit promissio
sine utriusque partis consensu, non est admissio sine obligante”; otherwise we are, once again,
left just with an act of utterance by means of which the respondent merely says that he admits
something, even if nothing has been posited to him) and, last, the notion of ‘obligatio’ implies
both correct position and correct admission.
Finally, Obj.4 is a variation on the theme, once again directed against the corollary of the
second assumption according to which every position is an obligation. The argument is based on
the passage from the active to the passive form of the verbs ‘ponere’ and ‘obligare’ and runs as
follows: only what is posited is obligated, but only sentences are posited, therefore only sentences
are obligated. The conclusion is false: even if Peter does not explicitly point it out, he takes
for granted that someone too (i.e. the respondent) is obligated in a obligation, therefore the
assumption that every position is an obligation, from which we have drawn this false conclusion,
should be rejected as well.
5 Peter first replies, with a quick dismissal, to the last objection, which is fallacious since it
hinges on the fact that the term obligari can be taken as referring equivocally either to someone,
i.e. the respondent, or to something, i.e. a sentence.
6 Cf. [William Buser, 1990, p. 68].
33 Sed . . . termini. ] BEV om. MOP 34 Et . . . illorum ] ad horum primum O 34 dicitur ]
respondetur O 34 ‘oratio’, ‘propositio’ ] post parte transp. O 35 logicum ] loycam O
37 hoc ] om. O 39 in di"nitione ] om. O 40 responsalis ] responsurus O
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Sumpto autem isto termino ‘obligatio’ primo modo – secundum quem modum
non accipimus – non valet consequentia. Neque illo modo est de predicamento
actionis, sicut neque iste terminus ‘oratio’ vel ‘constructio’. Nec tamen, hoc modo 45
sumpto termino, est illa di!nitio bona ‘obligatio est oratio composita ex signis
obligationis et obligato’, quia di!nitum ponitur in di!nitione neque obligatio est
illud aggregatum.7
!RObj.2" Ad secundam formam dicitur || negando assumptum illud, scilicet B 96ra
‘potest esse quod ponam tibi istam ‘tu curris’ absque hoc quod obligem te ad 50
7 The reply to the first objection is based on a distinction between two readings that are
available for certain terms (as verbalia or non verbalia). In the first sense, which is connected
to the definition of obligation as actus and the corollary, with the examples of heat and vision,
presented in sec. 1.1, the alternative definition of obligation as oratio is automatically ruled out,
since the presence of individual agents (one positing, the other admitting) is presupposed in the
definition itself, which is formulated in terms of actus. Moreover, there is an additional reason
to dismiss the alternative definition, even if we took the term ‘obligatio’ in a non-verbal sense:
the definition, according to Peter, would still su!er from circularity, since the defined is part of
the definition.
A similar example, that clarifies how we should understand the term verbaliter, is also found
in the Tractatus de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Fiira] “Ad sextum dicitur quod
iste terminus ‘relatio’ potest accipi verbaliter prout derivatur a ‘refero, refers’, et pro tunc dicit
actualem relationem et non est genus generalissimum in predicamento relationis quo ad abstracta.
Sed alio modo ‘relatio’ est idem quod ‘respectus’, non connotando aliquam actionem sed puram
habitudinem respectivam alicuius ad aliquid; et illo modo est genus generalissimum. Et est
sicut de istis terminis ‘propositio’, ‘constructio’, ‘oratio’. Unde sicut est propositio licet nullus
proponatur et constructio licet nullus construat et oratio licet nullus oret, sic est relatio licet
nullus referat”. Again, later on in the same text, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Fiirb] “Ad
decimoquartum dicitur quod iste terminus ‘corruptio’ et iste terminus ‘remissio’ et ‘perfectio’
aliquando sunt nomina verbalia denotantia actuales actiones. Et isto modo sunt in predicamento
actionis. Et secundum istum modum hoc argumentum tenet ‘hoc est remissio, igitur hoc est
actio’, ‘hoc est perfectio, igitur hoc est actio [. . . ] Alio modo illi termini ‘intensio’ et ‘remissio’
sunt termini nominales entia non de predicamento actionis sed de predicamento habitus vel
relationis significantia, vel secundum alios de predicamento qualitatis. Et isto modo non sequitur
‘hoc est remissio, igitur hoc est actio’ ”.
With respect to this set of problems, see also the objections put forward by [William Buser, 1990,
p. 68] and [Marsilius of Inghen, 1489, sig. Aiirb] against alternatives definitions of obligatio. The
definition as ‘oratio composita ex signis obligationis et obligato’ is held by Albert of Saxony
who may be reasonably seen as the target of these remarks. Albert says in his Sophismata:
“Obligatio est oratio !composita" ex signis obligationis et obligato”, cf. [Albert of Saxony, 1490,
sig. Niiiirb]. As Ashworth has pointed out, cf. [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 14 f. 13], this definition
is rejected by Marsilius in virtue of its generality, while Buser claims that it does not provide
the nature of the defined. Here Peter seems to give an additional reason by suggesting that
the definition does not work because it is circular. To be noted is also the fact that the term
‘aggregatum’ used in connection with the definition of obligation as ‘oratio composita’ is found
in [Roger Swyneshed, 1977, p. 252].
43 Sumpto ] Supp praep. et del. O 44 consequentia ] illa praep. O 45–48 Nec . . .
aggregatum ] om. O
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istam’, quia ponere est obligare.8
!i" Et negatur ista consequentia ‘potest esse quod ego proferam istam proposi-
tionem ‘pono tibi istam ‘tu curris” absque hoc quod obligem te; igitur potest esse
quod ponam tibi istam absque hoc quod obligem te’, quia non sequitur ‘profero
istam ‘pono tibi istam ‘tu curris”, igitur pono tibi istam ‘tu curris”, sicut non 55
sequitur ‘profero istam ‘pono tibi istam tu ‘curris’’, || igitur obligo te ad istam ‘tu P 66va
curris”, quia numquam est ponere nisi sit admittere.9
!ii" Et si arguitur, quia prius ponitur propositio quam admittatur, dicitur quod
non, licet prius proferantur illi termini ‘pono tibi istam ‘tu curris” vel aliam, quia
non est positio nisi quando obligatur respondens. 60
!iii" Et si arguitur quod numquam sunt simul positio et admissio || et per conse- V 72ra
quens numquam est obligatio, quia, ut frequentius, prius est corrupta ista prolatio
talis orationis ‘pono tibi istam ‘tu curris” quam respondens dicat ‘admitto illam’,
huic dicitur quod in hac arte presupponimus, gratia argumenti, eandem propositio-
nem || remanere vel unam sic significantem sicut significavit illa quam intendebat E Giiva65
ponere ponens. Non enim posset bene de vocalibus disputari, quia ut frequenter
quod ponebatur non est, quando respondens concedit vel negat illud.
1.6. Quarto, volo ponere quod extra tempus obligationis rei veritas est fatenda.10
8 The replies to Obj.2 and Obj.3 point out that we cannot correctly speak of positio or
admissio as stand-alone moments of a disputation since one logically presupposes the other. We
are entitled to speak correctly of something being posited in a disputation if and only if it is
posited to someone who, in turn, admits it (in this respect cf. par. !i" for the di!erence between
‘I utter the sentence ‘I posit something to you” and ‘I posit something to you’; and par. !ii" for
the temporal occurrence of position before admission). Conversely, no one can be said, properly
speaking, to admit a sentence that has not been posited to him (cf. infra, sec. 1.7). Moreover,
the fact that positio and admissio do not occur at one and the same time, since their utterances
take place at di!erent moments, is without e!ect: for it is assumed that what is signified by
those utterances has some kind of persistence throughout the disputation (cf. par. !iii").
9 A trace of this line of thought might have influenced Paul of Venice: as has been already
pointed out by Ashworth, a sequence of arguments similar to what Peter is suggesting here and
in the next two sections can be found in [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 6].
10 This assumption is universally accepted by authors of obligations treatises, insofar as it is
a necessary condition for the assessment, when the time of the obligation has come to an end,
of what has been going on during the disputation; in particular it is a condition for an objective
evaluation of the responses given by the respondent. It is formulated in the same words, for in-
stance, in [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 78va], [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 34], and [Walter Burley, 1963,
p. 53].
52–53 propositionem ] om. O 54 quod ] ego add. O 54 ponam ] pono O 56 pono . . .
‘curris’ ] om. O 59 aliam ] tales O 60 respondens ] om. O 62 ut frequentius ] frequen-
ter O 63 talis ] illius O 63 admitto ] illam ego praep. O 64 gratia argumenti ] om. O
65 remanere ] om. O 65 sic ] om. O 65 significavit ] om. O 66–67 Non . . . illud ] EV om.
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1.7. !RObj.3" Et per istam respondetur ad ul-||timam formam11 negando istam M 83ra70
consequentiam ‘tu profers istam propositionem ‘ego admitto istam ‘tu curris”;
igitur tu admittis istam ‘tu curris” quia, cum admittere sit promittere et non sit
promissio sine utriusque partis consensu, non est admissio sine obligante, igitur
etc.
1.8. Quinto, postea, accipiendum est quod illi termini ‘concedendum’ et ‘negan- 75
dum’ idem significant, in sequentibus, quod ‘dignum concedi’ et ‘dignum nega-
ri’. || Et non participialiter, scilicet quod significet ‘concedendum’ quod concede- L 68rb
tur et ‘negandum’ quod negabitur, quia isto modo necessarium simpliciter, bene
respondendo, est negandum et impossibile simpliciter concedendum.12
11 Two problems must be highligted in connection with this passage. First, the target of this
reply is clearly Obj.3, cf. supra 1.4, but it is not altogether clear in what sense the expression
‘per istam’ should be taken: apparently, it refers to the fourth assumption, but it is di"cult to
see what kind of role that assumption plays in justifying the reply to Obj.3. In other words, while
the reply to the objection – denying the inference from ‘a makes the utterance ‘I admit p” to ‘a
admits p’ – may be seen as an acceptable move, it seems independent of the fact that outside the
time of obligation the respondent must always tell the truth, while assessing the outcome of the
disputation. The only plausible solution I see is that there is actually no logical link entitling us
to draw, from the mere utterance of a sentence, the conclusion that what the uttered sentence
says is true. For this reason, such an inference must be rejected outside the time, because it is
invalid (or, to put it better, the corresponding conditional must be denied, because it is false).
The second problem is textual: the clause ‘ad ultimam’, which occurs in our incunable, is
inconsistent with the rest of the text, for it should refer to Obj.4, not to Obj.3. But Obj.4
has already received a reply (cf. supra 1.5). The solution is provided by the manuscripts. In
M, O and P the whole passages containing Obj.4 and RObj.4 are lacking and, therefore, the
clause ‘ad ultimam’ correctly refers to Obj.3, which is actually the last objection dealt with in
those witnesses. In manuscript V, Obj.4 and RObj.4 are witnessed, but so is also the clause
‘ad ultimam’: the text is thus inconsistent (possibly the inconsistency in E is derived from the
inconsistency in the line of transmission of V). If we want to maintain Obj.4 and RObj.4, the
best choice is therefore adopting the last reading available, namely that of manuscript B, which
has the whole set of four objections and replies, as in E and V, but reads ‘ad penultimam’ instead
of ‘ad ultimam’ in the passage we are considering.
12 This treament of the basic obligational properties ‘concedendum’ and ‘negandum’ can be
traced as far back as the first half of the XIII century. A very similar formulation, based on
the distinction nominaliter vs participialiter, can be found in one of the first witnesses of the
obligational literature, cf. [Nicholas of Paris (?), 1998, p. 191]. A characterization in the same
terms (i.e. ‘concedendum’ = ‘dignum concedi’, ‘negandum’ = ‘dignum negari’) is outlined by
[Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 78va]. Strode does not present the distinction in terms of the readings
nominaliter vs participialiter. Peter’s treatment is retrieved, afterwards, by Paul of Venice
[Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 34] and [Paul of Pergula, 1961, p. 106].
70 istam ] illud etiam O 70 ul-||timam ] EOPV penultimam B 72 tu curris ] om. O
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1.9. Sexto, ulterius, dicitur quod positio est obligatio per quam respondens obli- 80
gatur ad concecendum positam propositionem, cum sibi proposita fuerit.13
Peter makes use of the same argument in the Tractatus de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a,
sig. Eiiii+3vb] “Et accipiatur in dicta regula ‘concedendum’ nominaliter et non participialiter,
quia accipiendo participialiter multa necessaria simpliciter sunt neganda et multa impossibilia
simpliciter sunt concedenda bene respondendo”.
13 This is the specific definition of positio. Its distinctive feature is that when something is
posited (and admitted) at the beginning of a disputation, it must be conceded, whenever proposed
at any subsequent step of the disputation. The criterion adopted for determining the subdivision
of obligations into their subtypes, therefore, appeals to the way the respondent must treat (i.e.
respond to) the obligatum when it is put forward as a propositum. This idea is confirmed by the
dual definition of depositio, cf. infra, sec. 6.1.
80 Sexto ] om. O 80 dicitur ] dicamus O 81 positam ] positum O 81 propositionem ]
per positionem O 81 sibi ] ibi ante per positionem transp. O 81 proposita ] propositum
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2. Rules
2.1. Quibus positis, pro regula teneatur quod omnis propositio intellecta, scita esse
possibilis et non repugnans alicui bene admisso vel bene concesso, que petitur per
signa positionis admitti, est admittenda.14 Ut si ponatur quod nulla propositio
14 This is the first obligational rule put forward by Peter and it is meant to govern the very
first step of a disputation, providing criteria for the admission of sentences.
Two facts must be noted, in this respect. First, it is very unusual to come accross an explicit
rule that governs admissio. The requirement that a sentence be possible, in order for it to be ad-
missible, is generally accepted throughout the development of the obligational literature (except
for the case of positio impossibilis, where some kinds of impossible sentences can be admitted
too). The duty of admitting (i.e. the explicit formulation of the principle that the respondent is
obligated to admit) a possible sentence, on the other hand, is very seldom given (along with addi-
tional conditions) in the form of a rule. This is the case in Peter of Mantua, [Paul of Venice, 1988,
p. 51] and another source, namely [Anon. Obligationes MS Lat. misc.e 79 , fol. 18ra] (the rema-
rk is due to Ashworth, cf. [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 51, f. 2], I have not seen the manuscript);
[Marsilius of Inghen, 1489, sig. Biva] gives it as a special rule of positio while it is found in
[William Buser, 1990, p. 92] as a corollary to the second assumption. Again, the requirement is
present, as the first assumption, in [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 77va].
Second, the rule states that the respondent is bound to admit a given sentence if four conditions
are fulfilled: the sentence must be (1) understood, (2) known to be possible, (3) not repugnant
to anything that has been already correctly admitted or granted and (4) posited. I shall adopt,
with some modifications, the formalization first introduced by [Knuuttila and Yrjönsuuri, 1988],
that I have also used above. But the focus here is on presenting the rules in thesis-form. There
might be good reasons to maintain that rules should be viewed as tantamount conditionals: at
least in Peter’s treatise this seems to be how the author himself regards them (in this respect,
cf. infra 3.35; and also, for an analogous treatment, [William Buser, 1990, pp. 108–110]). This
means, in turn, that they should be put, as it were, at the object-language level. The first rule
can be formalized as follows:
(R1) # p # q
!
( Ua p $ Ka ! p $ ( (Aa q % Ca q ) & ¬ ( q & ¬ p ) ) $ P p ) ' OAa p
"
The symbols should be read as follows (cf. also infra, ‘List of symbols’): Uap stands for ‘a
understands p’, Kap for ‘a knows that p’, Aap for ‘a admits p’, Cap for ‘a grants (or has granted)
p’ while Pp stands for ‘p is posited’; finally, the operator O stands for ‘ought to’ so that the
expression OAap must be interpreted as ‘a ought to admit p’. The same holds for the expressions
that can be formed by applying the operator O to C (= ‘grant’), N (= ‘deny’) and D (=
‘doubt’). What we obtain are expressions of the form OCap, ONap and ODap that correspond
to the fundamental operations described by the standard obligational vocabulary ‘concedendum’,
‘negandum’ and ‘dubitandum’. It is worth noting that, although obligations have nothing to do
with ethics or deontic logic (to my knowledge this view is endorsed only by [Dumitriu, 1977]),
appealing to the basic notion of the latter can be fruitful to our purposes. For if we look at
the dual notions representend by the box and diamond of deontic logic, it is easy to see that
they can help us understand, by analogy, some properties that we want O (= ought to) to have.
O can be regarded as a modal operator with a corresponding dual notion L (= it is permitted
to) such that, by definition, O is equivalent to ¬L¬. In particular, this approach is useful in
1 regula ] principio O 2 et ] om. O 2 alicui ] alteri O
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sit aut quod nullus loquatur vel quod nulla obligatio fiat aut quod tu non sis,
admittendus est casus.15|| O 117va5
2.2. Secunda regula: omne bene admissum, propositum eodem modo significans,
est concedendum. Et omne sequens ex eo et propositum est concedendum. Et
omne sibi repugnans est negandum.16
the case of negation, because it enables us to correctly formulate expressions such as ‘non est
negandum’, which should be read as O¬ (= ¬L, it is not permitted to) rather than ¬O (=
L¬, it is permitted not to). I have recalled above the opportunity to formulate explicitly certain
negative duties that may arise in the context of a disputation. Interpreting O in the way just
described can help us understand such negative obligations in terms of prohibitions (otherwise
the denial of a duty to respond in a given way might ambiguously lend itself to be seen as a
permission not to respond in that way. In this respect, cf. also [Knuuttila and Yrjönsuuri, 1988].
15 The kind of sentences provided here, as tantamount examples of posita that should be
admitted according to the criteria established by (R1), belongs to an inventory of cases that are
often referred to, in the secondary literature, as pragmatic paradoxes, i.e. problematic sentences
that may cause trouble in the context of their utterance. For a discussion directly linked to the
context of obligations, cf. especially [Ashworth, 1984]. It must be noted that the opinions about
the admissibility of such sort of sentences are various in the obligational tradition, and do not
depend on the adoption of any given set of rules. Within the framework of responsio antiqua, for
instance, some authors openly reject posited sentences such as ‘Nihil est tibi positum’ or ‘Tu non
es’, because they are considered incompatible with the very same fact that an obligation may
actually arise. Other authors, like Peter, Buser, or Paul of Venice, on the other hand, admit this
kind of sentences, their strategy of response focusing rather on the specific replies that must be
given to the proposita that are put forward thereafter, in order to maintain consistency. For the
peculiar case of Strode, cf. [Ashworth, 1993, especially pp. 366–365].
16 The second rule performs two tasks. The first clause (R2.1) determines the respondent’s
behaviour in the presence of the positum: whenever this is put forward by the opponent, during
the disputation, with the same meaning, it must be granted. In this connection it is remarkable
that medieval authors throughout the development of the obligational tradition are well aware
of the risks of equivocation and opaque contexts. Peter’s clause ‘eodem modo significans’ is very
close, for instance, to Burley’s requirement that the positum be admitted only when it is ‘sub
forma positi propositum’. If the opponent posits ‘Marc is running’, the respondent, once he has
admitted it, will be bound to grant it whenever it is proposed during the disputation, in the
same form, but he will be by no means required to grant ‘Tully is running’ as well, on these
grounds alone. The second clause of the rule establishes how to deal with relevant sentences
following from (cf. (R2.2)) or incompatible with (cf. (R2.3)) the positum alone: if a sentence
follows from the positum it must be granted whenever proposed during the disputation, whereas
if its negation follows from the positum, the sentence must be denied whenever proposed. As for
the meaning of ‘sequi’, the crucial notion presupposed here is that of a formal consequence. As
I have said above, I will not enter the question of the logical properties of this fundamental con-
cept of medieval logic: it is problematic under various respects, for its historical development,
for the di!erences of definition and rules adopted by medieval authors and for its theoretical
import in connection with related notions in the contemporary philosophy of logic (e.g. entail-
ment, relevance, conditionals, consequence relations). A good study devoted to the notion of
4 quod ] om. O 4 quod ] om. O 5 admittendus ] admittenda O 5 casus ] om. O
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2.3. Tertia regula: omne sequens ex bene admisso cum bene concesso vel be-
ne concessis et bene admissis, et opposito bene negati vel bene negatorum, est 10
concedendum propositum. Et quodlibet repugnans est negandum.17
consequence in Peter of Mantua is [Bertagna, 2000]. For an investigation of the logical features
of formal consequences in connection with relevance logic, cf. [Read, 1993a] and bibliography
therein. Finally, for more general accounts of the notion of consequence in medieval logic, cf.
[Boh, 1982] and [Dutilh Novaes, 2008]. I will confine myself, in this context, to assume that the
kind of consequence relation used by Peter may be tentatively described (or its logical behaviour
may be described) by appeal to strict conditionals (indicated here by means of the symbol ‘&’),
which will be therefore my candidate, in the following, to represent the notion in a modern per-
spective and to characterize the meaning of terms such as ‘sequens’, ‘pertinens’, ‘repugnans’ or
‘impertinens’ (in support of this choice, cf. also [Yrjönsuuri, 2001a] and [Schupp, 1993]). Peter’s
definition of a valid consequence is stated at the very beginning of his Tractatus de consequentiis,
[Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+2va] “Consequentia bona denominata a ly ‘si’ vel ‘ergo’ est
necessaria habitudo duarum propositionum, quarum secunde non potest contradictorium stare
cum prima sine nova impositione vel potest esse convertibilis cum una tali sine sua nova impo-
sitione”. As to whether di!erent types of consequences may come into play in the obligational
framework, interesting remarks are found in [Peter of Candia, Obl., Mantua, fol. 164ra-vb], who
applies the distinction between formal and material consequence to the notion of ‘following’ in the
context of obligations (for instance, a relevant sentence can be said to be materially or formally
relevant according to the type of consequence in which it occurs as a conclusion, the premises
being one or more already correctly granted or denied sentences). Be this as it may, the rule can
be formalized as follows (the new symbol R is such that Rp stands for ‘p is proposed’):
(R2.1) # p
!
( Aa p $ R p ) & OCa p
"
(R2.2) # p # q
!
( Aa p $ ( p & q ) $ R q ) & OCa q
"
(R2.3) # p # q
!
(Aa p $ ( p & ¬ q ) $ R q) & ONa q
"
17 The third rule instructs the respondent on how he is supposed to deal with sentences that
are either sequentially or incompatibly relevant not only to the positum (which was the business
of the preceding rule), but also with respect to the subsequent steps of the disputation. There is
enough evidence, on these grounds alone, to conclude safely that Peter should be placed, beyond
any reasonable doubt, within the framework of the responsio antiqua tradition. As is well known,
the most distinctive feature of this line lies in that the relevance of sentences at any given step
of a disputation is defined in terms of logical dependence on the cumulative outcome of the
disputation up to that point, i.e. on the conjunction of the positum along with all correctly
granted and (all the negations of) correctly denied sentences put forward in the disputation.
Peter’s adoption of this standard set of rules is reflected throughout the treatise by its application
in the analysis of sophisms (strong evidence along these lines is to be found, especially, in the
third section of the treatise, where he deals with a variety of issues concerning contradictions
and definitely rejects responsio nova, i.e. the revised rules introduced by Swyneshed). I propose
to rephrase the content of the present rule by means of two distinct clauses, namely (R3.1) and
(R3.2), in order to better spell out the meaning of the text (the new symbol G is introduced here
as a shortcut to indicate sentences that have been correctly admitted, granted or that are the
9 Tertia regula ] item O 10 et ] vel O 10 admissis ] admisso O 10 vel ] ex oppositis add.
O 10–11 est . . . propositum ] inv. O
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2.4. Quarto, pro regula teneatur quod omnes propositiones concesse et contra-
dictorie negatorum debent facere copulativam possibilem. Et hoc est quod aliqui,
voluerunt dicere || cum dixerunt quod omnes responsiones, in arte obligatoria, sunt P 66vb
retorquende ad idem instans.18 15
opposite of correctly denied sentences in a given disputation; Gq therefore stands for ‘q is (i) a
correctly granted or the opposite of a correctly denied sentence or (ii) q is a conjunction of such
sentences’):
(R3.1) # p # q # r
!
( Aa p $ Ga q $ ( ( p $ q ) & r ) $ R r ) & OCa r
"
(R3.2) # p # q # r
!
( Aa p $ Ga q $ ( ( p $ q ) & ¬ r ) $ R r ) & ONa r
"
What (R3.1) says is that, at any given step of the disputation, whatever is sequentially relevant
with respect to the sequence of sentences (including the positum) that have been put forward and
correctly evaluated at the preceding steps, must be granted. Correspondingly, (R3.2) provides
instructions for the duty of denying a sentence when its negation follows from (i.e. when it
is incompatibly relevant with respect to) that very same set of sentences. If we take together
(R2.1), (R2.2), (R2.3), (R3.1) and (R3.2) we have a partial set of rules to deal with (sequentially
and incompatibly) relevant sentences (for the complete system, we still need to wait for the rule
that governs the replies to irrelevant sentences, which is formulated below, cf. infra, sec. 2.5).
18 This rule should count as a test of consistency for the outcome of a disputation. If we
regard a disputation as an ordered sequence of n evaluated sentences, with the positum as its
first element, rule four requires that their conjunction be a possible sentence. This in turn, is
equivalent, as Peter rightly points out, to the requirement that all responses be given as if they
were referred to one and the same instant of time and this is indeed the form in which the
statement is usually presented. Here is a way to formalize it (the operator
#n!1
i=0 stands for the
conjunction of n sentences):




The rule has a long tradition since it belongs to a nucleus of principles that are already
discussed in the early phase of the theory’s development. A standard feature in XIII century
obligations is that disputations were taken to be led not over time but in an instant-like temporal
environment. From a conceptual point of view, this assumption has a special relevance. It is easy
to see that if we have this rule, there is little room even for ‘harmless’ forms of contradictions
as in the case of Swyneshed’s theory (if we accept that an account in terms of two-column
book-keeping such as that given by [Yrjönsuuri, 2001a, pp. 22–23] solves all problems with
Swyneshed’s view). This principle becomes a matter of controversy at the turn of the century (a
detailed discussion is found in [Gelber, 2004]). If time is allowed in the disputation, the evaluation
of irrelevant sentences is subject to variations, since something that is true at the beginning of
the disputation may become false after a lapse of time. If replies to irrelevant sentences depend
on their truth value outside the disputation, it follows that variations in the states of a!airs
a!ect the way we are supposed to reply to the corresponding sentences. Now, to avoid this sort
of clashes, the reference to a single instant of time was assumed in the responsio antiqua. With
12 Quarto ] item O 12 regula ] principio O 12–13 contradictorie ] opposite O
13 negatorum ] negatarum O 13 aliqui ] alii O 14 quod ] om. O 14 in . . . obligatoria ]
post instans transp. O 14–15 sunt retorquende ] inv. O
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2.5. Quinta regula: ad omnem propositionem impertinentem concesso vel conces-
sis, || respondendum est secundum sui qualitatem, scilicet si sit vera, concedenda; V 72rb
si sit falsa, neganda. Et istam || regulam ego extendo ad impositionem secundum M 83rb
opinionem hic sustinendam.19
Swyneshed the situation changes, since he assumes that disputations occur over time. For this
reason, the importance of explicitly adopting the present rule becomes even greater in the late
XIV century, since it amounts to an utter rejection of Swyneshed’s views. Cf. infra 3.21 for a
context where the rule applies, clearly in contrast with the latter’s account of conjunctions.
For an analysis of the relationship between consistency, compossibility and cotenability (the
latter resulting from contingency plus logical independence), cf. [Martin, 1993]. Peter’s for-
mulation of the rule is also briefly discussed in [Ke!er, 2001, p. 148]. Finally, for a charac-
terization of what it means for a conjunction to be possible, cf. Tractatus de consequentiis
[Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Fiiivb] “Ad possibilitatem copulative requiritur quod quelibet pars
sit compossibilis alteri et quod omnes collective sint compossibiles”.
19 The fifth rule governs the treatment of irrelevant sentences. Peter never gives a definition
of the notions of relevance and irrelevance in his treatise. Nevertheless, a close scrutiny of how
rules are applied in the examples shows that it is reasonable to assume that his own interpre-
tation coincides with the standard account of responsio antiqua. Relevant sentences are, thus,
understood in terms of the relation of logical dependence (sequentiality or incompatibility) they
bear towards the positum and the cumulative set of sentences that make up the disputation,
whereas irrelevant sentences are to be understood as the complement of relevant ones, i.e. as
those that are not relevant. Therefore, irrelevant sentences are logically independent with respect
to anything that has been previously admitted, granted or denied during the disputation. Before
providing a formalization of the rule, two things must be noted. First, there is no trace of an
explicit indication of the treatment of doubtful sentences in Peter’s text, although throughout
the treatise it is clear that Peter assumes the last clause below to hold as well as the two expli-
citly stated clauses governing concession and denial, respectively. Second, the reference to the
respondent’s state of knowledge, as to a general criterion on the basis of which irrelevant senten-
ces should be evaluated, does not enter the discussion here, but again the standard treatment of
irrelevant sentences in the obligational literature assumes that the respondent does always have,
as it were, a background to rely on when he has to establish the truth value of a given irrelevant
sentence: this background is usually formulated in terms of knowing something to be true or
false, or being in doubt about it. Moreover, this kind of approach is evident from the application
of this rule throughout the treatise, although in this passage it is not fully and explicitly laid
down in its components. The rule can be formalized as follows:
# p# q # r
% !




( Ka r & OCa r ) % (Ka ¬ r & ONa r ) % ( (¬Ka r $ ¬Ka ¬ r ) & ODa r )
" &(R5)
The antecedent of this conditional is an explicit formulation of the logical properties of being
irrelevant: it could be replaced indeed by a shorter clause, if we assume that the definition of
‘being irrelevant’ coincides with the conditions that for a given a sentence p, neither p nor its
negation ¬ p follow from the positum, either alone or in conjunction with correctly granted or
the opposite of correctly denied proposita. For the extension of this rule to the case of impositio
cf. infra, sec. 5.11.
16 Quinta regula ] item O 17 scilicet ] om. O 18 ego ] etiam O 19 opinionem ] abbrv.
apne O
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2.6. !Obj.1" Sed contra istam regulam forte arguitur, quia ex illa sequitur quod 20
non omnis positio est obligatio neque omne ponere est obligare. Consequens fal-
sum. Et consequentia patet, quia regula ista innuit quod obligatur respondens
solum ad bene admissum. Igitur, licet ponatur ista ‘homo est asinus’ et admitta-
tur, adhuc non est obligatus respondens ad istam, quia non tenetur eam concedere
quam non bene admisit. 25
!Obj.2" Ex isto sequitur quod non est possibile quod aliquis obligetur ad propo-
sitionem simpliciter impossibilem secundum positionem: quia non tenetur respon-
dere, ut innuit regula, nisi ad licite promissum seu admissum; sed numquam licite
admittitur impossibile simpliciter secundum positionem; igitur etc.
!Obj.3" Item, data ista regula, sequitur quod positum et admissum, || scitum B 96rb30
esse tale,20 est negandum et contradictorium concedendum respectu eiusdem.
!Obj.4" Item, sequitur quod, in aliqua consequentia bona et formali, denominata
a li ‘si’ et significante ex compositione suorum terminorum etc., antecedens est
concessum et consequens negandum. Et tunc sequitur quod non omne sequens ex
concesso vel concessis est concedendum. 35
!Obj.5" Item, sequitur ultra quod non omne repugnans concesso vel concessis
est negandum.21|| E Giivb
2.7. Sed pro istis advertatur quod admittere propositionem aliquam est promitte-
re se responsurum ad eandem secundum exigentiam arguentis. Et cum non omne
promissum sit servandum, sed solum licite || promissum, ideo non ad omne ad- L 68va40
missum repondendum est secundum quod est promissum, quia forte est non licite
admissum vel promissum.22
20 I. e. impossibile simpliciter.
21 A sequence of five objections – or, perhaps more precisely, of five remarks – is raised here
with the aim of qualifying the second rule (concerning the reply to the positum and to proposita
that are relevant to it). In particular, the focus is on the eventuality that an impossible simpliciter
sentence (i.e. an explicit contradiction or a sentence such as ‘homo est asinus’, ‘nullus deus est’
and the like) is posited and then proposed in a disputation.
22 This section displays the replies to the objections that have been put forward in the previous
section. Cf. supra, sec. 2.6.
20 istam ] secundam O 21 Consequens ] est add. O 22 Et ] om. O 22 consequentia
patet ] inv. O 23 ad bene ] ad b scr. et del. O 24 ad istam ] om. O 24 eam ] illam O
26 Ex ] item praep. O 26 isto ] illa O 28–29 licite admittitur ] inv. O 29 simpliciter . . .
positionem ] om. O 29 igitur ] ideo O 31 contradictorium ] eius add. O 32 consequentia ]
post formali transp. O 32 bona et ] om. O 33 et ] om. O 34 concessum ] concedendum
O 36 concessis ] propositum add. O 41 est promissum ] inv. O 41 est ] post promissum
transp. O 42 admissum vel ] om. O
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!RObj.1" Ex quibus patet quod non omnis positio obligat, sed solum licita po-
sitio. Neque omne ponere est obligare. Et non sequitur ‘ego pono tibi istam; et tu
admittis istam; igitur tu obligaris || ad illam’.23 O 117vb45
!RObj.2" Et tunc, ultra, conceditur quod non est possibile quod aliquis obligetur
ad propositionem simpliciter impossibilem per positionem.24|| M 83va
!RObj.3" Et per idem conceditur quod positum et admissum est negandum, ut
si ipsum fuerit impossibile simpliciter.
!RObj.4" Et ita conceditur quod, frequenter, antecedens est concessum et conse- 50
quens non est concedendum, in consequentia denominata a li ‘si’ significante etc.25
Sicut si posita fuerit propositio impossibilis, sequens ex ea est neganda, quamvis
illa propositio posita et admissa fuerit concessa. Et causa tota istius est quia non
oportet inconveniens pertinaciter multiplicare, sed solvere.26
!RObj.5" Ex quo patet responsio ad ultimum, quod oppositum male concessi 55
et admissi || est concedendum. Negandum || tamen est quod contradictorium P 67ra
V 72vaconcedendi sit concedendum aut repugnans concedendo sit concedendum respectu
eiusdem.
23 Again, the link between positio, admissio and obligatio must be understood according to
the sense established above: an obligation arises only if and when something has been posited
by the opponent and admitted by the respondent in compliance with all the requirements. As
this reply and the following show, the five objections are more of qualifications of the rules laid
down above than substantive objections directed against them. In particular, as far as I can see,
they focus on a specific problem, namely that of ruling out impossibilities per se, like explicit
contradictions of the form p $ ¬ p, theses that are generally held to be metaphysically impossible
or whereby a contradiction is implicitly embedded in the meaning of terms. Allowing this sort of
sentences in an obligation would make the whole business trivial in virtue of the principle that
from the impossible anything follows: there would be no way for the respondent to maintain
consistency. ‘Licita positio’ thus coincides with what is commonly known under the name of
‘falsi (or falsa) positio’ or ‘positio possibilis’: only possible sentences – though often false and
with controversial features – can be posited and admitted.
24 Positio impossibilis is explicitly ruled out by this corollary.
25 Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+4ra] “Ex quibus patet
non sequi ‘antecedens istius consequentie scite esse bone etc., cum aliis particulis ibi positis, est
concessum, igitur consequens est concedendum’. Sed oportet quod sit bene concessum”.
26 This somewhat unusual practical remark does not give precise instructions as to how the
respondent should behave in this sort of situations, cf. [Ashworth, 1992, p. 666].
43 solum ] omnis O 44 Et ] ideo O 44–45 tu . . . istam ] eam admittis O 45 illam ] eam
O 49 ipsum ] positum et admissum O 49 impossibile simpliciter ] inv. O 50 ita ] etiam
add. O 51 non . . . concedendum ] est negandum O 52 posita ] positum O 52 sequens ] tunc
propositio impossibilis praep. O 53 propositio ] impossibilis add. O 53 posita . . . concessa ]
fuerit admissa et concessa O 53–54 Et . . . solvere ] om. O 55 quod ] quia O
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3. On positio
3.1. Sed, pro dictorum argumentorum praxi habenda, exemplariter disputemus.27
27 The third section of the treatise is devoted to the analysis of several di"culties arising
from the rules that Peter has adopted. Although the chain of objections and replies – sometimes
nested into one another – may appear, at first sight, quite entangled and confusing, it is possible
to identify an underlying structure insofar as Peter seems to focus on a number of clustered
problems connected to one another.
A first group of sophisms (cf. sec. 3.1–3.14) mainly deals with the problem of qualifying the
general notions of obligation and the first two rules (governing admission and the responses
to the positum and to proposita logically related to it) so as to enable the respondent to face
situations where he is asked to reply to a sentence that is underdetermined or whose reference
is not precisely identified. Here the question at stake is how the criteria for admission are to be
applied in problematic cases and how to treat the logical consequences of the positum alone, for
example when it consists of a sentence with some sort of referential opacity.
A second group of sophisms (cf. sec. 3.15–3.27) is centred upon the issue of how the respondent
is supposed to deal with various kinds of contradictions that may arise in the context of positio.
This group may be further split into two parts. The first encompasses sec. 3.14 to 3.19 and
contains a discussion of the treatment of contradictory sentences in special cases, as when they
are, for instance, posited one after another. In this part, textual evidence can be found in
support of the conclusion that Peter endorses a view (cf. infra the remark ‘respectu diversarum
obligationum’) which is reminiscent of the so-called relativized interpretation of obligations,
described in [Spade, 1982b] as a possible solution to explain away some problematic corollaries of
the rules of responsio antiqua. This account has been also fruitfully explored by [Ashworth, 1981]
in connection with late XIV century authors such as Strode and Paul of Venice. According to
this interpretation, the circumstance that one and the same sentence ought to be conceded and
denied, in two distinct disputations having the same positum (this feature depending on the fact
that the evaluation of sentences is essentially related to the order in which they are proposed),
does not represent a form of inconsistency for the theory, since it is with respect to di!erent
disputations that this happens to be the case, and therefore the concession of a propositum in
one disputation is not inconsistent with its denial in another disputation. In addition to that,
again in the second group of sophisms dealing with contradictions, there is an assessment (and
rejection) of the reform of obligational rules, introduced by Swyneshed in the third decade of
the XIV century, which is commonly known under the name of responsio nova. The contrast
with this alternative view is strong, as is clearly visible in the discussions of sec. 3.20–3.27, where
Swyneshed’s rule for conjunctions is challenged and dismissed. Again, Peter approaches the
problem in a way which is close to Strode’s account, as long as he rejects the claim that two
incompatible sentences are such only if they are conjoined (cf. infra, the arguments in sec. 3.22–
3.27; especially significant, in this respect, is the discussion of the role of the conjunction operator
‘et’, cf. also [Ashworth, 1996, pp. 360–365]).
In the final part of this section, Peter is concerned with a variety of other issues involving time
and the context of utterance (cf. sec. 3.28–3.32), pragmatic paradoxes (cf. sec. 3.33–3.36), the
properties of being relevant and irrelevant insofar as they are evaluated infra tempus (cf. sec. 3.37–
3.38) and, eventually, the distinction between the possibility of a given casus and the possibility
for it to be true (cf. sec. 3.39–3.40).
1 pro . . . habenda ] dictarum regularum pro habenda practica O
TRACTATUS OBLIGATIONUM 84
Obligo te ad istam ‘tu curris’ posito quod demonstrem te qui sedes. Qua
admissa, proponatur eadem. Qua concessa, negata vel dubitata, cedat tempus
obligationis.28
28 The first sophism o!ers an example of the method used by Peter in the analysis of obliga-
tional disputations. A case is stated by means of which we are conveyed all information that is
supposed to be relevant in the course of the disputation. Together with the statement of the case,
a sentence is put forward to play the role of obligatum (I use, here, the general term obligatum
because the description holds in the case of positio as well as in that of depositio). After the
stage has been set, one or more proposita are put forward and submitted to the respondent’s
evaluation. Since the examples can usually be regarded as tantamount sophisms, the standard
practice consists in displaying a number of objections that apparently leave the respondent with
no solution. If we regard a disputation as a sequence of evaluated sentences, it is easy to see how
sophisms are constructed. In the simplest case, they may be shaped with a linear structure, such
that at some point, in the sequence starting with the positum, we run into a contradiction or
into some other sort of incorrect answer. The linear structure obtains when, for each proposed
sentence, only one type of reply is taken into account (i.e. concession, denial or doubt). In more
complex cases, sophisms may be conceived of as having a tree structure. In such situations, we
are actually in the presence of a plurality of linear disputations, that are considered together.
Each point of the tree corresponds to a propositum with its evaluation (concession, denial or
doubt). The tree always stems from a single point, the positum, but it branches into distinct
paths whenever, for a given propositum, we want to take into account di!erent outcomes de-
pending on the way we reply to it. Each single disputation involved in such a structure, can
be reconstructed by going backwards, along the path that starts with a termination of the tree,
through the sequence of previous points, up to the positum. In the treatise, examples of both
types of sophisms are found, as we will see shortly. I have made use of a schematic representation
for a large number of disputations discussed in the sophisms, by means of numbered sequences
of sentences, each of which is associated with the corresponding reply (by means of the letters
A, for admission, C for concession, N for denial and D for doubt) and its justification (the latter
always being on the right-hand column). Whenever the respondent replies incorrectly at a given
step (i.e. he commits himself to the violation of a rule, he grants a contradiction or an impossible
per se sentence such as ‘homo est asinus’ and so on), I use the symbol (. Generally speaking, if
a sophism is constructed in such a way that the respondent actually has no way out, save for re-
fusing to admit the positum, that will mean that the sequence ends up with ( (if the disputation
is linear) or all branches end up with ( (if the disputation has a tree structure). After displaying
the objections, usually a solution is picked out from a limited number of standard alternatives.
The respondent has the following options at hand: either he will reject the casus refusing to
admit the first sentence, or he will admit the first sentence and then modify one or more of the
replies presented in the sophism, by o!ering an alternative reading. This, in turn, often means
showing that a given sentence must be regarded as relevant rather than irrelevant or vice versa.
Since the behaviour of the respondent in the obligational context is fixed once and for all when
the set of proposition and the order in which they are proposed are given, the only room for
manoeuvre consists in arguing in favour or against the logical status of sentences (occasionally,
and only in the case of irrelevant sentences, the discussion may turn to truth and falsehood, cf.
for instance infra, sec. 3.28–3.30. It will be soon clear that this pattern assumes the most various
arrangements in Peter’s treatise, although the structure is approximately invariant. Either Peter
responds by rejecting the casus or he o!ers an alternative reading of one or more proposita. In
2 Obligo ] igitur add. O 2 posito . . . sedes ] om. O
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!Obj.1" Et arguitur quod ista non fuit concedenda, si concessa fuerit, quia ista 5
fuit falsa et non fuisti obligatus, igitur etc. Patet consequentia. Et arguitur ante-
cedens, quia in nulla specie obligationis fuisti obligatus a me, igitur etc. Probatur
antecedens quia neque per positionem neque per depositionem et sic de aliis, quia
qua ratione tu fuisti obligatus per unam speciem, eadem ratione quamlibet, igitur
per nullam.29 10
!Obj.2" Si dubitatur vel negetur, arguitur tunc sic: ista ‘tu curris’ fuit tibi posita
et a te bene admissa, igitur non fuit a te dubitanda neque neganda. Ista conse-
quentia30 est bona denominata etc., et antecedens est a te dubitandum, saltem si
concedis te fuisse obligatum, igitur consequens non est a te negandum.31
addition to that, in some situations the solution may depend on a further qualification of a rule,
if a case can be stipulated which puts that rule into question.
29 The first sophism is meant to shed light on the following issue: the respondent must be
always explicitly aware under what kind of obligation he is supposed to reply. The structure is
quite simple, with only one level of objections. The strategy is proceeding by exclusion. Let us
assume that the case has been admitted and the opponent has put forward his first propositum,
namely ‘Tu curris’. If the respondent grants it, the objection runs as follows: since it is actually
the case that you are sitting and you are under no obligation (for no obligation has been specified),
you should not have granted the propositum ‘Tu curris’. The first available way of reply must
be therefore ruled out.
30 Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3vb] “Alia regula est
quod, si consequentia !est" bona etc., significans etc., habens etc., quorum nullum etc., scita esse
formalis, et antecedens est dubitandum, et consequens !est" intellectum propositum, et cum his
scitum est quod ex nullo vero sequitur falsum, tunc consequens non est negandum”.
31 If, on the other hand, the respondent chooses among the two alternatives that are left to
him (doubting or denying the propositum ‘Tu curris’), then the opponent will argue as follows:
(*) “The sentence ‘You are running’ has been posited to you and correctly admitted by you,
therefore you should neither have doubted nor denied it”. The validity of inference (*) depends
on a corollary of rule (R2.2) (if something has been correctly posited and admitted, it ought to be
conceded; if it ought to be conceded, it ought not to be doubted nor to be denied), although Peter
does not say it explicitly here. What happens next? The antecedent of (*) must be doubted, for
we know that the respondent is under an obligation but ignore which obligation is at stake. On
these grounds, we can at least infer, according to Peter, by appeal to the rule of consequence
that governs responses to conditionals whose antecedent ought to be doubted (if the antecedent
of a valid consequence ought to be doubted, then the consequent ought not to be denied) that
the conclusion of (*) ought not to be denied. As a result, we have, on the one hand, a sentence
p = ‘Tu curris’ that is either doubted or denied and, on the other hand, the consequent of (*).
The di"culty is even more evident, if the situation is described in symbols as follows:
( D p % N p ) $ O¬N ( O¬D p $ O¬N p )
This amounts to saying that no matter what decision is taken by the respondent – doubting or
5 fuit ] sit O 5 si . . . fuerit ] om. O 6 falsa ] ut pono add. O 6 fuisti ] tu praep. O
6 consequentia ] hec praep. O 7 in ] om. O 7 a me ] om. O 8 quia ] om. O 9 ratione ]
nam add. O 9 quamlibet ] per praep. BMOPV om. E; sed non per quamlibet add. MOPV
om. BE 11 dubitatur ] dubitetur O 11 tunc ] om. O 12 neque ] vel O 13 denominata
etc. ] om. O 13 et ] eius add. O
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3.2. !R1Obj.1-2" Sed pro isto intelligendum est quod non obligatur aliquis nisi 15
per terminos specificos obligationis: quia cum obligatio fit circa certum o!cium
exercendum – puta circa negare, concedere aut aliter respondere – ideo non potest
respondens convenire cum arguente, nisi conveniat secum per terminos specificos.
Et ideo per hoc genus ‘obligo’ non potest aliquis obligari ab arguente, quia nemo
obligatur ad illud ad quod nescit se obligari. 20
Ideo, cum dicit arguens ‘obligo te ad istam ‘tu curris”, dicat respondens queren-
do qua specie obligationis velit eum obligare, et non admittat aliquid antequam
specificetur per quam || speciem obligationis || vult eum obligare. Et iste est modus M 83vb
B 96varegularis respondendi.32
denying p – he will be compelled to accept at least that he is not allowed to deny that he should
not have replied in either way. Strictly speaking, from the standpoint of the logic of obligations,
this is not equivalent to the claim that the respondent is bound to grant that he should not have
replied in either way, since, actually, from the prohibition to deny a sentence, apparently it just
follows that the sentence should either be granted or doubted. Nevertheless, if the respondent
doubts p and the opponent argues that p should not have been doubted, the respondent cannot
dismiss the objection by rejecting it, since he ought not to deny that p should not have been
doubted. For this reason, I reckon that here Peter is content with showing that the objection is
su"cient to make both alternatives appear questionable. The sophism can be represented in the
tabular form described above and which will be of frequent use in these notes:
O Tu curris A possible
1.1 Tu curris C ( the respondent is under
no obligation (neither positio
nor depositio)
1.2 D ( cf. rule of consequen-
ce (with an antecedent that
ought to be doubted)
1.3 N ( cf.1.2
The sophism has a very simple tree structure. A sentence is put forward (without specifying
the type of obligation): it is admitted and then proposed in the first place. Three alternatives
are taken into account, corresponding to the three type of replies available (conceding, denying,
doubting). Each response is ruled out because it involves some kind of unacceptable conclusion.
In the next section, Peter provides his solution.
32 In Peter’s treatise, solutions are often introduced, as this example shows, by clauses such
as ‘sed pro isto intelligendum’, ‘pro istis advertatur’ or similar. The solution to the first sophism
points out that no appeal to ambiguity must be left to the opponent, if we want the respondent not
to be forced into a contradiction and, at the same time, comply with the obligational constraints,
i.e. the rules he is subject to. Therefore, a case like this should not be admitted until it has
been determined explicitly in the context of which kind of obligation (e.g. positio or depositio)
the disputation is supposed to take place.
16 fit ] sit O 16 circa ] ce conf. scr. et del. ? O 17 aut . . . respondere ] vel dubitare O
17 ideo ] et praep. O 18 arguente ] arte O 18 specificos ] speciales O 19 Et ideo ] igitur O
19 arguente ] arte O 20 ad illud ] om. O 22 qua specie ] per quam speciem O 22 velit ]
vult O 22 et non ] nec O 22 admittat ] admittet O 22 aliquid ] respondens add. O
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3.3. !R2Obj.1-2" Aliter tamen posset responderi sophistice admittendo istam ‘tu 25
curris’ cum dicitur ‘obligo te ad istam ‘tu curris”. Et cum proponitur illam ‘tu
curris’, dicitur ‘respondeo ad istam’. Et si arguitur ‘tu respondes ad istam, igitur
concedendo, negando vel dubitando vel alio modo’, conceditur consequentia. Et
consequenter respondeatur || secundum || partes propositas. Et concesso antece- L 68vb
O 118radente, concedatur consequens. Et negatur prima pars antecedentis proposita et 30
secunda. Et conceditur tertia, si per ordinem proponeretur. Et si queratur qua
specie obligationis obligatur, dicat respondens quod non oportet certificare.
Unde diligenter advertatur quod quotienscumque est una disiunctiva sequens
cuius || quelibet pars est falsa non sequens, quelibet pars est neganda preter ulti- V 72vb
mam propo-||sitam. Et ita per oppositum de copulativa: cum co-||pulativa fuerit P 67rb
E Giiira
35
vera sed repugnans, cuius nulla pars est repugnans per se, quelibet pars preter
ultimam est concedenda.33
33 The argument is quite di"cult. First, Peter proposes an alternative solution to the first
sophism that would result in a sophistical (or captious) reply, as opposed to the preceding one
which is said to be given in conformity with the rules, cf. supra, sec. 3.2 the remark ‘et iste
est modus regularis respondendi’. This alternative approach would require the following: the
respondent should generically say that he is going to reply to the proposed sentence ‘Tu curris’.
The alternatives are, as above, concession, denial or doubt. I leave aside the clause ‘alio modo’
for it plays no e!ective role in the argument. If the respondent commits himself to replying (let
us use the label Resp), he thereby commits himself to the disjunction of the three alternatives:
Resp ( p ) & ( C p % N p % D p )
The idea behind the argument is that we might face a situation where a disjunction of n
sentences is sequentially relevant and must therefore be granted, while each one of its disjuncts
is irrelevant and false. In virtue of the fact that the disjunction is sequentially relevant, we
must grant it, but we might also be willing to deny all of its disjuncts (since they are irrelevant
and false). This is however not possible since we would obtain an inconsistent set of sentences.
How are we suppose to act in such a case? Peter o!ers an account of what turns out to be a
standard option that he adopts several times throughout his treatise. I will call it, according
to Peter’s use, responsio per ordinem. It consists in a sort of mechanical procedure aimed at
maintaining consistency while minimizing the denial of true sentences or the concession of false
ones. The procedure consists in denying the first n ) 1 proposed disjuncts of a sequentially
relevant disjunction that has been previously granted, if they are put forward one after another,
i.e. per ordinem: at step n the last disjunct will have become sequentially relevant and it will be
granted accordingly. This procedure is nothing more than an application of disjunctive syllogism
with n premises: from the rejection of the first n) 1 premises, the last one follows (and at this
stage, in the obligational framework, the reply to it is forced by the rules for relevant sentences).
The converse of this principle plainly holds in the case of conjunction too, the only di!erence
being that if a conjunction is incompatibly relevant, whose conjuncts are irrelevant and true,
whenever they are proposed one after another, they must all be granted except for the last one.
25 responderi sophistice ] inv. O 27 igitur ] tu respondes add. O 28 conceditur conse-
quentia ] respondetur concedendo consequentiam O 28 Et ] tunc add. O 29 respondeatur ]
respondetur O 29 Et ] om. O 30 concedatur ] conceditur O 31 proponeretur ] proponatur
O 32 obligatur ] respondes O 32 dicat ] dicatur O 32 respondens ] om. O 34 non . . .
neganda ] om. O 36–37 preter ultimam ] post concedenda transp. O
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3.4. Nunc, contra primam et secundam regulam, simul arguitur: quia utraque
istarum est possibilis ‘rex sedet’, ‘nullus rex sedet’, ideo utraque illarum est ad-
mittenda, cum sit utraque intellecta a te. Pono igitur tibi utramque istarum.34 40
It is noteworthy that a similar minimizing procedure is found in [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 88vb],
but in reverse order, in the case of an incompatibly relevant true conjunction: if none of its
conjuncts is repugnant, the first that is put forward must be conceded, while any subsequently
proposed conjunct must be denied. In the present sophism, I think Peter more or less takes up
this line of reasoning, which can be represented as follows:
O Tu curris A possible
1. Tu curris Resp the respondent says ‘Respon-
deo ad istam’
2. Tu respondes ad istam, igitur concedendo,
negando vel dubitando
C
3. Tu respondes ad istam C
4. Tu concedis istam N irrelevant and false
5. Tu dubitas istam N irrelevant and false
6. Tu negas istam C sequentially relevant by 2.–5.
This is the best solution I have been able to figure out in order to make sense of the text. To
read it as I do, however, it is necessary to correct the text by substituting ‘antecedentis’ with
‘consequentis’ in the passage ‘et negatur prima pars antecedentis proposita et secunda’. The
antecedent is ‘Respondes ad istam’, while the compound sentence, whose parts can be granted
or denied according to the order in which they are proposed can be, in my opinion, only the
consequent. The correction is however supported only by the meaning of the text, since all
manuscripts report ‘antecedentis’. It goes without saying that at steps 4. to 6. the three options
could also appear in a di!erent order, the only invariant element being that whatever is proposed
at step 4. and 5. must be denied, whereas step 6. must be granted as sequentially relevant.
34 The second sophism addresses the problem of how to deal with sentences that are, to some
extent, underdetermined.
P Utraque istarum A possible
1. Utraque istarum C sequentially relevant, by
(R1)
2. Ista sunt duo contradictoria C ( irrelevant and true
Two alternatives are taken into account: either the positum ‘utraque illarum’ (where by
‘illarum’ two contradictory sentences are intended) is admitted by the respondent (who thereby
commits himself to the concession of a contradiction) or the case is not admitted. If the case
is not admitted, it can be argued that the respondent is violating rule (R1). The rule requires
to admit any possible sentence whatsoever when it is posited; but both p and ¬ p are possible,
therefore p and ¬ p must be admitted (the reply to this argument is given below (cf. infra, sec.
3.8 ‘Sed ad argumentum primum’). Moreover, if the respondent refuses to admit the case posited
in this sophism (where the positum is ‘utraque illarum’), the opponent can submit a variation
on the theme, which is the object of the next sophism (the next positum being ‘altera illarum’).
38 Nunc ] casus in marg. O 38 simul ] om. O 38 quia ] et praep. O 40 cum sit utraque ]
om. O 40 intellecta . . . te ] inv. et. ante ideo transp. O 40 utramque ] utraque O
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Si admittatur, proponitur utraque. Si conceditur, patet quod conceduntur duo
contradictoria: quod enim sint duo contradictoria est verum non repugnans.35
Sed forte dicitur non admittendo.
!Obj.1" Sed contra: tu teneris admittere omnem propositionem possibilem ti-
bi positam; sed utraque istarum est possibilis et posita; igitur teneris admittere 45
utramque istarum.
3.5. !Obj.2" Item, si non admittitur utraque illarum quia altera alteri repugnat,
saltem pono tibi alteram illarum ‘rex sedet’, ‘nullus rex sedet’. Qua admissa,
propono tibi istam ‘rex sedet’. Et patet quod ista est dubia et impertinens, et ideo
dubitanda. Qua dubitata, proponitur ‘nullus rex sedet’, que est etiam dubitanda, 50
quia dubitato uno contradictoriorum, immediate proposito reliquo, dubitandum
est. Quibus dubitatis, arguitur sic: utrumque illorum dubitas; sed alterum illorum
est positum; igitur positum dubitas.36
!RObj.2" Sed huic forte dicitur, cum || ponitur altera illarum, admittendo al- M 84ra
teram illarum; et cum proponitur altera illarum, concedendo alteram illarum. Et 55
tamen utraque illarum dubitatur, cum proponitur.
35 Here we have again a pair of dichotomic alternatives. Peter first assumes that the positum
is admitted and in the next two-fold objection he assumes the opposite. In either case, the
respondent apparently is committed to contradiction or to the violation of a rule.
36 The third sophism is a variation on the same theme: here the positum is no longer ‘Utraque
istarum’ but ‘Altera illarum’. The problem, however, still lies in that the reference of the sentence
is not fixed precisely enough so that the respondent can be aware of which sentence he is replying
to. The structure of the disputation is the following:
P Altera illarum A possible
1. Rex sedet D irrelevant and doubtful
2. Nullus rex sedet D cf. the rule ‘dubitato uno
contradictoriorum, reliquum
est dubitandum’)
3. Utrumque illorum dubitas; sed alterum
illorum est positum; igitur positum dubitas
C (
41 proponitur ] proponatur O 41 utraque ] et add. O 42 quod . . . repugnans ] om. O
43 Sed . . . admittendo ] Si non admittatur O 44 Sed ] om. O 44–45 tibi positam ] om. O
45 et posita ] om. O 46 utramque ] utraque O 47 si ] omnino add. O 47 admittitur ]
admittatur O 47 altera alteri ] inv. O 49 et ] om. O 50 dubitanda ] est add. O
50 proponitur ] illa add. O 50 que . . . dubitanda ] qua dubitata quia dubitanda est O
51 immediate proposito ] om. O 51 reliquo ] et reliquum O 51–52 dubitandum est ] du-
bitandum et inc.: post contradictoriorum transp. O 52 utrumque illorum ] utramque illa-
rum O 52 sed ] om. O 52 alterum illorum ] alteram illarum O 53 positum ] tibi posita
O 53 positum ] tibi praep. O 54 ponitur ] proponitur O 54 admittendo ] admittenda O
55 altera . . . Et ] om. O
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Et ultra dicitur quod nulla illarum est mihi posita; et licet posueris mihi alteram
illarum, tamen nullam illarum posuisti mihi; et licet utramque illarum dubitaverim,
tamen non dubitavi mihi positum.37
37 This first reply to the third sophism is possibly taken from Strode (the whole sophism being
reminiscent of his text), who discusses the very same di"culties in connection with his second
assumption (the equivalent of Peter’s first rule for the concession of the positum). I report in
full Strode’s passage with the aim of showing how close Peter’s treatment is to arguments we
can read in the text of the Englishman, cf. [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 82ra-rb] “Super illud quod
dicebatur in suppositione secunda, scilicet ‘omne scitum esse positum etc.’, pono tibi alterum
illorum ‘rex sedet’ et ‘nullus rex sedet’, que scias esse contradictoria inter se contradicentia.
Sed diceres forte hic non admittendo, quia nescitur de qua fit mentio magis quam si diceretur
‘pono tibi aliquam propositionem’.
Sed contra: igitur per idem non esset talis casus admittendus, si ponatur quod scias unam
illarum, ‘rex sedet’ et ‘nullus rex sedet’, que sunt contradictoria, quia non fit mentio in tali casu
de aliqua propositione. Nec iste casus est admittendus ‘pono tibi quod aliquis homo currit’,
quia non fit mentio nec de isto nec de illo. Item sit rei veritas quod nulla propositio falsa sit.
Tunc pono tibi omnem propositionem. Ille casus est admittendus, quia illum admittendo nullum
sequitur inconveniens; ergo et sua particularis esset admittenda, quod fuit negatum.
Admittitur ergo forte casus. Deinde proponatur admissum [scil. the sentence ‘alterum il-
lorum’]; conceditur secundum secundam suppositionem. Deinde proponitur ‘rex sedet’. Sed si
conceditur vel negatur, cedat tempus. Et constat quod concessisti vel negasti infra tempus pro-
positionem que fuit tibi dubia; nec scivisti an sequebatur !vel" an repugnabat tibi posito; ergo
nulla fuit causa quare illam debuisti concedere vel negare. Si tunc dubitatur illa ‘rex sedet’,
cum proponitur infra tempus, proponatur illa ‘nullus rex sedet’. Si conceditur vel negatur, con-
tra: dubitato uno contradictoriorum, deberet aliud dubitari; sed scis illa esse contradictoria, per
casum, quorum dubitas unum; ergo a te fuit aliud dubitandum.
Arguitur etiam extra tempus quod male respondebas infra, sicut arguebatur de alia. Dubita-
tur ergo forte ‘nullus rex !sedet"’ cum proponitur. Sed contra: cedat tempus. Tunc, infra tempus,
utrumque illorum dubitasti; et concessisti ‘alterum illorum’; igitur tunc concessisti aliquam pro-
positionem quam dubitasti. Et ideo male respondisti per quintam suppositionem [scil. the duty
not to reply in two di!erent ways to a sentence, in the same disputation]. Et minor probatur,
quia concessisti propositionem sive casum tibi positum; sed nulla propositio erat tibi posita, vel
nullus casus erat tibi positus nisi altera illarum; ergo concessisti alteram illarum. Et illo casu
videtur concludi posse quod concessisti aliquam propositionem vel alterum illorum; et tamen
nullam propositionem vel aliquam illarum concessisti nec admisisti; et sic a te concedebatur et a
me proponebatur aliqua propositio; sed illa non fuit a me posita nec a te concessa.
Responderi ergo poterit, secundum viam communem probabilem, admittendo casum primum.
Deinde consequenter, ut petunt argumenta, concedendo conclusiones adductas. Negatur tamen
quod dubitavi propositionem quam concessi, quia tunc illa quam concessi fuisset tunc quando
dubitavi [possibly an echo of this passage is found in another sophism, cf. infra, 4.19, RObj.2].
Quod negatur, sicut nec sequitur ‘promitto tibi denarium et omnem denarium promitto Sor; ergo
promitto tibi denarium quem promitto Sor”.
In particular, Strode’s text supplies a step that is missing in the sequence of sentences of Peter’s
own sophism, but which is presupposed in Peter’s RObj.2. For the clause ‘et cum proponitur
altera illarum [presumably to be read as ‘altera illarum’, i.e. as the sentence ‘altera illarum’],
concedendo alteram illarum’ hinges on the assumption that the first sentence proposed after the
57 et . . . posueris ] posuisti enim O 58 utramque ] utraque O 58 dubitaverim ] dubitavi
O 59 tamen non ] inv. O
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!ORObj.2" Sed contra: cedat tempus obligationis. Et arguitur quod in illo tem- 60
pore aliqua obligatione fuisti obligatus, que fuerat B. Et arguitur sic: B obligatione
fuisti obligatus; sed B obligatio fuit composita ex signis obligationis et obligato;
igitur aliquid fuit obligatum quod fuit pars huius obligationis; et per consequens
aliquid fuit tibi positum, cum non fuerit alia obligatio quam positio. Sic igitur
aliqua istarum fuit tibi posita; sed utramque illarum dubitasti; igitur positum et 65
a te admissum dubitasti in tempore obligationis; igitur male respondisti.38
3.6. Sed pro isto et pro similibus advertendum est quod non est a respondente
respondendum ‘admitto’, nisi post || signum obligationis sequitur propositio ex- O 118rb
pressa aut terminus certam propositionem admittendam declarans respondenti, ut
cum ponitur illa ‘tu curris’ vel cum dicitur ‘pono tibi istam’, demonstrata certa 70
propositione respondenti nota. Ita etiam a respondente non est respondendum
ad aliquam propositionem, nisi illud verbum ‘propono’ determinet propositionem
integram, ut ‘propono tibi istam ‘tu curris”, aut terminum certam propositionem
respondenti designantem, ut ‘propono hanc’, certa propositione || respondenti nota P 67va
demonstrata, quam sciat ipse demonstrari.|| V 73ra75
Et ideo, cum dicitur ‘pono tibi alteram illarum’, dicitur non || admittendo quo- L 69ra
usque certificeris que illarum ponitur. Et si ponitur || quod sis certificatus optime B 96vb
que sit ista que tibi ponitur, admittatur hoc. Et iterum cum dicitur ‘pono tibi
alteram illarum’, dicitur non admittendo. Et si dicitur quare, dicitur quod non
curet. Sed dicat que est ista quam vult ponere. Et si ponit ipse respondens quod 80
ipse dicat, admittatur; et respondeatur ut prius cum ipse dicitur ‘pono alteram
admission of the positum ‘altera illarum’ is the positum itself, i.e. the sentence ‘altera illarum’,
rather than the sentence ‘rex sedet’ as in Peter’s text. I cannot otherwise make sense of RObj.2,
since the clause in question would not match the rest of the text. Moreover, I also see a link
between the last part of Strode’s text (from ‘Responderi ergo poterit’ to the end of the quotation)
and the additional reason provided by Peter in support of RObj.2 (cf. ‘Et ultra . . . ’), namely the
argument based on a distinction between readings de sensu composito and de sensu diviso, the
connected issue of modes of supposition depending on it and the classical argument ‘promitto
tibi denarium, sed nullum denarium tibi promitto’.
38 I assume that this additional counter-argument should count as an objection to the second
part of RObj.2, aimed at showing that the solution was only apparent. Nonetheless, attributing
this piece of reasoning to Peter, as if it represented his own point of view, leaves me perplexed
because it makes use of a definition of obligation that he had previously rejected.
60 quod ] sic O 60–61 in illo tempore ] infra tempus O 62 signis ] signo O 63 aliquid
. . . obligationis ] aliquod obligatum fuit pars obligationis O 64 alia ] aliqua praep. O 64 Sic ]
Et si praep. O 65 utramque ] utraque O 65 positum ] tibi praep. O 65–66 et . . . ad-
missum ] om. O 66 in tempore ] infra tempus O 66 obligationis ] om. O 67 isto ] istis O
68 admitto ] om. O 68 post ] om. O 68 sequitur ] sequatur O 68–69 propositio expres-
sa ] inv. O 69 declarans respondenti ] inv. O 70 cum . . . vel ] om. O 70 istam ] hoc O
70 demonstrata ] una add. O 72 determinet ] terminet O 72–73 propositionem integram ]
propositio integra O 73 tibi istam ] om. O 74 designantem ] designans O 74 nota ] om. O
75 sciat ipse ] inv. O 77 certificeris ] certificetur O 77–92.84 Et . . . respondendum ] om.
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illarum’. Sed cum hoc, dicat quod multum placeret admittere alteram illarum,
si tibi velit certificare quam ponere vult, quamvis concedam quod non est opus
certificare me. Et ita est obligatorie respondendum.39
3.7. Consimiliter si dicitur ‘pono propositionem possibilem et nulli repugnantem 85
quam habeo in mente mea’. Et ita cum dicitur ‘pono omnem propositionem pos-
sibilem’, dicitur non admittendo, quia nulla propositio est sequens ad id verbum
‘pono’ ad quam debeat responderi.40
Verumtamen, in certo casu, licet non sequitur aliqua propositio aut certus ter-
minus discretus id verbum ‘pono’, per aliquas circumstantias potest respondens 90
admittere, ut si respondens sciret quod nulla est propositio nisi || ista ‘rex sedet’ E Giiirb
sic significans, et opponens diceret ‘pono tibi omnem propositionem || possibilem M 84rb
que est in rerum natura’, potest respondens admittere, quia sic esset certus quam
propositionem admitteret.41
39 The solution to the third sophism requires further specifications with respect to the posited
sentence in case it contains elements of ambiguity or it is not well established what the respondent
is actually going to reply to. In such situations the constraint of admitting the sentence fails. In
particular, the sentence can be admitted only if it is explicitly expressed or if it is ‘indicated’,
in an act of ostension, by means of a demonstrative pronoun. Thus, the sophism serves as
a test to specify the limits of application of the first rule. A similar conclusion is found in
[Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 81ra] “Nisi certificet non admittam casum [. . . ] Ad casum ergo cum
mihi ponitur propositio quam cogitas, dico non admittendo illam. Et si dicitur quare, dico quia
nescio que sit illa [. . . ] Et si arguitur contra: illa est a te admittenda per primam suppositionem,
concedo non ut verum sed sic sequens ex casu. Si queritur tunc an admitto illum, respondeo
quod non admitto istam nec respondeo ad illam. Et si queratur quare, dico quia sic mihi placet
respondere, saltem nisi certificer aliter quam sim certificatus adhuc. Dico quod libenter obligarer
ad illam, ut tecum conferrem, dum velles mihi proferre correspondentem quam audirem”.
40 Another variation on the same set of problems is given in the fourth sophism: if it is not well-
defined what the posited sentence refers to, the case must not be admitted unless the sentence is
specified in some additional way. In this case, the problem arises because the respondent ignores
what sentence the opponent has (literally) in mind or, again, because of the presence of the term
‘omnis’ ranging over a set of sentences that is not furtherly qualified, except for the property
that its elements are possible.
Again, the source is possibly [Ralph Strode, 1517, 80vb–81ra] where we find the sophisms ‘pono
tibi omne possibile’ and ‘pono tibi propositionem quam cogito’. A similar discussion is also in
[Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 123].
41 The previous caveat is suspended in special cases, as for instance when the respondent
knows that the class of possible sentences has only one element.
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Et sicut dicitur de isto verbo ‘pono’, ita de illo verbo ‘propono’. Unde, quam- 95
vis omne sequens ex bene concesso sit concedendum, non tamen cum propono
‘omne sequens’ est concedendum omne sequens, quia forte multa sequentia sunt
non intellecta aut de quibus non est animadversum a respondente.42 Ita etiam,
cum proponitur ‘altera illarum’ – ‘deus est’ vel ‘homo est asinus’ – non est re-
spondendum concedendo vel negando alteram illarum, cum nesciat que propositio 100
proponatur concedenda vel neganda.43
3.8. !RObj.1" Sed ad argumentum primum: cum arguitur quod utraque illarum
est admittenda ‘rex sedet’, ‘nullus rex sedet’, dicitur concedendo et quod utramque
illarum divisive teneor admittere, non tamen teneor admittere simul utramque
illarum mihi positam neque plus probat argumentum.44 105
42 The passage presents a textual problem: the correct reading is probably the one provided
by manuscript P, whose text reads ‘cum dicitur ‘propono ‘omne sequens” non est respondendum
concedendo omne sequens”. As for the spirit of the remark ‘multa sequentia sunt non intellecta’,
an interesting discussion of the role of epistemic requirements in the obligational rules is found
in [Boh, 1990, especially pp. 78–83] where Peter’s views are examined in some detail.
43 Generalization of the previous solution which is extended to the class of proposita: not only
does the requirement of well-definedness hold with respect to the positum, but it also holds for
any sentence that is put forward during the disputation. This is a further example of Peter’s
inclination to insert, in the discussion of objections, replies and solutions to the sophisms, a
number of general considerations that can be regarded as refinements of the rules, if not as
additional rules in their own right.
44 Cf. supra, sec. 3.4. Peter appeals to the distinction between the compound and divided
senses in whose terms the sentence ‘Utraque illarum est possibilis’ can be read. In the compound
sense, i.e. if we read it as ! ( p $ ¬ p ), the sentence is false, since the scope of possibility extends
over a contradiction. If, on the other hand, the sentence is taken in the divided sense, it will be
equivalent to the conjunction ! p $ !¬ p which is true. In the context of the disputation of the
second sophism, the opponent’s strategy was trying to force the respondent into contradiction
by positing ‘Utraque illarum’. The term ‘utraque’ stands, here, for two contradictory sentences
p and ¬ p, that are both, separatedly, possible, and therefore should be admitted according to
(R1). The point is that those sentences are possible in the divided but not in the compound
sense. Hence, the respondent is by no means compelled, by (R1), to admit the contradictory
conjunction ( p $ ¬ p ) for this sentence is, in fact, not possible (although its conjuncts are both
possible, as long as they are taken separatedly).
95 ita ] dicitur O 96 ex . . . concesso ] om. O 96 sit ] est O 96 cum ] dicitur add. P;
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3.9. Si tamen ponitur quod omne possibile sit tibi positum et a te bene admissum,
admittatur.45 Deinde proponitur ‘rex sedet’. Et cum ista sit dubia et impertinens,
ideo ista est dubitanda. Et ita etiam dubitatur ista proposita ‘nullus rex sedet’
etc.
!Obj.1" Sed contra: omne possibile est tibi positum et a te bene admissum; 110
sed utraque illarum est possibilis; igitur utraque || illarum est tibi posita et a te V 73rb
bene admissa. Et utraque illarum est tibi proposita; igitur utraque illarum est a
te concedenda. Et utramque illarum dubitas; igitur male respondes.46
3.10. Ideo, admisso casu, dicitur consequenter concedendo omnia, si per ordinem
proponatur. 115
!RObj.1" Et conceditur quod tu male respondes.47
45 The general strategy of answering to the sophisms without an explicit identification of
the posited sentence that has been given above (for instance, cf. supra, sec. 3.7) consists in the
rejection of the case, unless (or until) further specifications are provided, in precise terms, as to
what the positum-sentence is going to be like. In the following two sophisms (cf. sec. 3.9–3.13),
on the contrary, Peter takes into account cases that can be admitted, despite their superficial
similarity with those of the preceding type.
46 In the present case, we have the following disputation:
P Omne possibile est tibi positum et a te bene
admissum
A possible
1. Rex sedet D irrelevant and doubtful
2. Nullus rex sedet D cf. the rule ‘dubitato uno
contradictoriorum, reliquum
est dubitandum’)
3. Omne possibile est tibi positum et a te bene
admissum
C sequentially relevant, (R1)
4. Utraque illarum est possibilis [scil. ‘rex
sedet’, ‘nullus rex sedet’]
C irrelevant and true
5. Utraque illarum est tibi posita et a te bene
admissa
C sequentially relevant by 3.
and 4.
6. Utraque illarum est tibi proposita C irrelevant and true
7. Utraque illarum est a te concedenda C sequentially relevant by 5., 6.
and (R3.1)
8. Utramque illarum dubitas C irrelevant and true
9. Male respondes C sequentially relevant
47 First, a textual remark: the reading ‘proponatur’ of the incunable is mistaken: it should
be corrected in ‘proponantur’ (as in ms. O), since the verb refers to ‘omnia’.
The solution to the fifth sophism consists in the admission of the casus and the concession of
all proposita (save the first two), if they are put forward in the proposed order (to be noted is
the application, once again, of the strategy of reply per ordinem). It must be recalled that the
106 Si tamen ponitur ] tertius casus in marg. O 106 ponitur ] ponatur O 106 a ]
ad O 107 proponitur ] propono O 107 Et ] om. O 108 ista est ] om. O 108 Et ]
om. O 108 dubitatur ] dubitetur O 109 etc. ] om. O 115 proponatur ] proponantur O
116 conceditur ] etiam add. O 116 tu ] om. O
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Si tamen prius proponitur quod male respondes quam tu illarum utramque
dubites, negandum est tamquam falsum et impertinens. Deinde negatur quod
utramque illarum dubites, si proponitur, aliis concessis, per ordinem.48
Et si arguitur, in priori ordine, quod tu non male respondes, || quia tu bene O 118va120
re-||spondes ad aliquam propositionem tibi positam, igitur tu non male respondes, P 67vb
negatur consequentia.49
respondent is allowed to grant the sentence ‘tu male respondes’ if it is sequentially relevant in a
disputation, since this does not amount to a violation of the rules. Obligational mistakes are other
kinds of misbehaviours like, for instance, the concession and denial of the same sentence within
one and the same disputation, or the concession of something irrelevant and false or the denial of
something irrelevant and true. With respect to the sentence ‘tu male respondes’, a mistake occurs
if the respondent grants it, without being compelled to do so, within the time of the obligation,
or if he grants it outside the period of the obligation, since then he is committed only to truth.
The issue has interesting implications and is discussed at some length in [Ralph Strode, 1517,
fols. 78vb and 82vb]. The general point to be kept in mind is that there is a sharp distinction
between the internal development of the obligation (with its stock of sentences, logical relations,
commitments to the certain evaluations governed by the rules) and what goes on outside the
disputation, when its development must be assessed in objective terms (which is expressed, by
medieval authors, by means of the clause ‘extra tempus est rei veritas fatenda’). Di"culties
often arise because obligations are constructed in such a way as to make the two levels interact.
It has been argued (cf. for instance [D’Ors, 1991b] on dialogue and meta-dialogue) that such
attempts often result in confusing outcomes, where the distinction between the environments
infra tempus and extra tempus collapses. Yet, I think it is the opposite way around. Although in
a sometimes rough or even unprecise way, medieval authors of obligations treatises are generally
well aware that they are conflating the two levels, and they do it on purpose. As I have stressed
above, a typical example is the elaboration of a plethora of sophisticated casus based on the
distinction between (i) granting p within the time of the obligation, (ii) granting – outside the
time – that p ought to be granted within the time, and (iii) granting within the time that p ought
to be granted. Now, to the best of my knowledge, a theory of these logical relations has never
been sistematically developed, but there is much more to it than simple confusion. This kind
of questions might be relevant to a better understanding of obligations both as a theory (with
its logical features) and as a historical fact (since an accurate picture of their evolution cannot
prescind from what we actually find in the texts).
48 A variation in the order such as the one described here, would suspend the duty of granting
the sentence ‘tu male respondes’, since it would no longer be sequentially relevant.
49 By contrast, if the order remains the same as before, and it is argued that, since the
respondent has replied correctly to some sentence, he has not replied incorrectly, then according
to Peter the inference must be rejected. A justification for this move is not provided, but I assume
it relies on the presupposition that in the obligational context the expression ‘bene respondere’
can only refer to a full compliance with the rules. In other words, it is not su"cient to answer
correctly to a sentence, to infer that the respondent has done his job properly; or – which is the
same – breaking the rules once, immediately leaves the him open to the charge of responding
badly.
117 proponitur ] proponatur O 117 quod ] post quam transp. O 117 tu ] om. O
118 negandum est ] negando O 119 si ] postea add. O 119 proponitur ] proponatur O
119 aliis concessis ] inv. O 120 si ] om. O 120 respondes ] et quod tu bene respondes
add. O 121 positam ] propositam O 121 tu ] om. O 122 consequentia ] argumentum O
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3.11. !Obj.2" Item, admisso casu isto quod omne possibile sit tibi positum et a
te bene admissum, arguitur quod antecedens ad impossibile simpliciter sit a te
bene admissum. Consequens repugnat dictis. Et probatur consequentia: quia 125
admissa ista, proponitur tibi ‘utraque istarum contradictoriarum est propositio
possibilis’, quod, quia verum et impertinens, est concedendum. Et deinde propono
tibi ‘utraque illarum est tibi posita et a te bene admissa’: ista sequitur ex illis,
ideo concedenda. Et per || consequens ista duo invicem contradictoria sunt a te M 84va
bene admissa et simul. Et per consequens, antecedens ad illam copulativam ‘rex 130
sedet, nullus rex sedet’ simpliciter impossibilem est a te bene admissum.50
3.12. Sed huic dicitur admittendo quod omne possibile sit tibi positum et a te
bene admissum, idest quod omnis propositio possibilis sit tibi posita et a te bene
admissa.
!RObj.2" Deinde, cum proponitur quod utraque illarum duarum contradicto- 135
riarum est possibilis, negatur tamquam repugnans, quia repugnans est quod bene
admittas duo invicem repugnantia, || quod tamen sequitur illo concesso.51|| L 69rb
B 97raSed si ponitur quod omne possibile sit tibi positum et a te admissum absque
li bene et proponatur quod utraque illarum sit possibilis, conceditur tamquam
50 The argument can be represented as follows (note that the positum here is no longer ‘omne
possibile’, but ‘omne possibile est tibi positum et a te bene admissum’):
P Omne possibile est tibi positum et a te bene
admissum
A possible
1. Utraque istarum contradictoriarum est pro-
positio possibilis [scil. ‘rex sedet’, ‘nullus
rex sedet’]
C irrelevant and true
2. Utraque illarum est tibi posita et a te bene
admissa
C by P and 1.
51 The solution to the objection presented in the previous section consists in denying step 1.
as incompatibly relevant. The argument has the following form (let p stand for the positum, q for
the sentence proposed at step 1. and r for the sentence proposed at step 2.): ( p $ q ) & r, but
¬ r (because one cannot correctly admit contradictory sentences); therefore ¬ ( p $ q ); this is in
turn equivalent to (¬ p % ¬ q ); but p (= positum); therefore ¬ q. This means that the negation
of q follows. Hence, q is not irrelevant and true, but rather incompatibly relevant and should be
denied accordingly.
123 a ] ad O 124 a ] ad O 125 probatur ] arguitur O 126 admissa ista ] admisso il-
lo O 126 proponitur ] proponatur O 126 tibi ] om. O 126 contradictoriarum ] om. O
126 propositio ] om. O 127 est ] ideo O 127 Et ] om. O 127 propono ] proponatur O
128 illarum ] istarum contradictoriarum O 128 a ] ad O 128 ista ] ideo O 129 ideo con-
cedenda ] om. O 129 invicem ] om. O 129 a ] ad O 130 et simul ] om. O 130 Et per
consequens ] igitur O 130–131 rex . . . bene ] om. O 132 admittendo ] admisso O 132 a ]
ad O 133 quod ] om. O 135 quod ] om. O 135 duarum ] om. O 137 duo ] contradic-
toria add. O 137 invicem ] ad invicem O 137 tamen ] om. O 137 concesso ] admisso O
138 ponitur ] ponatur O 138 a ] ad O 138–139 absque . . . bene ] om. O 139 quod ] om.
O 139 illarum ] contradictoriarum add. O 139 sit ] est O
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verum non repugnans et quod utraque istarum est a te admissa. Et si inferatur 140
tunc quod utraque illarum est a te concedenda, negatur consequentia.52
3.13. Unde si ponitur quod propositio illa simpliciter impossibilis ‘homo est asi-
nus’ sit tibi posita et a te admissa, admittendum est. Et cum proponitur quod
ista ‘homo est asinus’ simpliciter impossibilis est a te concedenda, negatur quia
non valet ista ‘hec propositio impossibilis simpliciter est tibi posita et a te admis- 145
sa, igitur hec est a te concedenda’, quia ad hoc quod ista foret a te concedenda,
oportet quod in isto casu foret bene admissa, quod non est verum, quia bonum est
non multiplicare sed solvere.53
3.14. Sed contra responsionem arguitur probando quod eadem propositio est con-
cedenda et neganda ab eodem in || eodem tempore obligationis, quod tamen E Giiiva150
repugnat responsioni. Quia si unum contradictoriorum est concedendum, reli-
quum est negandum; ideo, si eadem propositio esset concedenda et || neganda et V 73va
contradictorium esset propositio, igitur esset concedendum et negandum.54
52 If the clause ‘bene’ is removed, the situation changes: the positum is still to be admitted (it
may well be the case that any possible sentence is posited to you and that you admit it, without
stipulating that your admission is correct), and step 1. is no longer incompatibly relevant but,
rather, irrelevant and true. Both contradictories are admitted by you. Fair enough, this is just
a true description of a fact. It might be unreasonable of you to admit them, but still, the fact
that you do is not inconsistent in itself. In the previous case, by contrast, the assumption was
that you correctly admitted two contradictories, i.e. in conformity with the rules, and this in
principle can never be the case.
53 The sophism is variation on the last remark. The positum is ‘Hec propositio simpliciter
impossibilis ‘homo est asinus’ est tibi posita et a te admissa’ without the clause ‘bene’ (notice
that in the present case the reading of the incunable is correct, as opposed to that of ms. O).
The case can be admitted and when the propositum ‘hec [= ‘homo est asinus’] est concedenda’
is put forward, it can be denied, because in order for it to be concedendum it should have been
correctly admitted, contrary to the assumptions.
54 In this section the focus shifts on a number of problems concerning contradictions. The
crucial point is defending the consistency of the set of rules laid down above. As usual, this issue
is spelled out at some length through series of objections and replies. Peter takes into account a
number of arguments against his own view (cf. ‘contra responsionem’) that an imaginary oppo-
nent may come up with in the attempt to show (‘probando’) that one and the same sentence must
be conceded and denied in the same disputation, a conclusion that would be inconsistent with the
general set of assumptions and rules that Peter endorses (‘quod tamen repugnat responsioni’).
He considers, in particular, two classes of objections. First, in sec. 3.14–3.19, the problem of
140 inferatur ] infertur O 142 ponitur ] ponatur O 142 propositio ] om. O 142 illa ]
hec sit O 142 simpliciter ] om. O 143 a ] ad O 143 admissa ] bene praep. O
143 admittendum ] admittenda O 143 quod ] om. O 144 impossibilis ] om. O 144 a ]
ad O 145 ista ] consequentia O 145 propositio ] om. O 145 tibi . . . et ] om. O 145 a ]
ad O 146 hec ] om. O 146 foret ] esset O 146 a te ] om. O 147 oportet ] oporteret O
147 in . . . casu ] illa O 147 foret ] esset O 147 bene ] a te praep. O 147–148 quia . . .
solvere ] om. O 149 Sed contra ] casus in marg. O 149 responsionem ] EV; istam add. M;
istam positionem O 149 est ] sit O 150 in ] et praep. O 153 esset ] foret O 153 igitur ]
contradictorium etiam O 153 esset ] foret O
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Sed arguitur consequentia: ponat Sor istam tibi ‘homo currit’, adequate signi-
ficantem hominem currere; et ponat Plato tibi istam ‘non homo currit’, adequate 155
significantem non hominem currere, contradictorio modo prime. Et sis tu obliga-
tus ad ambas istas per aliquod tempus. Deinde proponat Sor tibi istam ‘homo
currit’: ista est concedenda quia posita etc. Deinde proponat || Plato tibi istam P 68ra
‘non homo currit’: et patet quod est concedenda per idem. Ideo || sequitur quod O 118vb
eadem propositio sit concedenda et neganda, quod fuit probandum.55 160
granting and denying one and the same sentence, is examined in a number of sophisms where, for
instance, contradictory posita are posited and then proposed to the same respondent by di!erent
people. In this group of sophisms, Peter focuses on of the relative character of the ‘provability’ of
sentences which should be understood, each time, with respect to distinct disputations. Second,
in sec. 3.20–3.27, the issue is discussed in connection with Swyneshed’s controversial rule for
conjunction.
55 The seventh sophism is the first alleged proof against the opinion supported by Peter. It
takes the following shape:
PSor Homo currit et ista [scil. ‘homo currit’]
adequate significat hominem currere
A possible
PPlato Non homo currit et ista [scil. ‘non homo
currit’] adequate significat non hominem
currere
A possible
1.Sor Homo currit C by R1
1.Plato Non homo currit C by R1
The same sentence is granted and denied; but the respondent has just strictly played by the
standard rules. The latter, therefore, seem to entail an undesired conclusion. What has gone
wrong? Peter immediately recognizes the trivial mistake behind the argument: it is with respect
to two distinct obligations that the same sentence is granted and denied, which means that it is
in fact granted in one disputation and denied in the other.
154 consequentia ] illa praep. O 154 ponat ] nam add. O 157 istas ] om. O
157 aliquod ] a O 158 quia . . . etc. ] om. O 158 tibi ] om. O 159 per idem ] quia posita
tibi ab eo O 159 Ideo ] et O 160 eadem propositio ] om. O 160 sit ] est O
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3.15. Sed huic forte dicitur quod non est inconveniens quod eadem propositio sit
ab eodem in eodem tempore obligationis || concedenda et neganda, quia illud est M 84vb
respectu diversarum obligationum.56
!Obj.1" Sed contra: ponatur quod Sor teneat locum Platonis et ponat ipse
utrumque.57 165
!RObj.1" Sed adhuc forte dicitur quod non est inconveniens, quia est respectu
Sor qui locum tenet duorum respondentium.58
3.16. Deinde proponat tibi Sor ‘hec est vera ‘homo currit”: quia id est sequens,
ideo concedendum. Sequitur enim ‘homo currit; et ista adequate significat homi-
nem currere; igitur hec est vera ‘homo currit”. Antecedens enim est positum in 170
casu illo, igitur etc. Quo concesso, ponat Sor illam ‘non homo currit’, que contra-
dicit illi, que per idem est concedenda. Deinde proponat Sor quod utraque illarum
contradictoriarum est vera. Et patet quod illud est sequens. Quod si conceditur,
cedat tempus obligationis.59
56 Cf. also Tractatus de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+4ra] “numquam
est eadem propositio concedenda et neganda respectu eiusdem respondentis et respectu eiusdem
obligationis et sensu”. A similar line is taken by [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 87vb]. A discussion of
relevance and order in connection with the problem of granting contradictory sentences is found,
again, in [Ashworth, 1981, especially pp. 183–186]. There is no problem of consistency because
it may well be the case that contradictory outcomes are brought about by di!erent disputations.
Nevertheless, given the standard set of rules that Peter adopts, this can never happen to be the
case in the context of one and the same disputation. Here Peter is facing the issue not from the
point of view of outcomes, i.e. in terms of consistency with respect to sequences of proposita,
which in turn amounts to the issue of determining either (1) whether it might be the case that
a given sentence, put forward in the course of a disputation, must be granted and denied within
the context of that disputation or (2) whether it must be granted in one disputation and denied
in another disputation having the same positum. Rather, he takes into account an objection of
consistency at the very first step of a disputation, i.e. at the level of posita.
57 A cursory, harmless, objection to the previous remark (which insisted on relativizing contra-
dictory outcomes to di!erent disputations): what if we no longer have two people as opponents,
but just one person who posits contradictory sentences?
58 Again, the objection is quickly dismissed, because the person in question, as Peter says,
must be regarded as actually playing the role of two opponents. The incunable text is mistaken,
since it reports the phrase ‘respondentium’ where, clearly, ‘opponentium’ must be understood
(cf. also the previous objection, reading ‘Sor teneat locum Platonis et ponat ipse utrumque’: it is
only the opponent who is supposed to perform the act of positing something, not the respondent.
59 The passage is a continuation of the sophism presentend in sec. 3.14. Two textual remarks
are in order: the text ‘ponat Sor illam ‘non homo currit” does not properly fit in the symmetrical
structure of the sophism. It must therefore be corrected, as is confirmed by the readings of ms.
162 in ] et praep. O 164 contra ] om. O 165 utrumque ] utramque O 166 Sed ad-
huc ] Huic O 166 est ] adhuc O 167 locum tenet ] inv. O 167 respondentium ] om. O
168 quia ] et praep. O 170 enim ] om. O 170 est ] tibi add. O 171 illo ] om. O 171 Quo ]
Illa igitur O 171 concesso ] concessa O 171 ponat ] proponat O 171 illam ] hec est vera
O 171 homo ] Sor O 172 quod ] om. O 172 illarum ] om. O 173 contradictoriarum ]
contradictoriam inc. O
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!Obj.1" Et arguitur quod infra tempus obligationis concessisti impossibile sim- 175
pliciter, in quocumque tempore vel in quacumque obligatione fuerit non est cura;
igitur in tempore male respondisti.
!Obj.2" Item, in tempore concessisti repugnans tibi posito et a te bene admisso;
igitur in tempore male respondisti. Patet consequentia quia tam inconveniens est
concedere repugnans propositum ab uno quam ab alio, cum sit idem et eodem 180
modo repugnans.
!Obj.3" Fiat autem ista forma extra tempus ‘tu concessisti infra aliquod tempus
duo contradictoria esse vera, igitur infra aliquod tempus male respondisti’. Patet
consequentia quia neque respectu unius || neque respectu diversorum potest esse L 69va
quod duo contradictoria sint simul vera in sensu et ad sensum iam expressum.60 185
O, at two points: first ‘proponat’ should replace ‘ponat’; second ‘non homo currit’ should be
supplemented with ‘hec est vera’. This version of the sophism absorbs the objection of the
previous section. Here Socrates is the only opponent, but with the two-fold task of positing a
sentence and its contradictory along with some additional proposita:
P.1Sor Homo currit et ista [scil. ‘homo currit’]
adequate significat hominem currere
A possible
P.2Sor Non homo currit et ista [scil. ‘non homo
currit’] adequate significat non hominem
currere
A possible
1. Hec est vera ‘homo currit’ C sequentially relevant (the
consequence ‘homo currit
et ista adequate significat
hominem currere; igitur hec
est vera ‘homo currit” is
valid, and the antecedent is
P.1)
2. Hec est vera ‘non homo currit’ C sequentially relevant (same
valid inference, with P.2 as
antecedent)
3. Utraque illarum contradictoriarum est vera C sequentially relevant
60 The sequence of these three objections, put forward extra tempus (cf. the immediately
preceding clause ‘cedat tempus obligationis’) is meant to point out that, apparently, further
di"culties (beyond the fact that one and the same sentence ought to be granted and denied in
the same disputation) derive from the responsio characterized by the set of assumptions and rules
presented in the first two sections of the treatise. The conclusion of the three objections is the
same: the respondent replies incorrectly. First, because he would grant an impossibile simpliciter ;
176 obligatione ] EO propositione BV 176 fuerit ] om. O 177 in tempore ] infra tempus
obligationis OV 178–179 Item, . . . respondisti ] BE om. V 178 in tempore ] infra repugnans
tempus O 179 in tempore ] infra tempus O 179 inconveniens ] inc. forte conveniens aut
consequens O 180 propositum ] BEO om. V 182 Fiat ] EO ante fiat add. item B 182 infra
aliquod tempus ] infra tempus a V 182 aliquod ] om. O 183 aliquod ] om. O; idem BV
183–184 Patet consequentia ] Consequentia hec tenet O 185 in sensu ] EO add. ad sensum
V 185 et ad sensum ] om. O 185 expressum ] expresso O
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3.17. Ideo dicitur, in principio, negando istam conclusionem, scilicet quod eadem
propositio sit concedenda et neganda ab eodem infra idem tempus. Et admittitur
propositio illa ‘homo currit’ posita primo mihi a Sor. Et cum ponitur sua con-
tradictoria a Platone non admittitur, quia repugnat posito et bene admisso, quia
numquam repugnantia possunt simul bene stare nec respectu unius neque respectu 190
diversorum, ut argutum est, sicut neque umquam possunt plures opiniones esse ve-
re circa eandem materiam non convertibiles. Unde cum sunt plures opiniones circa
eandem materiam non convertibiles, aut unica earum || est vera || aut omnes false, V 73vb
M 85raquamvis, ut sepe contingit, || multe videantur a contradictione defendibiles, quod
B 97rbaccidit propter defectum speculationis et eius ignorantiam. Et ideo convenienter 195
respondendo || numquam debet idem respondens diversas opiniones circa eandem P 68rb
materiam || sustinere, nisi velit contradictoria concedere. Potest tamen unam post O 119ra
aliam gratia disputationis admittere et sustinere.61
second, because he would grant something inconsistent with a posited sentence that has been
correctly admitted; third, because he would grant, within the time of the obligation, that two
contradictory sentences are both true. The objections have a feature in common, namely that in
various ways, the attempt to solve the problem by relativizing responses to the context of di!erent
disputations is dismissed (cf. the remarks ‘in quocumque tempore vel in quacumque obligatione
fuerit non est cura’, ‘tam inconveniens est concedere repugnans propositum ab uno quam ab alio’
and ‘neque respectu unius neque respectu diversorum potest esse quod contradictoria sint simul
vera’).
61 A solution is provided here to the first group of arguments that should have counted,
allegedly, as tantamount proofs of the bad consequences (namely the duty of granting and denying
the same sentence in a disputation) of the responsio that Peter is willing to endorse in his treatise.
The solution consists in admitting the first positum and rejecting the second one in the context
of the seventh sophism (in its original version involving two disputants: though the same would
hold as well if we considered only one agent, as opposing ‘on behalf of many’). I take the clause
‘neque respectu unius neque respectu diversorum’ as going along the same lines taken in sec. 3.15.
No matter how many opponents there are, one must never admit two contradictory posita in the
same disputation, while it is perfectly consistent with the rules to admit contradictory posita in
di!erent disputations: which makes the claim consistent with the conclusion of this paragraph
‘potest tamen unam post aliam [. . . ] admittere et sustinere’. The remark ‘aut unica earum est
vera aut omnes false’ is problematic. It cannot certainly fit the square of opposition, at least as
far as contradictories are concerned, since it is a logical law that when one contradictory is true,
the other is false. One way to take the text as it stands, and make sense of it, is suggesting that
Peter might be referring here, though in a rather generic and loose way, to di!erent opinions
formulated in the form of pairs of contrary (not contradictory) universal sentences which are the
186 conclusionem ] EO consequentiam BM 186 scilicet quod ] om. O 187 sit ] est O
187 idem ] om. O 188 mihi ] om. O 188–189 sua contradictoria ] illa ‘non homo currit’ po-
sita O 189 posito ] priori O 189 et ] om. O 190 repugnantia possunt ] inv. O 191 neque
umquam ] numquam O 191 opiniones ] EB positiones O 192 non convertibiles ] om. BMOV
192 cum ] numquam O 192 sunt ] circa eandem materiam add. O 192 opiniones ] vere add.
O 193 unica ] EO una BMV 193 est ] EO erat V 193 omnes ] sunt add. O 194 ut . . .
contingit ] post videantur transp. O 195 speculationis ] speculantis O 195 convenienter ] con-
sequenter OV 196 numquam ] om. O 197 concedere ] sustinere vel praep. O 197 tamen ]
om. O 198 gratia disputationis ] om. V
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3.18. Sed adhuc, forte, arguitur quod eadem propositio est concedenda et neganda
ab eodem in eadem obligatione: quia ponatur tibi hec copulativa ‘hec ‘homo currit’ 200
est tibi posita et a te bene admissa adequate significans hominem currere, et hec
‘risibile currit’ adequate significans risibile currere est tibi deposita et a te admissa’.
Deinde arguitur quod hec est a te concedenda ‘homo currit’, quia est tibi posita
et a te bene admissa et est tibi proposita, igitur est a te concedenda: ponatur enim
cum toto casu quod hec sit tibi proposita. 205
!i" Et quod hec sit a te neganda arguitur: quia hec consequentia est bona ‘homo
currit, igitur risibile currit’;
!ii" et eius consequens est a te negandum, quia est de-||positum; igitur eius E Giiivb
antecedens est a te negandum.
Et sic ista ‘homo currit’ est a te concedenda et neganda.62 210
only sort of sentences that can be together false but not true. My understanding of the passage
for the moment does not reach further than this.
One last aspect is worth mentioning. The solution gives us a hint as to how to understand and
apply the clause ‘non repugnans alicui bene admisso’ built in rule (R1). The clause is operating
especially in the case of disputations with multiple posita such as the present one and it is meant
to rule out all posita that are inconsistent with the previous steps.
62 The sophism has the following structure:
P ‘Homo currit’ est a tibi posita et a te be-
ne admissa, et est tibi proposita, adequate
significans hominem currere, et hec ‘risibile
currit’, adequate significans risibile currere,
est tibi deposita et a te admissa
A possible
1. ‘Homo currit’ est tibi posita et a te bene
admissa et est tibi proposita, igitur est a te
concedenda
C irrelevant and true; valid
inference (by (R1))
2. Hec est a te concedenda ‘homo currit’ C sequentially relevant by P
and 1.
3. Hec consequentia est bona ‘Homo currit,
igitur risibile currit’; et eius consequens est
a te negandum quia est depositum; igitur
eius antecedens est a te negandum’
C irrelevant and true (valid
inference)
4. Hec est a te neganda ‘homo currit’ C sequentially relevant (by 3.
and the second conjunct of
P, which entails that ‘risibile
currit’ must be denied, since
it is deposited)
The sophism should count as an additional proof of the fact that the set of rules forces the
respondent, in some cases, to grant and deny one and the same sentence in the same disputation
199 Sed adhuc ] casus in marg. O 200 copulativa ] BELMOP om. V 200 hec ] E om.
O propositio add. M 201 a ] ad O 201 hec ] propositio add. M 202 currere ] currit O
202 deposita ] posita OV 202 a ] ad O 202 te ] EP bene add. LMOV 203–204 Deinde . . .
admissa ] om. V 203 quia ] illa add. O 204 a ] ad O 204 et . . . proposita ] om. O 206 a
te ] om. O 206 quia ] quod O 208 est ] tibi add. LO 210 Et ] si add. MO 210 concedenda
et ] om. M
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3.19. Sed huic dicitur, ut prius, negando quod eadem propositio est concedenda
et neganda ad sensum iam dictum.
Et admittitur ille casus et quod ista ‘homo currit’ est a te concedenda, quia
posita et bene admissa, ut ponit casus.
!Ad i" Et cum arguitur quod illa sit neganda ‘homo currit’ quia illa consequentia 215
est bona ‘homo currit, igitur risibile currit’, et consequens eius est negandum, igitur
et eius antecedens est negandum, negatur antecedens, scilicet quod consequens sit
negandum.
!Ad ii" Et cum arguitur quod illud est depositum et admissum, igitur negandum,
negatur consequentia. 220
!Obj.1" Sed illa consequentia est bona: hec ‘risibile currit’ est tibi deposita et a
te bene admissa, igitur est neganda.
!RObj.1" Sed eius antecedens est repugnans in illo casu, ideo etc.63
(as is shown, in particular, by steps 2. and 4.). The positum is a conjunction of the form “p’ is
posited to you and correctly admitted by you and ‘q’ is deposited to you and admitted by you’,
where ( p ' q ) holds. The casus, therefore, is a variation on the theme already discussed in the
previous sophism. Instead of having multiple, contradictory, posita, here we have a compound
sentence, whose conjuncts are, apparently, incompatible (the formulation is equivalent to positing
the antecedent and the negation of the consequent of a true biconditional sentence). The plurality
of incompatible sentences we were confronted with in the previous situation, is thus now absorbed
within the structure of a single compound sentence.
63 The strategy of reply suggested by Peter is, in this case, extremely subtle, at least as far as I
have been able to reconstruct the argument. Some di"culties may be raised on account of textual
problems that I will not face in detail here: much depending, for the sense of the argument, on
the presence or omission in the manuscripts of two occurrences of the term ‘bene’ in connection
with the admission of the depositum ‘risibile currit’. I am confident that the reconstruction I
will provide is su"cient to justify the textual choice that I am inclined to favour.
The general point conforms to the whole sequence of arguments presented in the previous
sections. The purported conclusion endorsed by our imaginary objector is always the same,
namely that one and the same sentence must be granted and denied in the same disputation on
the assumption that we accept Peter’s set of obligational rules. The structure of the example,
too, is similar to that of the seventh sophism, where the key elements involved were multiple
incompatible sentences posited one after another. Here, by contrast, we are confronted with
another kind of incompatibility coming in the form of a posited conjunction composed of a
posited sentence and a deposited one, the latter of which is entailed by the former. Yet, despite
the strong superficial similarity of the two sophism, their respective solutions diverge. In the
seventh sophism, the solution amounted to an explicit rejection of the second positum in virtue
211 est ] sit O 213 et ] om. O consequenter add. M 213 a te ] om. MP 215 quia ]
igitur O 216 est bona ] ante consequentia transp. O 216 consequens eius ] inv. O 217 et
eius ] om. O 217 negatur ] dicitur negando MO 217 quod ] eius add. MO 217 sit ] EM
est O 219 illud ] sit negandum quia add. O consequens scilicet ‘risibile currit’ sit negandum
add. M 219 igitur ] est add. O 220 negatur ] dicitur negando MO 220 consequentia ] con-
sequentiam MO 221 illa . . . bona ] EM bene sequitur O 221 hec ] om. O propositio add. M
221 deposita ] EM depositum O posita V 221–222 a te ] om. MO 222 admissa ] admis-
sum O 222 neganda ] EM negandum O 223 Sed . . . casu ] EV om. O 223 est repugnans ]
repugnat M
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of its incompatibility with the first one, on account of the fact that the latter had already been
correctly admitted, prior to the positio of the second. Here in the ninth sophism, on the other
hand, Peter opts for the admission of the casus (and of the whole compound positum) and for
the denial of one of the two conjuncts occurring in the antecedent of the conditional sentence
proposed at step 3. The casus is thus admitted, which in turn lead us to think that it must
be possible. As we will see shortly, that is exactly what Peter is willing to maintain here, and
it happens to be the case in virtue of the omission of the adverb ‘bene’ in the depositio-clause.
The crucial point Peter’s solution depends upon is precisely the way we regard step 3. of the
disputation. Apparently, the inference is sound, hence the mechanism of contraposition holds:
for this reason, in order to prevent the denial of the antecedent (which would amount to the
denial of the posited sentence ‘homo currit’) and escape the undesired conclusion that, again,
a sentence is both to be granted and denied in the same disputation, the only option left to
the respondent is rejecting the clause that the consequent of this conditional ought to be denied
(cf. the passage ‘negatur antecedens, scilicet quod consequens eius est negandum’). In this way,
a part of the premise which is essentially required in order for the argument to conclude that
‘homo currit’ must be denied is no longer available. So far, so good: Peter is asking us to deny
the component of 3. which says that the sentence ‘risibile currit’ ought to be denied because it
is deposited. One might wonder, now, on what grounds we could claim to be entitled to make
such a move, since after all the sentence has been deposited and admitted. What makes the
di!erence, here, is whether that sentence has been correctly admitted or simply admitted. In
the former case, there is no way out: if we assume by hypothesis, i.e. in the statement of our
casus, that the sentence ‘risibile currit’ has been deposited and correctly admitted, once we have
already correctly admitted, at a previous stage, the positum ‘homo currit’, then we are going to
be in trouble, because we could by no means claim that, at step 3., the solution is denying that
the sentence ‘risibile currit’ ought to be denied. This would simply be inconsistent with the first
rule of depositio (cf. infra, sec. 6.1). If that were the case (as might be suggested by the presence,
in some witnesses, of the term ‘bene’ in connection with the admission of the depositum ‘risibile
currit’) then Peter’s solution seems to be incorrect: the only way for the respondent to maintain
consistency, in that situation, would have been rejecting the case in the same way as the second
positum of the seventh sophism had been rejected. The denial of the antecedent of 3. would not
be an option.
This line of reasoning seems to be consistent with the last contracted remarks of Peter’s reply.
If it is argued that the denial of the antecedent of 3. (namely that the sentence ‘risibile currit’
ought to be denied) is illegitimate, because it follows from the assumption that the sentence has
been deposited and (simply) admitted, we can reply that this is a non sequitur. Why? Because
the rule for the denial of a proposed depositum is the mirror image of the rule for the concession
of a proposed positum: in both cases, in order for the rule to apply, a deposited or posited
sentence must have been correctly admitted by the respondent; if it has not, then the rule does
not put any constraint or duty on his shoulders. I think this interpretation is supported by the
fact that Peter makes a similar point, as we have already seen, in the treatise (cf. supra, sec.
3.13 when, to the claim that a posited and (simply) admitted sentence should be granted if it
is proposed, he replies “ad hoc quod ista foret a te concedenda, oportet quod in isto casu foret
bene admissa”, i.e. correctly admitted, and not admitted tout court. One could still argue by
appeal to the correct formulation of the rule of depositio (cf. infra, sec. 6.1), with the addition
of the essential clause ‘bene’ (cf. Obj.1): in that case, there would be no way to escape the duty
of denying the sentence ‘risibile currit’. Peter’s reply to the objection (cf. RObj.1) proves the
subtlety of his reasoning and, most of all, that he is well aware of its logical implications: the
antecedent of the rule, insofar as it is applied here, is inconsistent with the context of our casus,
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3.20. Sed adhuc forte arguitur quod eadem propositio sit concedenda et neganda
ad sensum iam dictum ab eodem in eodem tempore, quia aliqua copulativa est 225
neganda cuius quelibet pars est concedenda ab eodem in eodem tempore, igitur etc.
Patet consequentia. Et arguitur antecedens quia ponatur tibi sedenti illa ‘omnis
homo currit’. Deinde proponatur tibi ista ‘tu curris’. Qua negata quia falsa et
impertinens, proponatur illa ‘tu es homo’. Et patet || quod ista est vera non M 85rb
repugnans bene admisso, igitur est concedenda. Patet consequentia. Et arguitur 230
tunc sic: illa copulativa est neganda ‘omnis homo currit tu es homo’, quia ipsa est
antecedens ad propositionem bene negatam, igitur neganda; et utraque eius pars
est concedenda; igitur etc.64
because it can never be the case that the deposited sentence ‘risibile currit’ is correctly admitted,
on the assumption that the posited sentence ‘homo currit’ has already been correctly admitted
at a previous step (this fact is expressed well by the clause ‘eius antecedens [scil. hec ‘risibile
currit’ est tibi deposita et a te bene admissa’] est repugnans in casu illo’). Therefore, the rule
simply does not apply and no appeal can be made to it in order to rule out the denial of the
antecedent of 3. In sum, this is I think the best way to reconstruct the argument. The textual
assumptions that need to be made in order to justify it are, in the end, conservative with respect
to the text of the incunable, despite some inconsistencies with the readings of several witnesses.
Further external evidence in support of this interpretation is found in Peter’s treatise on conse-
quences, where he states the rule for conditionals with obligational operators and presents the
same argument which is found here, cf. Tractatus de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig.
Eiiii+3vb–Eiiii+4ra] “Alia regula est quod si consequentia est bona, denominata etc., significans
etc., habens antecedens etc., quorum nullum etc., scita esse formalis, et consequens est negan-
dum ab aliquo, et antecedens !est" intellectum propositum, et cum his bene scitum est quod
negandum non sequitur nisi ex negando, tunc est antecedens ab eodem negandum.
[. . . ] Sed contra, forte, arguitur: quia ponatur quod antecedens istius consequentie bone
‘homo currit, igitur risibile currit’ sit tibi positum, scitum esse tale et a te bene admissum, et
consequens tibi depositum; tunc ista consequentia est bona et antecedens est concedendum et
tamen consequens est negandum.
Sed ad primum dicitur quod, stante illo casu, antecedens illius consequentie est concedendum,
quia positum et bene admissum. Et consequens est concedendum, et non negandum, quia non
sequitur ‘est depositum et admissum, igitur est negandum’. Sed oportet plus assumere ad con-
cludendum quod con-||sequens sit negandum, scilicet quod sit bene admissum scitum esse tale
etc.; sed hoc ipsi posito repugnat, quia numquam est eadem propositio concedenda et neganda
respectu eiusdem respondentis et respectu eiusdem obligationis et sensu”.
64 In this section, Peter goes on to argue from the standpoint of someone who is willing to
challenge his views, but now under a di!erent perspective or, to put it better, by appeal to
an additional type of argument. In the previous sections, we have seen him face, successfully,
224 Sed ] casus in marg. O 224 sit ] est O 225 ad . . . dictum ] om. O 225 ] Et admitti-
tur casus iste quod ‘homo currit’ est a te concedenda quia posita et bene admissa ut ponit casus,
et tunc arguitur quod illa sit neganda ‘homo currit, ergo risibile currit’ add. V 225 in ] et praep.
O 226 quelibet ] utraque O 226 ab eodem ] om. O 226 igitur ] ideo O 227 Patet ] hec
add. O 227 illa ] ante tibi transp. O 228 tibi ista ] inv. O 228 quia ] est add. O 228 et ]
om. O 229 impertinens ] non sequens BMOV 230 est ] om. O 230 Patet ] hec add. O
230 arguitur ] antecedens add. O 231 currit ] et add. OMV 232 propositionem . . . nega-
tam ] oppositum bene negati MOV 232 igitur ] est add. O 232 eius ] om. O 233 est ] om.
O
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various attempts directed against the responsio he endorses. Here the focus shifts, in particular,
on the role played by Swyneshed’s rule for conjunctions. The general strategy is always that
of taking into account (in order to dismiss it) an alleged proof of the fact that one and the
same sentence must be granted and denied in the same disputation. It is di"cult to determine
precisely whether Peter knew directly Swyneshed’s text or not. What is unquestionable, though,
is that Swyneshed’s doctrine is largely discussed by a number of authors who are likely to be
considered among Peter’s sources, namely William Buser (perhaps via Marsilius of Inghen) and
Ralph Strode. This material might therefore have been drawn by Peter indirectly from their
treatises and brought in his own discussions not without a certain degree of freedom.
I will now outline the basic elements in the strategy of argument that we find in sec. 3.20–3.27.
Two points of view are represented: Peter’s own doctrine (cf. sec. 3.22, 3.24 and 3.25 to 3.27)
and Swyneshed’s doctrine (cf. sec. 3.21 and 3.23). Two theses and the logical relationship
between them are at stake. For the sake of brevity, let us call the two theses (Contr) (= ‘eadem
propositio sit concedenda et neganda ad sensum iam dictum ab eodem in eodem tempore’)
and (SW) (= ‘aliqua copulativa est neganda cuius quelibet pars est concedenda ab eodem in
eodem tempore’), the latter coinciding approximately with Swyneshed’s rule for conjunctions.
A general introductory point is made, in sec. 3.20, by putting together the two theses. The
objection, however, seems to be naive, since the aim is proving that (Contr), along the same
lines taken in the previous sections, is a bad consequence of Peter’s own rules; but this is done
by assuming (SW), which is not part of Peter’s original set and is indeed incompatible with it
(possibly the whole point of the argument is giving a proof of this fact, namely that (SW) is
actually inconsistent with Peter’s rules).
Be this as it may, in sec. 3.20 it is argued as follows: (SW) entails (Contr) and an argument in
support of (SW) can be put forward; therefore, (Contr) is proved, i.e. the conclusion we have
become familiar with in this part of the treatise, namely that one and the same sentence must be
granted and denied in the same disputation. The idea is that, if (SW) entails (Contr) and (SW)
holds, then we are forced to accept (Contr), in virtue of an application of modus ponens. Yet, no
one – not even a follower of Swyneshed – wants to accept (Contr), because it is contrary to the
general purpose of obligations. The argument is therefore aimed at showing the unacceptability
of (SW) which can be ruled out by contraposition plus the rejection of (Contr), once we have
assumed that the entailment holds.
Thus, everything in the argument depends in the end on determining whether (SW) actually
entails (Contr) or not, i.e. whether from the adoption of the special rule for conjunctions it
follows that one and the same sentence must be granted and denied in the same disputation. If
this is proved to be the case, then the rejection of (Contr), a thesis that we surely want to reject
in order to preserve the consistency of the system, will entail by contraposition the rejection of
(SW) as well.
What will a counter-argument on Swyneshed’s side be like? The best option would be denying
that (SW) entails (Contr). But this is exactly what is going on in sec. 3.21, where such a point
of view is well represented by appeal to an argument based on the assumption that inconsistent
sentences are such only when they are conjoined.
In sum, Swyneshed’s followers would deny the entailment in order to keep (SW) and not to be
forced to accept (Contr). Peter, on the other hand, accepts the entailment and denies (Contr),
thereby obtaining, by contraposition, the denial of (SW). The argument he provides against the
denial of the entailment (which is close to [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 79va]) focuses on the role
of the conjunction operator (= ‘et’) and the fourth rule, cf. supra, sec. 2.4 (= if all evaluated
sentences that make up a disputation are conjoined, the resulting conjunction must be a possible
sentence).
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3.21. !Obj.1" Ideo forte dicitur, in principio, negando illam consequentiam ‘ali-
qua copulativa est neganda cuius utraque || pars est concedenda, igitur eadem O 119rb235
propositio est concedenda et neganda’: || quia dicitur quod ille due ‘omnis homo V 74ra
currit’ et ‘tu es homo’ non repugnant illi ‘tu non curris’ nisi copulentur; || ideo, L 69vb
cum copulantur, negatur copulativa, scilicet ‘omnis homo currit et tu es homo’,
234 in principio ] om. O 235 est ] om. O 237 nisi ] EMV ille due add. O; cum add. V
238 copulantur ] copulentur O
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quia est copulativa repugnans.65
65 In this passage, an argument is provided to reject the assumption that (SW) entails (Contr).
The doctrine is a standard tenet of responsio nova, where the logical notions of relevance and
irrelevance are defined with respect to the relation that any propositum bears to the positum
alone. On this account, a propositum is sequentially (or incompatibly) relevant if and only if it
(or its negation) follows from the positum (no other sentence proposed after the positum comes
into play to determine its logical status). In particular, in contrast with the set of rules adopted
by Peter and the responsio antiqua tradition, if a propositum is incompatible with a correctly
granted or denied sentence (di!erent from the positum) it must be treated as irrelevant, and
evaluated, accordingly, with respect to its actual truth or falsehood. A corollary of this approach
is that if a conjunction is put forward, whose conjuncts are a (false) positum and a true irrelevant
sentence, it must be treated as irrelevant and false, and consequently denied, even if both of its
conjuncts, when they are proposed separatedly, must be granted (the positum because it must
always been granted; the other sentence because it is irrelevant and true, by hypothesis). Let
us see how this is applied in the present case. In the previous section the tenth sophism was
sketched through the following set of sentences and replies (the casus being ‘ponatur tibi sedenti
illa ‘omnis homo currit”):
P Omnis homo currit A possible
1. Tu curris N irrelevant and false
2. Tu es homo C irrelevant (on Swyneshed’s
account, because it does not
follow from, nor is it in-
compatible with the positum
alone) and true
3. Omnis homo currit et tu es homo N incompatibly relevant (it im-
plies 1., which has been
denied)
Two features of this sophism must be pointed out. First, at step 2. there is an application
of Swyneshed’s approach. The sentence ‘tu es homo’ is irrelevant on his account, because it
is not implied, nor is its negation implied by the positum. The sentence is true in the actual
world, and therefore it ought to be granted, even if its negation is implied by the positum in
conjunction with step 1. (by contraposition). The mechanism however is prevented in principle,
because proposita have no influence on the logical status of what is put forward at subsequent
steps of the disputation. Second, it might be argued that the evaluation of step 3., as it goes in
the example, is a kind of confusing move which mixes up the approaches of responsio nova and
antiqua. The reason is that the conjunction ‘omnis homo currit et tu es homo’ should certainly
be denied, on Swyneshed’s view, but not because it is incompatibly relevant (as it would turn
out to be, according to the responsio antiqua, by virtue of its inconsistency with the already
correctly denied propositum ‘tu curris’). Rather, it would be denied as an irrelevant and false
sentence (false because the positum is false, on the assumption that you are sitting; and irrelevant
because a conjunction does not follow from one of its conjuncts alone, and relevance is indeed, for
Swyneshed, a matter of logical dependence on the positum alone). I will not enter this specific
issue here, but just mention that the confusion might stem from a miscast representation of
Swyneshed’s position some traces of which are already found in Strode, cf. [Ashworth, 1993,
381–383].
Be this as it may, the point made in this objection – representing Swyneshed’s view – is that
(Contr) does not follow from (SW), i.e. it does not follow that one and the same sentence must
239 est copulativa ] inv. O
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3.22. ||!R1Obj.1" Sed contra: quia tunc posita et bene admissa ista ‘omnis homo P 68va240
currit’, proponatur illa ‘homo non currit’. Et arguitur quod ista est concedenda,
quia illa est vera non repugnans bene admisso, igitur est concedenda. Patet con-
sequentia. Et arguitur antecedens quia iste propositiones non repugnant nisi sint
copulate; sed iste non sunt copulate, ut pono; igitur neutra alteri repugnat. Patet
consequentia et maior etiam ex responsione.66 245
be granted and denied in the same disputation. The most plausible candidate to play the role of
the sentence that in this example would undergo such a double, contradictory evaluation is ‘tu
curris’. The argument seems to run as follows: the positum and step 2. must be granted. Until
they are granted separatedly, nothing happens, because in order for an inconsistency to arise the
two sentences should actually be conjoined: that would enable us to derive in the end, by modus
ponens, the conclusion that the sentence ‘tu curris’, that has already be denied at step 1., must
be now conceded. The question then boils down to whether it can be plausibly claimed that,
once we have granted two sentences, we can still deny their conjunction. In the argument, Peter
claims that if the positum and the propositum of step 2. are conjoined, the conjunction must be
denied as incompatibly relevant. The confusion, I reckon, rests on the fact that Peter is probably
assuming Swyneshed’s point of view in a slightly distorted way. The reply actually is the one
that Swyneshed would give: the conjunction is to be denied. The reason behind it, however, is
di!erent from the reason that Swyneshed would provide: according to him, the conjunction is
simply irrelevant and false, and that is the rationale for its denial.
Moreover, even if the conjunction ‘omnis homo currit et tu es homo’ were granted, I venture
that this would be no big deal in this context, since from the logical standpoint, the concession of
3. is su"cient to conclude that the sentence ‘tu curris’ ought to be granted only according to the
responsio antiqua, which maintains that whatever follows from a correctly granted propositum
must be conceded. On the other account, by contrast, nothing must be conceded by virtue of
the fact that it follows from a propositum (alone, in conjunction with the positum or with other
proposita): the sentence ‘tu curris’ after all would still remain an irrelevant and false sentence
which would have to be denied (recall that the respondent is actually sitting, in virtue of the
original stipulation). The same holds, by generalization, in the case of all inferences involving
anything more than the positum in their premises and involving, as their conclusions, sentences
which are irrelevant to the positum alone, the idea behind this picture being basically that no
propositum should be allowed to feature in the derivation of a any sentence whatsoever, cf. in
this respect [Ashworth, 1996, p. 364–365].
66 In this section, Peter o!ers the first of three arguments (cf. infra, sec. 3.25–3.27, for the
second and third one) against the attempt, based on the requirement of sentence conjunction
for relevance, to reject the entailment from (SW) to (Contr). Peter’s reply to the argument
of the previous section, which is grounded on the assumption that inconsistency, in obligational
disputations, derives only from actually conjoining sentences with one another (and from actually
proposing such conjunctions) is subtle. If this were the case, then the idea of ‘following from’ or
‘being incompatible with’ the positum itself would be spoiled of its very same meaning, because
by generalizing the previous move to the denial of any form of incompatibility, unless sentences
are actually conjoined, the basic criterion to establish the logical status of a sentence as relevant
or irrelevant would be thrown away. That this is what Peter has in mind in his reply is clear
from the argument:
242 quia . . . vera ] om. O 244 copulate ] EO cathegorice (!) V 244 Patet ] hec O
245 etiam ] patet O
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3.23. !OR1Obj.1" Sed huic forte dicitur quod iste due bene repugnant, licet non
copulentur aut sint copulate.67
3.24. !ROR1Obj.1" Sed contra: igitur per idem iste tres repugnant ‘omnis ho-
mo currit’, ‘tu es homo’, ‘tu non curris’, aut saltem stat istas tres repugnare sic
significando, licet non sint copulate, quod repugnat positioni.68 250
P Omnis homo currit A possible
1. Homo non currit C irrelevant and true
If sentences cannot be said to be inconsistent with one another unless they are conjoined, as
has been claimed in sec. 3.21, then also in this example we must take 1. to be irrelevant to
the positum, as a generalization of the point made above. The positum is not conjoined with
1., therefore, even if 1. contradicts it (i.e. even if its negation is implied by the positum, which
is pretty much the definition of incompatible relevance, also on the responsio nova account)
it ought not to be denied, but rather it should be regarded as irrelevant (cf. ‘non repugnans
bene admisso’) and evaluated accordingly as true (the respondent is assumed to be still sitting,
therefore ‘homo non currit’ is true).
67 In this section, again, it is the point of view of one who argues from the standpoint of
Swyneshed’s account that Peter takes into consideration and represents. The crucial point is
that no one, not even the strongest supporter of the responsio nova would accept an extreme
conclusion such as the one presented in the previous section: the positum ‘omnis homo currit’ and
the propositum ‘non homo currit’ are definitely incompatible, even if they are not conjoined. But,
as the next remark will show (cf. infra, sec. 3.24), the requirement that sentences be actually
conjoined as a necessary condition for their incompatibility turns out to be hardly sensible, if not
utterly untenable. In other words, if we were to concede, with the aim of keeping intact the notion
of logical consequence, that in sec. 3.22 the conjunction requirement must not be operating, how
could we ever deny, then, that the objection that prompted us to make an exception in that
particular case, can be extended and generalized to any other situation whatsoever: ‘per idem’
any three or more appropriately chosen sentences would turn out to be incompatible with one
another, no matter whether they come in the form of a conjunction or not.
68 In this section Peter replies to (and argues against) the argument of sec. 3.23. His own idea
is that if we assume that incompatible sentences are such only when they are conjoined, then
the notion of relevance itself loses its content and e!ectiveness. Consider the argument in sec.
3.23: a sentence that contradicts the positum is proposed and it is argued that it should not be
considered incompatible to it, because it is not conjoined with it. To this patently unacceptable
conclusion, even a supporter of Swyneshed’s view would reply that in a case like that, the two
sentences of sec. 3.23 are incompatible, even if they are not actually conjoined. But here is
exactly where the underlying assumptions of this approach come home to roost: if one is forced
to say that the two sentences ‘omnis homo currit’ and ‘homo non currit’ are incompatible, in
order to preserve a minimal distinction between relevant and irrelevant sentences as well as the
very same notion of logical consequence, then how could one still deny that the triple presented
in sec. 3.24 consists of sentences that are incompatible, even if they are not conjoined?
246 iste due ] EMO ille regule V 246 licet ] sed forte O 246–247 non copulentur ] om. O
247 aut ] seu non BV 247 sint ] non sic O 248 contra ] inc. scr. et del. O 248 igitur ]
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3.25. !R2Obj.1" Item, si propositiones non repugnant nisi sint copulate, bene
admissa illa ‘omnis homo currit’, proponitur ista ‘tu es non currens’ que, quia vera
non repugnans, concedenda est.
Qua concessa, arguitur: tu es non currens, igitur homo est non currens, igitur
homo non currit, quod || est oppositum positi. B 97va255
Ideo, si negatur ista ‘tu es non currens’, proponitur illa ‘tu es currens’, que
neganda est quia falsa non sequens. Deinde proponitur ‘tu es homo’: et etiam ista
est concedenda ex responsione.
Et tunc sequitur quod non de quolibet termino singulari, pro aliquo supponente
simpliciter sumpto, predicatur alterum contradictoriorum incomplexorum, quia 260
utraque istarum negatur ‘tu es currens’, ‘tu es non currens’, concesso quod tu es
homo.69
69 The second argument comes in the form of a more elaborate sophism, with the following
structure:
P Omnis homo currit A possible
1.1 Tu es non currens C irrelevant and true
2. Tu es non currens; igitur homo est non
currens; igitur homo non currit
C ( (it is unclear, though,
why the inference should be
granted, as Peter assumes)
1.2 Tu es non currens N
3. Tu es currens N irrelevant (on the responsio
nova account) and false
4. Tu es homo C irrelevant (on the responsio
nova account) and true
As in sec. 3.22 above, Peter argues here against the conjunction requirement for relevance. If
the requirement is adopted, as it happens to be the case on Swyneshed’s account, the notions
of relevance and irrelevance as well as the corresponding classes of sentences di!er with respect
to those that are involved on the responsio antiqua account. Consequently, the answers that
we are supposed to give to proposita must be changed as well, according to the new criteria.
For instance, the set of replies to proposita like those presented in this sophism is such that
undesired consequences obtain, from the logical point of view. In particular, it can be shown
that, for a given predicate term, neither it nor its opposite can be predicated of a given singular
subject term (cf. ‘non de quolibet termino singulari, pro aliquo supponente simpliciter sumpto,
predicatur alterum contradictoriorum incomplexorum’), which eventually results in a rejection
of the Law of the Excluded Middle.
The structure of the argument is straightforward, although there is some unclarity it is di"cult
to make sense of, in the first part. The idea is proposing in the first place the sentence ‘tu es non
currens’. If it is granted, as irrelevant and true, then sentence 2. ‘tu es non currens; igitur homo
251 nisi ] ipse add. L 251 bene ] EV tunc O 252 currit ] tibi add. O 252 proponitur ]
proponatur O 252 tu . . . currens ] add. homo V 252 es non ] inv. O 252 quia ] est add.
O 254 arguitur ] om. O sic add. M 254 es ] EMO homo add. B 254 igitur ] sequitur
quod O 254 homo ] om. V 254 igitur ] et sic sequitur quod O et tunc sequitur homo est
non currens ergo M 255 oppositum ] contradictorium MO 256 que ] om. O 257 et etiam ]
om. O 258 ex responsione ] EMO te existente V; quia vera non repugnans add. M 259 pro
aliquo ] post supponente transp. O 260 predicatur ] potest O 260 incomplexorum ] verificari
add. O
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3.26. !R3Obj.1" Item, ponatur tibi sedenti || ‘omne sedens est Sor’. Deinde propo- M 85va
natur ‘tu es Sor’. Qua negata, quia falsa non sequens, ut pono, proponitur ista ‘tu
es sedens’. Patet quod ista est vera non repugnans et per consequens concedenda. 265
Qua concessa, arguitur sic: tu es sedens, igitur aliquod sedens non est Sor, quod
est oppositum positi. Si negatur consequentia, ponatur oppositum consequentis
cum antecedente. Et stabunt ista simul ‘tu es sedens et omne sedens est Sor et
ultra, igitur tu es Sor. Patet sillogismus in quarta figura.70 Et antecedens est con-
cedendum, quia ista est negata ‘tu es sedens, igitur aliquod sedens non est Sor’. E Giiiira270
Igitur oportet concedere copulativam compositam ex antecedente et oppositum71
consequentis etc.72
est non currens; igitur homo non currit’, whose consequent is the contradictory of the positum,
is put forward. If it is granted, then we have proved something inconsistent with the positum
on the hypothesis that ‘tu es non currens’ has been granted (1.1). We could then switch to the
second part of the sophism and deny ‘tu es non currens’, to obtain, in the end, the rejection of
the Excluded Middle. At this stage, the pieces would still fit. The problem is that it is not clear
why the respondent should be bound to grant sentence 2.: the inference, as it stands, is by no
means valid, unless the additional assumption ‘tu es homo’ is made by the opponent, in the form
of a propositum, and granted by the respondent at a previous step. Even the manuscripts do
not help, in this sense: it would have been useful to find a passage dropped o! the text with the
required supplement (proposal and concession of ‘tu es homo’ not only in the second, but also
in the first part of the sophism); a situation like that obtains sometimes in the tradition of this
treatise, but unfortunately not in this case.
70 Cf. Tractatus syllogismorum, under the rubric ‘quarta figura’, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a,
sig. Dviiira] “Sequens modus ‘Dirami’ nominatur indirecte concludens, ex maiori particulari
a"rmativa et minori universali a"rmativa, particularem a"rmativam, ut ‘Tu es homo; et omnis
homo currit; igitur tu curris’ ”.
71 The correct reading, confirmed by mss. O, P and V, is indeed the ablative ‘opposito’.
72 The sophism has the following structure:
P Ponatur tibi sedenti ‘omne sedens est Sor’ A possible
1. Tu es Sor N irrelevant and false
2. Tu es sedens C irrelevant (according to the
responsio nova) and true
3. Tu es sedens, igitur aliquod sedens non est
Sor
N
4. Tu es sedens et omne sedens est Sor; igitur
tu es Sor
C valid inference (syllogism in
the fourth figure I-A-I)
5. Tu es sedens et omne sedens est Sor C sequentially relevant (nega-
tion of 3.)
263 Item ] casus in marg. O 263–264 proponatur ] proponitur O 264 tu es ] om. O
264 quia . . . pono ] BEV om. MO 264–266 proponitur . . . sic ] om. V 264 proponitur ]
proponatur O 265 Patet ] et praep. O 265 et . . . concedenda ] om. MO 266 aliquod ]
aliquid O 268–269 et ultra ] BE om. OMPV 269 Patet ] ille est add. O 269 figura ] om.
O 270 ista ] consequentia add. BMP 270 est ] om. O 270 negata ] post quia transp. O
270 aliquod ] aliquid O 271 oppositum ] opposito OPV 272 etc. ] om. O
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3.27. Huic dicitur admittendo casum. Et quando proponitur ‘tu es sedens’, nega-
tur tamquam repugnans posito et opposito bene negati. Et licet sequatur ex obli-
gatione tali, non tamen est concedenda, quia ad sequens vel repugnans obligationi 275
non est pertinenter respondendum, immo obligato.73
73 The final part of the text is contracted. I assume that the clause ‘immo obligato’ is an
adversative counterpart of ‘obligationi’. The meaning of the sentence, therefore, is the following:
‘it should not be appropriately replied to something which follows from or is incompatible with
the obligation (= ‘ad sequens vel repugnans obligationi’), but rather !to something which follows
from or is incompatible with " the obligatum (= ‘immo obligato’)’.
The solution to this sophism consists in the admission of the case and the denial of 2. which is
not irrelevant as one who endorses Swyneshed’s view would claim, but rather incompatible with
the positum and the correct denial of 1., i.e. with the sentences ‘omne sedens est Sor’ (= positum)
and ‘tu non es Sor’ (= opposito bene negati). The denial of 2. follows, by contraposition, from
those two sentences, therefore the sentence ‘tu es sedens’ is incompatibly relevant.
A sophism of similar structure (the triple of sentences involved being: ‘omne stans in ista
domo est asinus’, ‘tu stas in ista domo’, ‘tu es asinus’) is discussed by Strode, albeit with a
di!erent treatment, in connection with the same set of issues concerning Sywneshed’s rules and
the role of the conjunction requirement, cf. [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 79va]. In Peter there is an
additional element that enters the discussion, namely the problem of relevance to the obligation
(i.e. not only to the posited sentence, but to the whole casus; in this respect, cf. also infra,
sec. 3.37–3.38). This issue has a well-established tradition reflected for instance, on the Parisian
scene, by elaborate distinctions between di!erent notions of relevance, which are defined with re-
spect to the obligatum, to the admissio, to the obligatio and so forth, cf. [Albert of Saxony, 1490,
sig. Niiirb-Nvra], [William Buser, 1990, pp. 74-80], [Marsilius of Inghen, 1489, sig. Aiivb-Aiiivb].
Despite the apparently clear structure of the argument, it must be said that the treatment is
not fully unproblematic, since although the logical status of ‘tu es sedens’ is rightly identified by
Peter with that of an incompatibly relevant sentence, the role of the last remark (cf. ‘quia ad
sequens vel repugnans obligationi non est pertinenter respondendum, immo obligato’) is di"cult
to understand. This characterization has a precise meaning in the tradition, which in all likeli-
hood is not, however, the one intended here. The notion of being relevant to the obligation is
employed for the most part in connection with sentences that may cause pragmatic paradoxes to
arise (cf. infra, sec. 3.33–3.34). A hint about what Peter might have had in mind here is to be
found, perhaps, a few sections below (cf. infra, sec. 3.37–3.38) where he returns on these matters.
The present passage, however, remains puzzling, probably as a result of the presence of a number
of overlapping issues that are in fact unrelated and should theoretically be kept distinct. Until
a stemma will have been fully established, it is hard to draw conclusions and argue in favour
of the expunction of a passage, solely on the basis of the frequency with which it occurs in the
manuscripts but it should be noted, for the sake of completeness, that this problematic passage
is omitted, in its entirety, by five out of six witnesses, and is reported only by ms. B.
On the whole, I think the passage is inconsistent with the general point that is being made
here. If the sophism should count as an additional argument against the responsio nova, there
would be no need to provide a solution by explaining how one should respond according to the
responsio antiqua. It would have su"ced to prove, as Peter does in sec. 3.27, that, on the account
that we want to reject, some problems happen to arise: in other words, the conclusion of sec.
3.26 would have been enough to make the point).
273–276 Huic . . . obligato ] BE om. LMOPV
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3.28. Item, ponatur quod Sor non obligato proponatur illa ‘deus est’ quam ipse
concedat. Et proponatur Platoni eadem quam neget necessariam male responden-
do. Et Cicero dubitet illam male etiam respondendo. || Quo posito, proponitur illa O 119va
‘tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male respondet’ demonstrando per ly ‘illorum’ 280
Sor et Platonem et Ciceronem. Et non respondeat aliquis illorum || nisi ad istam P 68vb
et modo predicto.74
74 Let us try to see, first, what the structure of the argument is like:
P Ponatur quod Sor non obligato proponatur
illa ‘deus est’ quam ipse concedat. Et pro-
ponatur Platoni eadem quam neget necessa-
riam male respondendo. Et Cicero dubitet
illam male etiam respondendo
A possible
1.1 Tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male re-
spondet, demonstrando per ly ‘illorum’ Sor
et Platonem et Ciceronem, et non respon-
deat aliquis illorum nisi ad istam [scil. ‘deus
est’] et modo predicto
C
1.1.1 Tu concedis falsum non sequens, igitur tu
male respondes
C ( if understood with the
correct time reference
1.1.2 Si tu respondes sicut iste illorum qui male
respondet, et ille illorum qui male respon-
det respondet negative, igitur tu respondes
negative
C ( valid inference: the conse-
quent ought to be granted in
contrast with the reply given
at 1.1
1.2 D
1.2.1 Si dubitas illam ‘tu respondes sicut iste isto-
rum qui male respondet’ et Cicero etiam du-
bitat illam [scil. ‘deus est’] male responden-
do, igitur tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui
male respondet
C ( valid inference: the conse-
quent ought to be granted, in
contrast with the reply given
at 1.2
1.3 N
1.3.1 Tu negas illam [scil. ‘tu respondes si-
cut ille illorum qui male respondet’], igi-
tur respondes negative; et iste illorum qui
male respondet respondet negative; igitur
tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male
respondet
C ( valid inference: the conse-
quent ought to be granted in
contrast with the reply given
at 1.3
1.3.1.1 Tu respondes ad istam et non respon-
des a"rmative neque dubitative neque alia
responsione, igitur etc.
C (
The sophism – which is found also in [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 298] and [Robert Fland, 1980,
p. 46] – is quite di"cult, especially because it involves a number of remarks, in the reply, that
cover di!erent topics without an explicit statement of what the aim of the discussion is. Despite
278 proponatur Platoni ] inv. O 278 neget necessariam ] inv. O 279 male etiam ] inv.
O 279 proponitur ] proponatur tibi O 281 et . . . Et ] om. O 281 respondeat ] nam add.
O 281 illorum ] ad aliquam aliam propositionem add. O 281 ad istam ] deus est add. O
282 et . . . predicto ] om. O
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!i" Si concedis illam, tu concedis falsum non sequens, igitur tu male respondes,
posito quod tu non respondeas ad aliquam propositionem nisi ad istam quam nunc
tibi propono. 285
Item, si tu respondes sicut iste illorum qui male respondet, et ille illorum qui
male respondet respondet negative, igitur tu respondes negative. Voco enim hic
unum ita respondere sicut alius quando uterque respondet a!rmative aut negative
etc.
!ii" Si dubitas illam ‘tu respondes sicut iste istorum || qui male respondet’ et V 74rb290
Cicero etiam dubitat illam male respondendo, igitur tu respondes sicut ille il-
lorum qui male respondet. || Illa consequentia est bona etc.; et antecedens est L 71ra
concedendum; igitur et consequens.
!iii" Si negas istam et respondes negative, et iste illorum qui male respondet
respondet negative, igitur tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male respondet.75 295
this fact, however, a unifying common thread is likely to be identifiable in the treatment of issues
that may arise as long as we introduce in the obligational context considerations concerning the
time and context of utterance of certain types of proposita. Peter takes into account three
di!erent outcomes, depending on how the respondent decides to reply to the first propositum at
step 1, namely to the sentence ‘tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male respondet’. The idea, as
usual, is showing that no matter what kind of response is given, it will be incorrect. Cf. also
[Ashworth, 1984] for discussion of related kinds of inconsistency.
75 (i) Two arguments are provided to rule out the first alternative, namely the concession of
1. The first argument runs as follows: if the respondent grants 1., he thereby violates the fifth
rule (R5) governing the replies to irrelevant sentences. The reason is that 1. is in fact irrelevant
and false, because the respondent is actually replying as the one who is replying correctly (=
Socrates) and therefore he (= the respondent) is replying correctly as well. In other words, if the
respondent grants the sentence ‘tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male respondet’ and Socrates
grants the sentence ‘deus est’, they both reply in the same way; but we have assumed that
Socrates replies correctly, therefore the respondent too replies correctly. It makes no di!erence
at all that this happens to be the case with respect to di!erent sentences: the point is just the
two of them perform the same speech act, namely conceding, denying or doubting. An additional
problem would be that the sentence proposed at step 1. says that the respondent replies like
the one who replies incorrectly, therefore, if he replies correctly, by granting it, that would imply
that he is replying incorrectly. Peter does not mention anyway the risk represented by such a
purported self-referential paradox. I think the reason of this absence is that the paradox is only
apparent, because in fact if one grants that he is replying incorrectly, it does not follow that
what he has granted is the case, namely that he is replying incorrectly.
The second reason why granting 1. must be ruled out is that afterwards step. 1.1.2 might
be proposed. Now, 1.1.2 actually is a valid inference, provided that we supply the additional
assumption ‘et ille illorum qui male respondet respondet negative’ (the case would hold as well
if all occurrences of ‘negative’ were replaced by ‘dubitative’). But its antecedent, namely step
1., has been granted by hypothesis, therefore its consequent ought to be granted too. But again,
the consequent that ought to be granted is precisely the sentence ‘tu respondes negative’. Thus
we come to the paradoxical conclusion that if the respondent replies a"rmatively, he ought to
283 tu . . . respondes ] etc. O 284 posito ] pono enim O 288 unum ] ante sicut transp. O
288 alius ] alium O 290 Si ] tu add. O 292 et ] om. O 293 et ] om. O 294 et ] EO ergo
M
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3.29. Sed pro isto dicitur quod ad propositionem propositam est respondendum
secundum qualitatem illius mensure pro qua proponitur, nisi alia fuerit conven-||tio M 85vb
inter opponentem et respondentem huic repugnans aut nisi repugnet ei quod est
obligatum. Ex quo sequitur quod non valet consequentia ista ‘hec propositio est
vera et impertinens tibi proposita, igitur hec est a te concedenda’. Ut si tibi tacenti 300
proponatur illa ‘tu loqueris’, dum tu neges eam, bene respondes; et illa est vera et
impertinens tunc; sed non negas illam pro tempore pro quo respondes. Ita etiam
non sequitur ‘tu concedis falsum non obligatus, igitur tu male respondes’. Sed
bene sequitur ‘tu concedis falsum non obligatus, pro tempore pro quo proponitur,
igitur male respondes’.76 305
grant that he replies negatively.
(ii) If the respondent replies by doubting 1., he replies exactly in the same way as Cicero does
(albeit to a di!erent sentence). But Cicero replies incorrectly, therefore the respondent as well
replies incorrectly as Cicero does. The inference at step. 1.2.1 is valid and, again, the antecedent
ought to be granted; therefore the consequent ought to be granted too. But the consequent
is exactly the sentence that has just been doubted, hence respondent will have granted and
doubted 1. at one and the same time, because the duty of conceding of 1. is derivable from a
valid inference plus the assumption that 1. has been doubted.
(iii) An analogous piece of reasoning is supposed to hold also in the case of the denial of 1.The
text requires a correction, whose plausibility is confirmed by O: the reading to adopt is ‘si negas
istam, igitur (instead of ‘et’) respondes negative’.
76 These general remarks are, supposedly, meant to introduce the solution discussed in the
next section (cf. infra sec. 3.30 ‘Et ita intelligantur quedam ex dictis’ where ‘dictis’ obviously
refers to the remarks made in the present section). Here we might find some clue to figure out the
role of this sophism: the point is how to interpret the general duty of replying in a given way to
a sentence. This must be done, in standard cases, in accordance with the status the propositum
has with respect to the time when it is put forward (this is what I take the clause ‘secundum
qualitatem illius mensure pro qua proponitur’ to mean). As a consequence of this assumption,
it does not follow simpliciter, i.e. without any further qualification, that an irrelevant true
sentence ought to be granted, if it is proposed in a disputation. The duty arises only if the rule
is understood with the correct reference to time. From a more general point of view, that might
be seen as a further qualification of the rule for irrelevant sentences, at least if we are to take
at face value the particular example that is under consideration here, but it cannot be excluded
that Peter might have upheld it as a more general characterization, valid also for the the other
rules. Moreover, it strikes me that this sophism, which is found besides Peter’s treatise, only
in one case before him, namely in Fland, and one case after him, Paul of Venice, is discussed
by the latter, albeit with a di!erent treatment, in connection with his tenth rule for irrelevant
sentences (the sophism in Paul hinges on the attempt to prove that there exists an irrelevant
sentence that should neither be granted, denied nor doubted). Be it as it may, this is not the
only problem that we are confronted with in the attempt to identify the right co-ordinates of this
sophism, since the sequence of corollaries of sec. 3.32 also raises many di"culties, insofar as they
seem to address, once more, the problem of granting and denying one and the same sentence in a
298 opponentem et respondentem ] inv. O 298 nisi ] hoc add. O 298 repugnet ] repu-
gnat O 298–299 est obligatum ] obligatur O 299 consequentia ista ] hoc argumentum O
300 hec ] om. O 301 proponatur ] tibi add. O 301 neges ] negas O 302 illam ] eam O
303 tu ] om. O 305 igitur ] sup. lin. conf. O
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3.30. Et ita intelligantur quedam ex dictis. Ex quibus patet responsio ad casum:
admisso enim casu, negatur illa propositio ‘tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male
respondet’ tamquam falsa pro tempore pro quo proponebatur non sequens. Et
capitur hic iste terminus ‘ita respondere’ pro similitudine responsionis in conces-
sione, negatione vel dubitatione etc. De virtute enim sermonis, qualiter respondet 310
Sor taliter et Plato respondet ad illam ‘deus est’.
!Ad iii" Et quando, ulterius, arguitur ‘tu negas illam, igitur tu respondes ne-
gative; et iste illorum qui male respondet respondet negative; igitur tu respondes
sicut ille illorum qui male respondet’, negatur antecedens || tamquam repugnans. O 119vb
Et si proponitur ‘tu respondes ad istam et non respondes a!rmative neque 315
dubitative neque alia responsione nisi negative, igitur etc.’, negatur antecedens.
Et si queritur qua responsione respondes, non certificetur || donec fiat sequens B 97vb
per ordinem proponendi.
Et ex hoc patet responsio ad tales propositiones etiam extra tempus: cum
proponuntur, tu || negas propositionem quam tibi propono; illa enim neganda P 69ra320
est.
Et quando tu negas, si proponitur ‘tu negas istam tibi propositam’ conceditur,
quia facta est vera pro tempore prolationis.77
given disputation. In any case, a point that can safely be made at this preliminary stage, is that
di!erent issues are conflated in this discussion, and that they all have to do, roughly speaking,
with the relation between certain proposita, their respective replies and the time or the context
of their utterance. In the following sections the point will be spelled out more in detail.
77 In this section, Peter provides his solution to the sophism. The case must be admitted and
the correct way to reply is denying step 1., namely the sentence ‘tu respondes sicut ille illorum
qui male respondet’. The reason that justifies this move is related to the remarks of the previous
section: the sentence is irrelevant and false with respect to the time when it is put forward. The
irrelevance depends on the fact that ‘tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male respondet’ does not
follow from the positum. The reason for its falsehood is less evident. Peter does not say much
about it. Basically, I think the problem is that we lack some essential information in order to
evaluate its status in terms of truth or falsehood, because its truth value depends on an event
(namely, the respondent’s reply) that has not taken place yet, at the time when the sentence is
put forward. It is di"cult to assess the truth value of a sentence involving a reference to an act
that has not been performed: the respondent has not replied to anything yet, when the sentence
is put forward. How can we determine its correct truth value? It is pretty clear that Peter is
willing to regard the sentence as false. My explanation thus is that the sentence is false exactly
by virtue of the fact that the respondent has not replied yet: therefore, a fortiori, he cannot have
replied ‘sicut ille illorum qui male respondet’.
Let us return to the argument. We have decided to deny 1. as irrelevant and false pro tempore
pro quo proponebatur. Now, how are we supposed to deal with the subsequent objection, put
307 propositio ] proposita O 308 proponebatur ] proponitur O 309 capitur ] capiatur O
310 qualiter ] qualitercumque O 311 et ] om. O 311 Plato respondet ] inv. O 312 tu ] om.
O 315 respondes ] ad illam add. O 315 a"rmative ] nec praep. O 316 negatur ] dicitur
negando O 317 queritur ] queratur O 317 fiat ] fiet O 319 Et ] om. O 320 proponuntur ]
proponitur O 322 tu ] om. O 322 proponitur ] proponatur O 322 conceditur ] concedatur
O 323 prolationis ] propositionis O
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forward at step 1.3.1? The following sentence is proposed ‘[antecedent =] tu negas illam [scil.
‘tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male respondet’], igitur respondes negative; et iste illorum qui
male respondet respondet negative; igitur [consequent =] tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male
respondet’. It contains a valid inference, therefore the whole sentence should be granted. If we
grant the antecedent ‘tu negas illam’ (where ‘illam’ always refers to the first propositum of step
1.), we have the problem already described, because by iterated detachment, we can derive the
duty of granting the consequent ‘tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male respondet’, i.e. the very
same sentence that we have just denied, at the preceding step, as irrelevant and false pro tempore
pro quo proponebatur. The solution is denying the antecedent of 1.3.1, namely the sentence ‘tu
negas illam’, as incompatibly relevant (for its concession would entail the concession of a sentence
that has already been correctly denied).
After this move, one might still be willing to raise the objection that, after all, the respondent
does not reply but negatively, therefore the same conclusion is supposed to follow, i.e. that he
replies as the one who replies incorrectly. Yet, on Peter’s view, the antecedent of this consequence
would still have to be denied, again – presumably – as incompatibly relevant (cf. ‘et si proponitur
‘tu respondes ad eam et non respondes a"rmative, neque negative, neque dubitative, neque alia
responsione nisi negative; igitur etc.’ negatur antecedens’).
Moreover, if it is argued that it can be shown by exclusion that the respondent replies nega-
tively (it can be easily done by disjunctive syllogism), then Peter adopts the familiar strategy of
reply per ordinem: let all alternative ways of replying (a"rmatively, dubitatively and so on) be
put forward one after another; and let them all be answered according to their status, until we
come in the end to the last one, which will have become relevant, in the meanwhile (cf. ‘et si
queritur qua responsione respondes, non certificetur donec fiat sequens per ordinem proponendi’).
Two concluding remarks. First, reference to time might also be needed in order to have the
first part of the argument work properly. Step 1.1 (granting the first propositum) is incorrect,
because it is argued that if the respondent grants something irrelevant and false, then he replies
incorrectly. But the point made in sec. 3.29 seems to go the opposite way around (cf. ‘Ita etiam
non sequitur ‘tu concedis falsum non obligatus, igitur tu male respondes’. Sed bene sequitur
‘tu concedis falsum non obligatus, pro tempore pro quo proponitur, igitur male respondes”) by
calling for the fulfillment of an additional condition. If the condition is added to 1.1.1 above, then
there is a di!erent reason to maintain that ‘tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male respondet’ is
false. Above I have argued that the falsehood depends on the fact that the respondent actually
replies as the one, in the triad, who replies correctly, i.e. Socrates; and therefore if he grants that
he replies as the one who replies incorrectly, he is going to grant something false. Now, if we add
the reference to time, the reason is the same as in case 1.2: the respondent a fortiori does not
reply incorrectly, because at the time when the sentence ‘tu respondes sicut ille illorum qui male
respondet’ is put forward, he is still not replying at all. Second, the solution is generalized, in
the concluding part of sec. 3.28, to the reply that is supposed to be given extra tempus. In this
connection, Peter makes a very intriguing, albeit contracted, example involving a self-referential
statement. Take the sentence ‘tu negas propositionem quam tibi propono’. If it is put forward
(I propose to follow the text of manuscript O in emending ‘proponuntur’ with ‘proponitur’, as
referring to the sentence which comes next rather than to the preceding ‘propositiones’), one
might argue that, since the clause ‘propositionem quam tibi propono’ refers to the very same
sentence in which it occurs, then whatever reply is given to it, it is bound to be incorrect. If the
sentence is granted or doubted, then it should have been denied, because the speech acts that
are performed in replying to it are su"cient to falsify it (the sentence says of itself that you deny
it, but you do not, therefore what it says to be the case, turns out not to be the case; but if what
it says to be the case turns out not to be the case, the sentence is false and in the environment
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3.31. Sed forte arguitur || probando quod non pro tempore pro quo proponitur M 86ra
|| propositio est respondendum ad eam secundum sui qualitatem,78 quia ex illo E Giiiirb325
!Obj.1" sequitur quod Sor et Plato respondent ad eandem propositionem unus con-
cedendo, alter alio modo respondendo in eodem sensu || extra tempus obligationis, V 74va
et tamen uterque non male respondet ad istam propositionem.79
!Obj.2" Item, sequitur quod Sor concedit A propositionem et Plato concedit
contradictorium A, utroque bene respondente et non obligato. 330
!Obj.3" Item, sequitur quod Sor concedit et negat eandem propositionem non
male respondendo: quia ponatur quia Sor eadem propositio proponatur a diversis,
sed unus ante alium proponat eam, sic quod sit falsa quando unus proponit et vera
quando alter proponit.
!Obj.4" Item, potest Sor ponere A propositionem Platoni et per horam aut sal- L 71rb335
tem per tempus notabile || potest Plato di"erre responsionem; et interea forte pro-
positio proposita est facta impossibilis; et tunc sequitur quod Sor bene respondet
concedendo impossibile. Que omnia predictis videntur repugnare.80
in which we are discussing, namely extra tempus, this entails that it should be denied. On the
other hand, if the sentence is denied, what it says to be the case, actually happens to be the case,
therefore the sentence should have been granted instead of being denied. What are we supposed
to do, then? Peter’s conclusion is that the sentence ‘tu negas propositionem quam tibi propono’
must be denied. And the reason is the same as in the solution to the sophism: it is false, because
no one has replied to anything yet, and extra tempus one must always respond according to the
assumption that rei veritas est fatenda (cf. supra, sec. 1.5 where the fourth assumption is laid
down). After the sentence ‘tu negas propositionem quam tibi propono’ has been denied, if the
sentence ‘tu negas istam tibi propositam’ is put forward, then and only then it must be granted,
since in the meantime it has become true (cf. ‘quia facta est vera pro tempore prolationis’). So
the point is to deny sentences such that the states of a!airs that would make them true have not
obtained yet.
78 In this section, Peter presents a group of five objections that might be raised against the
requirement of replying to a sentence with respect to the time when it is put forward and uttered
by the opponent.
79 The first two objections concern the e!ects of the assumption in question extra tempus but
the structure of both arguments is not perpicuous.
80 The text of the incunable makes some confusion: the correct readings are supplied by ms.
M, according to which the role of opponent is played by Plato, whereas the role of respondent
is played by Socrates. Moreover, since at stake, in this set of objections, are the e!ects of the
assumption of time reference outside the period of an obligation (sentences must be therefore
evaluated according to their actual truth values), I think that ‘ponere’ should be replaced by
‘proponere’, as suggested by mss. M and O.
324 forte ] contra add. O 325 est respondendum ] inv. et post ad eam transp. O
325 secundum . . . qualitatem ] om. O 327 alio . . . respondendo ] negando O 328 istam ]
eandem O 331 sequitur ] om. O 332 respondendo ] ad illam add. O 333 sed . . . eam ] om.
O 333 sit falsa ] transp. O 333 proponit ] eam ipsam add. O 333 et ] om. O 333 vera ]
transp. O 334 quando ] vero add. O 334 proponit ] propositionis et add. ipsa sit vera
O 335 potest ] posset MO 335 Sor ] Plato M 335 ponere ] proponere MO 335 Platoni ]
transp. O; Sorti M 335 et ] om. O 335–336 aut . . . forte ] om. O 336 Plato ] Sor M
337 proposita ] Sortis O
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!Obj.5" Item, proponatur hec Sor tacenti et non obligato ‘tu negabis vel dubi-
tabis propositionem quam tibi propono’. 340
!i" Si Sor neget eam, tunc ista propositio pro tempore prolationis fuit vera:
igitur concedenda.
!ii" Si concedat, tunc ista fuit falsa: igitur neganda.
!iii" Si dubitat, tunc ista fuit vera pro tempore prolationis: igitur concedenda.81
3.32. Sed pro his dicitur quod conclusiones antedicte non sunt impossibiles, cum 345
ad diversa tempora referantur.82
Item, hic certa regula poni non potest nisi secundum quod opponens et respon-
dens conveniunt, cum pro eadem mensura non possit responsurus respondere bene
respondendo pro qua proponit opponens, quia ante responderet quam intelligeret
illud ad quod responsurus erat.83 350
The idea here is that Plato may propose to Socrates a sentence p, which is possible at time t1.
Socrates takes his time, before replying; then, after a lapse of time, say at t2, Socrates replies to
p, according to its status at t1, i.e. when the sentence was possible. But in the meanwhile, the
sentence has become impossible for some change that has taken place in actual reality. If Socrates
replies to p at t2 according to its status with respect to the time of the original utterance, he
will thereby grant an impossible sentence.
81 The fifth and last objection is interesting. Let us assume that, at time t1, the following
sentence is proposed to Socrates, while he is silent and under no obligation: ‘tu negabis vel
dubitabis propositionem quam tibi propono’ (= p). It plainly contains a self-referential clause,
because the only sentence that is put forward actually is p itself; therefore, we could replace the
clause in question by rephrasing the original sentence as follows: ‘tu negabis vel dubitabis p’
(= p). Now, let us assume that at some time t2 Socrates replies to p. If he denies or doubts p
at t2, then the sentence ‘tu negabis vel dubitabis p’, proposed at t1 was true (cf. ‘et tunc ista
propositio pro tempore prolationis fuit vera, igitur concedenda’: recall the duty of answering
truthfully extra tempus). If, on the other hand, Socrates grants p at t2, then p at t1 was false
and should have been denied accordingly (cf. ‘ista fuit falsa, igitur neganda’). In conclusion, if
Socrates (i) denies or (iii) doubts p, he should have granted it, whereas if he (ii) grants p, he
should have denied it.
82 The remark is especially appropriate if we look at the last objection of the previous section.
There was no duty to grant sentence p, at time t1, because p becomes true only at time t2.
Therefore, the duty of granting p is referred to t2, not to t1, i.e. to the time when the sentence
is actually denied or doubted: the two inconsistent replies are referring to di!erent times. What
one could claim, at most, is that p should be granted at time t2, because it is true for or with
respect to time t1.
83 The sense of this remark is not fully clear. At first sight, it is meant to narrow down the
scope of the time reference assumption, if we are allowed to take the term ‘hic’ as meaning ‘in such
cases’, i.e. in cases like those presented in the objections, which should count as exceptions to the
routine, when the assumption applies. This would be consistent, I reckon, with the remark made
in sec. 3.29 after presenting the assumption, which is supposed to apply ‘nisi alia fuerit conventio
341 pro . . . prolationis ] post vera transp. O 343 concedat ] concedis O 343 ista ] il-
la propositio O 344 dubitat ] dubitas O 344 igitur concedenda ] om. O 345 antedicte ]
antecedentes O 346 ad ] om. O 347 hic ] hec tamen O 347 certa regula ] inv. O
347–348 opponens et respondens ] inv. et transp. O 348 responsurus respondere ] inv. O
350 illud ] om. O 350 erat ] est O
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Sed de hoc postea dicetur.84 Ad ultimum infra dicendum est.
3.33. Item, si ponatur quod ad nihil sis obligatus, deinde proponitur ‘tu es obli-
gatus’.85
!Obj.1" Si conceditur, contra: nulla specie obligationis es obligatus, igitur non M 86rb
inter opponentem et respondentem huic repugnans [i.e. incompatible with the circumstance that
a sentence is answered with respect to the time of its utterance] aut nisi repugnet ei quod est
obligatum’. Cases like those presented in the above objections would be precisely the outcome
of this kind of exceptional ‘conventio’, that make it di"cult to establish a rule (cf. ‘certa regula
poni non potest’). In such cases, some additional hypothesis is needed and the assumption does
not hold simpliciter.
84 Possibly, the locus that is referred to, in this passage, is sec. 5.13, where Peter, in the
context of a discussion on impositio, rejects the case posited in the sophism ‘omne nesciens se
esse A est A’ because it is not understood from the very beginning what the signification of A
is.
85 This sophism and the next one belong to a very popular class of arguments that are quite
often discussed in obligational treatises. Sometimes this kind of sentences are referred to in
modern literature by the label ‘pragmatic paradoxes’, cf. [Ashworth, 1984], [Ashworth, 1985],
[Dutilh Novaes, 2006a] and [Schupp, 1993, especially pp. 103–115]. Their discussion is generally
meant to establish whether possibility, as a criterion for the admission of posita, should apply
in a restricted or in an unrestricted manner (cf. [Ashworth, 1985, p. 314]; an example of
restricted application is provided, for instance, by [Albert of Saxony, 1490, sig. Niiii+4ra-rb] “talis
positio [scil. ‘nihil est tibi positum’] non est admittenda, quia positum repugnat obligationi [...]
Talis positio [scil. ‘tu nihil admittis’] non est admittenda, quia repugnat admissioni”. Other
authors like [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 79ra] “Ex quibus patet quod tales casus negare non est nisi
fuga miserorum nescientium huius artis vigorem”, [William Buser, 1990, pp. 178] “respondent
aliqui faciliter unica responsione, scilicet non admittendo positum [...] Sed istae responsiones
sunt tamquam fugae miserorum fugentium di"cultatem” and Peter himself opt for unrestricted
application because they see no reason to rule out sentences that are, after all, possible in their
own right although they may cause problems with respect to the context of their utterance.
Billingham also holds a similar view, cf. [Ashworth, 1985, p. 316]: “Billingham and his followers
clearly did not see this sophism as posing any problems of pragmatic inconsistency”. Peter
has already quickly mentioned the problem (cf. supra, sec. 2.1). It is probably not a matter of
mere coincidence that the examples he provides to clarify how the rule for admission must be
understood, are picked out from a class of sentences (such as ‘nulla propositio sit’ and the like)
that one might be inclined to reject because of the pragmatic inconsistency they may generate.
This type of sentences, despite their apparent paradoxical character, must be admitted whenever
posited, since they are possible. The idea is confirmed, here, by the solution provided to both
sophisms.
The first one is a variation on a theme that commonly comes in the more familiar form of the sen-
tences ‘nihil est tibi positum’ or ‘tu non es obligatus’, cf. for instance [Walter Burley, 1963, p. 49],
[Marsilius of Inghen, 1489, sig. Biiii+2rb-va], [Albert of Saxony, 1490, sig. Niiii+3vb–Niiii+4va],
[Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 79ra], [William Buser, 1990, pp. 176–180], [Paul of Venice, 1988, p.
170], [Roger Swyneshed, 1977, p. 256].
351 hoc ] hac O 351 postea ] plus add. O 351 dicetur ] om. O 351 Ad . . . est ] om. O
352 Item ] alt- forte pro alter casus in marg. O 352 si ] om. O 352 sis ] conf. forte species
O 352 proponitur ] proponatur O 354 obligationis ] tu add. O
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es obligatus. Patet consequentia. Et antecedens quia ad nihil es obligatus. 355
!Obj.2" Item, hec est impertinens ‘tu es obligatus’, que extra tempus esset
neganda, igitur nunc est neganda.
3.34. Sed huic breviter dicitur, admisso casu, concedendo istam ‘tu es obligatus’. O 120ra
!RObj.1" Et negatur ista consequentia ‘ad nihil es obligatus, igitur nulla specie
obligationis es obligatus’, quia stat quod ista propositio ad quam sis obligatus non 360
sit aliquid sed aliqua.
!RObj.2" Secunda etiam forma non valet: quia, per obligationem factam, est
ista vera ‘tu es obligatus’, que extra tempus erat falsa.86
86 The sophism has the following structure:
P Ad nihil es obligatus A possible
1. Tu es obligatus C
2. Nulla specie obligationis es obligatus, igitur
non es obligatus
C ( the inference is valid, and
the antecedent holds because
it is implied by P (‘ad nihil
es obligatus, igitur nulla spe-
cie obligationis es obligatus’
is valid too)
3. Hec est impertinens ‘tu es obligatus’, que
extra tempus esset neganda, igitur nunc est
neganda
C (
Solution: admission of the positum, concession of 1., denial of the inference ‘ad nihil es ob-
ligatus, igitur nulla specie obligationis es obligatus’. The argument against this consequen-
ce appears pretty sophistical, but Peter is not the only author to endorse such a view (cf.
[William Buser, 1990, p. 180] “ista propositio ‘nihil est tibi positum’, sicut nec quaecumque alia,
non est aliquid, sed est aliqua, scilicet subiectum, praedicatum et copula”. This fact alone, I
reckon, would speak against the claim that “we do not find direct traces of Buser’s work in the
writings of influential authors like [...] Peter of Mantua”, [Kneepkens, 1982, p. 160]). The posi-
ted sentence ‘ad nihil es obligatus’ is equivalent to ‘non ad aliquid es obligatus’. The respondent,
however, is obligated to a sentence. But a sentence is not just something (= aliquid), but rather
several things (= aliqua). One could also understand Peter’s use of ‘aliqua’ as referring to the
feminine gender of the latin term ‘propositio’ but I am more inclined to think that the former
solution is the right one on the basis of the textual parallel with Buser.
The reason for the denial of the second argument (‘hec est impertinens ‘tu es obligatus’, que
extra tempus esset neganda, igitur nunc est neganda’) is interesting. Apart for the role it plays in
the argument, which is quite clear, it might prompt the impression of an unusual counterfactual
flavour in the assertion that a sentence that was false (and therefore ought to be denied) outside
the period of the obligation has become true per obligationem factam. At first sight one might be
tempted to say that nothing like that is going on here, because we would need to have a clause
such as ‘per obligatum’ or ‘per positum’ instead of the clause ‘per obligationem factam’. The
latter remark might suggest that we are in the presence of a familiar example of relevance to the
obligation which fits pretty well in the context of a pragmatic paradox (we will see a di!erent
355 Patet ] hec O 355 Et ] arguitur add. O 355 nihil ] tu add. O 357 nunc ] adhuc O
359 nihil ] tu add. O 359 nulla specie ] per nullam speciem O 360 obligationis ] tu add. O
360 quam ] tu add. O 362–363 etiam . . . vera ] om. O
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3.35. Item, ponatur quod nulla propositio sit. Deinde proponitur ‘omne positum
et bene admissum propositum est concedendum’.87 365
!Obj.1" Si conceditur, igitur aliqua propositio est.
!Obj.2" Si negatur ista, tu negas regu-lam; igitur male respondes. Si conceditur P 69rb
totum, inferatur quod aliqua propositio est, quia bene sequitur ‘tu negas regulam,
igitur aliqua propositio est’, cum omnis regula sit propositio. Ideo forte dicitur V 74vb
negando antecedens.88 370
!Obj.3" Sed tunc, forte, queritur quare negatur antecedens.
!i" Cui si dicitur quia repugnat, arguitur antecedens sic, quia bene sequitur ‘id
repugnat, igitur illud est’.
!ii" Vel, si forte dicitur quod tu negas ipsum quia tibi placet negare ipsum, igitur
ipsum est. 375
!Obj.4" Item, cedat tempus obligationis, negata ista ‘omne positum et bene
admissum est concedendum’. Et arguitur: infra tempus negasti regulam, igitur
male.89
story in the section on impositio, where Peter really seems to be claiming something that can
be assimilated to a kind of counterfactual reasoning). Yet, Obj.2 claims that the sentence ‘tu es
obligatus’ is irrelevant and true. Peter does not explicitly declares what logical status he ascribes
to the sentence, but it is reasonable to assume that he regards it as irrelevant too (otherwise,
rather than saying that the sentence is true in virtue of the obligation, he would have probably
said that the sentence had become relevant, as opposed to the claim made in the objection). The
point is that the sentence is not false, but true, and this is how the objection is dismissed. It
is no big deal to realize that the truth value of an irrelevant sentence is often influenced by the
casus and that the latter often happens to be inconsistent with the positum. The unusual thing
is, by contrast, that the casus takes over the positum in this sophism. It is a matter of granting
a sentence because it follows from the casus (the expression might be misleading: following from
the casus simply means being true according to it) and is incompatible not with the positum but
with the very same fact that an obligation arises (a common way of arguing against pragmatic
paradoxes). It is basically not a matter of relevance at all: here all the weight of the argument
is put on the shoulders the casus, i.e. the circumstance that something is actually posited to the
respondent. Normally, the two levels are kept sharply distinct, but here the casus comes into
play as the only independent variable.
87 This is a contracted version of the first obligational rule (R1), cf. supra, sec. 2.1.
88 Namely, the sentence ‘tu negas regulam’.
89 The first three objections claim, in various ways, that no matter how the respondent replies
to the propositum that is put forward in the first place (i.e. the first rule in thesis-form), it
follows, in any case, that at least a sentence exists, contrary to what is posited. The fourth
objection, on the other hand, insists rather on the fact that the respondent replies incorrectly, if
he denies a rule.
364 Item ] casus in marg. O 365 admissum ] infra tempus obligationis add. O
365 propositum ] om. O 366 conceditur ] contra add. O 366 propositio ] om. O 367 ista ]
contra O 367 conceditur ] concedatur O 369 cum ] quia O 369 sit ] est O 371 forte ] om.
O 372 Cui ] om. O 372 antecedens sic ] quod illud antecedens sit O 372 id ] illud antece-
dens O 373 illud ] antecedens add. O 374 tibi placet ] inv. O 377 admissum ] propositum
add. O 377 arguitur ] sic add. O 377 tempus ] tu add. O 378 male ] respondisti add. O
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3.36. Ideo dicitur, admisso posito, negando quod omne positum et bene admissum
propositum est concedendum. 380
!RObj.2" Et cum arguitur ‘tu negas regulam, igitur male respondes’, negatur
antecedens.
!RObj.3" Et cum queritur quare negatur, dicitur quod nulla propositio negatur
neque regula negatur !Ad i" quia repugnans, neque negatur !Ad ii" quia placet
negare. 385
!RObj.4" Et cum arguitur ulterius ‘cedat tempus obligationis’ et arguitur quod
in tempore negasti regulam || igitur male respondisti, dicitur negando consequen- E Giiiiva
B 98ratiam, quia illa regula erat contingens repugnans posito.
Unde generaliter nulla regula hic posita est concedenda, quando positum bene
admissum repugnat ei.90 M 86va390
3.37. Item, pono tibi sedenti istam ‘omnis homo currit’. Deinde propono ‘tu L 71va
sedes’.
90 The sophism has the following structure:
P Nulla propositio est A possible
1.1 Omne positum et bene admissum proposi-
tum est concedendum
C ( (cf. Obj.1: aliqua
propositio est)
1.2 N
2. Tu negas regulam, igitur male respondes C
3. Tu negas regulam, igitur aliqua propositio
est
C ( (cf. Obj.2: omnis regula
est propositio, igitur aliqua
propositio est)
4. Tu negas regulam N ( (cf. Obj.3 i–ii: aliqua
propositio est)
The solution to the sophism consists in admitting the positum and denying the first propo-
situm, i.e. the sentence ‘omne positum et bene admissum propositum est concedendum’ (the
replies to the objections are intended to prove that, once this sentence has been denied, we are
by no means forced into contradiction by the structure of sentences and replies proposed the-
reafter). In particular, the solution hinges on the assumption that a rule can be denied, if it
is put forward in a disputation, in virtue of its contingency. Remarkably, Peter suggests here
that rules must be regarded as non-necessary sentences whose negation is therefore possible (and
sometimes acceptable as in the present case). The respondent can have recourse to this charac-
terization, whenever the rule is repugnant to the positum. There seems to be a clash between
posited sentences and the rules that are supposed to provide the logical framework within which
those sentences must be discussed. In any case, the suspension of validity holds only for incompa-
tibility with the positum. An analogous treatment is found in [William Buser, 1990, p. 108–109]
and [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 314] “Omnes regule obligationis habent intelligi sine obligatione
contraria”.
379 posito ] casu O 384 regula negatur ] inv. O 384 negatur ] om. O 384 placet ] mihi
add. O 385 negare ] regulam add. O 386 ulterius ] transp. O 387 in tempore ] infra tempus
O 387 dicitur negando ] negatur O 387–388 consequentiam ] consequentia O 388 erat ]
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!Obj.1" Si negatur, contra: tu negas sequens, igitur male respondes, quia bene
sequitur ‘pono tibi sedenti istam ‘tu es homo’, igitur tu sedes’.91
!Obj.2" Item, in eodem casu proponitur ‘hec ‘tu curris’ non est sequens neque 395
repugnans sed impertinens”.
Qua concessa, proponitur ista ‘tu es homo’.
Qua concessa, quia vera non repugnans, proponitur ‘tu curris’. Si negatur, cedat
tempus. Et arguitur quod in tempore male respondisti, quia negasti sequens ex
bene admisso et concesso. Si igitur conceditur ista ‘tu curris’, proponitur ‘hec ‘tu O 120rb400
curris’ non est sequens neque repugnans sed impertinens’.
Si negatur, negatur a te concessum, igitur male.
Si conceditur, ista consequentia est bona ‘omnis homo currit; tu es homo; igitur
tu curris’ et significat ex compositione suorum terminorum; igitur illa ‘tu curris’
sequitur ex illis; igitur est sequens.92 405
91 The correct reading is ‘pono tibi sedenti istam ‘omnis homo currit’, as supplied by ms. O.
92 Here is the structure of the sophism:
P Omnis homo currit A possible
1. Tu sedes N
2. Tu negas sequens, igitur male respondes C ( (cf. Obj.1: bene sequi-
tur ‘pono tibi sedenti ‘omnis
homo currit’, igitur tu sedes’)
3. Hec ‘tu curris’ non est sequens neque
repugnans sed impertinens’
C
4. Tu es homo C irrelevant and true
5.1 Tu curris N ( in tempore male respondi-
sti, quia negasti sequens ex
bene admisso et concesso (cf.
P and 4.)
5.2 C
6.1 Hec ‘tu curris’ non est sequens neque
repugnans sed impertinens’
N ( negatur a te concessum (cf.
3.), igitur male
6.2 C
7. Ista consequentia est bona ‘omnis homo
currit; tu es homo; igitur tu curris’ et signi-
ficat ex compositione suorum terminorum;
igitur illa ‘tu curris’ sequitur ex illis; igitur
illa est sequens
C ( the consequent of this va-
lid inference is inconsistent
with 6.2
The two objections, that are resolved in the next section, concern the proposed replies to 1.
(first part of the argument) and the inconsistency of 6.2 and the consequent of 7. (second part
of the argument).
394 tu . . . homo ] omnis homo currit O 395 proponitur ] proponatur O 397 proponitur ]
proponatur O 397 ista ] om. O 398 quia . . . negatur ] om. O 399 in tempore ] infra
tempus O 400 proponitur ] proponatur O 401 repugnans ] repugnat O 401 sed ] quia O
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TRACTATUS OBLIGATIONUM 126
3.38. Sed pro his dicitur, admisso posito, negando istam ‘tu sedes’.
!RObj.1" Et negatur ista consequentia ‘ista est sequens, igitur est a te conce-
denda’. Omnis enim propositio, de virtute sermonis, est sequens ex aliquo saltem
in casu, licet ipsa sequens sit impossibilis. Respondens enim non obligatur ad
concedendum aliquod falsum, nisi sequens ex bene admisso et bene concesso etc. 410
Neque obligatur respondens ad obligationem, sed obligatur ad obligatum per V 75ra
obligationem.93
93 The sophism is quite articulated and deals with how to understand properly the notion
of ‘sequens’. The first objection addresses the problem of whether anything else, apart from
the positum (and the subsequent steps, as long as they become part of the cumulative ‘history’
of a disputation), has some role in determining the logical status of sentences. The problem
concerns in particular the information conveyed right before the beginning of a disputation while
stating the casus. Peter resolves the issue by denying the proposed answer of step 1. It does
not follow that, if the opponent posits a sentence to the respondent while the latter is sitting,
then the respondent’s being seated should count in any way (i) to determine the logical status
of sentences that come thereafter or (ii), worse, as a part of the positum itself. At most, a piece
of information like that will play a role when it comes down to assigning a truth value to a
sentence that has already been identified, on independent grounds, as irrelevant. Unfortunately,
here we have a first big problem with the argument, because in the end Peter rightly denies that
the sentence ‘tu sedes’ is relevant but he also claims that it should be denied. I do not see how
he could justify this conclusion. The sentence is to be regarded as irrelevant, and it is actually
true, according to the casus (cf. ‘pono tibi sedenti istam ‘omnis homo currit’). But the fifth rule
(R5) requires us to grant sentences with these two features (we may forget about the condition
of knowing that the sentence is true because it does not enter into the argument). What then?
Is there any room for choice in our responses? The issue remains open.
The solution to the first part of the sophism consists thus in admitting the positum and
denying the sentence ‘tu sedes’, proposed in the first place. Once we have denied 1., how are we
supposed to deal with the objection put forward at step 2? And then what about the second,
more elaborate, part of the sophism, from step 3. on? Peter makes a rather complicated point
(cf. RObj.1). The argument is quite interesting in its own right, because it sheds some light
on the notions of relevance and irrelevance, that turn out to be the outcome of a sophisticated
conceptual e!ort.
I am not fully convinced by all the details of the replies (particularly those addressing the
sequence of sentences proposed in the second part of the disputation), but the main point is
quite straightforward as long as it consists in a qualification of the notions (i.e. the properties
of being relevant vs irrelevant) that come into play in the sentences put forward at steps 2., 3.
and 6.
Peter suggests, as a reply to the objection proposed at step 2., to reject the inference ‘ista
est sequens, igitur est a te concedenda’, because it rests on the unreliable generalization that
the respondent replies incorrectly, if he denies a sentence that follows. Note that I intentionally
use this generic expression and not the technical phrase ‘sequentially relevant’. The objection
holds only on the assumption that, if a sentence follows, then it ought always to be granted.
Is that true? On the face of it, in the obligational framework, one would be inclined to answer
a"rmatively. But in fact it depends on what we exactly mean by ‘following’. If following means
to be sequentially relevant (according to the definition resulting from the rules) then the answer
407 igitur ] illa add. O 410 falsum ] sequens BMOV 410 et ] vel ex add. O 410 etc. ]
vel huiusmodi add. O
TRACTATUS OBLIGATIONUM 127
Et per hoc est concedendum, de virtute sermonis, quod nulla propositio est
impertinens, quia omnis propositio est pertinens saltem sibi ipsi, quia sequens ad P 69va
seipsam.94 415
!RObj.2" Et ideo, cum proponitur in illo casu quod hec non est sequens ‘tu
curris’, neganda est; sed conceditur quod ipsa est impertinens admisso et adhuc
non est sequens ex aliquo concesso neque ex aliquibus concessis.
Et ultra, si per ordinem formetur argumentum, conceditur ista ‘tu es homo’ et
iterum conceditur quod ista ‘tu curris’ non est sequens ex aliquibus concessis neque 420
ex aliquo concesso. Et conceditur quod ista consequentia est bona, scilicet ‘omnis M 86vb
homo currit; tu es homo; igitur tu curris’, et quod iste due sunt concedende ‘omnis
is indeed a"rmative: any sequentially relevant sentence ought to be granted. If, on the other
hand, we say of a given sentence that it follows from the casus, then we are by no means required
to grant it, when it is proposed. As a matter of fact, for the most part, in the construction of
sophisms, the casus and the positum are supposed to conflict in some way, because the falsehood
of the latter is determined with respect to the explicit assumptions laid down by means of the
former.
The point, therefore, is not that Peter is willing to deny the rule according to which sequentially
relevant sentences ought to be granted. I think his aim, here, is showing that ‘following’ can be
said in many ways. In a sense, any sentence, of which it is said that it follows, is said to be
following from something. In the context of obligations, more specifically, this characterization
is equivalent to what we indicate by means of the expression ‘sequentially relevant at step n’, i.e.
anything that is logically entailed or derivable from something that has been previously admitted
or granted, according to specific rules.
In sum, the sentence ‘tu sedes’ is not ‘sequens’ in the right sense, it is irrelevant and true;
still it is claimed that there is no obligation to grant it (cf. ‘Respondens enim non obligatur
ad concedendum aliquod falsum [here the sentence ‘tu sedes’], nisi sequens ex bene admisso
et bene concesso. Neque obligatur respondens ad obligationem [i.e., I assume, to background
assumptions made by stating the casus], sed obligatur ad obligatum per obligationem’). I am
puzzled by this conclusion, but it is worth adding that it seems to be utterly in conflict with a
claim made above, cf. supra, sec. 3.34. On that occasion, Peter argued that the sentence ‘tu es
obligatus’ (in a positio where the positum was ‘ad nihil es obligatus’) should have been granted
as true per obligationem factam. Some further reflections are needed to better understand this
point.
94 The remark, as interesting as it could be in its own right, looks quite threatening in the con-
text of obligations: would it not make the very same distinction between relevant and irrelevant
sentences collapse? The answer is negative, for again, as above, it is all about distinguishing the
di!erent senses in which the term can be taken. If it is taken literally, then nothing can be said
to be irrelevant, because everything is at least relevant to itself, insofar as everything is entailed
by itself. This is, however, not the standard sense of the term in the obligational context, where
it is employed, by contrast, to characterize in a much more restrictive way the class of sentences
falling under it. For it is always implicitly presupposed that it is with respect to a given sentence
or set of sentences that something is (or is not) irrelevant.
413 per hoc ] iuxta hoc O 413 est concedendum ] inv. et transp. O 414 saltem ] transp.
O 415 seipsam ] ipsam O 418 neque ] vel O 420 quod ] om. O 420 tu curris ] transp. O
420 concessis ] concedendis O 421 concesso ] om. O 421–422 scilicet . . . curris ] om. O
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homo currit’, ‘tu es homo’. Et negatur quod ista sequatur ex illis, scilicet ‘tu curris’,
quia dicitur forte quod iste non significant ex compositione suorum terminorum.
Et, breviter, semper respondeatur secundum ordinem, semper stando in ultima 425
repugnante ipsam negando.95
95 Here we come to the solution to the second part of the argument. It requires the denial of the
sentence proposed at step 3. – ‘hec ‘tu curris’ non est sequens neque repugnans sed impertinens’
– that in the above reconstruction of the sophism was granted by hypothesis. If we deny 3. it
follows that (i) ‘tu curris’ is either ‘sequens’ or ‘repugnans’ and (ii) it is not ‘impertinens’. But
Peter has just claimed that no sentence is ‘impertinens’ at least de virtute sermonis. How can
we accomodate this? Peter claims that it might be granted that ‘tu curris’ is irrelevant to the
admitted sentence, i.e. the positum, and that, on the other hand, it does not follow yet from
any other granted sentence (‘cf. ‘adhuc non est sequens ex aliquo concesso neque ex aliquibus
concessis’). This is based on a distinction between being irrelevant with respect to something as
opposed to being irrelevant simpliciter and again on the idea that ‘following’ has a very precise
sense in the oligational context: it means following from certain peculiar sentences.
The two notions (relevance and irrelevance) are, to some extent, qualified. A sentence is not
irrelevant simpliciter but it may be said to be irrelevant to the positum; it cannot be denied that
a sentence is relevant (for it is at least relevant to itself, on the literal reading), but that sentence
can be said not to be relevant at a given time with respect to something that has been previously
evaluated in a disputation. As a result, it is plausible to regard the two notions according to the
characterization outlined above in Part I, sec. 1.3–1.4, i.e. as always involving an index: relevant
at step n means relevant with respect to a particular set of sentences, while relevant at, say, step
n + 7 may well refer to a di!erent set (which includes the former). All the more so, if we think
of these notions in dynamic terms as it happens to be the case in the responsio antiqua. For any
given disputation (i.e. once we have set up the casus and posited a sentence), there are no such
things as the class of relevant vs the class of irrelevant sentences, fixed once and for all. The
two classes evolve according to what is proposed and evaluated at each step. A sentence that is
not relevant at, say, step n might become relevant at step n + 7, depending on what has been
granted or denied in the meanwhile. If we think of these notions as being indexed to the steps
of a disputation, so that we would have a sequence of predicates, each of which is linked to a
single step, we may have a way to understand the structure of this sophism. Peter is claiming, I
suggest, that the respondent is actually responding to di!erent sentences (involving, as it were,
di!erent notions of being relevant and irrelevant) at the two steps 3. and 6.
The final part of the reply concerns the argument ‘per ordinem’ and is devoted to the sequence
of proposita 4. to 7. Step 4. ‘tu es homo’ should be granted, as irrelevant and true; step 5.
‘tu curris’ should be granted too as sequentially relevant (if follows from the positum and 4.).
With step 6., by contrast, we have a serious problem. Let us look at it closely. The original
argument of the sophism is clear: the sentence ‘hec ‘tu curris’ non est sequens neque repugnans
sed impertinens’ was proposed twice (at step 3. and at step 6.). The first occurrence (step 3.)
was put forward before ‘tu curris’ (step 4., sequentially relevant) and apparently it was correctly
granted, because at that point of the disputation ‘tu curris’ actually was irrelevant. In the
evaluation of the second occurrence (step 6.) we must keep in mind that, in the meantime, ‘tu
curris’ has become sequentially relevant and therefore it is no longer irrelevant. We can deny the
propositum (step 6.1) or we can grant it (step 6.2). In either case we reply incorrectly, because
6.1 is inconsistent with the reply given at step 3., whereas 6.2 is inconsistent with the consequent
423 scilicet . . . curris ] om. O 424 iste ] illa O 424 significant ] significat O 425 semper ]
consequenter O 425 semper ] om. O 425 in ] illa add. O 426 repugnante ] repugnanti O
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3.39. Item, ponatur quod omnis homo qui est albus currat et nullus istorum potest
currere. Et per ly ‘illorum’, in ista propositione ‘nullus istorum potest currere’
adequate significante quod nullus istorum potest currere, demonstrentur omnes
homines qui sunt albi. Quo admisso, proponitur ‘nullus istorum potest currere’. 430
Et illud est concedendum, quia sequens ex copulativa que est casus.
!Obj.1" Deinde proponitur ‘aliquis istorum potest currere’, demonstratis omni-
bus hominibus qui sunt albi per ly ‘illorum’.
!i" Si conceditur, contra: quia concedis repugnans, quia contradictorium con-
cessi. 435
of 7. The problem arises with respect to the discussion made above about the answer to be given
to step 3. As we have seen, the sentence ‘hec ‘tu curris’ non est sequens neque repugnans sed
impertinens’ should be denied and not granted in its first occurrence. But if this is the case, what
happens to the rest of the argument? For instance, the inconsistency between the concession of
3. and 6.1 does not arise any longer: it is not granted that ‘negatur a te concessum’, since 3.
must in fact be denied.
And this is not the end of the story, because Peter claims that the correct reply to the second
occurrence of our problematic propositum is granting it. But how can this be compatible with
the denial suggested as the correct reply to the first occurrence? We would have therefore a
symmetric and reversed situation: the denial of step 3. would be incompatible with 6.2, not with
6.1. The problem is that 6.1 is not inconsistent with anything: we could simply deny both 3.
and 6.1 and there would be no need to go on, as Peter does, to look for a solution. What has
gone wrong? Is Peter right in thinking that there is still some form of inconsistency between the
two occurrences, provided that denying the first occurrence is the correct reply to it?
I am not sure that I have a satisfactory answer to that question, but let us try to figure out
a possible way out of the problem. Peter claims that at step 6. we should grant the sentence
‘ista ‘tu curris’ non est sequens ex aliquibus concessis neque ex aliquo concesso’ (let us call it
6*), which is pretty similar to the sentence he is willing to grant at step 3. In the solution he
proposes to deny the original occurrence ‘hec ‘tu curris’ non est sequens neque repugnans sed
impertinens’, but he also suggests that the respondent grants the sentence ‘hec ‘tu curris’ est
impertinens admisso et adhuc non est sequens ex aliquo concesso neque ex aliquibus concessis’
(let us call it 3*), which, save for the clause ‘impertinens admisso’, is the same as 6*).
Now, what happens if we read the argument with 3* and 6* instead of 3. and 6., respec-
tively? 3* is granted, therefore 6* cannot be denied (as in the original argument, where we
had an inconsistency between 3. and 6.1). Let therefore 6* be granted. Here we still have an
inconsistency with the rest of the argument (in particular with the consequent of 7.), because 6*
roughly says that the sentence ‘tu curris’ does not follow from other proposita and 7. proves that
it is the opposite way around. Hence the need, for Peter, to search for a solution, that he finds
in the usual strategy of replying per ordinem. This time, the only candidate to be denied at the
last step as incompatibly relevant is the sentence ‘iste non significant ex compositione suorum
terminorum’. In the context of obligations thus, the need of maintaining consistency can force
the respondent even to deny that words have their usual meaning.
427 Item ] alius casus in marg. O 427 nullus ] nullorum O 428–429 Et . . . currere ]
om. O 429 demonstrentur ] conf. forte demonstratis O 429–430 omnes homines ] omnibus
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!ii" Si negatur, contra: aliqui homines albi currunt. Sint igitur Sor et Plato albi
qui currunt. Igitur aliquis illorum potest currere, illis albis demonstratis.
!Obj.2" Item, si nullus istorum potest currere et per ly ‘illorum’, in ista propo-
sitione significante adequate quod nullus illorum potest currere, sunt demonstrati
homines qui sunt albi, igitur ista est vera ‘nullus istorum potest currere’ per cuius 440
partem sunt demonstrati homines albi.
!i" Et tunc arguitur sic: nullus homo demonstratus || per ly ‘illorum’ in ista O 120va
propositione potest currere; sed omnis homo albus est demonstratus per ly ‘illorum’
in ista propositione; igitur nullus homo albus potest currere.
!ii" Et alia ex parte, aliquis homo albus potest currere, || quia omnes homines L 71vb445
albi currunt. Igitur ex casu sequitur contradictio.
!iii" Et arguitur antecedens, scilicet quod nullus homo demonstratus per ly ‘il-
lorum’ in ista propositione potest currere: quia nullus homo pro || quo verificatur E Giiiivb
ista propositio potest currere; sed omnis homo albus est homo pro quo verificatur
ista propositio, ex quo per ly ‘illorum’ demonstrantur omnes homines qui sunt albi; 450
igitur nullus || homo albus demonstratus per ly ‘illorum’ potest currere. Ideo forte M 87ra
|| dicitur, in principio, negando casum.96 B 98rb
96 The sophism has the following structure:
P Omnis homo qui est albus currit et nul-
lus istorum potest currere. Et per ly ‘il-
lorum’, in ista propositione adequate signi-
ficante quod nullus istorum potest currere,
demonstrentur omnes homines qui sunt albi
A possible
1. Nullus istorum potest currere C sequentially relevant (it is
part of the positum)
2.1 Aliquis istorum potest currere (demonstra-
tis omnibus hominibus qui sunt albis, per
ly ‘illorum’)
C ( incompatibly relevant (it is
the negation of 1.)
2.2 N ( aliqui homines albi cur-
runt, igitur aliquis istorum
potest currere
A similar sophism is in Heytesbury, cf. [Wilson, 1966, p. 155]. The point, here, is calling
attention to cases whose stipulation may contain a contradiction. A quick look at the casus is
su"cient to see immediately the contradiction, since the posited sentence is a conjunction of the
following form (where H, B, C stand for ‘being a man’, ‘being white’ and ‘run’, respectively):
(Case 1) #x ( (Hx $ Bx ) & Cx ) $ #x ( (Hx $ Bx ) & ¬!Cx )
The argument for the rejection is sound: seemingly there is no way to defend the case of this
sophism, as it stands. Nonetheless, there are interesting features, in its formulation, that Peter
dwells on in the next section. In particular two aspects are worth mentioning which both concern
436 albi ] om. O 437 currunt ] currant O 437 Igitur ] et arguitur sic: Sor et Plato albi
currunt praep. O 437 illis ] ipsis O 439 sunt demonstrati ] demonstrantur O 440 homines ]
omnes praep. O 440 qui sunt ] om. O 445 alia ex ] inv. O 445 aliquis ] omnis O
447 arguitur ] illud add. O 447 scilicet quod ] quia O
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3.40. !i" Sed contra, iste casus est possibilis: omnis homo qui est albus currit et
Sor et Plato non possunt currere et per ly ‘illorum’ in ista propositione ‘nullus
istorum potest currere’ adequate significante quod nullus illorum potest currere 455
demonstrantur omnes || homines qui sunt albi, et ex isto casu sequitur ille primus, P 69vb
igitur primus est possibilis.97 Patet consequentia.
!ii" Et arguitur antecedens: quia Sor et Plato existentibus hodie omnibus homi-
nibus albis, pro crastina die illis non existentibus, est hodie iste casus possibilis.
!iii" Sed arguitur quod iste sequitur ex illo quia bene sequitur || ‘omnis homo V 75rb460
qui est albus currit; et Sor et Plato non possunt currere; et per ly ‘illorum’ demon-
strantur omnes homines qui sunt albi in ista propositione ‘nullus istorum potest
currere’ adequate sic significante; igitur omnis homo qui est albus currit et nullus
illorum potest currere; et per ly ‘illorum’ in ista propositione ‘nullus istorum po-
test currere’ demonstrantur omnes homines qui sunt albi’. Tenet consequentia quia 465
prima pars consequentis sequitur ex prima antecedentis, et secunda ex secunda, et
tertia ex tertia.98
the second clause of the posited conjunction. First, the presence, of a demonstrative term such
as ‘illorum’; second, the fact that the sentence is modalized. On the basis of these two elements,
Peter conjures up an objection to the e!ect that the case should be regarded as possible (cf.
sec. 3.40) and, accordingly, no longer rejected. The brief discussion below o!ers the occasion to
introduce a distinction between the fact that a sentence is possible and the possibility for it to
be true. Peter’s conclusion is that some sentence are possible even if they cannot be true.
97 The point of the argument is clear. In the situation just described in the previous section,
one would be tempted to respond by rejecting the posited case (let us call C1) since it is con-
tradictory. The strategy of the present objection is showing that (a) C1 is entailed by another
case, say C2; that (b) C2 is, by contrast, possible; and, therefore, that (c) C1 is possible too.
98 This part of the argument is intended to prove (b), i.e. that C2 is possible. It is, however, not
quite straightforward to understand what Peter has in mind here. There are at least two problems
that must be faced: first, a model is provided that should count as an imaginary situation in
which the case is possible (i. e. a situation in which C2 can be realized), but it is not fully
clear how such a model is supposed to do his job. Second, a distinction between the notions of
‘possible’ and ‘possibly-true’, not unusual in the obligational tradition (cf. [William Buser, 1990,
p. 82]), is envisaged a few lines below by Peter in order to figure out a viable solution to the
sophism (the conclusion is presumably that Case 1 is indeed possible although it cannot be true:
it must be therefore admitted and then one should reply per ordinem). I will try to outline a
tentative reconstruction. Let us follow the order of the text.
First, cf. par. (i) sec. 3.40, Peter lays down an inference, which he regards as a valid one and
which is the basis of the whole argument: ‘iste casus est possibilis [the statement of C2 follows],
et ex iste casus sequitur ille primus [i.e. C1], igitur primus est possibilis’. Now, we need to see
more closely what this new casus C2, that Peter regards as possible, is like. It consists of a
conjunction of three sentences: ‘omnis homo qui est albus currit (= C2.1) et Sor et Plato non
453 contra ] quia add. O 453 possibilis ] quod add. O 453 currit ] currat O
456 demonstrantur ] demonstrentur O 457 igitur ] ille add. O 457 Patet ] hec add. O
458 Plato ] Platone OM 460 Sed ] et O 461–462 demonstrantur ] conf. forte demonstren-
tur O 463 sic ] om. O 463 significante ] quod nullus istorum potest currere add. O 463 qui
est ] om. O 464–465 in . . . currere ] om. O 466 prima ] parte add. O 466 secunda ]
sequitur add. O
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possunt currere (= C2.2) et per ly ‘illorum’ in ista propositione ‘nullus illorum’ potest currere,
adequate significante quod nullus illorum potest currere, demonstrantur omnes homines qui sunt
albi (= C2.3)’.
Second, cf. par. (ii) sec. 3.40, Peter proves that C2 is possible. We have to imagine the following
situation: let us consider two moments of time, today and tomorrow, and assume that today the
set of white men contains, as its only members, Socrates and Plato. Moreover, let us assume,
that tomorrow the set of white men will no longer contain Socrates and Plato, because they
will have ceased to exist overnight. It might be necessary to make an additional assumption,
namely that some other white have come into existence by tomorrow, but let us leave this aside
for a moment. Peter’s conclusion is that today the casus is possible. Unfortunately, he does not
say anything more than this, therefore I think that it may be useful to spell out the underlying
reasons of his claim. Let us consider the conjuncts one by one. The sentence C2.1, namely
‘omnis homo qui est albus currit’, will be true tomorrow if some white man exists tomorrow
and no matter how many white men there are, they all run tomorrow. The sentence C2.2 will
be true tomorrow if Socrates and Plato will not be able to run tomorrow (and indeed they will
not, since we have assumed that they won’t be there any longer). The sentence C2.3 will be
true tomorrow if the term ‘illorum’ picks out all white men (it will turn out that the occurrence
of ‘illorum’ tomorrow will have to pick out the individuals that are white men today, namely
Socrates and Plato). The question arises as to what the status of the three components of C2 is,
with respect to the model we have built up, i.e. with respect to the two moments of time. We
know for sure, because Peter makes it explicit, that today Socrates and Plato are the only white
men. And we also know for sure that tomorrow Socrates and Plato (= all white men existing
today) will no longer exist. Let us assume, finally, that Socrates and Plato are both running
today. What happens if we put all these pieces together? In particular what happens of the
two conditions expressed by the other two conjuncts? C2.2 says that Socrates and Plato cannot
run. On the assumption that Socrates and Plato are the only elements in the set of white men,
C2.2 entails the modalized sentence C1.2 containing the demonstrative term ‘illorum’, as long as
the reference of the latter is fixed by its occurrence in sentence C2.3 which claims that the term
picks out all white men. Both sentences, needless to say, refer to Socrates and Plato. Thus, in
sum, tomorrow there will be some white men who will running (by the additional hypothesis;
they will not be Socrates and Plato, though), the sentence ‘Sor et Plato non possunt currere’
will be true, because the individuals it refers to will be no longer existent (Socrates and Plato),
while the last sentence C2.3 will be true, because we assume that the demonstrative it contains
will still be referring to the class of white men today, i.e. Socrates and Plato.
Third, cf. par. (iii) sec. 3.40, it is argued that C1 follows from C2. The argument, here, is
simpler. Not only C2 but also C1 does have a three-fold structure: it consists of a conjunction
of three sentences ‘omnis homo qui est albus currit (= C1.1) et nullus illorum potest currere
(= C1.2) et per ly ‘illorum’, in ista propositione ‘nullus illorum potest currere’, demonstrantur
omnes homines qui sunt albi (= C1.3)’. Let us then regard C2 as the three-fold antecedent and
C1 as the three-fold consequent of the entailment we want to prove. Now, C2 entails C1 because
C2.1 entails C1.1, C2.2 entails C1.2 and C2.3 entails C1.3, respectively.
It is far too easy to see why the first and third inference are sound: C2.1 and C1.1 are the
exactly one and the same sentence, namely ‘omnis homo qui est albus currit’, and the same
holds for C2.3 and C1.3 (= ‘per ly ‘illorum’ in ista propositione ‘nullus illorum potest currere’
demonstrantur omnes homines qui sunt albi’).
The fact that C2.2 (= ‘Sor et Plato non possunt currere’) entails C1.2 (= ‘nullus illorum potest
currere’) is, by contrast, less evident. Since the reference of ‘illorum’ in C1.2 is fixed by C1.3 on
the set of all white men, the entailment must depend on the assumption, made in par. (ii) sec.
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!iv" Et sic arguitur quod iste casus est possibilis, scilicet quod tantum Sor de-
monstratur et tamen hoc est Sor et hoc non est Sor, quia sequitur: tantum Sor
demonstratur, et Sor est Sor et Plato non est Sor, igitur tantum Sor demonstratur 470
et hoc est Sor et hoc non est Sor. Tenet consequentia et prima pars consequentis
sequitur ex prima antecedentis, secunda ex secunda, et tertia ex tertia.99
3.40, that this set contains only Socrates and Plato. If the set of all white men = {Socrates,
Plato}, then C2.2 entails C1.2. The condition is fulfilled by the stipulation of our model.
99 So far, we have proved that C2 entails C1 and that C2 is possible; we may therefore expect
Peter to draw the conclusion that C1 is possible too. In this paragraph, though, Peter sets up an
analogy with a similar case, involving the presence of demonstratives, and in the next paragraph
he will make his final point to the e!ect that the conclusion is qualified in a very peculiar sense.
It is not fully clear what the analogy is meant to show, because the terms involved are not
completely symmetric with the former case of C1 and C2. Still, let us see what is going on here.
Take two sentences, T1 and T2. T1 reads ‘Tantum Sor demonstratur (= T1.1) et Sor est Sor (=
T1.2) et Plato non est Sor (= T1.3)’ whereas T2 is the sentence ‘Tantum Sor demonstratur (=
T2.1) et tamen hoc est hoc (= T2.2) et hoc non est hoc (= T2.3)’.
The first sentence, T1, is obviously possible because it simply says that only Socrates is
indicated and, then, it contains two identities that are both true. But T1 entails T2, therefore
T2 should be possible too. The entailment, again, is proved on the basis of the respective
entailments of the atomic components (T1.1 entails T2.1, T1.2 entails T2.2 and T1.3 entails
T2.3). The first entailment is clearly sound, since one and the same sentence is at stake. But
what of the other two? Here the situation gets more complicated. In a sense, it is true that
T1.2 entails T2.2 and T1.3 entails T2.3, for it would su"ce to make the opportune substitutions
of proper names with demonstratives. In other words, we need to index the demonstratives in
an appropriate way in order to disambiguate the occurrences of the term ‘hoc’. For instance,
if h1 stands for the demonstrative used to indicate Socrates and h2 for the demonstrative used
to indicate Plato, then the sentences ‘Sor est Sor’ obviously entails ‘h1 est h1’, whereas ‘Plato
non est Sor’ entails ‘h2 non est h1’. Now what is the point of it all? It is the fact that, under
the assumption that only Socrates is indicated, we are by no means entitled to make use of
two distinct demonstratives in rephrasing the initial identities, and therefore we are left with
the impossibility of uttering the sentence T2 and having all three conditions of T2 verified, at
one and the same time. Under the hypothesis of T1.1/T2.1 (= ‘Tantum Sor demonstratur’) T2
cannot be true. The circumstance that is envisaged in T2 is indeed possible and it also follows
from the possible case T1, but as it stands it cannot be true, because whenever we utter T2,
we are committing ourselves to the use of only one demonstrative, and therefore we lack an
additional demonstrative to pick out the right reference for T1.3 (= ‘hoc non est Sor’). It is
as though all demonstratives were to collapse onto one single demonstrative, used to indicate
Socrates, the only individual who can be the object of an act of ostension in such a casus.
The situation of T1.3 is similar to a case where a demonstrative is used to refer to a non-
existent object: having a demonstrative that does not work properly because its natural reference
(Plato, here) cannot be indicated (because of a stipulation) is more or less the same as having a
demonstrative by means of which we want to try to indicate something that does not exist. And
here we come to the point of the whole argument and of this analogy.
Again, unfortunately, Peter does not spell out the argument in detail, therefore some specu-
lation is needed to fill in the gaps. The point is showing that a sentence might well be possible
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!v" Tamen verum est quod, licet iste casus sit possibilis, tamen non potest esse
verus, sicut quamvis illa propositio sit possibilis ‘hoc non demonstratur’ demon-
strato Adam, tamen ipsa non potest esse vera sic significando. Ideo in principio 475
dicitur ad argumentum per ordinem, ut patet ex predictis.100
and, still, it might be the case that it is not possibly-true. What sentence is most likely to have
these logical properties in the above argument: C1 or C2? I am inclined to think that it is C1,
since it is with respect to this sentence that the situation just described obtains. In particular,
the problem is represented by the presence in C1.2 and C1.3 of demonstratives that lack a refe-
rent with respect to the time when the sentences should be true. The circumstance is possible,
namely that none of those that are indicated through the demonstrative ‘those’ can run, because
there is another circumstance (described by C2) in which the situation obtains. But in such a
circumstance (i.e. tomorrow when Socrates and Plato no longer exist), the expression ‘those that
are indicated’ is supposed to have empty reference.
Therefore, when we utter the sentences C1.2 and C1.3 today, we are thereby implying at one
and the same time that the demonstrative occurring in it picks out something and that it does
not. In the situation in which the sentences are supposed to be possible, the demonstrative must
not pick out anything, whereas in any situation in which the sentences are actually uttered,
they assert that something is indeed indicated. They can never be true when they are asserted,
because the only situations in which they would be true are situations that in fact would falsify
what these sentences say. We simply cannot truthfully express their content in that form.
The situation is not very di!erent from more familiar examples. For instance, the sentence
‘hoc non demonstratur’ is possible, if the demonstrative ‘hoc’ picks out an individual like Adam
who does not exist. It is possible because it describes a possible state of a!airs, namely that a
non-existent object is not indicated and, since Adam does not exist, a fortiori he will not be
indicated. But the sentence as such cannot be true, if it is asserted, because, no negative sentence
of this sort, containing a demonstrative, can be directly falsified. Consider the di!erence between
the sentences ‘Adam non demonstratur’ and ‘hoc non demonstratur’ (wher ‘hoc’ still refers to
Adam). The former is possible and possibly-true (trivially, because it is also true, as a matter of
fact), while the latter is possible, but not possibly-true. The reason is that its being true would
entail a contradiction, since ‘hoc non demonstratur’ can be rephrased as ‘it is not the case that
what is indicated (= hoc) is indicated’.
100 As I have already recalled, a discussion of these notions in the context of obligations
is found in [William Buser, 1990, pp. 82-88], where it features in the section devoted to the
statement of preliminary assumptions and definitions, in connection with the characterization
of the notion of a possible sentence. The distinction between ‘possible’ and ‘possibly-true’ is
used by Buridan, cf. [Buridan, 1966, p. 183 ], whose example, which would perfectly fit in the
above discussion, is the famous ‘No sentence is negative’. The problem is extensively discussed
in [Prior, 1969].
Finally, the distinction is also called into play in Peter’s treatise on consequences, whe-
re we find a very similar case to the one presented here, cf. Tractatus de consequentiis,
[Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3rb-va] “Secunda regula: si consequentia est bona, a"rma-
tiva, denominata a ly ‘si’ vel ‘ergo’ vel ‘igitur’, significans ex compositione suorum terminorum,
et consequens eius est falsum, antecedens etiam est falsum. [. . . ] !Obj.2" Secundo arguitur sic:
ista consequentia est bona ‘Sor non demonstratur, igitur hoc non demonstratur’ et antecedens
[correxi : the text has ‘consequens’, cf. ms. L] illius est verum in casu et consequens non potest
esse verum, igitur etc. [. . . ] !RObj.2" Ad secundam dicitur concedendo illam consequentiam.
473 Tamen ] transp. O 473 quod ] om. O 473 tamen non ] inv. O 476 ut . . . predictis ]
etc. O
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4. On questio, certificatio, dubitatio, petitio, sit verum and other sophisms
on positio
4.1. Questio, certificatio, petitio, dubitatio et suppositio non sunt species distincte
a positione.101
Advertendum est preterea quod obli-||gatur respondens ad respondendum per O 120vb
hoc verbum ‘certifico’ seu per hoc complexum ‘sit verum’ vel ‘sit dubium’ aut || M 87rb
‘non sit dubium’ vel ‘sit scitum’ et respondere debet obligatus per istam notam 5
‘certifico’ aut ‘sit verum’ sicut obligatus per illud signum ‘pono’, in hoc quod ubi
fiat per illud signum ‘pono’, cedit obligatio facta per illud signum ‘certifico’ si ob-
ligatum repugnat obligato,102 quod est sic usitatum ex beneplacito disputantium,
ex eo quod sepe vult opponens obligare ad falsum sustinendum respondentem, ut
videat qualiter sciat se a contradictione defendere.103 Sicut posito et bene admisso 10
Et dicitur quod antecedens potest esse verum, sed consequens non potest esse verum sic signi-
ficando [. . . ] Sicut sepe accidit quod multe sunt propositiones possibiles que non possunt esse
vere, sicut hec copulativa ‘solus Sor qui est demonstratur et hoc est Sor et hoc non est Sor’,
quia ista sequitur ex ista ‘solus Sor qui !est" demonstratur !et Sor" est Sor et Plato non est
Sor’. Et ita conceditur quod hec universalis potest esse vera ‘nihil demonstratur’ quamvis eius
nulla singularis possit esse vera sic significando; sed ista numquam est vera aliqua eius singulari
existente. Item alique sunt propositiones vere que non possunt esse false sic significando, ut
puta ‘hoc demonstratur’ demonstrato aliquo [. . . ] Numquam tamen [. . . ] est concedendum quod
antecedens illius consequentie ‘Sor non demonstratur, igitur hoc non demonstratur’ sit verum et
consequens falsum.”
101 This section of the treatise is divided into two parts. The first part, cf. sec. 4.1–4.10, is
devoted to the analysis of a number of sophisms concerning specific subtypes of positio. Peter’s
list is similar to the one that is found in [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 78ra et passim] except for the
case of dubitatio. The second part, cf. sec. 4.11–4.21, contains a number of sophisms focusing
on more elaborate types of positio, according to the complexity and the structure of posita
(conditional sentences, temporal sentences, disjunctions, conjunctions and so on).
102 The point is made by [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 78ra] “Et solet talis certificatio reputari
vel sustineri ut positio [correxi : the printed edition has ‘posito’ instead], dum non sit altera
species obligationis iam ducta in contrarium. Quando autem ponitur aliqua propositio repugnans
certificationi, sustinetur positio et cedit [the printed text has ‘conceditur’; I should thank prof.
Ashworth for pointing out to me that the correct reading, as is reported by mss., is ‘cedit’]
obligatio certificationis”.
103 The clause provides a clue to Peter’s understanding of the purpose of obligations.
1–2 Questio, . . . positione ] om. O 3 est preterea ] inv. O 3 ad respondendum ] conceden-
do add. O 4–5 aut . . . dubium’ ] om. O 6 pono ] nisi add. O 6 hoc ] hac O 6–7 ubi fiat ]
obligatio facta O 7 obligatio facta ] obligationi facte O 8 obligato ] obligationi O 8 est ]
om. O 9 ex ] om. O 9 respondentem ] respondente O 10 qualiter ] quomodo O 10 Sicut ]
unde praep. BMOPV
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quod Sor currat, non est hec concedenda ‘hec est vera ‘Sor currit”, ita obligato
respondente per certificationem sic dicendo ‘sit verum quod Sor currat’, non est
hec concedenda primo loco proposita ‘hec est vera ‘Sor currit”.104
Solemus etiam certificationem facere per verba adiectiva coniunctivi vel precep-
tivi modi, sicut dicendo ‘cedat tempus obligationis’, ‘concedatur a te ista ‘homo 15
est asinus”.105
104 On the whole, the sense of the passage is clear. The respondent is always supposed to
reply as in a disputation governed by the rules of positio. There is no structural di!erence, since
all these variations fall within the scope of the latter. Yet, there are some interesting aspects that
are worth pointing out. First, the remark that a certificatio is taken over by a positio, whenever
the obligatum of the first is inconsistent with the obligatum of the second. The sense of that is
not clear, in particular if we look at the examples provided to clarify the point. Second, there is
a textual problem, because ms. O has a quite di!erent text, suggesting that things might be read
the opposite way around: ‘respondere debet obligatus per illam notam ‘certifico’ aut ‘sit verum’
sicut obligatus per illud signum ‘pono’, nisi in hoc [correxi the ms. has ‘hac’] quod obligatio facta
per illud signum ‘pono’ cedit obligationi facte per illud signum ‘certifico’ si obligatum repugnat
obligationi’. Here the idea is rather that certificatio has a priority over positio and not vice
versa. This happens in those problematic cases where there is a latent inconsistency between
the obligatum and the obligatio (not, as in the incunable text, between the two obligata). As
far as I can see, I think the circumstance envisaged by O is preferable, because we have seen
elsewhere in the treatise that certificatio is often introduced at a later step, when the work is
already in progress, in a disputation with a problematic casus, and when it is introduced, to
some extent, the specific information it conveys replaces or at least qualifies in a relevant way
the original obligatum; cf. also infra, sec. 4.2 where a similar priority is ascribed to suppositio
(not the property of terms, but a type of obligation such that the suppositum must be upheld not
only as true but also as necessary) over positio and certificatio, when the latter are inconsistent
with the former.
The third interesting point is the remark ‘quod est sic usitatum ex beneplacito disputantium,
ex eo quod sepe vult opponens obligare ad falsum sustinendum respondentem, ut videat qualiter
sciat se a contradictione defendere’. In the obligational literature there are not many explicit
descriptions or references to the purposes or to the applications of the ‘art’, and when they
feature in the texts, they often happen to be overlooked (in this respect, a good point about the
necessity of balancing historical accuracy and explanatory value is made by [Sinkler, 1992]). I
do not want to emphasize too much the importance of these lines. I just want to single out the
clause ‘ut videat qualiter sciat se a contradictione defendere’ since it gives us at least an idea
of what the opponent might be willing to do when he conjures up a di"cult case, containing
a false positum (possibly with some sort of hidden inconsistency to the obligation, or between
multiple posita): no doubt there might be further purposes, but the one thing that is explicitly
witnessed in this text is the opponent’s intention to see whether and how the respondent proves
to be capable of defending a thesis and how (in a good or in a bad way, one may venture to ask?)
he manages to avoid contradictions. In a sense, therefore, the oppondent is willing to test the
respondent’s logical skills; and this is done in a regimented context where the ability to maintain
consistency is the relevant criterion for their assessment.
105 The remark is found in [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 78rb] “Sed certificatio fit communiter
per verba coniunctivi modi ut cum dicimus ‘stet oppositum consequentis cum antecedente’ vel
14–15 adiectiva . . . modi ] om. O 15 sicut ] sic O 15 cedat tempus obligationis ] om. O
15 concedatur . . . ista ] peto te concedere istam O
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4.2. Ideo, secundum veritatem, iste non sunt di-||stincte species obligationis: ‘du- L 70ra
bitatur a te ista ‘rex sedet”, ‘peto te concedere istam ‘homo est asinus”, sed con-
tinentur sub certificatione vel positione. Quapropter, si obligetur respondens sic:
‘dubitetur || a te deum esse’, eo admisso, conceditur propositum, scilicet quod tu P 70ra20
dubites deum esse, quia positum. Deinde, si proponitur ‘deus est’, conceditur et
negatur quod tu concedas.
Et capitur hic ‘dubitare’ pro ‘dubie respondere’. Si enim ‘dubitare’ pro ‘dubie
respondere’ esset species distincta obligationis, || sic ‘concedere’, ‘negare’, ‘credere’ V 75va
essent species distin-||cte obligationis, ut cum dicitur ‘concedatur a te Sor esse’, E Giiii+1ra25
‘credas papam esse Rome’, ‘negetur deum esse’, quod non est verum.106
Ita etiam dicitur quod dicendo ‘peto quod concedas hominem esse asinum’ non M 87va
plus est dicere quam ‘concedas’; || neque aliter respondendum est ab obligato per
hunc modum ‘peto quod concedas hominem esse asinum’ quam ab obligato isto
modo ‘concedas hominem esse asinum’ aut ‘sit verum quod concedas hominem esse 30
asinum’.
Et sicut predicti modi obligandi continentur sub certificatione vel positione, ita
modus obligandi per ly ‘suppono’ aut ‘presuppono’ || continetur sub positione. Un- B 98va
de suppositio vel presuppositio est positio de qua hic intendimus. Unde per istam
notam ‘presuppono’ solemus obligare respondentem ad sustinendum suppositum 35
non solum tamquam verum sed frequenter tamquam necessarium.107 Et frequenter
reputamus nos non esse obligatos ad illud suppositum, quia concederemus extra
tempus tamquam necessarium.108 Et cedit etiam in presentia suppositionis que-
libet alia positio vel certificatio per quam ponitur repugnans supposito. Et hoc
modo supponendi sepe usi sumus superius.109 40
‘transeat A punctus B lineam’ vel ‘alteratur Sor sic vel sic’ ”.
106 The point is made by [Albert of Saxony, 1490, sig. Niiii+2vb] and
[Marsilius of Inghen, 1489, sig. Aiiii+2ra], when they determine the number of species to
be admitted.
107 Cf. [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 78rb] “Sed utimur tali termino ‘suppono’ disputando non
solum ut suppositam propositionem sustineat respondens concedendo, sicut conceditur aliquod
contingens, sed sicut necessarium vel verum de se notum”.
108 Typically, the object of an obligation is a contingent falsehood, that we require someone to
uphold as true during the period of the obligation. Nothing prevents us, however, from positing
true or even necessary sentences, although that is by no means the standard practice in this kind
of texts.
109 I have not identified a specific locus in the treatise.
17 Ideo ] et O 17–18 dubitatur ] dubitetur O 19 Quapropter ] om. O 20 esse ] et non
conceditur add. O 20–21 eo . . . esse ] deinde proponatur tu dubitas illam O 21 quia ] conce-
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4.3. Sed forte contra iam dicta arguitur.110 Peto te concedere quod nullus deus
est. || Deinde propono ‘deus est’. O 121ra
!Obj.1" Si concedis, tu concedis contradictorium obligati a!rmative sustinendi,
igitur male.
!Obj.2" Item, proponatur ‘nullus deus est’. 45
!i" Si negatur, cedat tempus obligationis et arguitur sic: in tempore tu fecisti
contra petitum, igitur male fecisti. Patet consequentia. Et arguitur antecedens:
quia petitum fuit te concedere nullum deum esse; et negasti nullum deum esse;
igitur male respondisti.
!ii" Si conceditur, in tempore obligationis, nullum deum esse, arguitur sic: in 50
tempore concessisti impossibile simpliciter per obligatum possibile, igitur etc. Non
enim debet respondens in disputatione ita ignavis verbis opponentis assentire quod
concedat impossibile simpliciter.
Item, concessa ista ‘nullus deus est’, proponitur illa ‘homo est asinus’. Et patet
quod illa est sequens ex concesso, igitur concedenda. Et ita quodlibet aliud sequens 55
ad illam esset concedendum. Et quia omnis propositio de mundo esset sequens ad
illam, formata consequentia, igitur omnis propositio esset concedenda, concessa illa
|| ‘nullus deus est’. Et, per consequens, repugnans concesso esset concedendum. M 87vb
110 In this section, Peter presents a sophism and a sequence of objections against an example
of petitio.
41 Sed ] casus in marg. O 41 arguitur ] sic add. O 41–42 nullus . . . est ] significet
scr. et del. O 43 concedis ] conceditur et contra add. O 43 tu concedis ] conceditur O
43 obligati ] petiti O 44 male ] om. O 45 Item, . . . est ] om. O 46 Si negatur ] om. O
46 obligationis ] om. O 46 in tempore ] infra tempus O 47 fecisti ] respondisti O 48 te ]
om. O 49 respondisti ] om. O 50 in tempore ] infra tempus O 50–51 in tempore ] in-
fra tempus O 51 etc. ] male O 52 ita ] om. LO 52 ignavis ] ignarus et tantum add. O
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4.4. Ideo dicitur, admisso posito, concedendo illam ‘deus est’.
!RObj.1" Et ista non est oppositum obligati, quia obligatum est totum illud || P 70rb60
‘tu concedis illam ‘nullum deum esse”.
!RObj.2" Sed ad secundam formam, cum arguitur quia in tempore male re-
spondisti, quia tu fecisti contra petitum, dicitur negando, quia non feci contra
petitum, quia non concessi repugnans posito neque negavi sequens ex eo neque
aliquid huiusmodi.111 65
111 The sophism has the following structure:
PT Tu concedis quod nullus deus est A possible
1. Deus est C ( tu concedis contradic-
torium obligati a"rmative
sustinendi, igitur male
2.1 Nullus deus est N ( tu fecisti contra peti-
tum, igitur male respondi-
sti (the antecedent is proved
as follows: petitum fuit te
concedere nullum deum esse)
2.2 C ( in tempore obligationis
concessisti impossibile sim-
pliciter per obligatum possi-
bile
3. Homo est asinus C sequentially relevant (in vir-
tue of the principle ex impos-
sibili quodlibet)
The solution consists in the admission of the casus. To the first propositum, at step 1., one
should reply by granting it as irrelevant and true. From this reply it does not follow that
the respondent is granting the contradictory of the obligatum, because the obligatum is not the
sentence ‘nullus deus est’ but the sentence ‘tu concedis illam ‘nullum deum esse”. The respondent
by admitting the present case of petitio is thereby committing himself only to the act of granting
that he will grant the sentence ‘nullus deus est’ whenever it is proposed.
The second objection is two-fold. If the sentence ‘nullus deus est’ is put forward then either
the respondent denies it, cf. par. (i), or he grants it, cf. par. (ii)-(iii). In the former case, he
can be charged of replying incorrectly, because the petitio required him to grant the sentence
‘nullus deus est’. In the latter case, i.e. if the respondent grants ‘nullus deus est’, Peter has
two arguments: first, an impossible simplciter sentence is being granted, but the obligatum was
possible (the respondent was only required to grant an impossible sentence, which is not per se
an impossible circumstance, it is simply a fact that may be truthfully and consistently described
by a sentence saying that it is the case), therefore something must have gone wrong on the
respondent’s side. Second, by granting ‘nullus deus est’, in virtue of the principle ex impossibili
quodlibet and of the fact that ‘nullus deus est’ actually is an impossible sentence, the respondent
is committing himself to grant whatever may be submitted to his evaluation from that point on,
including sentences such as ‘homo est asinus’ and the like.
60 oppositum obligati ] contradictorium positi O 60 obligatum ] positum O 60 est totum ]
inv. O 60 illud ] om. O 61 illam ] om. O 62 secundam ] illam O 62 quia ] om. O 62 in
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TRACTATUS OBLIGATIONUM 140
4.5. Et sicut responsum est ad illud obligatum, ita respondendum est si obligetur
|| per istum modum ‘dubitetur a te ista ‘deus est”.112 Deinde proponitur ista ‘deus L 70rb
est’.113
Peter’s reply to the second objection is less straightforward than the reply to the first one.
He makes no point to (ii)–(iii), which I think he must consider as sound objections. Thus
we are entitled to draw the conclusion that the respondent should not grant ‘nullus deus est’.
The argument then (cf. RObj.2) must be directed against the point made in par. (i). On
the assumption that the respondent denies the propositum ‘nullus deus est’, the objection runs
as follows: the inference ‘in tempore fecisti contra petitum, igitur male fecisti’ is sound and its
antecedent (i.e. ‘in tempore fecisti contra petitum’) is proved by means of the following additional
inference: ‘petitum fuit te concedere nullum deum esse; et negasti nullum deum esse; igitur male
respondisti’. Peter’s reply consists in the denial of the antecedent of the first inference, namely
‘in tempore fecisti contra petitum’. How does he make his point? He seems to argue that in order
for the responent to be liable to the charge of taking a wrong line against the petitum, he should
have granted something inconsistent with the petitum or denied something that follows from it;
but the petitum is ‘tu concedis illam ‘nullus deus est” and ‘nullus deus est’ (i.e. the propositum
denied by the respondent at step 2.1) neither follows nor is inconsistent with ‘tu concedis illam
‘nullus deus est”. Examples of inconsistent senteces, in the present case, would probably be –
one might guess – ‘tu non concedis illam ‘nullus deus est”, ‘tu non respondes ad illam’ and the
like.
112 This section presents a peculiar sophism that might generate some confusion. Although
at first sight it appears to be a case of dubitatio, it is in fact another example of petitio, where
instead of requiring the respondent to grant a sentence, he is asked to doubt it. The aim is, I
reckon, to instruct the reader to keep distinct positio proper and the subtype that is in question
here, namely petitio, i.e. the obligation by means of which one is required to perform certain
second-order speech acts, and to warn him against the risk of confusing the two levels. The
general point is that a petitio involving the requirement of granting the sentence p is equivalent
to a positio where the positum is not p but rather ‘you grant ‘p”. This implies in turn that if
p is put forward, there is no need to grant it (the need arises, by contrast, if the sentence ‘you
grant ‘p” is put forward). The rationale behind this is that the duty ranges over a ‘higher-order’
sentence involving a speech act that is supposed to take place relative to a speech act on p, not
over the basic sentence itself.
113 The structure is similar to that of the previous sophism and the solution, too, conforms
to an analogous pattern of reasoning:
PT Dubitetur a te ista ‘deus est’ A possible
1.1 Deus est C ( (cf. Obj.1–3)
1.2 D
2.1 Nullus deus est N ( (cf. Obj.4–5)
2.2. D ( (cf. Obj.6–7)
The argument is not di"cult but it has a complex development, therefore I have decided to
split it into several sections. The obligatum is ‘dubitetur a te ista ‘deus est”. Once it is admitted,
the sentence ‘deus est’ is put forward in the first place. Two alternatives are taken into account:
either ‘deus est’ is granted or it is doubted.
The former case is deal with in sec. 4.5, where three objections (Obj.1–3) are raised against
step 1.1.
66 Et sicut ] casus in marg. O 66 obligatum ] om. O 67 proponitur ] proponatur O
67 ista ] om. O
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!Obj.1" Si conceditur, contra: tu concedis quod habes dubitare, igitur male || V 75vb
respondisti. 70
!Obj.2" Item, tu fuisti obligatus ad dubitandum istam et non !du"bitasti, igitur
male respondisti. Tenet consequentia quia, si tu fuisti obligatus ad dubitandum
istam, tu tenebaris dubitare quam concessisti, igitur male.
!Obj.3" Item, cedat tempus obligationis. Et arguitur, ut prius114, quia positum
fuit quod dubitares istam ‘deus est’ et tu non dubitasti, igitur male respondisti.115 75
4.6. Ideo, forte, dicitur dubitando illam ‘deus est’, sicut argumenta petunt. Qua
dubitata, proponitur ‘nullus deus est’.
!Obj.4" Si negatur, et suum contradictorium est propositum, igitur suum con-
tradictorium est concedendum. Et tu dubitas, igitur male.116
!Obj.5" Item, dubitato uno contradictoriorum, reliquum immediate propositum 80
in eodem tempore obligationis est dubitandum.117
Ideo forte dubitatur ‘nullus deus est’.
!Obj.6" Sed contra: quia ista ‘homo est asinus’ non esset neganda, quia ista
consequen-||tia est bona ‘nullus deus est, igitur homo est asinus’ denominata E Giiii+1rb
etc., et antecedens est dubitandum a te, igitur consequens || non est a te negan- O 121rb85
dum.118 Et ita arguitur quod nullum aliud impossibile simpliciter tibi propositum
The latter case, on the other hand, is the topic of sec. 4.6, where the additional propositum
‘nullus deus est’ is put forward. This, in turn, is either denied or doubted. Each alternative is
ruled out by a pair of objections: the first one (i.e. denying ‘nullus deus est’) is dismissed by
Obj.4–5, while the second is rejected on the basis of Obj.6–7. Apparently, every examined reply
has some problem. The solution, presented in sec. 4.7 below, consists in admitting the casus,
granting the first propositum ‘deus est’ and replying to the three objections (Obj.1–3) that were
raised against it.
114 Cf. supra, sec. 4.3, Obj.2 par. (i).
115 All three objections are based on the same type of confusion that we have seen above in the
previous sophism, for it is argued, here, that the respondent should have doubted the sentence
‘deus est’; but, since he has not, he replies incorrectly. Cf. infra, sec. 4.7 for the solution.
116 Cf. supra, sec. 2.3, where Peter states his third rule: if the contradictory of a correctly
denied sentence is put forward, in a disputation, it ought to be granted.
117 This is not the first time we come accross this rule: Peter has already used it twice in this
treatise (cf. supra, sec. 3.5 and 3.9). In both objections, the argument is that if the respondent
denies ‘nullus deus est’ he replies incorrectly, because he should have doubted it.
118 Again, Peter makes use of this rule of dubitatio in connection with valid consequences.
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est negandum a te inferendo ipsum || ex ista ‘nullus deus est’.119 M 88ra
!RObj.6" Sed forte dicitur quod non valet consequentia ista, quia non arguitur
de consequentia formali.120
!ORObj.6" Sed hec responsio non valet, quia neque in se est vera neque tollit 90
argumentum aliquantulum mutatis terminis obligati. Dubitetur enim a te ista co-
pulativa ‘tu es et tu non es’, contradictionem formaliter includens, ex qua quelibet
propositio est apta formaliter sequi sic significando. Et tunc patet quod ista con-
sequentia est formalis ‘tu es et tu non es, igitur homo est asinus’; et antecedens
est a te dubitandum; igitur consequens non est a te negandum.121 95
!Obj.7" Item, cedat tempus obligationis et arguitur quod in tempore dubitasti
impossibile simpliciter scitum esse tale, igitur male respondisti.|| B 98vb
4.7. Ideo dicitur, in principio, admittendo positum. Et cum proponitur ‘deus est’,
conceditur.
!RObj.1" Deinde, cum proponitur ‘tu concedis deum esse’, conceditur quia ve- 100
rum non repugnans. Et si infertur quod tu male respondes, conceditur tam con-
sequentia quam consequens, et negatur illa consequentia, si fiat, ‘tu dubitas deum
esse, igitur tu non concedis deum esse’.122
119 If an impossible sentence such as ‘nullus deus est’ is doubted, then by application of the
rule of consequences, in virtue of which if the antecedent is doubted, then the consequent ought
not to be denied, we draw the conclusion that an impossible sentence such as ‘homo est asinus’
ought not to be denied. The consequence ‘nullus deus est, igitur homo est asinus’ is valid because
its antecedent is impossible and because the principle ex impossibili quodlibet holds. But ‘nullus
deus est’ is doubted by hypothesis, therefore ‘homo est asinus’ ought not to be denied.
120 Here we have a purported reply to the previous objection, relying on the fact that ‘homo
est asinus’, allegedly, does not follow ex vi terminorum from ‘nullus deus est’. The point is
interesting since, according to Peter’s doctrine of consequences, a conditional sentence having
‘nullus deus est’ as its antecedent, is indeed valid, but only materially, whereas if we replace the
antecedent with an explicit contradiction, the consequence becomes formally valid.
121 The reply is dismissed, therefore the original objection still holds. The idea is that the
argument does not depend on the choice of the particular sentence ‘nullus deus est’, because
it would preserve its strength even if we were to replace that sentence with a formal explicit
contradiction.
122 This reply is supposed to address the first objection that is raised against the respondent,
if he grants the sentence ‘deus est’ proposed in the first place. For the sake of brevity, I have not
included the content of this objection in my schematic reconstruction of the disputation. But
properly speaking, the objection is raised infra tempus. This is why, presumably, Peter makes
use of the locution ‘cum proponitur ‘tu concedis deum esse”. The problem is, though, that in the
text there is no step at which the sentence ‘tu concedis deum esse’ is put forward in this form.
87 negandum a te ] inv. O 87 inferendo ipsum ] inv. O 88 Sed ] si O 88 non valet ] tran-
sp. O 88 consequentia ista ] inv. O 89 de ] in O 91 mutatis ] mutantis O 91 obligati ] om.
O 92 quelibet ] alia add. O 93 apta ] nata O 93 formaliter ] om. O 96 et . . . tempore ]
om. O 99 conceditur ] concedatur O 101 non repugnans ] et impertinens O 101 infertur ]
inferatur O 101 quod ] om. O 101 conceditur ] concedatur O 101–102 tam . . . consequens ]
tamquam sequens O 102 tu dubitas ] dubitatis ? O
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!RObj.2–3" Et cum arguitur quod infra tempus male respondisti, quia tu fuisti
obligatus ad dubitandum istam ‘deus est’ et tu non dubitasti illam igitur etc., 105
respondetur negando antecedens, quod tu fuisti || obligatus ad dubitandum istam, P 70va
quia tu fuisti obligatus ad concedendum istam ‘tu dubitas deum esse’.123
4.8. Item, si obligatio fiat per tales modos loquendi ‘currat Sor’, ‘disputet Plato’,
arguitur quod aliqua est obligatio que non est obligatio.124
Cedat enim omne tempus obligationis per quod est aut fuit obligatus aliquis. 110
Quo admisso, arguitur quod tu es obligatus et non es obligatus.
!i" Sequitur nam quod tu non es obligatus quia cessit omne tempus obligationis
per quod est vel fuit obligatus aliquis, || igitur tu non es oligatus.125 V 76ra
!ii" Et sequitur quod es obligatus, quia sequitur ‘omne tempus obligationis cedit,
igitur omne tempus obligationis est cedens’. Et ultra sequitur quod omne tempus 115
|| obligationis est, igitur aliquis est obligatus et maxime tu qui admisisti.126 M 88rb
The closest thing that we may find is, I suppose, the antecedent of the inference ‘tu concedis
quod habes dubitare, igitur male respondisti’ (cf. Obj.1). The reply could have easily run along
the same lines of the previous sophism, but here Peter seems to be implying that there is more
to it (cf. the remark ‘et si infertur quod tu male respondes, conceditur tam consequentia quam
consequens et negatur illa consequentia, si fiat, ‘tu dubitas deum esse, igitur tu non concedis
deum esse’).
123 Again, the point is that the respondent has not committed himself to doubting the sentence
‘deus est’ but, rather, to granting the sentence ‘tu dubitas deum esse’.
124 The argument is supposed to show that if an obligation is made by means of expressions
containing subjunctive verbs (it is not, by the way, a matter of grammatical form but rather,
more generally, of underlying logical properties) then a contradiciton follows. It is interesting
that Peter uses as an example the expression ‘cedat tempus’ which normally occurs at the end
of a disputation to fix its temporal limit. After the sentence has been uttered, the opponent and
the respondent no longer find themselves in the ‘artificial’ environment of the obligation and are
bound to assess its development objectively. Outside the time, nothing but truth is allowed.
The example may also count as casus of certificatio (cf. supra, sec. 4.1, where Peter says
“solemus etiam certificationem facere per verba adiectiva coniunctivi vel preceptivi modi, sicut
dicendo ‘cedat tempus obligationis’ ”). The argument should hold as an objection against the
claim that certificatio is a subtype of positio along the lines of what Peter has said to introduce
the present series of sophisms (cf. supra, sec. 4.3 the remark “sec forte contra iam dicta arguitur”,
i.e. against the list of accepted subtypes): if certificatio is made by means of such verbs, then it
follows that ‘aliqua est obligatio que non est obligatio’. Peter is certainly willing to reject this
conclusion and retain certificatio in own his list.
125 If the time has come to an end, then nobody is any longer under an obligation; therefore,
a fortiori, the respondent involved in the present disputation is under no obligation either.
126 The objection relies on the assumption that the obligation must be still existing, in some
way, if we rephrase the expression ‘cedit’ with ‘est cedens’. It all depends on whether we take the
ascription of the property of ‘being cedens’ to the time of the obligation inclusively or exclusively
104 arguitur ] ultra add. O 105 deus est ] om. O 105 tu ] om. O 106 quod ] sci-
licet add. O 106 dubitandum istam ] inv. O 107 quia ] sed O 110 est aut ] om. O
111 et . . . obligatus ] om. O 112 Sequitur . . . obligatus ] om. O 112 quia ] sequitur add. O
112 cessit ] cedit transp. O 113 obligatus aliquis ] inv. O 114 quod ] tu add. O 115 quod ]
igitur O
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Huic dicitur quod ista obligatio cedit ex convenientia facta aut presupposita
inter opponentem et respondentem. Ideo respondeatur ibi secundum exigentiam
habite significationis istius termini ‘cedat’ inter eos.127
4.9. Item, presupponatur quod quelibet consequentia, denominata a ly ‘si’ vel 120
‘ergo’, significans ex compositione suorum terminorum, cuius antecedens est im-
possibile per accidens, est bona.||128 L 70va
Item, quod omnis consequentia, cuius consequens est necessarium, sit bona.129
Quo admisso, sit rei veritas quod numquam respondisti ad istam ‘celum move-
tur’. Deinde ponatur ista ‘tu respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur”.130 125
(like in the case of terms such as ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’). If the time of the obligation has the
property of ‘being cedens’, then it still is and the obligation in turn still is. But then someone
is obligated (cf. supra, sec. 1.1 ‘si obligatio est, aliquis obligatur’): who is the most plausible
candidate? Of course it is the respondent, i.e. the one who has admitted the original stipulation.
It may sound a little weird, but this is how the argument actually runs.
127 The reply depends on an agreement or, to put it better, on a stipulation about the meaning
of the term ‘cedat’, that opponent and respondent should make before the disputation. I suggest
that the only matter of controversy that may arise is related to the problem of determining, in
advance, whether the obligation is still operating or not when the sentence ‘cedat tempus’ is
uttered.
128 Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+2vb] “De qua conse-
quentia ‘ut nunc’ ponitur ista regula, quod quelibet propositio impossibilis nunc seu per accidens
est apta inferre quamlibet aliam propositionem. Unde bene sequitur ‘Adam non fuit, igitur
chymera est’, quia per nullam potentiam posset oppositum consequentis stare cum antecedente”.
129 Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+2vb] “Dicitur secun-
do quod quelibet propositio nunc seu per accidens necessaria est apta sequi ad quamlibet
propositionem. Unde bene sequitur ‘deus est, igitur Adam fuit”’.
130 There is no way to make sense of this sophism according to the text of the incunable, as it
stands. The needed information, however, is supplied by ms. O. In the incunable a fundamental
passage is lacking, namely the proposal of the sentence ‘celum movetur’ and the corresponding
reply to it. The sophism hinges on the fact that the respondent admits a posited sentence p
which says that he has never replied to another sentence q. Immediately thereafter, q is put
forward and answered. Then again, sentence ¬ p is proposed. Now, the latter is, on the one
hand, the negation of the positum, but on the other hand, it truly says what happens to be the
case, once the respondent has replied to q. The notions involved here are those of necessity per
accidens vs impossibility per accidens which in turn call into play considerations about the truth
and falsehood of sentences over time.
The sophism is also a variation on a standard theme. A useful guide is the treatment that
is found in [William Buser, 1990, p. 106], where the posited sentence is the more familiar ‘tu
numquam respondisti ad deum esse’. In particular, Buser explicitly lays down a rule to allow for
the concession and denial of this class of sentences. A discussion of earlier accounts of this type
of problem is found in [Stump, 1980, p. 259-60]. The argument features also in Paul of Venice’s
117 obligatio ] certificatio O 119 termini ] verbi O 120 Item ] casus in marg. O
120 quod . . . denominata ] iter. O 120 quelibet ] omnis O 120 a ] da O 123 Item, . . .
bona ] om. O 124 respondisti ] responderis O 125 ponatur ] proponatur tibi O 125 celum
movetur ] Qua posita, propono ‘celum movetur’. Qua concessa, proponatur [celum movetur scr.
et del.] ‘tu respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur” O
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!Obj.1" Si conceditur, conceditur contradictorium positi, igitur male.
!Obj.2" Si negatur, contra:
!i" tu negas sequens ex tibi posito et a te bene || admisso, igitur male respon- O 121va
des. Patet consequentia. Et arguitur antecedens: quia ista consequentia est bona
‘tu non respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur’, igitur respondisti ad istam ‘ce- 130
lum movetur”, quia tam antecedens est impossibile per accidens quam consequens
necessarium. Tenet consequentia.131
!ii" Vel cedat tempus obligationis et arguitur quod in tempore negasti sequens
ex tibi posito et bene admisso, igitur male respondisti.132
treatise, cf. [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 67, especially f. 13 for further references].
131 Peter takes into account the following inference: ‘the antecedent of this consequence is
impossible per accidens and the consequent is necessary, therefore this consequence (i.e. ‘tu
numquam respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur’, igitur tu respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur”)
is sound’, cf. the two assumptions stipulated in the casus.
132 Here is the structure of the sophism:
Pr.1 Quelibet consequentia, denominata a ly
‘si’ vel ‘ergo, significans ex compositione
suorum terminorum, cuius antecedens est
impossibile per accidens, est bona
A possible
Pr.2 Omnis consequentia, cuius consequens est
necessarium, est bona
A possible
P Tu numquam respondisti ad istam ‘celum
movetur’
A possible
1. Celum movetur C irrelevant and true
2.1 Tu respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur’ C ( inconsistent with P
2.2 N (
3. Tu negas sequens ex tibi posito et a te bene
admisso, igitur male respondes
C valid inference
4. Ista consequentia est bona ‘tu non re-
spondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur’, igitur
respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur”
C sequentially relevant (it fol-
lows from Pr.1 and Pr.2)
According to the solution provided in the next section, the situation might be more compli-
cated than this, because it is not fully clear, on the basis of Peter’s account, how exactly the
respondent is supposed to reply. Anyway, there are some things that may safely pointed out. The
casus encompasses two preliminary presuppositions concerning the validity of tantamount types
of consequences. The first consequence at stake is valid ut nunc, since it involves an impossible
per accidens sentence as its antecedent. Apparently, the second consequence is not ut nunc, but
the development of the whole argument makes me think that it, too, should regarded as such (cf.
infra Obj.2 where Peter says that ‘tu respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur’ is necessary: what
kind of necessity, if not necessity per accidens, can be ascribed to such a sentence, provided that
it is a true sentence de preterito, as in the present case?). Be this as it may, let the positum be
‘tu numquam respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur”. Since it is possible, the respondent admits
it. At step 1. the sentence ‘celum movetur’ is put forward and correctly granted, as irrelevant
126 conceditur2 ] et praep. O 129 Patet ] illa add. O 130–131 igitur . . . movetur ] om.
O 131 impossibile per accidens ] possibile O 131 consequens ] est add. O 133 in tempore ]
infra tempus O 133 negasti ] tu praep. O 134 et ] ad te add. O
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4.10. !RObj.1" Sed huic dicitur negando istam consequentiam ‘tu negasti sequens 135
ex tibi posito et a te bene admisso, igitur male respondisti’. Sed bene sequitur
‘tu negasti in tempore sequens ex tibi posito et a te bene admisso in consequentia
formali, igitur male respondisti’.
!ORObj.1" Sed contra hoc arguitur quia ex isto sequitur quod omnis propositio
impossibilis per accidens est admittenda. Et sequi-||tur tunc quod concedendum E Giiii+1va140
est quod Adam potest esse et quod Adam non fuit et quod ad preteritum sit
potentia.133
!RORObj.1" Sed huic forte dicitur negando istam ultimam consequentiam.
Negandum tamen est in tempore quod ista sit impossibilis ‘tu respondisti ad
istam ‘celum movetur”. Immo concedendum est quod illa est vera ‘tu respondisti 145
|| ad istam’ saltem concesso in tempore obligationis quod ista est sic significans. M 88va
Immo negandum est quod tu concedas || impossibile.134 P 70vb
and true (as I have said, it is unavoidable to supplement the text, otherwise the argument would
make no sense).
Then, the sentence ‘tu respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur” is put forward. How should
the respondent reply to it? Peter, as usual, takes into account two alternatives, concession and
denial. Suppose, first, that the respondent grants it, presumably on the grounds that it should be
regarded as an irrelevant sentence which is also actually true, as of now, i.e. after the respondent
has replied to ‘celum movetur’ at step 1. Then Obj.1 can be raised against this move: the
sentence is incompatibly relevant to the positum. If on the contrary the respondent denies ‘tu
respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur”, this time regarding it as incompatibly relevant, it can be
argued to the opposite that the sentence is rather sequentially relevant and should be granted,
accordingly. This fact is proved on the basis of the two presuppositions laid down in the initial
statement of the casus. Take the consequence ‘tu non respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur’ (=
p), igitur tu respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur’ (= ¬ p)’. The antecedent is impossible per
accidens as long as the respondent has actually replied to the sentence ‘celum movetur’. For
the same reason the consequent is necessary (per accidens, although the condition is not stated
explicitly). But that is exactly what the initial pair of presuppositions was concerned with.
Every consequence of either sort (i.e. with an impossible per accidens antecedent or with a
necessary per accidens consequent) is sound and in the present case both conditions are fulfilled.
Therefore, the consequent follows from the antecedent, i.e. the sentence ‘tu respondisti ad istam
‘celum movetur’ is sequentially relevant. The objection can be raised infra tempus, cf. par. (i),
or extra tempus, cf. par. (ii).
133 Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis. [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+2vb] “Apud eum, vero,
qui poneret potentiam esse ad preteritum et quod deus potest verificare istam propositionem
‘Adam non fuit’, nulla foret consequentia ut nunc sed omnis consequentia foret ut semper”.
134 The solution is not entirely perspicuous. Supposedly, the casus must be admitted, since
Peter focuses on alternative ways to reply to the proposita. The point is denying the inference
‘tu negasti sequens ex tibi posito et a te bene admisso, igitur male respondisti’, i.e. giving an
alternative reply to step 3. of the disputation. But it is more likely that the remark refers not
135 tu negasti ] infra tempus praep. O 136 bene ] om. O 137 tu negasti ] transp. O
137 in tempore ] intra tempus O 137 a ] ad O 137 consequentia ] bona add. L 139 hoc ]
forte add. O 140 impossibilis ] possibilis O 140 sequi-||tur ] om. O 140 quod ] om. O
143 forte ] om. O 144 tamen ] conf. O 144 est ] quod add. O 144 in tempore ] infra
tempus obligationis O 146 est ] sit O 147 concedas ] concedis O
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to the inference proposed infra tempus, cf. par (i), sec. 4.9, but to the occurrence of the very
same inference outside the period of the obligation, cf. ibid., par. (ii). Now, Peter qualifies
the inference in question, by adding two conditions, namely (a) that the denial of a sequentially
relevant sentence (which ought to be granted) takes place within the time of the obligation
and (b) that the sentence is sequentially relevant according to a formal consequence (i.e. not
materially). If the inference is specified by (a) and (b), then its denial is no longer a solution to
the sophism, because it would be strictly against the rules.
However, the last requirement, namely that a sentence be sequentially relevant only in the
sense of being the consequent of a formal consequence, is problematic. Peter argues that, on this
assumption, it follows that every impossible per accidens sentence would have to be admitted
(if it is posited). Moreover, it follows that there would be a potentia ad preteritum, and that
sentences like ‘Adam potest esse’ or ‘Adam non fuit’ should be granted. Possibly, the reason is
that the move would amount to obliterating the distinction between impossibility simpliciter vs
per accidens, in the context of obligations. If there is a potentia ad preteritum, then no sentence
is impossible per accidens (because a false sentence de preterito could be verified by a change in
the course of events that have actually taken place in the past): this in turn implies that every
impossible per accidens sentence, in the new framework, would have actually to be regarded
as possible and to be admitted accordingly. Moreover, sentences such as ‘Adam potest esse’ or
‘Adam non fuit’, that are impossible per accidens, would have to be granted, if they are put
forward in a disputation. Peter seems to reject this view (cf. ‘sed huic forte dicitur negando
istam ultimam consequentiam’).
The final part of the solution is even less clear. Peter argues in support of the reply, within the
time of the obligation, to proposita that are in fact not to be found in the original formulation
of the sophism. In particular, the respondent ought to deny that the sentence ‘tu respondisti ad
istam ‘celum movetur” is impossible and, by contrast, grant that it is true, if he has formerly
granted that this is what it signifies; he ought to deny, finally, that he grants an impossible
sentence. A crucial emendation to the text is needed. The only candidate to be regarded as an
impossible sentence in the sophism is ‘tu non respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur’, therefore
a ‘non’ must be supplied in the occurrence of this sentence, when Peter says ‘negandum tamen
est in tempore quod ista sit impossibilis ‘tu !non" respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur’. The
correction is required by the sense of the argument and it is confirmed by only one manuscript,
namely M, whereas all other witnesses report the sentence without ‘non’. A problem still remains,
because apparently, when Peter says, immediately thereafter, that the respondent should grant
that the sentence ‘tu respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur” is true, all manuscript, including M,
omit the ‘non’. Either Peter is in fact referring to the other sentence involved in the sophism
(i.e. ‘tu respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur’) or, if he is referring to the same as before, the
correction must be supplied in this sentence too. I am inclined to opt for the first alternative:
Peter is referring to one sentence in the former case, to the other in the latter case. The general
solution to the sophism remains, in any case, uncertain.
A similar argument, involving impossible and necessary per accidens sentences, is found again
in Peter’s treatise on consequences, where the example clearly stems from the context of obli-
gations, cf. Tractatus de consequentiis [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3vb] “Et etiam posita
ista ‘hoc instans non fuit’ et admissa, deinde durante tempore obligationis proposita ista ‘hoc
instans fuit’, neganda est. Et ista est facta vera tunc ‘hoc instans fuit’, tamen adhuc ista est
neganda ‘hoc instans fuit’, quare cedat tempus obligationis. Et tunc patet quod ista forma non
valet ‘hoc erat sequens ex posito et bene admisso, et antecedens fuit concedendum, igitur et con-
sequens’. Immo antecedens fuit concedendum et consequens non: iam enim hec consequentia est
bona ‘hoc instans non fuit, igitur hoc instans fuit’, quia per nullam potentiam posset oppositum
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4.11. Item, ponatur quod, si rex sedet, tu scias regem sedere et, si nullus rex sedet,
tu scias nullum regem sedere. Deinde proponitur ista ‘rex sedet’. Qua dubitata,
quia est impertinens quam extra tempus dubitares, non facta alia mutatione, pro- 150
ponitur ‘nullus rex sedet’. Qua etiam dubitata, proponitur ‘tu scis regem sedere
vel tu scis nullum regem sedere’. Qua concessa, quia sequitur ex casu, proponitur
‘tu scis quod rex sedet’. Qua negata, quia falsa est non sequens, proponitur ‘tu
scis quod nullus rex sedet’. Qua concessa, quia sequens ex concesso cum opposito
bene negati, arguitur quod tu scis nullum regem sedere et est tibi dubium nullum 155
regem sedere, quod est impossibile.135
consequentis stare cum antecedente compossibiliter !sic significando" [add. L].”
135 After covering a number of issues related to the proposed list of subtypes of positio, with
this section, the focus shifts back on the topic of positio proper.
This sophism was very popular, in the obligational tradition. Let us see its structure:
P Si rex sedet, tu scis regem sedere et si nullus
rex sedet, tu scis nullum regem sedere
A possible
1. Rex sedet D irrelevant and doubtful
2. Nullus rex sedet D
3. Tu scis regem sedere vel tu scis nullum
regem sedere
C sequentially relevant (by P
and the Law of the Excluded
Middle)
4. Tu scis quod rex sedet N irrelevant and false
5. Tu scis quod nullus rex sedet C sequentially relevant (it fol-
lows from 3. and the de-
nial of 4. by disjunctive
syllogism)
Replies 2. and 5. are incompatible. Moreover, as Peter notes in the treatise on consequences,
such a case also entails both ‘rex sedet’ and ‘nullus rex sedet’, since we have K p % K ¬ p; but
then, depending on which one of the two disjuncts is proposed first (and denied as false), the
second can be inferred by disjunctive syllogism. It is even easier to see the structure of this piece
of propositional/obligational logic in the following way:
P. ( p & K p ) $ (¬ p & K¬ p )
1. D p (irrelevant and doubtful)
2. D¬p (irrelevant and doubtful)
3. C ( K p %K ¬ p ) (sequentially relevant by (1) and the Law of the Excluded Middle)
4. N ( K p ) (irrelevant and false)
5. C ( K ¬ p ) (by (3) and (4))
But K ¬ p and D¬ p are inconsistent. The sophism is found, in the context of a len-
gthy discussion involving several crucial issues pertaining to the fundamental obligational
notions (relevance, irrelevance, criteria for the evaluation of sentences), in Kilvington, cf.
[Kretzmann and Kretzmann, 1990, pp. 126–135]. A first systematic attempt to reconstruct
Kilvington’s account of obligations, on the basis of the arguments developed in his sophism, is
148 Item ] casus in marg. O 148 si ] ante ponatur transp. O 148 scias ] scis
O 149 Deinde ] om. O 149 proponitur ] proponatur O 150 quam ] inc. forte et O
150 dubitares ] dubitaretur O 150–151 proponitur ] proponatur O 152 proponitur ] quod
add. O 153 proponitur ] quod add. O 154 concesso ] posito O
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4.12. Ideo dicitur in principio negando casum: quia ponitur casus et conditio-
nalis impossibilis.136 Et ita negatur casus temporaliter positus, si ponatur quod,
quandocumque rex sedet, || scias regem sedere et, quandocumque nullus rex sedet, V 76rb
scias nullum regem sedere: quia a temporali cuius utrumque verbum est a!rma- 160
tivum sequitur cathegorica tam de primo verbo quam de secundo. Et ex illo casu
manifeste sequitur contradictio.137 Et ita dicitur de aliis.138
due to [Spade, 1982b, pp. 19–28], whose counterfactual interpretation is largely inspired by what
can be grasped of Kilvington’s solution. For a specific and detailed account of the sophism cf.
also [D’Ors, 1991a].
136 The topic is covered extensively in Peter’s treatise on consequences, cf. Tractatus de conse-
quentiis [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Fiiva-vb] “Accipiamus, primo, quod conditionalis bona est
consequentia denominata a ly ‘[ni]si’ vel a ly ‘quando’, quod aliquando sumitur pro ‘[ni]si’, cuius
contradictorium consequentis !non" potest repugnare antecedenti, aut potest esse synonima cum
una tali sine nova impositione dum fuit de terminis expressis. Secundo, accipiatur quod omnis
conditionalis bona est propositio necessaria, quod patet ex primo accepto. Ex quibus sequitur
tertium, quod quelibet conditionalis infert conditionalem cum nota necessitatis consequentie de
similibus terminis, ut sequitur ‘si tu curris, tu disputas; igitur necessario, si tu curris, disputas’,
quia non potest esse quod antecedens sit verum sic significans et non sit necessarium, cum omnis
conditionalis vera sit necessaria, per primam suppositionem. Item, quod omnis simpliciter mala
est impossibilis, quia propositio necessaria numquam potest esse falsa sic significando, propositio
tamen falsa potest incipere esse necessaria sic significando, ideo aliqua consequentia falsa non
simpliciter potest esse vera sic significando. Ex quibus sequitur quod hi casus non sunt possibiles
cum ponitur quod si rex sedet, scias regem sedere et si nullus rex sedet, scias nullum regem
sedere. Similiter, non est possibile quod Sor erit liber si obviavit servo et quod Sor erit servus si
obviabit libero, quia omnes iste conditionales sunt impossibiles”.
137 Cf. again Tractatus de consequentiis [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Fiiivb] “Ex temporali
cuius utraque pars est a"rmativa sequitur utraque pars. Unde sequitur ‘tu moveris, quando tu
curris; ergo tu curris et tu moveris’. Ex illa regula sequitur quod omnes tales casus non sunt
possibiles quibus ponitur quod, quando rex sedet, scias regem !sedere" et, quando nullus rex
sedet, scias nullum regem sedere, quia ex illo casu sequitur quod rex sedet et quod nullus rex
sedet”.
138 The solution to this sophism is rejecting the case posited since it contains an implicit
contraditcion, under the form of what Peter refers to as an impossible conditional. The reason
behind the rejection is that the positum has the following structure: (p * Kap $ ¬p * Ka¬p).
By the law of the excluded middle, this yields (Kap%Ka¬p) which is inconsistent with the obli-
gational duty of doubting p and ¬p when put forward at previous steps of the disputation. The
job of the respondent in such cases is to detect in advance the contradiction that is implicitly
embedded in the sentence posited by the opponent and refuse to admit it. The rejection of a
case, on the grounds that it contains a contradictory conditional sentence, is also found in Peter’s
treatise on insolubles, cf. Tractatus de insolubilibus, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Hiivb] “Item,
ponatur quod talis sit conventio inter Sor et Platonem quod, si Sor doceat filium Platonis, debeat
a Platone habere centum, si filius Platonis vincet primam questionem quam unquam habebit.
Et ultra ponatur quod interea labatur tempus quousque ipse sit doctus et Sor requirente pecu-
niam habeat questionem cum filio Platonis et non habuerit iste filius unquam aliam questionem.
Et queritur an Sor debeat habere istam pecuniam vel non. Si sic, igitur ipse perdet primam
157 casus et ] una O 158 Et ] om. O 159 sedet ] tu add. O 160 utrumque ] om. O
160–161 a"rmativum ] a"rmatum O 161 Et ] om. O
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4.13. Item, pono || tibi istam ‘tu es obligatus’ donec proponitur tibi aliquod B 99ra
negandum.139
questionem et per consequens Sor non debet habere istam pecuniam. Ideo, in principio, dicitur
quod Sor non debet habere istam pecuniam. Et arguitur tunc sic: Sor non debet habere istam
pecuniam ex ista lite; et hoc est solum ex eo quod discipulus suus vicit istam questionem; et
ista est prima questio; igitur iste vicit primam questionem; et si sic, igitur Sor debet habere
istam pecuniam. Item, ponatur quod Sor habeat duos servos et utrumque manumittat sub ista
conditione, quod si unus eorum qui debet ire per viam obviavit libero, iste sit servus et alter, si
obviavit servo, sit liber. Et vadant ambo et gratia argumenti obvient sibi ipsis solis. Et queritur
utrum ambo sint liberi vel ambo servi vel unus servus et alter liber. Et patet quod quocumque
dato sequitur illum esse servum et esse liberum. Ideo dicitur, in principio, negando omnes istos
casus. Primum enim est impossibilis, ut clarum est. Secundus etiam et similes sunt impossibiles
quia in eis clauduntur conditionales impossibiles”. Moreover, in this reply Peter also points out
another feature of this type of conditional, namely the fact that they contain a reference to time.
This is the topic of the sophism discussed in the next sections.
139 This type of sophism belongs to a well-established tradition in the development of positio.
The taxonomy of positio embraces a first subdivision between positio falsa and positio impossi-
bilis. The former is often divided, in turn, into several subtypes according to the structure of
the posited sentence and by the connectives occurring in them. Very generally, the subdivision
conforms to the following pattern:
positio simplex : the positum is a categorical sentence
positio composita: the positum is a compound sentence (i.e. a sentence with one or more
connectives. It can be subject to a further subdivision in disiunctiva and coniunctiva,
according to the presence of a disjunction or a conjunction as a positum (cf. infra, sec.
4.17–4.21)
positio dependens: the positum must be upheld as true, under a given condition (many
sophisms whose case is rejected are of this form, in virtue of the easiness of constructing
cases with impossible conditionals, cf. sec. 4.11–4.12)
positio cadens: this a subtype of the former, the condition of the obligation being that
the obligation ceases when the given condition is fulfilled. It involves temporal terms such
as ‘donec’, ‘quamdiu’ or ‘usque’ (cf. sec. 4.13–4.15)
positio renascens: this category falls within the scope of positio cadens with the addition
of a condition that, when fulfilled, implies the re-arising of the obligation. Again temporal
terms such as ‘quamdiu’ are involved, for instance with the stipulation that the obligation
is operating vs not operating according to the alternate truth of a given sentence (cf. sec.
4.16)
In many treatises, especially of the XIV century, these topics are introduced by means of
rubrics explicitly subdividing the analysis according to a precise taxonomy. Peter proves to be
aware of all this materials and discussions, which are substantially covered in their entirety in his
treatise, although apparently without great intents of systematicity. The only red line that can
be recognized is perhaps the order of presentation of sophisms. As far as the taxonomy of positio
is concerned, we see that the materials which were dealt with in section 3., focused especially
on positio simplex : the posita in the sophisms of that section are all categorical sentences of
various sorts. In section four, after the discussion, in the first part, devoted to the subtypes of
positio that are shown not to be ‘species distincte’ (petitio, dubitatio etc.), the focus shifts not
much on a di!erent topic, but rather on other subtypes always belonging to this very same type
163 tu . . . obligatus ] ELM currens est homo OP tu non es homo BV 163 proponitur ]
proponetur O
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Qua posita et bene admissa, proponitur ‘tu es obligatus’. Qua concessa, propo- 165
nitur ‘tu es homo’. Qua concessa, proponitur iterum ‘tu es obligatus’.|| O 121vb
!Obj.1" Si negatur, contra quia ista est concedenda, !i" quia tu es obligatus
donec proponitur tibi aliquod negandum, sed adhuc non est propositum aliquod
negandum, igitur adhuc tu es obligatus.
!ii" Item, tu es obligatus donec proponitur tibi aliquod negandum, || igitur tu L 70vb170
es obligatus. Tenet consequentia a temporali || ad alteram eius partem. M 88vb
Deinde proponitur ‘tu non es homo’. Qua negata proponitur iterum ‘tu es
obligatus’. !Obj.2" !i" Si negatur, et prius concessisti, igitur male. !ii" Si concedi-
tur, contra: tamcito tu non es obligatus, quamcito proponitur aliquod negandum;
sed proponitur aliquod negandum; igitur iam tu non es obligatus. Consequentia 175
est concedenda et antecedens est concedendum, igitur et consequens, quod est
oppositum concessi, igitur etc.140
4.14. Idem fiat argumentum si ponatur quod tu scis obligatus quamdiu non pro-
ponitur tibi aliquod negandum aut quamdiu non est propositum aliquod negan-
dum.141 180
of obligation. This is the only reason, if any, that can be found at the origin of the order of
treatment that he adopts.
140 The present sophism, which is an example of positio cadens, has the following structure:
P Tu es obligatus, donec proponitur tibi
aliquod negandum
A possible
1. Tu es obligatus C irrelevant and true
2. Tu es homo C irrelevant and true
3.1 Tu es obligatus N ( (cf. Obj.1 i–ii)
4. Tu non es homo N incompatibly relevant (it is
inconsistent with the conces-
sion of 2.)
5.1 Tu es obligatus N ( inconsistent with 1. (cf.
Obj.2 i)
5.2 C
6. Tamcito tu non es obligatus, quamcito pro-
ponitur aliquod negandum; sed iam propo-
nitur aliquod negandum; igitur tu non es
obligatus
C ( (the consequent is incon-
sistent with 5.2; cf. Obj.2
ii)
141 These are nothing but variations on the same theme. The condition expressed by ‘donec’
is the same as that expressed by ‘quamdiu non’. In the obligational tradition, a connected issue
is often discussed, namely the question whether these temporal limits are to be taken inclusively
or exclusively. In Peter, though, we find no trace of the debate. In this passage, obviously ‘scis’
165 Qua . . . admissa, ] deinde O 166 Qua concessa, ] si conceditur O 166 iterum ] om. O
167 Si negatur, contra quia ] et patet quod O 168 proponitur ] proponetur O 168 est ] tibi
add. O 168 propositum ] positum O 170 tu ] si praep. O 170 proponitur ] proponetur O
172–177 Deinde . . . etc. ] om. O 178 Idem ] Item praep. O 178 scis ] es O 178 obligatus ]
donec proponetur tibi aliquod negandum vel add. O 178–179 proponitur ] proponetur O
179–180 aut . . . negandum ] om. O
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4.15. Ideo ad argumentum respondetur concedendo totum usque ad illam ‘tu non
es homo’, que negatur. Et conceditur quod tu es obligatus.
!RObj.2" !Ad ii" Et cum arguitur: ita cito tu non es obligatus quamcito pro-
ponitur tibi aliquod negandum; sed iam proponitur tibi aliquod negandum, igitur
iam tu non es obligatus, huic dicitur quod hoc consequens bene stat cum illo ante- 185
cedente, scilicet quod iam non es obligatus. Et tamen tu es obligatus. Sed de hoc
non est cura, ideo negatur minor, scilicet quod iam proponitur aliquod negandum;
et hoc admissa illa cathegorica temporali.142
4.16. Sed si ponatur quod tu sis obligatus quamdiu preponetur143 tibi aliquod
negandum et non sis obligatus quamdiu non proponetur tibi aliquod negandum, 190
dicitur quod casus est impossibilis.144
is a typographical error of the incunable, that must be emended with ‘sis’.
142 The solution consists in the admission of the casus and in the acceptance of all replies
proposed in the reconstruction up to step 4. The final propositum ‘tu es obligatus’ must be
granted. The objection against this reply hinges on the fact that the sentence ‘tu non es homo’
has been correctly denied at step 4., which in turn implies that something that ought to be
denied has been put forward, therefore the obligation should have come to an end. By putting
forward the propositum at step 6., apparently, we can force the respondent to grant the sentence
‘tu non es obligatus’ which is an oppositum concessi (cf. step. 5.2). Peter seems not to give much
importance to this fact and suggests to deny the sentence ‘iam proponitur aliquod negandum’,
presumably on the grounds that it is the only factual sentence we have no logical commitment to
(as when we are responding per ordinem): even if its denial is contrary to fact (because actually
a sentence that ought to be denied has been put forward) it is perfectly legitimate. Indeed,
it becomes compelling by virtue of its logical relation to the previously evaluated sentences;
and we know that logical dependence has always priority over factual truth in the context of
obligations. The argument, however, is not fully convincing, because it strongly appeals to the
order in which sentences are proposed which never depends on the respondent’s choice. If the
sentence ‘iam proponitur aliquod negandum’ is proposed as the last propositum, nothing goes
wrong, because, although it is factually true, it can be denied as incompatibly relevant (if it were
granted, the negation of ‘tu es obligatus’ would follow; therefore 6. and 5.2 entail its denial). But
what happens if that sentence is put forward before the whole consequence of step 6.? It would
probably have to be granted as irrelevant and true. But then, if the respondent does not want
to grant, in the end, the sentence ‘tu non es obligatus’, he would have to reject the consequence.
Biting the bullet in this case might be not that easy.
143 Obviously, the correct reading is ‘proponitur’, as is confirmed by O.
144 A case like that must be rejected because it contains an impossible conditional. Peter does
not fully spell out the argument, but his suggestion seems correct. For the positum is equivalent
to the conditional sentence ‘si aliquod negandum est tibi propositum, tu es obligatus; et si aliquod
negandum non est tibi propositum, tu non es obligatus’. Let then the sentence ‘tu es obligatus’
be put forward in the first place. If it is granted, the condition that ‘aliquod negandum non est
181 ad . . . respondetur ] admisso casu dicitur O 181–182 totum . . . obligatus ] quod tu
es obligatus et quod tu non es homo O 185 tu ] om. O 185 illo ] om. O 187 negatur ]
negetur O 187 minor ] maior O 187 quod ] om. O 188 illa ] om. O 189 Sed ] om. O
189 preponetur ] proponitur O 189 tibi ] transp. O 190 et ] om. O 190 non sis ] inv. O
190 non ] supra lin. O 190 proponetur ] proponitur O 190 tibi ] om. O
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Sed si velit opponens respondentem obligare non ponendo totam illam proposi-
tionem ‘rex sedet donec proponitur tibi aliquod negandum’ sed ponat sibi illam et
|| certificet respondentem quod sit rei veritas quod ipse sit obligatus ad illam donec P 71ra
proponetur sibi aliquod negandum vel non proponetur sibi aliquod negandum vel 195
‘quamdiu’ sive ‘usque quo’ etc., videat respondens quomodo debeat intelligere il-
lum terminum ‘donec’ et illud verbum ‘propono’, quia optima regula respondentis
est non respon-||dere ad aliquid nisi optime noverit terminorum vires.145 E Giiii+1vb
4.17. Item, ponatur hec copulativa ‘tu es papa || et rex sedet vel tu curris’. Deinde M 89ra
proponitur ‘rex sedet’.146 Qua dubitata quia impertinens est, proponitur ‘nullus 200
rex sedet’. Qua dubitata, proponitur ‘utraque illarum est dubitanda a te’. Qua
concessa quia vera non repugnans, proponitur ‘nulla illarum est concedenda’. Qua
concessa, proponitur ‘tu curris’. Et patet quod ista est falsa et non sequens, et
ideo neganda. Deinde proponitur ‘rex sedet’. Que si dubitetur, contra: tu dubitas
sequens ex una parte positi cum opposito bene negati, igitur male respondes. Ideo 205
si conceditur illa, proponitur ‘tu concedis illam’. Qua concessa proponitur ‘tu non
male respondes’. Quo iterum concesso proponitur ‘illa est concedenda’. Et patet
quod illa est sequens.
!Obj.1" Et sic eadem propositio est concedenda et non concedenda.
!Obj.2" Item, cedat tempus obligationis: in tempore obligationis concessisti || V 76va210
et dubitasti eandem propositionem, igitur male || respondisti. O 122ra
tibi propositum’ is fulfilled, therefore ‘tu non es obligatus’ should be granted too, which results
in an inconsistency. The same holds if ‘tu es obligatus’ is denied, because then in turn it is the
condition that ‘aliquod negandum est tibi propositum’ that will have been fulfilled; therefore the
sentence ‘tu es obligatus’ should have been granted, contrary to the hypothesis.
145 The passage is unclear. There might be a textual problem that I have not been able to
fix. All manuscripts have the sentence ‘rex sedet donec proponitur aliquod negandum’ but this
seems to make little sense.
146 This is a common pattern of sophism that exemplifies another sybtype of positio known
as positio composita. Here at stake are the e!ects of turning the crank of propositional logic in
the context of an obligational disputation. Needless to say, albeit in the absence of brackets, the
conjunction here is ‘(tu es papa) et (rex sedet vel tu curris)’, i.e. a conjunction composed of a
categorical sentence, as its first element, and of a disjunction, as its second element.
192 velit ] vult O 192 respondentem ] aliter add. O 193 proponitur ] proponetur O
193 sed ] om. O 193 illam ] rex sedet add. O 194 quod . . . veritas ] om. O 194 obligatus
ad illam ] inv. O 196 sive ] om. O 196 quo ] om. O 196 debeat ] debet O 198 noverit ]
om. O 199 Item ] inc. in marg. forte casus no- O 200 proponitur ] proponatur O 200 est ]
om. O 201 proponitur ] proponatur O 202 proponitur ] proponatur O 202 concedenda ]
a te add. O 203 proponitur ] proponatur O 203 patet quod ] cum O 203 est ] sit O
203 et ] om. O 203 et ] om. O 204 proponitur ] proponatur O 206 proponitur ] propo-
natur O 206 proponitur ] proponatur O 207 concedenda ] a te add. O 210 in tempore ]
infra tempus O 210 obligationis ] om. O 210 concessisti ] tu praep. O
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!Obj.3" Item, in eodem casu proponitur ‘hec est a te concedenda ‘papa currit”.
Si conceditur, conceditur falsum non sequens. Si negatur, proponitur ‘tu non es
papa vel papa currit’. Qua concessa quia vera non repugnans, arguitur sic: tu
non es papa vel papa currit; sed tu es papa; igitur papa currit. Illa consequentia 215
est bona etc.; et antecedens est concedendum; igitur et consequens. Et conse-
quens est illa propositio ‘papa currit’. Igitur illa propositio ‘papa currit’ est a te
concedenda.147
4.18. !RObj.1" Ideo dicitur in principio admisso casu dubitando illas propositiones
‘rex sedet’, ‘nullus rex sedet’ cum proponuntur. Et dicitur quod utraque illarum 220
est dubitanda. Et cum proponitur ‘tu curris’, negatur. Et conceditur iterum quod
147 The sequence of sentences can be displayed as follows:
P Tu es papa et rex sedet vel tu curris A possible
1. Rex sedet D irrelevant and doubtful
2. Nullus rex sedet D irrelevant and doubtful
3. Utraque illarum est dubitanda a te C irrelevant and true
4. Nulla illarum est concedenda C sequentially relevant (by 3.)
5. Tu curris N irrelevant and false
6.1 Rex sedet D
7. Tu dubitas sequens ex una parte positi cum
opposito bene negati, igitur male respondes
C (
6.2 Rex sedet C
8. Tu concedis illam C
9. Tu non male respondes C
10. Illa est concedenda C (
11. Illa est sequens ex una parte tibi positi
cum opposito bene negati, igitur illa est
concedenda
C
12.1 Hec est concedenda ‘papa currit’ C ( conceditur falsum non
sequens
12.2 N
13. Tu non es papa vel papa currit C irrelevant and true
14. Tu non es papa vel papa currit; sed tu es
papa; igitur papa currit
C valid inference
15. Illa consequentia est bona etc.; et antece-
dens est concedendum; igitur et consequens
C
16. Antecedens est concedendum C
17. Consequens est illa propositio ‘papa currit’ C
18. Illa propositio ‘papa currit’ est concedenda C ( inconsistent with 12.2
A similar type of sophism is discussed, for instance, in [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 84va],
[Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 336].
213 sequens ] igitur ideo add. O 213 negatur ] negetur O 213 proponitur ] propona-
tur O 215 tu ] non add. O 216 etc. ] om. O 216 est ] a te add. O 216–218 et
. . . concedenda ] consequens illud ‘papa currit’ est a te concedendum, quod fuit probandum O
219 dubitando ] dicendo O 219 propositiones ] primo propositas O 220 cum proponuntur ]
om. O 220 dicitur ] conceditur O 221 conceditur ] cum dicitur O
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rex sedet. Et cum proponitur ‘tu concedis illam’, conceditur. Et negatur quod non
male respondeam, quia negatur quod illa sit concedenda.148 Et si arguitur quod
illa sit sequens || ex una parte tibi positi cum opposito bene negati, igitur illa L 72ra
M 89rbest a te concedenda, dicitur de virtute sermonis quod illa consequentia non valet, 225
sicut nec ista valet ‘hec sequitur ex parte tibi positi et admissi, igitur hec est a te
concedenda’. Sicut posita tibi ista ‘nullus homo est asinus’, hec ‘homo est rudibilis’
sequitur ex parte positi et tamen non est concedenda. Sed quia illud non est ad
propositum, ideo negatur illud antecedens, scilicet quod illud sequatur ex parte tibi
positi et a te bene admissi cum opposito bene negati. Et si arguitur quod sequitur 230
ex illis, et illa sunt partes admissi et oppositum bene negati, igitur etc., concessa
prima parte ultima negatur, si per illum ordinem proponatur. In || hac enim P 71rb
arte, maxime hec regula servanda est quod ad nullam propositionem respondeatur
concedendo aut negando, nisi ipsa proponatur. Et cum fit consequentia, negetur
vel concedatur, et non dicatur ad antecedens vel || ad partes antecedentis vel ad B 99rb235
consequens nisi secundum ordinem proponendi.149
148 The text of the incunable must be corrected according to manuscript O, where ‘non’ is
omitted and the reading ‘respondeam’ replaced by ‘respondes’.
149 The solution to the sophism consists in the admission of the casus and the acceptance of the
proposed replies up to step 5. At step 6, of the two alternatives available, namely doubt (= 6.1)
or concession (= 6.2), the respondent should pick out the second. After granting ‘rex sedet’, he
will have then to deny both 8. and 9. (cf. ‘et negatur quod non male respondeam, quia negatur
quod illa sit concedenda’). Step 11. must be rejected too. As far as the argument in support of
the denial of 11. is concerned, namely that it is not always to be granted that if something follows
from ‘a part’ of the positum, then it ought to be granted, the objection is rather sophistical, since
‘homo est rudibilis’ is taken to follow from ‘nullus homo est asinus’ by replacing ‘asinus’ with
‘rudibilis’ and simply removing the term ‘nullus’. Obviously, the move is by no means legitimate.
I think Peter realizes that this would be too far-fetched an argument, when he claims ‘illud non
est ad propositum’ (i.e. it is not relevant to the point that is being made here). The consequence
therefore holds, and the reply focuses on the denial of its antecedent, namely the sentence ‘illa
est sequens ex una parte tibi positi cum opposito bene negati’. How can this denial be justified?
Once again with recourse to the strategy of reply per ordinem, which looks, as it were, like a
spare solution in Peter’s obligations. I have the impression, to some extent, that replies can be
classified into types of decreasing ‘value’. The top level is reached when (i) the respondent admits
the casus and resolves all problems, by identifying the right status of every sentence submitted
to his evaluation and providing the correct reply to each, according to the rules. The second
choice, when (ii) there is no way to fix all the objections, is trying to save as much as possible
by replying per ordinem. This often requires the respondent to concede an awkward sentence at
the very last step of a disputation, but still it enables him to maintain consistency. The third
alternative is that (iii) the respondent grants that he has replied incorrectly (i.e. that within
the time, he grants the sentence ‘tu male respondes’). Last, (iv) if he detects a contradiction
222 conceditur ] concedatur O 222 non ] om. O 223 respondeam ] respondes O 224 sit ]
est O 225 a te concedenda ] inv. O 225 dicitur ] quod add. O 226 nec ista ] hec non O
226 et ] ad te add. O 227 hec ] om. O 230 a ] ad O 230 Et ] ut et se scr. et del. O
232 ultima negatur ] inv. O 234 fit ] sit O 234–235 negetur vel concedatur ] negata vel
concessa O 235 et ] om. O 235 vel . . . antecedentis ] om. O
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4.19. !RObj.2" Et ad aliam formam, cum arguitur quod in tempore eandem pro-
positionem concessisti et dubitasti, igitur male respondisti, dicitur negando con-
sequentiam. Sed bene sequitur: infra tempus eandem propositionem concessisti
et dubitasti ita se habendam ad concedendum et dubitandum quando concessisti 240
sicut quando dubitasti, igitur male respondisti.150
Et si arguitur contra: omnes responsiones sunt retorquende ad idem instans,
dicitur quod illud est impossibile: non enim due responsiones possunt fieri ab
eodem in eodem instanti, immo nulla responsio.
Sed verum est quod concessa et opposita bene negatorum debent esse talia quod 245
copulativa ex illis composita sit possibilis, || sicut a principio dictum est.151 O 122rb
4.20. !RObj.3" Et cum proponitur || ulterius in illo casu ‘hec est concedenda ‘pa- M 89va
pa currit”, negatur illa. Et conceditur illa disiunctiva proposita ‘tu non es papa vel
papa currit’, quia || est vera non repugnans, quia una eius pars est vera scita esse V 76vb
talis. Et consequenter conceditur quod papa currit tamquam sequens ex concesso 250
at the very beginning, he should not admit the casus (nor, consequently, the positum). There
is no explicit definition of this sort of ranking nor is the strategy of its application ever spelled
out. Nonetheless, the common practice seems to conform to the principle that the respondent
has to admit as many casus or posita as possible (after all there is a rule to govern the duty
of admissio); to grant as seldom as possible that he replies incorrectly (or to put it better,
to grant as seldom as possible infra tempus the sentence ‘you reply incorrectly’); to appeal to
the argument per ordinem again as seldom as possible; and finally, to defend himself, as often
as possible, by identifying all the incorrect ascriptions of relevance and irrelevance, truth and
falsehood, that are proposed by the opponent. The last solution when combined with the first
is the best outcome for the respondent.
An interesting attempt to interpret Burley-style obligations not simply in terms of fully regi-
mented and determined games, but allowing also for non-deterministic aspects has been made by
[Dutilh Novaes, 2005]. On that occasion, it has been argued that certain replies can be evaluated
according to a ‘point-system’, in such a way that the respondent has a certain degree of freedom
in his replies and can be guided by strategic reasons to opt for one reply rather than another in
order to score as many points as possible. I think the idea of ranking various types of responses,
according to the criteria briefly outlined here, might well fit in that context.
150 Cf. supra, sec. 4.17. It is well known that in the context of obligations governed by the
rules of responsio antiqua, whenever a disjunction is put forward involving a doubtful disjunct,
the other being false, then by proposing sentences in an appropriate order, it can be shown that
one and the same sentence is first doubted and afterwards granted in the same disputation (=
Spade’s (4d)-inconsistency, cf. [Spade, 1982b, p. 8]). Peter seems to accept here this soft kind
of inconsistency (at least in the sense that a sentence can be replied in two di!erent ways in the
same disputation). The point is also interesting with respect to the discussion of the properties
of sentences that ought to be doubted that I have taken up above. This suggestion may be an
additional element for the reconstruction of Peter’s views on the topic.
151 Cf. supra, sec. 2.4.
237 in tempore ] intra tempus O 238 dubitasti ] negasti O 240–241 ita . . . dubita-
sti ] eandem propositionem concedendam quando dubitasti vel dubitanda quando concessisti
O 243 non ] nulle O 245 negatorum ] vel oppositum bene negati add. O 246 copulativa ]
transp. O 246 illis ] ipsis O 248 Et ] cum add. O 249 quia ] illa add. O
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et prima parte positi, quia sequitur ‘tu non es papa vel papa currit; sed tu es papa;
igitur papa currit’. Ista consequentia est bona, quia ar-||guitur ad disiunctivam152 E Giiii+2ra
cum destructione unius partis super alteram partem eius.153 Et cum ulterius ar-
guitur quod illa consequentia est bona scita esse talis etc., illud conceditur. Et
conceditur quod prima pars antecedentis est concessa et concedenda. Et negatur 255
quod secunda sit concedenda tamquam repugnans.154
4.21. Et est hic advertendum quod sicut in illo casu conceditur illa falsa ‘papa
currit’ quia sequens secundum illum modum proponendi, ita etiam quocumque
casu contingenti falso et bene admisso secundum istam speciem fieri potest, quia
quecumque propositio falsa contingens concedatur bene respondendo a responden- 260
te disiungendo illam cum opposito illius falsi admissi. Ut posita et admissa ista
falsa ‘tu curris’, faciam concedere consequenter quod tu es papa proponendo tibi
istam ‘tu non curris vel tu es papa’ que, quia vera non tibi repugnans, concedenda
est. Qua concessa arguitur sic: tu non curris vel tu es papa; sed tu curris; igitur
tu es papa. Et sic de aliis.|| L 72rb265
152 The correct reading is ‘a disiunctiva’.
153 Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Fiiiva] “Item a disiunctiva
cum destructione unius partis super alteram partem valet consequentia”.
154 Peter proves to be aware of one of the most widely known consequences of the standard
obligational rules, namely the fact that any false conclusion compossible with any contingently
false positum whatsoever can be proved in a disputation. If p is a false positum, then any false
sentence q, compossible with p, can be proved by proposing in the first place the disjunction
¬ p % q, which ought to be granted because it is irrelevant and true (in virtue of the presence of
¬ p, which is true, if p is false). Then by disjunctive syllogism (p is posited, hence ¬ p must be
denied) we can conclude that q ought to be granted too. As is confirmed by remark of the next
section, Peter is well aware of this feature of the theory. This thesis is discussed, among others,
by [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 84ra], [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 336], and [Walter Burley, 1963, 3.21–
3.22].
The issue here is the interaction between basic sentences and higher-order sentences. Now, the
end of this section seems to imply that ‘papa currit’ (= p) ought to be granted, as sequentially
relevant (cf. ‘conceditur quod papa currit tamquam sequens ex concesso et prima parte positi,
quia sequitur ‘tu non es papa vel papa currit; sed tu es papa; igitur papa currit”). But “papa
currit’ est concedenda’ (= OCp) cannot be granted because it is the opposite of step 12.2.
Peter argues that step 15. should be granted but 16. should be denied (the second part of
the antecedent, i.e. supposedly the sentence “tu es papa’ est concedenda’) as incompatibly
relevant. The move is perfectly legitimate, because the following principle does not hold: OCp '
OC(OCp). In this way, Peter obtains a solution to the objection and maintains the principle of
provability of arbitrary falsehoods.
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5. On impositio
5.1. Quamvis omnis impositio sit positio, tamen aliqua exempla specialiter pone-
mus de impositione.155
Et accipiamus primo quod impositio de qua hic intendimus est || obligatio qua P 71va
instituitur terminus vel oratio ad significandum quod vel que vel quomodo prius
non significabat. Que impositio maxime convenit terminis vocalibus aut scriptis. 5
Mentalibus etiam convenire potest qui tunc fiunt equivoci cum imponuntur, quia
absolvi non possunt ab eo quod naturaliter significant. Et in hoc refert inter vocalia
aut scripta ex una parte et mentalia ex altera, quia vocalia et scripta absolvi
possunt simpliciter ab imponente ab eorum significatione || priori, mentalia vero M 89vb
non.156 10
5.2. Item, accipiendum quod quotienscumque imponitur ad significandum termi-
nus qui ante non significabat aliquid, propter cuius impositionem fit propositio vera
que non ante erat propositio, concedenda est simpliciter illa propositio non quia
155 The fifth section of Peter’s treatise is devoted to the analysis of a number of problems
and sophisms concerning impositio, a further subtype of positio which focuses on the variation
of meaning of words and sentences. A variety of topics is dealt with: sec. 5.1–5.3 lay down and
discuss some preliminary assumptions specifically related to impositio; sec. 5.4–5.6 focus on a
first type of impositio whose distinctive feature is the attribution of a meaning to terms that
did not previously signify; the rest of the section concerns the variation of meaning of terms and
sentences whose original meaning is modified by virtue of a new stipulation. Three groups of
arguments are identifiable: the first is covered in sec. 5.7–5.11 where we find a lengthy discussion
of a very popular sophism on the ascription to the sentence ‘homo est asinus’ of the meaning of
the sentence ‘deus est’; in sec. 5.14–5.23 the focus shifts on problems related to the suppositio
of terms; finally, sec. 5.24–5.29 deal with incompatible sentences that are assumed to convert
(with the exception of 5.26 which takes up the issue of ill-formed expressions).
156 Impositio is a subtype of positio dealing with variations of meaning. According to Peter,
it pertains, properly speaking, to spoken and written terms or sentences, but not to their mental
counterparts, unless the latter are taken to be equivocal. The reason is that spoken and written
signs signify ad placitum, i.e. conventionally, whereas their mental correlates have a natural
signification that cannot be suppressed or replaced on the basis of new stipulations (the rationale
is not hard to figure out: mental terms do not derive their signification from stipulations, therefore
no stipulation can change it).
The distinction is used in a similar context by [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 89va-vb]. The e!ects
of this assumption are visible, for instance, in sec. 5.25 below, where Peter, in replying to an
objection, recalls the distinction between those who maintain that mental terms, besides their
natural signification, can also signify ad placitum, and those who hold the opposite view.
Some remarks on this issue are also found in Peter’s treatise on supposition, in the context of
a discussion intended to reject material and simple supposition, cf. Tractatus de suppositionibus,
[Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Airb-Aiivb].
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sequens, sed quia vera.157 Et in hoc omnes disputantes convenire oportet. Aliter
enim nulla esset propositio vocalis concedenda vel scripta: quia si est conceden- 15
da, non est concedenda nisi quia impositor imposuit terminos ad significandum per
quorum impositionem facte sunt propositiones vere. Nec || aliquis esset sillogismus O 122va
aut consequentia vocalis vel scripta concedenda nisi fuisset casus de impositione
factus.158|| B 99va
5.3. Sed contra illud, forte, arguitur quod ex illo sequitur quod omnis homo est 20
obligatus et cuilibet homini est facta impositio || aut presuppositum per quam V 77ra
concedit propositiones vocales aut scriptas.
157 This passage is of crucial importance. It seems that in the case of impositio, the act by
means of which a meaning is assigned to a word or to a sentence modifies the implicit background
– actual reality or our set of beliefs related to it – we need to turn to, whenever we are going to
evaluate a sentence in the context of a disputation. The clause ‘non quia sequens sed quia vera’
explicitly gives a hint along these lines: if the duty of granting a sentence arises – according to
a given modification of meaning stipulated in the casus – not in virtue of its being sequentially
relevant but rather in virtue of its being irrelevant and true, then the act by means of which a new
meaning is given to the sentence in question is e!ective outside the context of the disputation.
Every new stipulation a!ects (our way to describe) the states of a!airs that are to be looked at
in the evaluation of irrelevant sentences. In other words, acts of baptizing are operating at the
background level of obligational disputations and become functional to the evaluation of irrelevant
sentences, since it is exactly to that level that we must go back to pick out the information
needed to determine their truth value. This approach seems to be quite original, since, to my
knowledge, the standard response in the obligational framework is regarding sentences a!ected
by the impositio as irrelevant to it and then replying to them exactly as one would reply outside
the disputation (this is often expressed by the clauses ‘respondere infra tempus sicut extra’ or
‘propter impositionem non est responsio varianda’). Peter contends, on the contrary, that within
the context of an obligational disputation, we must reply to irrelevant sentences with modified
meanings according to actual reality insofar as our linguistic characterizations of the latter are
modified by the new stipulations. The mechanism is the same but the information we get from
the outside is influenced by the impositio. In this connection, Peter seems to distinguish between
the general case of positio and the specific case of impositio, which is endowed with a peculiar
property. On what grounds is such a di!erent treatment justified? I think that one might be
tempted to see the following intuition behind Peter’s choice: it is only in case of stipulations
about meaning that we must assume that the consequences of a counterfactual hypothesis must
enter the otherwise water-proof context of a disputation, since if this were not the case, opponent
and respondent would not even be able to understand each other.
158 The idea is intriguing. In the context of a disputation, the agents involved must agree on
a basic fact, which is a sort of prerequisite of meaningfulness (cf. ‘omnes disputantes convenire
oportet’): the concession of a sentence, as well as the concession of a sequence of sentences
logically related to one another, both depend on a stipulation of meaning made by means of a
casus of impositio, at least at the token-level (i.e. the level at which proposita are put forward
in virtue of their being uttered by the opponent).
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Item, arguitur quod nullus terminus unquam fuit impositum ad significandum
a primo impositore, quia nullus fuit terminus primus ab eo impositus nec esse po-
tuit, igitur etc. Patet consequentia. Et arguitur antecedens: quia si aliquis fuit 25
primus terminus, ponamus quod fuerit iste terminus ‘homo’; tunc sit Sor, gratia
argumenti, qui fuit primus impositor. Et imposuit illum terminum ad significan-
dum non solum sibi sed alteri. Tunc oportuit quod, per propositionem vocalem vel
scriptam, exprimeret quod iste terminus sic esset significativus. Et si sic, aliqua
fuit propositio vocalis antequam ille terminus sic significaret.159 30
Sed pro his formis iam supra dictum est.160
5.4. De vocibus, autem, vel scriptis que ante non significabant et nuper impo-
nuntur ad discrete significandum, intelligatur quod si ista vox ‘Sor’ imponeretur
ad hunc hominem mere substantialiter et discrete significandum, qui homo ante
fuit per magnum tempus, tunc concedendum est quod iste homo est Sor, posito 35
quod illa vox nec alium significet nec ante significaverit. Et conceditur quod iste
homo fuit || Sor etiam || antequam || ipse vocaretur ‘Sor’ et fuisset Sor, licet num- L 72va
E Giiii+2rb
M 90ra
quam ipse fuisset vocatus ‘Sor’. Et sciebas istum hominem esse Sor quando ipse
non vocabatur ‘Sor’, nec aliquis homo potuit unquam esse Sor, nisi iste homo.161
Et si queratur quare conceditur quod ille est Sor et non est Bu" vel Plato vel || P 71vb40
159 Here Peter presents two objections to the assumptions made in sec. 5.2. First, it can
be argued, by generalization, that the idea that sentences are granted in virtue of stipulations
of meaning implies that the scope of impositio should extend far too much beyond the context
of obligational disputations, to the e!ect that it would in fact embrace the whole business of
language. Second, the idea of a term acquiring its meaning for the first time in virtue of an
act performed by a primus impositor, who makes the stipulation required in order for a term to
be capable of signifying, is problematic, not only de facto but also in principle (cf. the remark
‘nullus fuit terminus primus ab eo impositus nec esse potuit’). The argument is based on the
idea of an infinite regress. If we assume that in order for a term to signify, there must have
been a preliminary stipulation, which in turn is formulated through words or sentences, then we
are bound to the ineluctable conclusion that there must also have been a first stipulation at the
beginning of the chain. But the first stipulation, too, will have had to be made by means of
some written or spoken expression, already provided of a meaning (cf. ‘tunc oportuit quod, per
propositionem vocalem vel scriptam, exprimeret quod iste terminus sic esset significativus’).
Strode in his treatise makes a similar point, explicitly mentioning the problem of an infinite
regress, cf. [Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 90ra].
160 I have not found a specific passage in this treatise or elsewhere in the Logica that could
count as a reply to the two objections, but I am inclined to think that Peter is willing to reject
both of them, and maintain the core of his doctrine unaltered.
161 A similar point is made in Peter’s treatise on appellatio, cf. Tractatus de appellationibus,
[Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Biivb].
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huiusmodi, dicitur quod iste terminus ‘Sor’ modo mihi significat istum hominem
et ista est modo mihi propositio ‘iste est Sor’ et non ista ‘iste est Bu"’.
Propter impositionem concedo quod iste est Sor; nego tamen quod iste sit Sortes
propter impositionem. Sicut, quia vocatur ‘Sor’, concedo quod iste est Sor; sed
non concedo quod iste est Sor quia vocatur ‘Sor’; et quia non vocatur ‘Bu"’ vel 45
‘Plato’, ideo non concedo quod sit Bu" vel Plato.162
5.5. Posito, autem, quod per totum istum diem iste terminus ‘Sor’ ita istum ho-
minem significabit quod nullum alium, sed cras imponetur ad significandum alium
hominem, est adhuc concedendum quod ille secundus non potest esse Sor nec po-
terit esse Sor neque unquam erit Sor, ita quod ille secundus est Sor, quia adhuc 50
convertuntur et convertentur per totam istam diem iste propositiones ‘ille secun-
dus poterit esse Sor’ et ‘ille secundus poterit esse iste homo’. Cras tamen, facta
illa secunda impositione, concedam illam ‘iste est Sor’; illum tamen numquam
162 I suggest to formalize the situation described in this passage as follows: let I be a two-place
operator that takes an individual constant as its first argument and a term standing for a proper
name as its second argument, in such a way that I ( t ,S ) must be read ‘t is called S’, where
S stands for the proper name S. This operator corresponds to the assignment of meaning to a
term by means of an act of impositio. Then let expressions of the form t = S stand for ‘t is S’.
Thus, to clarify the point made above, let t stand for ‘iste’, S for the proper name ‘Sor’ and,
since identity statements are at stake here, let the copula be represented through the symbol
of equality: the predication simply says that the individual denoted by t is the same individual
denoted by S; finally, C is the familiar operator for concession. Now, Peter’s claim is that the
following holds:
(1) I ( t , S ) & C (t = S) (= quia vocatur ‘Sor’, concedo quod iste est Sor)
(2) ¬C ( I ( t , S ) & t = S) (= non concedo quod iste est Sor, quia vocatur ‘Sor’)
This formulation is meant to capture Peter’s insight. I think the di!erence between the two
claims lies in the relative position of the operator that stands for the stipulation of meaning, I,
and the concession operator, C. In (1), the concession is made under the condition that t has
been assigned a given name; if the condition is fulfilled, then, on account of that, we can grant
the sentence ‘t is S’. But at the same time we are not willing to grant, more generally as in (2),
that t is S on account of the impositio. Here the symbolic rephrasing tries to reflect the wording
(and conceptual order) of Peter’s point: (1) corresponds to the first claim ‘propter impositionem
(= ‘quia vocatur’) concedo quod iste est Sor’, whereas (2) corresponds to the second claim ‘nego
tamen quod iste sit Sor propter impositionem (= ‘quia vocatur ‘Sor’)’. In the second case, the
negation, i.e. the refusal to grant, ranges over the whole implication. In (2) what is denied is
that a factual circumstance (this individual being Socrates) is implied by an act of impositio. In
(1), on the other hand, what the act of impositio implies is only the concession that something
is the case. I am not completely sure that this works, but I am pretty confident that it is what
Peter has in mind here.
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concedam esse Sor, et ille terminus ‘Sor’ cras non significabit istum esse Sor, de-
monstrato illo secundo. Sed tamen concedam cras illam non male respondendo || O 122vb55
‘ista significat quod iste est Sor’, quia tunc ille terminus aliter significabit quam
nunc significet.163
163 The sophism presented here and the one in the next section constitute, to some extent, a
complementary pair. Here Peter assumes that one and the same term, or better proper name,
is assigned in turn to two di!erent individuals at di!erent moments of time. In the next one, by
contrast, the idea is that the same name is assigned at the same time to two di!erent individuals.
The outcomes are di!erent, as one would expect. Let us see what is going on here, first. The text
is somewhat problematic because of a loose use of the demonstrative pronouns ‘iste’ and ‘ille’:
it is sometimes unclear to which of the two individuals the pronoun is supposed to refer. Peter
briefly shows what sentences should be granted at the two moments of time. I shall indicate
the two individuals involved by h1 (= the individual that is called Socrates today) and h2 (=
the individual that will be called Socrates tomorrow). Let then the indexes t1 and t2 stand for
‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’, respectively. Now, the situation, I think, can be depicted in the following
way:
(1) ( It1 ( h1 , S ) $ #x ( It1 ( x , S ) & x = h1) ) & Ct1 (h1 = S ) $ #x ( x = S & x = h1) )
This sentence is just a rephrasing of the assumption that there is only one individual, today,
who is called Socrates. Now, Peter first proves that, today, the following sentence ought to be
granted: ‘ille secundus [= h2] non potest esse Sor nec poterit esse Sor neque umquam erit Sor’.
Formally, it will turn out to be like this:
(2) Ct1 (¬!(h2 =ti S) #ti + t1
The reason is presumably that every occurrence of ‘Sor’ in the above sentence refers, today, to h1,
i.e. to the only bearer of that name. The prove is therefore based on the fact that the following
also holds (cf. ‘adhuc convertuntur et convertentur per totam istam diem iste propositiones ‘ille
secundus [= h2] poterit esse Sor [= h1 as of today]’ et ‘ille secundus [= h2] poterit esse iste homo
[= h1]’, because the term ‘Sor’, today, is convertible with ‘iste homo [= h1]’:
(3) !(h2 =t1 S) ' !(h2 =t1 h1)
The right-hand component of (3) is false, therefore the left-hand component is false, too. This
entails (2), i.e. the concession of its negation. So far, so good. We have come to know that under
the assumption that one individual has been assigned a proper name, today, for the first time,
its reference is fixed in such a way that, today, a modal sentence, involving the ascription of that
very same name to a di!erent individual at a later moment of time, is false. I do not want to
evoke anachronistic parallels, but there seems to be some kind of kripkean intuition operating
here: at least the focus is somehow on the relationship between the attribution of proper names
and the related behaviour of modalities over time, when the assumptions are modified.
What happens next? Or, better, what happens tomorrow, i.e. what sentences are we entitled
to grant, tomorrow? If the reconstruction of the logical relation between impositio and concession
that I have proposed (cf. footnote to the previous sec. 5.4) is correct, it is reasonable to read
Peter’s claim ‘cras [= t2] tamen, facta illa secunda impositione [= It2 ], concedam illam ‘iste [=
?] est Sor’ as follows:
(4) It2 ( h2 , S ) & Ct2 (? = S)
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5.6. Posito, autem, quod aliquis alius fuerit vocatus ‘Sor’ aut quod nunc de presen-
ti vocetur ‘Sor’, concedendum est quod uterque illorum est Sor et uterque istorum
But here a problem arises, namely that it is not altogheter clear whether it is h1 or h2 that
should fill the gap. It looks as though Peter saw a conflict between the need of maintaining that
the term ‘Sor’ is, properly speaking, tied to its original reference (i.e. h1) as if it were a sort of
rigid designator; and the need to cope with the new stipulation of meaning that the term has
undergone in the meantime (according to which, from a given time on, the new denotation of
‘Sor’ should be h2). The solution – claims Peter – is granting ‘iste est Sor’ on the one hand,
and then, of a given individual, never granting that he is Socrates (cf. ‘illum tamen numquam
concedam esse Sor’). Besides the problem of how to understand the first reply, we also need to
determine the right denotation of ‘illum’. As to the latter point, I am inclined to think that
Peter, by means of the demonstrative ‘illum’, is referring to h2. Hence, in the end, the sense of
the observation ‘illum numquam concedam esse Sor’ is simply that one should never grant that
the individual who will be called Socrates tomorrow is the same individual who is called Socrates
now. As to the first problem, then, one might tentatively suggest to read ‘concedam illa ‘iste est
Sor” by referring ‘iste’ to h2 as well.
But this is not the end of the story. Immediately thereafter, Peter makes two further claims.
First, the term ‘Sor’ at time t2 (= ‘cras’) will not signify ‘istum esse Sor, demonstrato illo
secundo’; second, by contrast (cf. ‘sed tamen’), at time t2 the sentence ‘ista significat quod iste
est Sor’, can be granted with no bad consequences. Again, what refers to what here? In the
first passage, perhaps Peter is meaning to say that, at time t2, the term ‘Sor’ will no longer
refer to h1 so that, by indicating h2 and uttering the sentence ‘iste est Sor’ we are no longer
referring to the individual that was previously signified by the term ‘Sor’. The problem with
this interpretation is that, in the first sentence, there seems to be a strong link between ‘iste’
and ‘demonstrato illo secundo’. Moreover, the possibility that Peter is actually referring, in both
occurrences, to h2 (and not, in the first occurrence, to h1) when he says ‘et ille terminus ‘Sor’ cras
non significabit istum [= h2] esse Sor, demonstrato illo secundo [= h2]’ is supported by the fact
that the subsequent step of the argument is put forward in the form of an adversative. What is
the sense of the claim? Peter argues that tomorrow the sentence ‘ista significat quod iste est Sor’
will (possibly will have to) be granted. On what grounds? The alleged reason is that the term
‘Sor’ (cf. ‘ille terminus’) tomorrow will signify otherwise than it now signifies, i.e. the denotation
the term will have tomorrow [= h2] will be di!erent from the denotation the term has now [=
h1]. If this is the justification, then the term ‘iste’ in the sentence ‘ista significat quod iste est
Sor’, can only refer to h2. What is then the last adversative opposed to? Either it refers to the
immediately preceding claim that the term ‘Sor’ will not signify tomorrow ‘istum esse Sor’, or to
the claim that tomorrow ‘iste est Sor’ will be conceded. The latter case, consisting of sentences
(6) and (7) below, is to my opinion more plausible. This is therefore how I would reconstruct
the argument, in the end (all replies being indexed at t2):
(5) Concedam illam ‘iste [= h2] est Sor’
(6) Illum [= h2] numquam concedam esse Sor [= h1]
(7) Ille terminus ‘Sor’ cras non significabit istum [= h2] esse Sor [= h1]
(8) Concedam cras illam non male respondendo ‘ista significat quod iste [= h2] est Sor [=
h2]’.
It seems to me that this is a viable way to find an interpretation that fits the text and preserves
consistency: the problem remains as to whether this is exactly what Peter is maintaining. Be
it as it may, the passage is on the whole destined to give the reader a hard time: part of the
obscurity maybe cannot just be explained away.
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fuit Sor, illis duobus demonstratis. || Et ultra quod ille terminus ‘Sor’ non est V 77rb60
terminus discretus sed communis, quia supponit confuse tantum in ista ‘uterque
illorum est Sor’; si enim staret discrete, sequeretur quod Sor esset uterque istorum,
cum aliis veris.|| M 90rb
Et si contra arguitur quod ille terminus ‘Sor’ est equivocus in illa propositione
‘uterque illorum est Sor’, igitur illa non est propositio: huic dicitur quod hic non 65
petitur illa di!cultas, ideo transeat. Ponatur enim gratia argumenti quod univoce
significet illos duos et stat quod intendimus.164
5.7. Cum vero imponuntur termini qui ex grammatica solent auctentice significa-
re ad significandum aliter quam prius, respondere solent quidam in tempore obli-
gationis sicut extra ad propositionem cuius termini variarunt significationem. Ut 70
illam ‘homo est asinus’ significantem adequate || deum esse in tempore propositam B 99vb
negant, quia extra tempus etiam negarent, ut dicunt.165
Sed isti tamen dividuntur, quia !i" eorum quidam negant illam in tempore et
concedunt quod illa est concedenda quia necessaria. !ii" Alii autem negant illam
et dicunt quod est neganda. Et refert iterum inter eos extra tempus, quia cum 75
arguitur prius quod negasti necessarium, igitur male respondisti, primi negant
antecedens et dicunt quod illa non erat necessaria, licet ipsi fuerunt obligati ad
concedendum quod illa esset necessaria. Eorum autem reliqui negant consequen-
tiam infra tempus obligationis || ‘tu negasti necessarium simpliciter, igitur male P 72ra
respondisti’.166 80
164 The circumstance envisaged in this sophism, which supplements the discussion started in
the previous one, is less hard to understand. The point here is that, if we drop the constraint
of unicity from the above assumptions, it just follows that when more individuals are assigned
a proper name in virtue of an act of impositio, then the name ceases to be a proper name and
thereby acquires the status of a full-blown common term.
165 This sophism can be found quite often in treatises on obligations. The reference to authors
who deny the sentence ‘homo est asinus’ when its signification is turned into the signification of
the sentence ‘deus est’ is not very indicative, since most medieval authors adopt this solution.
In this case, Peter seems to hold a minority view. The idea, as will be clear shortly, cf. infra,
sec. 5.11, is to grant the sentence as irrelevant and true.
166 It is quite di"cult to identify the followers of the views in question. General re-
ferences to the tradition of this sophism are found in [Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 195 f.
39]. Cf. also [Roger Swyneshed, 1977, pp. 264–265], [John of Holland, 1985, pp. 94–95],
[Marsilius of Inghen, 1489, sig. Biiva–Biiii+2rb] and [William Buser, 1990, pp. 132-154]. The
last two authors should probably be regarded as a general background, if not as the direct sour-
ce, of Peter’s presentation. As Ashworth has pointed out they are the only two authors who
o!er an elaborate treatment on this topic. Nonetheless the details of Peter’s reconstruction, and
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5.8. Sed contra primam illorum responsionem arguitur:167 quia negata ista in
tempore ‘homo est asinus’, cedat tempus obligationis.
!Obj.1" Et arguitur sic: tu negasti illam || que, in tempore obligationis, erat L 72vb
necessaria simpliciter, igitur male respondisti. Patet consequentia. Et arguitur
antecedens quod illa erat necessaria: quia in tempore significavit principaliter 85
deum esse, igitur in tempore fuit necessaria. Patet consequentia. Et arguitur
especially, the kind of objections he raises seem to be di!erent at some decisive points. In Buser
the sophism is taken to be an example of absolute imposition, i.e. such that a ‘complexum con-
gruum complexe imponitur ad significandum’ (a sentence that already has a meaning is assigned
the meaning of another sentence).
Be this as it may, I will opt for a analysis of the argument, leaving aside the problem of the
identification of sources. This is my suggestion for a reconstruction of the disputation:
I ‘Homo est asinus’ adequate significat deum
esse
A possible
1. Homo est asinus N (cf. ‘quia extra tempus etiam
negarent)
2.1 Illa est concedenda C
2.2 Illa est neganda C
3. Negasti necessarium simpliciter, igitur male
respondisti
N
4. Negasti necessarium [simpliciter] N
Some remarks are in order. First, the assignment of a new meaning, as far as I can see, is
an asymmetrical operation. If we stipulate that ‘homo est asinus’ signifies adequately as ‘deus
est’, then ‘homo est asinus’ actually means that there is a God, or that God exists, but not the
other way around (i.e. ‘deus est’ does not signify that a human being is a donkey). This is why
the objection ‘negasti necessarium simpliciter’ can be put forward if ‘homo est asinus’ is denied.
If, by contrast, the sentence ‘deus est’ had been assigned the meaning of ‘homo est asinus’, put
forward and granted, the right objection would have been ‘concessisti impossibile simpliciter’
(this seems to be the case for instance in [Roger Swyneshed, 1977, p. 264] who devotes some
space to the sophism in this inverted formulation). Second, the point of the whole discussion for
Peter is challenging the background assumption according to which ‘respondere solent quidam in
tempore obligationis sicut extra ad propositionem cuius termini variarunt significationem’. Third,
the views among these people are various, and they must be ruled out with specific arguments.
There are basically two categories: (i) those who deny ‘homo est asinus’ infra tempus but grant
the sentence ‘illa est concedenda’ (because ‘illa’ stands for a necessary sentence); and (ii) those
who deny infra tempus ‘homo est asinus’ and grant ‘illa est neganda’. The subdivision also
conforms to another criterion. Let us assume that the following objection has been put forward
(it is not clear whether the objection is made infra or extra tempus): ‘negasti necessarium
simpliciter, igitur male respondisti’. Now, the first group (i) would deny the antecedent of this
consequence, i.e. they would deny that, by denying ‘homo est asinus’, they have thereby denied a
necessary simpliciter sentence. The second group (ii), on the other hand, would deny the whole
consequence. In the following two sections Peter argues against both views.
167 The following objections are directed against the first reply (i): denial of ‘homo est
asinus’ and of the antecedent of the consequence ‘negasti necessarium simpliciter, igitur male
respondisti’.
81–82 in tempore ] infra tempus O 84–86 Patet . . . necessaria. ] om. O
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antecedens: quia illa fuit imposita ad significandum deum esse principaliter, igitur
eius impositio fuit facta per quam significavit principaliter deum esse.168
!Obj.2" Item, impositio illius fuit facta per quam significavit principaliter || M 90va
deum esse; igitur illa variavit significationem, cum ante significaverit hominem esse 90
asinum. Et ultra: variatio significationis facta fuit, et non nisi ad significandum
deum esse principaliter; igitur illa principaliter significavit deum esse. Primum
antecedens arguitur: quia tu fuisti obligatus per impositionem illius, || igitur || O 123ra
E Giiii+2vaimpositio illius fuit facta.169
!Obj.3" Item, in illa responsione data, ponatur quod respondebis ad illam ‘homo 95
est asinus’. Deinde arguitur quod qualitercumque respondebis ad illam ‘homo est
asinus’, tu male respondebis: quia vel concedes illam vel tu negabis vel dubita-
bis; sed sive sic sive sic, tu male respondebis ad illam; igitur qualitercumque tu
respondebis ad illam, tu male respondebis ad illam. Et sic aliqua esset propositio
ad quam non posses bene respondere infra tempus que tamen est scita a te esse 100
necessaria.170|| V 77va
!Obj.4" Item, per idem, data illa responsione, posita et admissa illa ‘tu es ob-
ligatus’, cedente tempore obligationis, negandum esset quod tu fuisti obligatus.
Consequens est falsum manifeste: quia ego posui tibi illam et tu bene admisisti
eam, igitur tu fuisti obligatus. Consequentia patet, quia illa ‘tu fuisti obligatus’ 105
sequebatur ex illa admissione, sicut quod illa significavit sequebatur ex illa impo-
sitione. Ubi, autem, non sequitur obligatum ex obligatione vel admissione, non sic
est; ideo non sequitur ‘ego posui quod Sor curreret; igitur Sortes currebat’.171
168 Here the fundamental tenet (cf. supra, sec. 5.2) of Peter’s account of impositio is operating:
the stipulation actually makes a given sentence signify otherwise than it previously did (cf. ‘eius
impositio fuit facta per quam significavit principaliter deum esse’). Accordingly, not only does
a false sentence become true in virtue of the stipulation; it may also become necessary, if it is
imposed the meaning of a necessary sentence, like in the present case.
169 In support of the hypothesis that the signification of a sentence is actually modified by an
act of impositio, in this passage we find the explicit remark ‘illa variavit significationem’.
170 This line of argumentation is not uncommon in the obligational literature, cf. for instance
[Paul of Venice, 1988, p. 298]. It is part of a general strategy in constructing objections: if
we can prove that there is a sentence that should neither be granted, nor doubted, nor denied,
then we may cause no little trouble to the respondent. Here, however, Peter just brings up the
possibility of this objection, without going through the details.
171 The argument presented here, by contrast, seems to be against the idea that impositio
comes into play in the evaluation of irrelevant sentences; rather, it is argued, some sentences
follow from (i.e. are relevant to) a given impositio, as when we say that a sentence is relevant
to the positio and admissio of something. The di!erence may appear slight, but it is of great
importance, because it a!etcs the whole picture: if a sentence ought to be granted in virtue of its
being relevant to the impositio, it does not mean that the impositio in question actually modifies
89–90 Item, . . . esse ] om. O 92 Primum ] et praep. O 93 illius ] om. O 95 in ] om. O
96–97 homo . . . tu ] om. O 97 concedes ] concedis O 98 tu ] om. O 99 tu ] om. O 99 ad
illam ] om. O 99 esset ] est O 103 esset ] foret O 104 ego ] om. O 105–108 Consequentia
. . . currebat ] om. O
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!Obj.5" Item, per idem, data illa responsione, sequitur quod ille terminus ‘ho-
mo’ non significaret hominem: quia, licet primus impositor posuerit, non tamen 110
sequitur quod significavit. Vel si propter eius impositionem factam de illo termino
‘homo’ concedendum est quod iste est homo, consimiliter imponas tu aut ego: et
non erit causa quare, ex impositione illa, ille terminus ‘homo’ significavit hominem
quin ex impositione mea vel tua posset significare asinum; aliter termini vocales
vel scripti non essent ad placitum significativi. Sed non est plus in istis sermonibus 115
morandum.172
the meaning of that sentence because, as in the case of positio, some of the sentences that we
are bound to grant in a disputation may actually be false. On the other hand, if a sentence,
whose meaning is modified in virtue of an impositio, ought to be granted as irrelevant and true
(cf. supra, 5.2 ‘non qiua sequens, sed quia vera’), this implies that in the case of impositio we are
adopting an approach that is structurally di!erent with respect to standard paradigm of positio.
Either the point made here is inconsistent with the rest of Peter’s doctrine, or, reluctantly, we
should take the claim ‘sicut quod illa significavit sequebatur ex illa impositione’ in a loose and
non-technical sense, i.e. as meaning not ‘following from’ but something like ‘depending on’ the
impositio. Despite this di"culty, it should be pointed out that after all the notions of ‘relevant
to the obligation’ and ‘relevant to the admission’, that Peter somehow recalls here, contain a
factual element: if I must grant something because it is relevant to the admission (sentences like
‘tu es obligatus’), that happens in virtue of the fact that something has been posited to me and
I have correctly admitted it. Perhaps, it may be argued that this is in the end not that far from
the factual import of impositio that Peter calls into play here.
Finally, as regards the claim ‘ubi non sequitur ex obligatione vel admissione, non sic est’, cf.
supra, sec. 1.3.
172 The point of the last objection to the first responsio is quite interesting. If impositio is
without factual influence, i.e. if the actual meaning of words and sentences does not depend
on it, this should also hold in the case of the very first assignments of meaning: then how
would terms and sentences become capable of signifying? The existence of a stipulation, and the
assumption that the stipulation has a cogent character on speakers, are the conditions of the fact
that written and spoken terms are ad placitum significativi. The fact that they are the outcome
of a stipulation is the reason of their being ad placitum, while the fact that they are significativi
depends tout court on the normative nature of stipulations as such (once the latter are made,
we are committed to upholding that, at least for a given lapse of time and in a given context –
like in an obligation – words and sentences signify according to the agreed convention).
110 non ] om. O 110 posuerit ] imposuit O 112–113 imponas . . . ‘homo’ ] om. O
114 quin ] qui O 114 mea . . . tua ] om. O 116 morandum ] permorandum O
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5.9. Contra secundam responsionem arguitur173 quia !Obj.1" ex illa sequitur quod
antecedens ad contradictoria est concedendum non male respondendo.174
!Obj.2" Item, quod repugnans bene concesso est concedendum.175
!Obj.3" Item, quod non omne possibile scitum esse possibile et intellectum non 120
repugnans, cum petitur per signa positionis admitti, est admittendum.176
!Obj.4" Item, quod in consequentia bona et formali, denominata etc., signifi-
cante || etc., consequens est negandum et antecedens [non]177 est concedendum, et L 73ra
per consequens non omne sequens ex bene con-||cesso propositum in tempore est
concedendum. P 72rb125
5.10. Iste conclusiones in hac arte || non sunt sustinende, quia tota intentio est M 90vb
convenientem responsionem instruere respondentem.178
173 The following objections are directed against the second responsio (ii): denial of ‘homo
est asinus’ and of the consequence ‘negasti necessarium simpliciter, igitur male respondisti’. In
contrast with the previous five objections against (i), all of which were more or less directly
connected with the nature of impositio, the next five arguments raised here against (ii) are
based on the idea that if we deny the consequence ‘negasti necessarium simpliciter, igitur male
respondisti’ we are bound to deny also the basic set of obligational rules. In the present section
the objections are simply stated, in the form of corollaries of (ii). In the next section Peter
provides the proof that they actually follow from (ii).
174 The first objection claims that, on account of the second responsio, a sentence implying
two contradictories would have to be granted, yet we would not be entitled to conclude on these
grounds that the respondent is replying incorrectly. Why is this a bad consequence? The reason
is that if something implies a contradiction, then it is by definition an incompatibly relevant
sentence, which ought to be denied. If it is granted, the corresponding rule is violated and the
respondent replies incorrectly. Cf. infra, sec. 5.10, PObj.1 (= proof of the first objection)
175 Cf. infra, sec. 5.10, PObj.2.
176 This objection relies on the claim that the denial of the first rule (cf. supra, sec. 2.1)
would follow. The reason of this fact is explained below, cf. infra, sec. 5.10, (PObj.3).
177 As the meaning of the sentence requires, the ‘non’ must be expuncted: the reading is
confirmed below, when the objection is proved, since the same sequence and ordering of words
occurs with the omission of ‘non’. Moreover, this is a rule that we find also in Peter’s treatise
on consequences, cf. Tractatus de consequentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3ra]. If the
consequent ought to be denied, then no problem at all arises in case we claim that the antecedens
ought not to be granted: that is exactly what one would expect. But the sense of the objection
goes rather the opposite way around: if we hold the secunda responsio, then we obtain, as a result,
a sound formal consequence whose consequent ought to be denied and whose antecedent ought
to be granted, which is problematic, because it would amount to a rejection of contraposition.
178 Another remark about the purpose of obligations, in this respect cf. also supra, sec.
4.1, where Peter says that false sentences are posited (often to the e!ect that some kind
of inconsistency arises) “ut [opponens] videat qualiter [respondens] sciat se a contradictione
defendere”.
117 arguitur ] sic add. O 117 quia ] om. O 118 non . . . respondendo ] om. O
120 scitum . . . intellectum ] bene intellectum esse possibile O 121 per . . . positionis ] om. O
122 et formali ] om. O 122 etc. ] da ly si O 123 etc. ] ex compositione suorum terminorum
O 123 non ] om. BO 123–125 et . . . concedendum ] om. O
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Sed quod iste sequantur ex illa responsione arguitur quia ponatur quod hec ‘ho-
mo est asinus’ fiat179 necessaria adequate significans deum esse convertibiliter cum
illa ‘deus est’. Cum proponitur illa infra tempus ‘homo est asinus’, negatur. Qua 130
negata proponitur suum contradictorium preponendo negationem toti, || scilicet B 100ra
‘non homo est asinus’: sit enim illa sua contradictoria ‘non homo est asinus’. Pa-
tet quod hec copulativa est concedenda secundum illos ‘deus ||est et non homo est O 123rb
asinus’, quia extra tempus concederetur.180
!PObj.1" Et tamen ipsa est antecedens ad illa duo contradictoria ‘deus est’ et 135
‘nullus deus est’.181
!PObj.2" Ex isto sequitur secunda conclusio: proposita autem et concessa ista
‘deus est’, concedenda est adhuc illa ‘non homo est asinus’ ex responsione, que
tamen repugnat sibi; igitur repugnans bene concesso est concedendum.182
The idea here is that, if one holds the view that is being put into question, then one is bound
to reject the fundamental rules of obligations. But the rules are the basis of the discipline and
they are set out to teach the respondent how to reply in the appropriate manner; therefore what
gets thrown away, in the end, is the view along with its unwanted side e!ects.
179 Possibly the reading ‘sit’, that is found in O, is preferable.
180 In order to understand the arguments provided below as tantamount proofs of the co-
rollaries to the second reply, we should see them in the framework of the following obligation
(the positum should be taken to be equivalent to that of the original sophism “homo est asinus’
adequate significat deum esse’):
I ‘Homo est asinus’ est necessaria adequa-
te significans deum esse convertibiliter cum
illa ‘deus est’
A possible
1. Homo est asinus N
2. Non homo est asinus C
3. Deus est et non homo est asinus C (cf. ‘hec copulativa est con-
cedenda [. . . ] quia extra
tempus concederetur’
181 The sentence proposed at step 3. and granted according to the assumption that propter
impositionem non est responsio varianda is a conjunction and hence it implies both of its con-
juncts, namely ‘deus est’ and ‘non homo est asinus’. But the latter is nothing but the negation of
‘deus est’, provided that we make the right substitution in virtue of the assumption that ‘homo
est asinus’ converts with ‘deus est’. Therefore a sentence (= ‘deus est et non homo est asinus’)
that implies two contradictories (= ‘deus est’, ‘nullus deus est’) ought to be granted.
182 The line is the same as before: if both ‘deus est’ and ‘non homo est asinus’ are put forward
after each other, they should be granted according to the assumption that the reply to a sentence
must not vary in function of new stipulations of meaning. On this view (cf. ‘ex responsione’)
both sentences, that would have to be granted extra tempus, ought to be granted infra tempus as
well. But once we have granted ‘deus est’, if we grant, afterwards, ‘non homo est asinus’, we will
thereby grant a sentence that is incompatibly relevant to an already correctly granted sentence
128 iste sequantur ] illa sequuntur O 128 arguitur ] sic add. O 129 fiat ] sit O
129 convertibiliter ] et convertatur O 130 Cum proponitur ] Tunc proposita O 130 homo . . .
asinus ] om. O 131 proponitur ] proponatur O 132 sua ] om. O 135 et ] om. O 137 Ex ]
et praep. O 139 concesso ] admisso O
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!PObj.3" Tertia etiam conclusio sequitur: quia, stante illo casu, hec est possibilis 140
‘homo est asinus’ scita esse talis etc. Et tamen illa non est admittenda, si petatur
admitti per signa positionis: quia si admittitur illa ‘homo est asinus’ cum toto
casu, pono igitur tibi illam ‘homo est asinus’ cum toto casu || et propono eandem. V 77vb
Qua negata, arguitur quod illa est concedenda, quia illa est posita et bene admissa.
!i" Et si sic, igitur non eodem modo respondendum est extra tempus obligationis 145
et intra, quia extra tempus negaretur et tamen in tempore conceditur.
!ii" Vel cedat tempus obligationis et arguitur quod infra tempus illa fuit conce-
denda, quia posita et bene admissa; et extra tempus est neganda; igitur responsio
nulla.183
!PObj.4" Alie etiam due conclusiones sequuntur, quia illa est consequentia sim- 150
pliciter bona infra tempus ‘deus est, || igitur homo est asinus’ denominata a ly ‘si’ E Giiii+2vb
etc., et antecedens est concedendum et consequens negandum.184
!Obj.5" Item, quod non eodem modo respondendum est intra tempus et extra
ad propositionem impositam arguitur sic: quia ponatur quod ista ‘homo est asi-
nus’ sit ad placitum significativa sicut una propositio greca, sic quod non significat 155
tibi latine; et sit propositio nec tu intelligas grecum.185 Dato illo, proponitur illa
(= ‘deus est’), which is against the rules.
183 The second reply (ii) implies the rejection or, at least, a restricted version of the first rule
for admission. On the other hand, if the rule holds, as a result one ought not to reply in the
same way within the time of the obligation as outside the time. But we want to keep the rule in
its unrestricted formulation, therefore it is this last claim that must be rejected. The argument
hinges on the fact that, according to Peter, the sentence ‘homo est asinus’, if it is assigned the
meaning of the sentence ‘deus est’, becomes necessary and therefore, a fortiori, possible. If it is
possible, in turn, it will fall within the class of sentences to which the first rule applies, namely
the domain of all possible sentences. But then, if ‘homo est asinus’ is posited, it will have to be
granted infra tempus.
184 Cf. Tractatus de consequentiis [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+4ra] “Apud eos qui,
eodem modo respondendum, dicunt infra tempus et extra ad propositionem quam ponimus suam
significationem variare, et dicunt istam esse negandam ‘homo est asinus’ – quamvis sit necessaria
– quia ex communi modo negaretur, addendum fore, in regula, quod consequentia non esset bona
propter aliquam impositionem a priori factam [as it is, by contrast, in the present case; cf. also
infra, sec. 5.25]. Sed apud eos qui respondent ad propositiones secundum earum qualitatem,
sicut infra dicetur, antecedens istius consequentie est concedendum et consequens, quia secundum
istum modum omne simpliciter necessarium est concedendum.” .
185 This objection adds to the list of four presented above. Most notably, right after the
passage quoted in the previous footnote, in the treatise on consequences, Peter has a similar
example involving Greek terms, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+4ra] “Ex quibus patet illum
non esse bonum modum arguendi, scilicet ‘hec consequentia est bona etc., denominata etc.,
141 etc. ] om. O 142 admittitur ] admittatur O 144 negata ] concessa O 144 illa ] om.
O 144 est ] tibi add. O 145 si ] om. O 146 tempus ] om. O 146 negaretur ] negatur O
146 in tempore ] intra tempus O 148 quia ] fuit add. O 148 tempus ] ipsa add. O 148 est
neganda ] negaretur O 150 etiam ] autem O 151 deus . . . asinus ] om. O 152 etc. ] vel ergo
O 155 sit . . . significativa ] significet ad placitum O 155 significat ] significet O 156 tibi ]
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‘homo est asinus’. Si conceditur aut dubitatur, peccatur secundum illam respon-
sionem. Si negatur, cedat tempus obligationis et arguitur quod in tempore negasti
propositionem || quam non intellexisti, igitur male respondisti.186 Patet conse- M 91ra
quentia. Et arguitur antecedens quia ista significavit solum grece in tempore, ut 160
habet concedere illa responsio et concedit.187
5.11. Ideo, sequitur tertia responsio respondens ad propositiones secundum quod
ille sibi significant vel non significant. Unde sicut facta impositione istius vocis
‘bub’ vel huius vocis ‘Sor’ || sit188 nomen singulare istius hominis, certo homine P 72va
demonstrato, conceditur quod iste homo est bub aut Sor, non quia illa sequatur 165
ex ista impositione sed quia est vera et impertinens, ita etiam, posito quod iste
terminus ‘homo’ significet unum asinum, conceditur quod asinus est homo non
quia ista ‘asinus est homo’ sequatur, sed quia est vera.189|| L 73rb
Unde iste consequentie non valent ‘tu vocaris ‘Sor’, igitur tu es Sor’ capiendo
illum terminum ‘Sor’ mere substantialiter, ‘iste ‘deus est’ et ‘homo est asinus’ 170
convertuntur; sed deus est; igitur homo est asinus’, quia antecedens || nunc forte O 123va
significans etc., habens etc., quorum etc., et eius antecedens est intellectum a te, igitur eius
consequens est intellectum a te’, quia si fieret consequentia, cuius antecedens esset latinum et
consequens grecum, que sciretur esse bona, antecedens in casu est intellectum et consequens non.
Potes enim credere tu, per veram relationem cui firmiter assentires, quod illa consequentia esset
bona, ut ‘homo currit, igitur antropos trechi”’. If we turn back to the treatise on obligations,
later in this work, Peter appeals again to a similar argument, cf. infra, sec. 5.13.
186 The same inference is used later, cf. infra, sec. 5.26, where the point in question is that
the respondent replies to a sentence involving a sequences of sounds with no signification such
as ‘bub’ or ‘bu!’.
187 Let us assume that the sentence ‘homo est asinus’ has the meaning of a Greek sentence
that we do not understand, and let it be put forward in a disputation. If it is either doubted
or denied, our opponent will claim that we have replied to ‘homo est asinus’ in a way that is
di!erent from the way we would usually reply to that sentence extra tempus. If we abide by his
requirement and deny ‘homo est asinus’, then the reply comes home to roost, because we are
denying a sentence that we do not understand.
188 The syntax is awkward: supplying a ‘quod’ before ‘sit’, as in O, might be of some help.
189 The general solution to the original sophism presented in sec. 5.7, then, simply amounts
to conforming to the assumption that impositio modifies the background against which we are
supposed to evaluate irrelevant sentences and that, obviously, if a sentence is the object of an
impositio, it is indeed irrelevant and must be evaluated according to its own status. The point
is that this status changes in function of the new meaning stipulated by means of the casus. In
that way, irrelevance plus modification of the background imply that a newly imposed sentence
should be be granted ‘non quia sequens, sed quia vera’.
158 Si ] nam add. O 158 negatur ] concedatur O 158 in tempore ] infra tempus O
158 negasti ] concessisti O 160 in tempore ] intra tempus O 160 ut ] EO et BV 163 sibi ]
om. O 163 vel . . . significant ] om. O 164 bub ] buf O 164 vocis ] termini O 164 sit ]
quod praep. O 165 bub ] buf O 166 et impertinens ] om. O 166 ita ] item O
167 significet ] convenienter add. O 167 unum ] om. O 168 ista . . . homo’ ] om. O
168 sequatur ] ante sequatur scr. et del. sequit O 168 quia ] illa add. O
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est possibile et consequens impossibile.190
Et addo generaliter ad istam responsionem quod si consequentia sit bona et
formalis denominata a ly ‘si’ etc. et antecedens est concedendum, consequens
etiam est concedendum.191 175
Item, quod ad propositionem impertinentem concessis aut negatis vel eorum
oppositis respondendum est secundum sui qualitatem. Et intelligatur ut dictum
est supra.192
5.12. Quibus acceptis, pono quod omne nesciens se esse A sit A. Deinde propono
‘tu es homo’. Quo concesso, quia verum non repugnans, proponitur ‘tu es A’. Si 180
negatur, contra: omne nesciens se esse A est A; tu nescis te esse A; igitur tu es
A. Si negatur minor, contra stet oppositum, scilicet ‘tu scis te esse A, igitur tu es
A’.|| V 78ra
Ideo forte dicitur negando illam consequentiam, quia minor est negativa et per
hoc non est forma in Darii. 185
190 These observations are in accordance with the general assumptions made in sec. 5.4. The
two consequences mentioned here are not unconditionally sound, and that is the reason of their
denial; nothing goes wrong, however, if we hold that the antecedent entails the duty of granting
the consequent in a casus of impositio. The remarks, therefore, are only apparently in contrast
with the claim that is found a few sections below, cf. infra, sec. 5.26. There is a passage in
[William Buser, 1990, p. 90] which shows a strong similarity with the point made here by Peter:
“Omnes tales consequentiae sunt defectuosae et malae, scilicet [. . . ] ‘tu vere vocaris ‘Sortes’,
ergo tu es Sortes’, “deus est’ et ‘homo est asinus’ convertuntur, sed deus est, ergo homo est
asinus’ [. . . ] quoniam in istis omnibus consequentiis, aliquo casu possibili posito, stat sic esse,
pro nunc, sicut per eorum antecedentia significatur; et tamen non erit ita, pro nunc, sicut per
eorum consequentia significatur, quare sequitur quod praedictae consequentiae et sibi similes non
valent [punctuation mine]”.
191 In fact the rule has a more complex structure, cf. Tractatus de consequentiis,
[Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eiiii+3va-vb] “Alia regula est quod si consequentia est bona, af-
firmativa, denominata etc., significans etc., habens antecedens et consequens expressa, quorum
nullum est multiplex, scita esse formalis, et antecedens est concedendum ab aliquo, et conse-
quens est intellectum propositum, et cum his bene scitur quod ex concedendo non sequitur nisi
concedendum, tunc consequens est ab eodem concedendum. Sed non sequitur hec consequentia
est bona [scita] scita esse talis et antecedens est ab aliquo concedendum et consequens est intel-
lectum, igitur consequens est concedendum, quia forte creditum erit quod antecedens sit falsum
aut forte creditum est quod ex concedendo sequatur non concedendum”.
192 Cf. supra, 2.5 where Peter says that the fifth rule, concerning irrelevant sentences, must
be extended to the case of impositio. As has been already pointed out, the characteristic feature
of impositio is that the stipulation made in the casus a!ects the background from which we pick
out the information needed to evaluate irrelevant sentences. The rule, therefore, is extended to
this type obligation, since it always holds that irrelevant sentences should be answered according
to their own status. The peculiarity in the case of impositio is that the latter is a!ected by the
assumption to which one is obligated.
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Sed contra quia sequitur: tu nescis te esse A, igitur tu es nesciens te esse A.193
193 It is di"cult to make sense of the presence of this sophism at this point, right after the
lengthy discussion of the previous one. The only link I see is the need of pointing out the role of
understanding sentences before replying also in such cases where variations of signification are
at stake.
The ordering of Buser’s treatise might also help us. In that text, after an interlocutory
appendix to the sophism involving the sentences ‘homo est asinus’ and ‘deus est’, Buser inserts a
discussion on the so-called impositio dependens (where the assignment of a new meaning depends
on the fulfillment a given condition). In particular he takes into account the case where an
‘incomplexum incomplexe imponitur ad significandum’, i.e. a term is assigned the meaning of
another term. The sophism there is ‘Imponatur A ad significandum quod sit nomen tuum, si
primum quod tibi proponitur sit falsum et non aliter, deinde propnatur tibi ista ‘tu es A”. Again,
in a similar order, and even more similar in terms and treatment is [Marsilius of Inghen, 1489,
sig. Biiii+1vb]. What has called my attention is just the fact that after the same sophism,
all three authors have a sophism involving a letter standing for something which is not known
or understood. The insertion of this example here might have been suggested to Peter by the
arrangement of materials on impositio in Buser and Marsilius, but I am in no position to produce
stronger evidence than this at the moment.
The structure of the sophism is the following:
P Omne nesciens se esse A est A A possible
1. Tu es homo C irrelevant and true
2.1 Tu es A N
3.1 Omne nesciens se esse A est A; tu nescis te
esse A; igitur tu es A
C ( (the consequent of this va-
lid inference is inconsistent
with the denial of 2.1)
4. Tu nescis te esse A N
5. Tu scis te esse A; igitur tu es A C valid inference, whose ante-
cedent is sequentially rele-
vant (by denial of 4.)
3.2 Omne nesciens se esse A est A; tu nescis te
esse A; igitur tu es A
N ( cf. Obj.
The argument focuses on the consequence put forward in the third place, i.e. ‘omne nesciens
se esse A est A; tu nescis te esse A; igitur tu es A’. If it is granted, it may be inferred, by
detachment, that the consequent ‘tu es A’ ought to be granted too. But that will be inconsistent
with its former denial, at step 2.1.
An alternative might be denying the minor premise, ‘tu nescis te esse A’, since the major
is the positum itself. If the minor premise is denied, then its contradictory is put forward, ‘tu
scis te esse A’. This implies in turn the duty of granting the corresponding categorical sentence
without the epistemic operator, i.e. the sentence ‘tu es A’. This solution, again, is inconsistent
with step 2.1. Here the question might be raised whether Peter correctly understands the denial
of ‘tu nescis te esse A’. Properly speaking, it might be argued that the sentence is best expressed
as a conjunction of the following form: (¬Ka p $ ¬Ka ¬ p ), where p stands for the sentence ‘tu
es A’, a is the respondent and K is the standard epistemic operator for knowledge. Its negation,
therefore, will be (Ka p % Ka ¬ p ). In that case, the passage from step 4. to 5. above would be
prevented. I assume therefore, that Peter does not understand step 4. in terms of a conjunction,
but rather as simply corresponding to ¬Ka p: once the latter is denied, it follows indeed that
Ka p holds.
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!i" Tenet consequentia quia illud est participium alicuius verbi et non nisi huius
verbi ‘nescio’, igitur etc.
!ii" Item, tenet consequentia ista sicut hec ‘tu non curris, igitur tu es non currens’
tenendo ly ‘non’ infinite, ita quod illud sit unum verbum infinitum ‘non curris’. 190
!iii" Item, tenet consequentia illa [consequentia] sicut hec ‘ego volo currere, igitur
ego sum volens currere’. Et tenet consequentia ultima ex tertio Ethicorum.194 Nec
illa contradicunt ‘tu scis te esse hominem’ et ‘tu nescis te || esse hominem’ tenendo M 91rb
ly ‘non’ infinite, sicut iste non contradicunt ‘tu curris’ et ‘tu non curris’ tenendo
ly ‘non’ infinite, || qua utraque illarum est [in] a!rmativa. B 100rb195
!iv" Item, illa responsio non tollit argumentum, quia si fiat illa forma ‘omne
nesciens se esse A est A; tu es nesciens te esse A; igitur tu es A’, si negatur minor,
contra: tu es homo, igitur es nesciens te esse A. Et antecedens est concessum.
Igitur etc. 195
5.13. In principio, igitur, dicitur quod casus non est admittendus, quia adhuc non 200
intelligitur quid significet || ly A. Sed tamen, gratia disputationis, volo admittere E Giiii+3ra
casum illum et volo admisisse nisi argumenta petant talem di!cultatem. Deinde,
cum proponitur ‘tu es homo’, conceditur. Et consequenter conceditur quod tu es
A. Si tamen primo proponatur quod tu es A, negatur. Et negatur postea quod tu
sis homo. 205
Sed forte contra illam responsionem arguitur, quia numquam concedenda est
illa || in casu illo, scilicet ‘tu es A’: quia cedat tempus et arguitur quod infra P 72vb
tempus concessisti || propositionem quam non scivisti esse veram et quam non O 123vb
The third an final alternative is the denial of the whole consequence, based on the fact that it
should not count as a valid inference since it is not a syllogistic mood of the first figure (Darii)
because it has a negative minor premise. The point is unclear. Still, in the following lines, Peter
rejects the denial of the consequence by arguing that the minor should be rephrased into the
categorical a"rmative sentence ‘tu es nesciens’. In order to prove that the inference is sound,
Peter provides four arguments (i-iv).
194 I have not found a passage in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics with such an argument.
Apparently, the reference seems to be good, because a large part of the third book is devoted to
the analysis of the notions of ‘voluntary’ vs ‘involuntary’. Still, the argument seems to be lacking
in Aristotle’s text.
195 The first step of the disputation, i.e. the concession of the sentence ‘tu es homo’, comes
into play here: unfortunately the argument could hardly be less straightforward than this. In
particular, I do not see what reason, if any, can justify the claim that the inference ‘tu es homo;
igitur tu es nesciens te esse A’ is sound. It might depend on what ‘A’ means; but since we do
not know the meaning of ‘A’, we are not entitled to claim that someone’s being a man entails
that he does not know to be A.
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intellexisti, igitur male respondisti.196 Patet consequentia. Et arguitur antecedens
quia predicatum huius quam concessisti nihil tibi significabat infra tempus, quia 210
nec hominem nec asinum nec aliquid aliud apprehendebas per illum terminum.
Sed huic forte dicitur quod iste terminus A significavit tibi aliquid et tamen nihil
tibi significavit. Et apprehendebas per A aliquid et nihil per A apprehendebas.197
Sed contra: per idem per hoc participium grecum ‘on’ tu apprehendis aliquid
et nihil per ipsum apprehendis. Et sic quilibet alter terminus grecus, pari ratione, 215
significat tibi aliquid et nihil tibi significat, || posito quod de istis terminis advertas. L 73va
Quod si concedatur, concedendum est etiam quod tu sis multum sapiens et nescis
te esse sapientem.198
Ideo dicitur ad argumentum quod ille casus non fuit admittendus, sicut pro-
bat argumentum. Et fuit excusatio secunda, in principio, quod volebat admisisse 220
casum illum nisi argumenta petant di!cultatem de intellectione A.199
196 In this respect, cf. supra, sec. 5.10, Obj.5.
197 The observation hinges on the distinction between the compound and the divided sense of
a sentence. The two sentences ‘A significavit tibi aliquid’ and ‘nihil tibi significavit’ are perfectly
compatible, because the inference ‘A significavit tibi aliquid; igitur A aliquid tibi significavit’ is
not sound. Therefore, to put it in the standard terms of medieval logic, the opposite (i.e. the
contradictory) of the consequent is consistent with the antecedent, and they can be both asserted
together. Depending on the mutual position of the verbs ‘significare’, ‘apprehendere’ and of the
terms ‘aliquid’, ‘nihil’, what changes, in such kind of examples, is the supposition of the latter
which is determined by the scope of the verb. If the term falls within the scope of the verb, then
it has merely confused supposition, which in turn implies that the only descent allowed is nominal
disjunctive (the so-called descent de disiuncto extremo) to the e!ect that reference indeterminacy
is preserved. If, on the other hand, the term falls outside the scope of the verb, it has determinate
supposition, which implies that only propositional disjunctive descent is allowed, i.e. a conclusion
in the form of a disjunction of sentences instantiating the term in question (in the instantiating
sentences the term can be replaced by demonstrative pronouns in discrete supposition).
A similar point is made below with the well-known example involving the promise of a penny:
cf. infra, sec. 5.23.
198 There seems to be a bit of irony in this remark which is presumably based on the fact
that if one grants the sentence ‘apprehendo aliquid’, it does not follow that there is anything in
particular of which one is entitled to say that he has apprehended it. Consequently, no matter
how many things are said to be apprehended or known in the compound sense, unawareness of
one’s being in such a state of knowledge is always round the corner in the divided sense.
199 The solution to this sophism, in the end, consists in a rejection of the casus, despite the
attempt, made for the sake of argument, to evaluate a range of alternative paths.
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5.14. Item, ponatur quod predicatum in ista ‘omnis homo est animal’ supponat
determinate, cuiuslibet alterius termini manente significatione, preter hoc quod ly
‘omnis’ non confundat predicatum confuse tantum.200 Et significet illa propositio
200 This is the first of a sequence of sophisms concerning the application of supposition theory
within the obligational context. In these examples, stipulations are relative to the modes of
supposition of certain terms. A term that is usually assumed to have a given mode of supposition,
in the context of a sentence, is assigned another mode in the initial statement of the casus.
As a result of such variations, the standard application of rules of ascensus and descensus
fails or, at least, turns out to be profoundly di!erent from what we are accustomed to. In the
present sophism, for instance, it is assumed that the predicate term occurring in the sentence
‘omnis homo est animal’ is in determinate supposition, which is contrary to the standard prac-
tice since (cf. infra the first rule governing the supposition of universal signs), terms such as
‘omnis’ usually cause the predicate of a universal a"rmative sentence to be in merely confused
supposition (the subject having, in turn, suppositio confusa distributiva). A similar set of pro-
blems is also dealt with in the final part of Peter’s treatise on consequences, cf. Tractatus de
consequentiis [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Fivva-vb], where he takes into account the question
whether “a singularibus su"cienter enumeratis ad suam universalem valet consequentia”. Peter’s
answer to the question is negative, cf. [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Fivvb] “Et ideo ad dubium
dicitur quod a singularibus su"cienter enumeratis non adducitur sua universalis de forma, nec
a singularibus su"cienter enumeratis cum ‘!et" sic de omnibus singulis’ vel cum tali constantia
‘et isti sunt omnes homines’ vel ‘omnia animalia’, quia fallit in exclusivis, in exceptivis, in de-
struentibus se, in propositionibus cum terminis ad actum mentis pertinentibus precedentibus –
ut ‘promittitur’, ‘cognoscitur’ etc. – et modalibus. Et non valet [et non valet] generaliter prece-
dente termino compositionem importantem, ut sunt tales ‘incipit et ‘desinit’. Nec valet de forma
ubi fuerit propositio universalis in qua predicatum supponat non confuse tantum”. In support of
the conclusion that, in some cases, the inference from all singular instances of a sentence to the
corresponding universally quantified sentence is not valid, Peter provides, as usual, a number of
arguments. Some of them closely recall what we find in this part of the section devoted to impo-
sitio. This approach confirms the suggestion of a connection, in Peter’s Logica, between various
logical doctrines and the frequent use of an obligational environment to test their admissibility
(if you claim that this is the case; you will have to defend it in an obligatio).
In order to facilitate a better understanding of the chain of arguments presented in the following
sections, I deem it useful to recall, at this point, a number of (somewhat long) excerpts taken
from Peter’s treatise on supposition, in particular his definitions of the various modes and the
corresponding rules of ascent and descent. A preliminary disclaimer is in order: Peter accepts only
personal supposition (and rejects both simple and material supposition) Here is how he defines
suppositio personalis and its subtypes, cf. Tractatus de suppositionibus, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a,
Aiivb-Aiiira]:
“[Definition of personal supposition] Suppositio personalis est statio termini in oratione con-
nexi significative sumpti, pro supposito aut suppositis pro quo vel pro quibus transit vis termini
in ipsum a quo habet ut supponat, et quia nulla suppositio est nisi personalis, ideo potest dici
pro regula quod omnis terminus supponens supponit personaliter.
[Division of personal supposition] Suppositionum autem personalium alia communis, alia
discreta.
[Definition of discrete supposition] Suppositio discreta est statio termini discreti aut termini
communis cum pronomine demonstrativo discreto pro supposito vel suppositis pro quo vel pro
222 in ista ] istius O 222 omnis ] quilibet O 223 manente ] remanente O
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ex compositione suorum terminorum. Deinde proponatur illa ‘omnis homo est 225
animal’.
!Obj.1" Que si conceditur, arguitur sic: omnis homo est animal; et ista sunt
omnia || animalia, demonstratis omnibus animalibus; igitur omnis homo est illud V 78rb
animal vel omnis homo est illud animal et sic de || aliis. Consequens est falsum. M 91va
Et illa consequentia est bona, quia ly ‘animal’ supponit determinate, sub quo 230
licet descendere ad omnia sua supposita cum debito medio disiunctive.201 Igitur
quibus transit in ipsum vis termini a quo habet ut supponat. Et dico cum pronomine demonstra-
tivo discreto propter tales terminos ‘taliter’, ‘talis’, ‘tantus’ etc. qui non faciunt propositiones
singulares. Unde illa est indefinita, demonstrato te albo, ‘talis homo currit’ quamvis subiciatur
terminus communis cum signo demonstrativo.
[Definition of common supposition] Suppositio personalis communis est statio termini com-
munis pro supposito vel suppositis pro quo vel pro quibus in ipsum transit vis termini a quo
habet ut supponat. Suppositionum communium personalium alia confusa tantum, alia confusa
et distributiva, alia determinata.
[Definition of merely confused supposition] Suppositio confusa tantum est statio termini com-
munis pro supposito vel suppositis pro quo vel pro quibus in ipsum transit vis termini a quo habet
ut supponat, sic quod sub illo virtute illius suppositionis licet descendere cum debita constantia
disiunctim aut copulatim ad sua singularia, si plura supposita habet, et non semper disiunctim
nec semper copulatim. Unde non sequitur ‘omnis homo di!ert ab omni homine; et isti sunt
omnes homines; ergo omnis homo di!ert ab illo vel ab illo etc.’ Consequens enim est falsum,
quia omnis homo est iste vel iste et sic de singulis, sed bene concluditur ex illo antecedente quod
omnis homo di!ert ab illo et ab illo homine etc.
[Definition of confuse and distributed supposition] Suppositio confusa et distributiva est statio
termini communis pro supposito vel pro suppositis pro quo vel pro quibus transit vis termini
in ipsum a quo habet ut supponat ille terminus super quem cadit vis termini ipsum habentis
distribuere. [. . . ]
[Definition of determinate supposition] Suppositio determinata est statio termini communis
pro supposito vel suppositis pro quo vel pro quibus in ipsum transit vis termini a quo habet ut
supponat, sic quod sub illo termino licet descendere disiunctive ad omnia sua singularia si plura
supposita habuerit – et non aliunde fuerit impeditus sicut sit in exceptivis – ut Sor est hoc”.
Besides definitions, it will come in useful to recall the rule that comes into play in the present
sophism. Peter’s first rule of suppositio reads: “Prima regula: omne signum universale a"rmati-
vum, ut ly ‘quilibet’, ly ‘omnis’ etc., non equivalens orationi, distribuit terminum sequentem cui
immediate additur et eius determinationem nisi impediatur, ut ‘quilibet asinus hominis currit’.
Tam ly ‘asinus’ quam ly ‘’hominis’ supponit confuse distributive. Sed terminos mediate sequen-
tes ab illo termino rectos, a quo illud signum regitur, confundit confuse tantum, dummodo illi
termini sint confundibiles et supponentes”, cf. [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Aiiira].
For an extensive discussion of several historical and conceptual issues connected with suppo-
sition theory (along with an analysis of the rules of ascent and descent) cf. [Spade, 1996, pp.
245–303].
201 Notice that here, in virtue of the stipulation made above, the type of descent at work is
the one which is allowed in the case of determinate supposition, namely propositional disjunctive
descent (if this were a standard situation one would expect the term ‘animal’ to be in merely
confused supposition which allows only for nominal disjunctive descent, i.e. the so-called inference
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antecedens est falsum: et non pro secunda parte, igitur pro prima parte.
!Obj.2" Vel brevius arguitur: concesso primo illam in tempore obligationis, ce-
dat tempus obligationis. Et arguitur: in tempore concessisti illam falsam non
sequentem, igitur male respondisti. 235
!Obj.3" Ideo si primo negatur ista ‘omnis homo est animal’, arguitur sic: iste
homo est animal et iste homo est animal et sic de singulis; et isti sunt omnes
homines; igitur omnis homo est animal. Illa consequentia patet a singularibus ad
suam universalem cum debito medio; et antecedens est verum; igitur et consequens.
de disiuncto extremo where the disjunction operator ranges over a set of terms that constitute,
disjunctively, the predicate).
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!Obj.4" Item, homo est animal; et nihil est homo non animal; igitur omnis 240
homo est animal. Consequentia patet a copulativa exponente ad suam expositam;
et antecedens est verum; igitur et consequens. || Et non est repugnans quod negas, O 124ra
ergo male respondes.202
202 The sophism has the following structure:
P Predicatum in ista ‘omnis homo est animal’
supponit determinate, cuiuslibet alterius
termini manente significatione, preter hoc
quod ly ‘omnis’ non confundit predicatum
confuse tantum
A possible
1.1 Omnis homo est animal C irrelevant and true
2. Omnis homo est animal; et ista sunt om-
nia animalia, demonstratis omnibus anima-
libus; igitur omnis homo est illud animal vel
omnis homo est illud animal et sic de aliis
C ( valid inference (the de-
scent is justified on the
assumption that ‘animal’
has determinate supposi-
tion); false consequent; by
contraposition, denial of
‘omnis homo est animal’,
which is inconsistent with
1.1
1.2 Omnis homo est animal N
3. Iste homo est animal et iste homo est ani-
mal et sic de singulis; et isti sunt omnes
homines; igitur omnis homo est animal
C ( valid inference (cf. ‘a sin-
gularibus ad suam universa-
lem’); true antecedent; the
consequent is incompatibly
relevant to 1.2
4. Homo est animal et nihil est homo non
animal; igitur omnis homo est animal
C ( valid inference (cf. ‘a co-
pulativa exponente ad suam
expositam’); true antece-
dent; the consequent is in-
compatibly relevant to 1.2
The first two objections, Obj.1 and Obj.2, argue against the concession of the sentence ‘omnis
homo est animal’. Note that the former objection is supposed to take place within the time of
the obligation through the proposal of one or more sentences (it depends on whether we decide
to split step 2. into several steps or not; for the sake of brevity I have decided to present it
in the shorter form, although probably it would be more appropriate to propose each sentence
in turn). The latter objection, by contrast, is raised outside the time, immediately after the
concession of ‘omnis homo est animal’. They are both meant to show that granting this sentence
raises di"culties, but it is always important to keep in mind that there is a structural di!erence
between arguments that are put forward in the form of sequences of sentences within the time of
the obligation and those that come along outside the time (for example sentences like ‘tu male
respondes’ may be well granted in the former case, but must never be granted in the latter).
Let us have a quick look at the content of Peter’s argument. Let h stand for the common term
‘homo’, a for the common term ‘animal’; then let h1, h2, . . . , hn stand for individual men and
a1, a2, . . . , an for individual animals. In the standard case, the sentence ‘omnis homo est animal’
can be rephrased as follows:
240 omnis ] non praep. O 241 patet ] tenet O
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(1) Omnis homo est (a1 % a2 % . . . % an)
This is a rephrasing of the sentence ‘omnis homo est animal’, where the term ‘animal’ which was
in merely confused supposition in the original, is now replaced by a disjoint predicate, according
to the only inference we are entitled to make, namely to a sentence of the same structure, in
which the predicate term is replaced by the disjunction of singular terms that instantiate it (the
logical status of a disjoint predicate of such a sort is not completely unproblematic, but I will
not face the problem here). In the present sophism, however, on account of the stipulation it is
not (1) the sentence that comes into play, but rather the following one:
(2) (Omnis homo est a1) % (Omnis homo est a2) % . . .% (Omnis homo est an)
This is how ‘omnis homo est animal’ should be read if ‘animal’ has determinate supposition: the
inference allows for descent to a disjunction of sentences in which the term in question is replaced
by all of its individual instances. Just to make things clearer, it may be useful to recall in what
sense the situation represented in the sophism is counter-intuitive and di!ers from the standard
assumptions. Normally, the reading of the sentence ‘omnis homo est animal’ would imply that
the following holds:
(3) (h1 est animal) $ (h2 est animal) $ . . .$ (hn est animal)
Now, (3) is a conjunction that can be inferred on the grounds that the term ‘homo’ in the
original sentence ‘omnis homo est animal’ stands in confused and distributive supposition, which
allows for descent to a conjunction of sentences where h is replaced by its individual instances.
What is the status of the term ‘animal’ in each conjunct of (3)? In this sentence, its mode
of supposition changes: the predicate is no longer (as in ‘omnis homo est animal’) in merely
confused supposition, because the term ‘omnis’ has been distributed onto the whole conjunction,
and now ‘animal’ occurs as a predicate in sentences of a di!erent logical form. In the conjuncts of
(3), it is in determinate supposition. This entails, in turn, that each conjunct of (3) is equivalent
to the following disjunction:
(3.i) (hi est a1) % (hi est a2) % . . . (hi est an)
where we finally have a disjunction of identities (here the copula ‘est’ actually stands for =) with
the guarantee that one of them is true, provided that the sequence a1, . . . , an coincides with the
whole set of individual animals. In the end, therefore, (3) is equivalent to:
(3.1) (h1 est a1) % (h1 est a2) % . . .% (h1 est an)
$





(3.m) (hm est a1) % (hm est a2) % . . .% (hm est an)
Let us now turn back to the objections. Obj.1 argues that the consequence proposed at step
2. of the disputation outlined above is valid, on the assumption that ‘animal’ has determinate
supposition; hence one can draw a conclusion of the form of (2). But this is obviously false,
because the resulting reading would be untenable (all men would be a single individual animal,
no matter what instance we pick out). Therefore, if we deny this conclusion, it turns out that
the antecedent, too, should be rejected by contraposition, and in particular its first part (i.e.
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5.15. Ideo dicitur in principio, quando ponitur203 illa ‘omnis homo est animal’,
negando illam. 245
!RObj.3" Et negatur ista consequentia ‘iste homo est animal et iste homo est
animal et sic de singulis; et isti sunt omnes homines; igitur omis homo est ani-
mal’. Nec illa regula ‘a singularibus ad suam universalem valet consequentia’ est
universalis: et unus de casibus in quibus || fallit est quando predicatum supponit P 73ra
communiter non confuse. 250
Et si queratur que universalis sequitur ex illis singularibus cum illo debito me-
dio, dicitur quod illa questio est multum impertinens. Dicitur tamen quod multe
sunt universales que sequuntur ex illis singularibus cum illo medio, quia ex illis
singularibus sequitur quod omnis homo est ens et quod omnis homo est substantia
et quod omnis homo sit ipsemet.204 255
the sentence ‘omnis homo currit’) since the second part is just a true factual claim about the
enumeration of the individuals falling under the term ‘animal’. As to Obj.2, the idea is that
‘omnis homo est animal’ is also false in itself, at least as long as the underlying interpretation
of it depends on the assumption that the term ‘animal’ has determinate supposition: it is false
because in fact it would mean either that every man is this animal or that every man is that
animal and so on, but it is simply false that every man is, for instance, Socrates or that every
man is the ass Brunellus and so forth. The first pair of objections, therefore hits the target:
‘omnis homo est animal’ should not be granted.
The second pair of objections, Obj.3 and Obj.4, is supposed to do the same job with respect
to the denial of ‘omnis homo est animal’, proposed in the first place, with the aim of showing
that this reply is incorrect as well as the first one. In this case, as we will see shortly, the
arguments are only apparently sound, because they in fact rely on the standard rules of descent
and ascent, as if no stipulation had been made. I shall discuss the point in the analysis of the
solution provided in the next section.
203 Like on other occasions, the incunable makes some confusion between ‘pono’ and ‘propono’.
The correct reading here, as in O, is ‘proponitur’, for the sentence is put forward in the course
of the disputation (and it is not the positum).
204 The solution to the sophism consists in admitting the casus and then replying negatively
to the first propositum ‘omnis homo est animal’. As has been just recalled, two objections are
raised against this reply: the first one is dealt with and dismissed here, while the second will
be the object of analysis a few sections below, cf. infra, sec. 5.18. In that place, Peter uses the
words ‘ad secundam formam’, but he is obviously referring to what in my reconstruction of the
argument turns out to be the fourth objection. The explanation is easy: Peter in fact regards the
arguments of Obj.1 and Obj.2 as good points against the concession of ‘omnis homo est animal’.
Therefore, the only two arguments he feels the need to take into account, as real objections, are
the last two arguments of my reconstruction (Obj.3 and 4.), i.e. the two objections against the
solution he is willing to support (denial of ‘omnis homo est animal’).
As far as Obj.3 is concerned, the point is that an inference, which would normally be accepted
as sound, turns out to be invalid, under certain conditions such as the modification of the
properties of a term. In particular, the conjunction of sentences containing all singular instances
244 ponitur ] proponitur O 247 et . . . homines ] om. O 248 suam ] om. O
248–249 valet . . . universalis ] om. O 249 in quibus ] quando O 249 predicatum ] add.
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of a given common term does not entail the corresponding universally quantified sentence (i.e.
the sentence containing the term ‘omnis’). Peter does not dwell on it, but I think that his claim
‘nec illa regula ‘a singularibus ad suam universalem valet consequentia’ est universalis: et unus
de casibus in quibus fallit est quando predicatum supponit communiter non confuse’ gives a hint
to work out the right interpretation of this passage. Let us recall the array-like development of
the original sentence ‘omnis homo est animal’ introduced above (I will label it, for the sake of
brevity, (Exp)):
(3.1) (h1 est a1) % (h1 est a2) % . . .% (h1 est an)
$





(3.m) (hm est a1) % (hm est a2) % . . .% (hm est an)
This a conjunction of disjunctions (each member of the disjunctions being an identity statement)
which is equivalent to the sentence ‘omnis homo est animal’ when the subject term and the pre-
dicate term, in the latter, have their standard mode of supposition (confuse and distributive and
merely confused supposition, respectively). The inference ‘a singularibus ad suam universalem’
fits in this structure because it consists in the reverse process: from the conjuction of all instances
to the original universally quantified sentence, with the predicate in merely confused supposi-
tion. Yet, in the present case, we have stipulated that the universally quantified sentence ‘omnis
homo est animal’ must not be read as if its predicate were in merely confused supposition, but
rather as if it were in determinate supposition: therefore the conjunction of all singular instances
cannot yield the sentence ‘omnis homo est animal’ and, at the same, time fulfill the requirement
that ‘animal’, in that sentence, is in determinate supposition. The inference would just yield
the sentence ‘omnis homo est animal’ with the standard modes of supposition, which is not the
sentence we are supposed to be replying to in this disputation.
Moreover, there is an extremely interesting fact to note about (Exp). It can be proved that
this conjunction of disjunctions does not entail the sentence ‘omnis homo est animal’ with the
determinate supposition reading either. Let us see how the proof works. First, let us take the
conjunction of all the first disjuncts of each row, then the conjunction of all the second disjuncts
of each row and so forth. What we get is, basically, a sequence of conjunctions, each of which
corresponds to a column of the array. The conjunction of all members of an arbitrary column i
is a sentence of the following form:
(i) (h1 est ai) $ (h2 est ai) $ . . .$ (hm est ai)
which in turn is equivalent to the sentence ‘omnis homo est ai’. Now take the disjunction of
all i-columns. What we obtain is the following sentence (I will label it (Det) after determinate
supposition):
(Omnis homo est a1) % (Omnis homo est est a2) % . . .% (Omnis homo est est an)
which is in fact equivalent to the sentence ‘omnis homo est animal’ with the predicate term in
determinate supposition. Now, if we can prove that there is a model which verifies (Exp) but
does not verify (Det), then we will have a guarantee that the former does not entail the latter. In
order for (Exp) to be true, we just need a true disjunct for each row (every row will then be true,
thereby guaranteeing the truth of the whole conjunction). In order for (Det) to be true, on the
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5.16. Et sicut dictum est de ista ‘omnis homo est animal’ || in casu illo, ita B 100va
dicendum est de ista ‘aliquis homo est [animal] et quilibet homo est ille’ posito
quod ly ‘ille’ supponat determinate. Unde secunda eius pars copulative est falsa et
tamen quelibet singularis illius universalis est vera, quia quelibet singularis illius,
other hand, we would need the truth of at least one column. But each column is a conjunction,
therefore, we need that all members of at least one column be true at one and the same time.
There is an easy way to find a model that fulfills the requirement for (Exp) but does not fulfill
the requirement for (Det). It goes by diagonalization. Let us assume that the arbitrary sentence
(hi est aj) is true if and only if i = j. Now, the truth of (Exp) is easy to ascertain: the first row
is true in virtue of its first element, the second row in virtue of its second element and so on and
so forth. As far as (Det) is concerned, by contrast, it will never be true in this model, beacuse
the model is not su"cient to make any of its disjuncts true. Recall that (Det) is a disjunction
of conjunctions, therefore in order for it to be true, the truth of at least one conjunction would
be required (i.e. the truth of at least one sentence of the form ‘omnis homo est ai’). But this, in
turn, would require the truth of all singular instances (the truth of all members of an i-column).
The model however guarantees the truth of only one element for each column, which is by far
insu"cient. Therefore, (Exp) is true and (Det) false in the model, which proves that the latter
is not logically entaild by the former.
But then, what is going on here? Against the objection that the commonly accepted inference
from the conjunction of all singular instances of a sentence to the corresponding universally
quantified sentence is valid, we are told that this is the case only when the term ‘omnis’ has
its usual meaning (I will take ‘meaning’ in a very loose sense here and in the following: strictly
speaking, syncategorematic terms do not signify as categorematic terms do; we could also say
that it does not have its usual properties). And this depends in turn on whether or not the
mechanism of suppositio works in the standard way. Now, the interesting fact is, in my opinion,
that this type of example is discussed within the context of sophisms on impositio. In the case
of syncategorematic terms such as ‘omnis’, a modification of meaning is equivalent to redefining
the behaviour of their logical properties. The ordinary interpretation of ‘omnis’ implies that in
any sentence in which the term occurs, the predicate term has merely confused supposition. If
I want to shu#e the cards and make things a little more complicated, I can therefore stipulate
that the mode of supposition of the predicate term di!ers with respect to the ordinary usage.
At this point, familiar inferences turn out to fail. If a new impositio is made that modifies
the ordinary meaning of ‘omnis’, then the corresponding logical properties associated with the
original meaning will be modified as well. The new impositio stipulates that the predicate in a
universal a"rmative sentence falling within the scope of ‘omnis’ has, contrary to the standard
practice, determinate supposition. This is the variation of meaning that takes place here, and
this is why Peter inserts this kind of discussions in his section on impositio. It is all about
determining how to react when a change in the meaning of something is made: in the case of
sentences or nouns that are assigned a new signification, the process normally requires that we
know how to adjust the attribution of truth values according to the stipulations; in the case of
syncategorematic terms, it also requires us to take into account the modifications of the logical
properties (e.g. inferences that were previously valid and that now become invalid or the other
way around) that the terms in question are supposed to convey to the sentences in which they
occur.
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divisim capta, est vera cum prima parte et sequitur bene: quelibet singularis illius 260
divisim capta est vera, igitur quelibet singularis istius est vera.205
205 The sophism is supposed to go along the same lines of the previous one, the only di!erence
being here the presence of a relative term (as is well known, the doctrine of relatives involves
specific rules to govern the supposition of anaphoric expressions in function of the supposition of
their antecedents). Peter makes a few cursory remarks that do not explain in full all the details
of the parallel with the previous case. I shall just point out some issues. First, let the sentence
‘aliquis homo est et quilibet homo est ille’ be posited, along with the assumption that ‘ille’
has determinate supposition. Peter claims that the second conjunct, consisting in the universal
a"rmative ‘quilibet homo est ille’, is false although all of its singular instances are true divisim
(i.e. if taken in turn one after another) in conjunction with ‘aliquis homo est’. The universal
sentence, however, cannot be true jointly with ‘aliquis homo est’ because the relative term ‘ille’
has determinate supposition. This implies that the intended interpretation of ‘quilibet homo est
ille’ is:
(Quilibet homo est ille1) % (Quilibet homo est ille2) % . . .% (Quilibet homo est illen)
On this reading, however, the sentence is obviously false. What Peter claims to be true, on the
other hand, are all singular sentences instantiating ‘quilibet homo est ille’ together with ‘aliquis
homo est’. What is the justification of this view? I think that Peter takes all elements of the
following sequence of conjunctions:
(1) (Aliquis homo est) $ (h1 est ille)
(2) (Aliquis homo est) $ (h2 est ille)
...
...
(n) (Aliquis homo est) $ (hn est ille)
to be true. To understand why, it is su"cient to consider the first one. In the second conjunct
(= ‘h1 est ille’), the relative term ‘ille’ stands in determinate supposition; therefore the sentence
is further analyzable into the disjunction:
(h1 est ille1) % (h1 est ille2) % . . .% (h1 est illem)
Now, if there is a man (and there must be at least one, since the sentence ‘aliquis homo est’
is assumed to be true) we can be sure that one of the above disjuncts is verified. By going
through the list of the m individuals that are indicated through ‘ille’, we will sooner or later
come accross the one that we need, or in other words, we will pick out in the sequence ille1,. . . ,
illem the relative that stands for the same individual that verifies ‘aliquis homo est’ (this is just
a generalization of the example with the three singular sentences A, B, C that Peter mentions
in this passage).
If that were the end of the story we might be content with this solution. There are, however,
two problems. The first one is that this interpretation does not completely fit the text. I really
see no way to make sense of the claim that ‘quattuor vera divisim capta vel quecumque non
componunt copulativam falsam significantem ex compositione illorum’. The insertion seems to
be out of place in the context of this argument. Second, it is also di"cult to maintain, on the
one hand, the claim that all singular instances of ‘quilibet homo est ille’ are separately true
with the sentence ‘aliquis homo est’ and, on the other hand, the assumption that ‘ille’ in the
universal sentence is in determinate supposition. The point is that in the standard case, the
260–261 et . . . vera ] om. O
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term ‘ille’ in each of the i-conjunctions laid down above (cf. ‘aliquis homo est $ hi est ille’) can
refer to a di!erent individual. But even if, at each row, ‘ille’ picks out a di!erent individual,
this is perfectly su"cient to make both members of any i-conjunction true. The casus of this
sophism, by contrast, implies that the reference of ‘ille’ is one and the same individual for all
i-conjunctions at one and the same time. I suspect that if we were to take the assumption at face
value, therefore, we would no longer be entitled to claim that the singular instances of ‘quilibet
homo est ille’ are all true divisim with the conjunct ‘aliquis homo est’. The di"culty rests on
that, presumably, what Peter passes o! as singular instances of the sentence ‘quilibet homo est
ille’, in fact are not its singular instances. The reason is that the term ‘ille’ is assumed to occur
in determinate supposition, which implies in turn that we can first descend to a sentence of the
following form:
(Quilibet homo est ille1) % (Quilibet homo est ille2) % . . .% (Quilibet homo est illem)
and secondly to the following singulares (the procedure holds, again, for each disjunct):
(h1 est illei) $ (h2 est illei) $ . . .$ (hn est illei)
Now, these are the singular instances of the sentence ‘quilibet homo est ille’ which is convertible
with their conjunction for an appropriately chosen i. If we turn back to the argument, though,
a problem immediately arises. The possibility for all sentences of the form ‘hj est ille’ to be
separately true in conjunction with ‘aliquis homo est’ depended upon the fact that the reference
of ‘ille’ was not fixed once and for all and that the demonstrative could pick out a di!erent
individual at each step. And this in turn depended on the fact that, at each step j, the occurrence
of ‘ille’ in sentences of the form ‘hj est ille’ did not refer to an individual fixed once and for all,
but could still be analyzed by means of a disjunction of sentences. Yet, on the assumption of the
casus, the situation is rather like this:
(1) (Aliquis homo est) $ (h1 est illei)
(2) (Aliquis homo est) $ (h2 est illei)
...
...
(n) (Aliquis homo est) $ (hn est illei)
I venture that, on this reading, there is at most one sentence of the form (hj est illei), for a fixed
i, which is true; but the claim that all singular instances are true together with ‘aliquis homo
est’ is plainly untenable. What are we to do then? I am inclined to think that Peter is aware of
the problem and therefore requires us to assume that the singular instances of ‘quilibet homo est
ille’ remain the same as if no change of the logical properties of the terms involved in the original
sentence had been made. I am tempted to regard the concluding remark of the argument as a
piece of evidence in support of this claim, cf. ‘pono enim quod ita significent ille singulares, dum
sunt coniuncte cum illa particulari [scil. ‘aliquis homo est’], sicut significabant : aliter enim non
essent vel ante non fuissent singulares illius [scil. of the universal sentence ‘quilibet homo est
ille’]’.
Finally, it must be noted, that an elaborate discussion of these kind of sentences is
also found, as one might expect, in Peter’s treatise on relatives, cf. Tractatus de relati-
vis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Avva]. Several sentences that are discussed here, including
the present sophism, are analyzed in that context too; nontheless the text on relatives is not of
much help because the discussion is quite intricate in that place as well.
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|| Item si quelibet singularis il-||lius divisim capta est vera, habeat igitur illa M 91vb
universalis ‘quilibet homo est ille’ supposita tria et tres singulares, puta A, B, C. E Giiii+3rb
Tunc A est vera cum || prima parte divisim; et B vera cum prima parte divisim; L 73vb
et etiam C est vera cum prima parte divisim. Sed quattuor vera divisim capta 265
vel quecumque non componunt copulativam falsam significantem ex compositione
illorum, quia verum numquam repugnat vero. Igitur illa copulativa facta ex illis
singularibus cum prima parte erit vera. Pono nam quod ita significent ille singu-
lares, dum sunt coniuncte cum illa particulari, sicut significabant: aliter nam iam
non essent vel ante non fuissent singulares illius. 270
262 Item . . . vera ] om. O 263 universalis ] om. O 264 divisim ] om. O 264 vera ]
est praep. O 264 divisim ] om. O 265–266 et . . . quecumque ] sequitur igitur, cum verum
non repugnat vero, quod ille cum prima parte O 267 illorum ] suorum et terminorum add.
O 267 quia . . . vero ] transp. O 267–268 Igitur . . . vera ] om. O 268 nam ] igitur O
268 quod ] om. O 269 dum ] ille add. O 269 significabant ] significabat et ex. add. O
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5.17. Et sicut dictum est de illa copulativa ‘aliquis homo est et quilibet homo est
ille’, || ita dicendum est de illa ‘aliquid est et nihil est illud’ dato quod ly ‘illud’ V 78va
supponat determinate. Et tunc sequitur quod illa est falsa pro secunda parte;
neque secunda pars sequitur ex singularibus, quarum quelibet est vera cum prima
parte.206 275
5.18. !RObj.4" Sed ad secundam formam207 dicitur negando illam consequentiam
‘homo est animal; et nihil est homo non animal; igitur omnis homo est animal’. Et
negatur quod illa sit copulativa exponens illam.208 Et si queratur que sit copulativa
exponens illam, dicitur quod illa potest poni209 per hunc modum: homo est animal;
et nihil est animal quin illud sit omnis homo; igitur omnis homo est animal.210 280
Et si iterum arguitur quod ista vocalis sit vera ‘omnis homo est animal’, quia
mentalis cui illa subordinatur est vera, igitur ista est vera, quia ista mentalis est
206 This is a variation on the same theme of the last two sophisms, in particular of the
immediately preceding one. Again, it is the universal sentence (in this case ‘nihil est illud’)
that is false, on the assumption that the relative term has determinate supposition. And, again,
it cannot be claimed that the sentence can be proved to be true because all of its singular
instantiating sentences are true, for the universal sentence in which the relative term features
in determinate supposition, simply does not follow from the conjunction of all of its singular
instances (presumably, the term would have to be in merely confused supposition in order for
the inference to be sound).
207 Cf. supra 5.14, reply to Obj.3.
208 I.e. it is denied that the conjunction ‘homo est animal et nihil est homo non animal’
is a correct expositio of the sentence ‘omnis homo est animal’, under the assumption that the
predicate ‘animal’, occurring in the latter, is in determinate supposition.
209 Presumably, the correct reading is ‘exponi’, as is confirmed by O.
210 This is a reply to the fourth objection to the sophism discussed previously, cf. su-
pra, sec. 5.14. The objection, that we had left aside for a moment, runs as follows: there is
a sound inference from the conjunction of a pair of sentences that are the exponentes of ‘omnis
homo est animal’; and the two sentences are true, therefore ‘omnis homo est animal’ is true as
well; but the respondent has denied it, therefore he has replied incorrectly (cf. the remark at
the end of sec. 5.14, Obj.4 ‘et non est repugnans [scil. the consequent ‘omnis homo est animal’]
quod negas, ergo male respondes’).
Once more, the fulcrum of the argument, in the reply, is the non-admissibility of a standard
inference, as a result of the new stipulations of meaning and logical properties of a term. Here
the point is the relation that a sentence bears to its exponentes (i.e. logically equivalent sentences
where, for instance, a given categorematic term, occurring in the original sentence, is explained
away). The inference from a sentence p to another sentence q, that in a standard situation would
count as equivalent to the former, fails under specific assumptions such as the variations of the
familiar modes of supposition of the terms involved are. In the present case, for instance, the
expositio proposed in Obj.4 is incorrect, because it rests on the hypothesis that everything has
its usual logical properties. But in virtue of the new impositio, the correct expositio presupposes
a di!erent reading, such as the one provided in this reply.
273 Et . . . sequitur ] om. O 274 singularibus ] suis praep.O 274–275 quarum . . . parte ]
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vera ‘omnis homo est animal’ cui subordinatur ista, dicitur quod illa vocalis non
subordinatur illi sed isti ‘animal omnis homo est’, || intelligendo tamen ly ‘animal’ O 124rb
a parte predicati et ly ‘homo’ a parte subiecti.211 285
5.19. Item, ponatur quod predicatum illius ‘nullus homo est animal’ stet determi-
nate, cuiuslibet alterius termini significatione remanente et illa propositione signi-
ficante ex compositione suorum terminorum. || Deinde proponitur ‘nullus homo P 73rb
est animal’.|| M 92ra
Si negas, negas verum non repugnans, igitur male respondes. Hec consequentia 290
patet. Et arguitur antecedens, quia bene sequitur ‘nullus homo est illud animal
vel nullus homo est illud animal; et illa sunt omnia animalia; igitur nullus homo
est animal’. Consequentia patet a descensu termini ad eius ascensum.212
Item, illa significat omnino sicut illa ‘animal nullus homo est’; sed hec est vera;
igitur et illa.213 295
Ideo forte conceditur illa ‘nullus homo est animal’.
!Obj.1" Sed contra: aliquis homo est animal, igitur non nullus homo est animal.
Tenet consequentia ab uno equipollenti ad aliud, quia ly ‘aliquis’ et ‘non nullus’
equivalent.214
!Obj.2" Item, contraria illius est vera, scilicet ‘quilibet homo est animal’; igitur 300
illa non est vera ‘nullus homo est animal. Vel sequitur quod duo contraria sunt
vera.215
211 A similar use of the term ‘subordinatur’, in connection with mental propositions in the
context of impositio, is found in [Brinkley, 1995, p. 34].
212 The inference relies on the assumption, contrary to the standard doctrine, that in a
sentence such as ‘nullus homo est animal’ the predicate term has determinate supposition instead
of confused and distributive supposition.
213 Again, assuming that the predicate term has determinate supposition implies that the
original sentence can be replaced by a disjunction of universal negative sentences having the
same subject (i.e. ‘homo’) and such that in each of them the original predicate term is replaced
by an individual instance. This in turn implies that for the whole disjunction to be true, there
need to be one true disjunct. But each disjunct has the form ‘nullus homo est ai’. This sentence
is true if and only if there is one individual animal such that no man is that animal, which is
expressed by Peter by reversing the order of words to produce the sentence ‘animal nullus homo
est’.
214 The objection relies on a standard inference based on the interchangeability of ‘non nullus’
and ‘aliquis’. Cf. Tractatus de equipollentiis, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Eivvb].
215 This objection and the following one are based on the square of opposition.
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!Obj.3" Item, si nullus homo est animal, aliquis homo non est animal. Tenet
consequentia ab universali ad particularem. Et ex alia parte quilibet homo est
animal. Igitur contradictio. 305
Item, si aliquis homo non est animal, igitur non quilibet homo est animal. Tenet
consequentia ab equipollenti ad aliud.216
216 This is the structure of the sophism:
I Predicatum illius ‘nullus homo est animal’
stet determinate, cuiuslibet alterius termi-
ni significatione remanente et illa proposi-
tione significante ex compositione suorum
terminorum
A possible
1.1 Nullus homo est animal N
2. Negas verum non repugnans, igitur male
respondes
C ( valid inference with true
antecedent
3. Illa significat omnino sicut illa ‘animal nul-
lus homo est’; sed hec est vera; igitur et
illa
C ( valid inference with true
antecedent
1.2 Nullus homo est animal C
4. Aliquis homo est animal; igitur non nullus
homo est animal
C ( valid inference, whose con-
sequent is inconsistent with
1.2 (cf. Obj.1)
5. Contraria illius est vera, scilicet ‘quilibet
homo est animal’; igitur illa non est vera
‘nullus homo est animal’
C ( valid inference, whose con-
sequent is inconsistent with
1.2 (cf. Obj.2)
6. Si nullus homo est animal, aliquis homo non
est animal
C ( inconsistent with ‘quilibet
homo est animal (cf. Obj.3)
The sophism consists of two groups of arguments focusing on the denial and concession of the
first propositum ‘nullus homo est animal’, put forward in the first place. The first two arguments
are raised against its denial and are regarded by Peter as sound. The sentence therefore is
presumably to be conceded. In this connection, three objections are raised (cf. Obj.1–3). In the
next section Peter dismisses them all and provides his solution to the whole argument.
The interesting feature of this sophism and of the one presented in sec. 5.21 is that the kind
of situations they represent is complementary with respect to those analyzed in the sophisms of
sec. 5.14–5.16. In those cases, the sentences that were a!ected by a variation of the standard
modes of supposition were universal a"rmative (merely confused supposition of the predicate
term was substituted by determinate supposition). Here, on the other hand, Peter takes into
account two examples of universal negative sentences, whose predicate normally is in confused
and distributive supposition, and again replaces the standard mode with determinate supposition
(cf. infra, sec. 5.20 RObj.1 ‘vis istius termini ‘nullus’ est distribuere terminum communem sup-
ponentem rectum ab eodem verbo sequente in eadem cathegorica; sed non est sic in illo casu’).
The correct reading of ‘nullus homo est animal’ therefore is no longer:
(Nullus homo est a1) $ (Nullus homo est a2) $ . . .$ (Nullus homo est an)
but rather becomes,
303 aliquis ] igitur praep. O 304 consequentia ] illa add. O 304 ad particularem ] et
cetera O 307 ab ] uno add. O 307 aliud ] reliquum O
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5.20. Sed pro isto dicitur admisso casu concedendo illam ‘nullus homo est ani-
mal’.217
!RObj.1" Et cum arguitur quod aliquis homo est animal, igitur non nullus homo 310
est animal, dicitur negando consequentiam. Et cum arguitur quod illa est bona
quia est ab || uno equipollenti ad reliquum, dicitur quod ly ‘aliquis’ et ‘non nullus’ L 74ra
non equipollent nisi utriusque termini remaneat vis sua; sed non remanet utriusque
termini vis sua, quia vis istius || termini ‘nullus’ est distribuere terminum commu- B 100vb
nem supponentem rectum ab eodem verbo sequente in eadem cathegorica;218 sed 315
non est sic in illo casu; igitur etc.|| V 78vb
!RObj.2" Et per hoc etiam dicitur quod iste non contradicunt ‘aliquis homo
est animal’ et ‘nullus homo est animal’ dato illo casu, sed ista || ‘nullus homo est E Giiii+3va
animal’, ‘non nullus homo est animal’. Nec iste sunt contrarie: ‘nullus homo est
animal’, ‘quilibet homo est animal’; sed iste: ‘nullus homo est animal’ et ‘quilibet 320
homo omne animal est’.219
!RObj.3"Et negatur illa consequentia ‘nullus homo est animal, igitur aliquis
homo non est animal’, sed sequitur solum ex illa, data illius termini significatione,
quod aliquis homo aliquod animal non est.
(Nullus homo est a1) % (Nullus homo est a2) % . . .% (Nullus homo est an)
217 The solution to the sophism is admitting the casus and granting the first propositum. All
subsequent objections can be dismissed. Once again, the general strategy is showing how the
change of modes of supposition invalidates several familiar inferences on which the objections
are based.
218 Cf. Tractatus de suppositionibus, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Aiiira-rb].
219 The last remark of this reply is particularly interesting, for the relation of contrariety
must be adjusted according to the assumption that ‘animal’ has determinate supposition in the
universal negative sentence ‘nullus homo est animal’. The latter can be represented as follows
(where H is stands for ‘homo’ and, as usual, a1, . . . , an stand for individual animals):
(1) #x(Hx & (¬(x = a1) % ¬(x = a2) % . . . % ¬(x = an)))
Now the contrary of (1) is the following sentence:
(2) #x(Hx & ¬(¬(x = a1) % ¬(x = a2) % . . . % ¬(x = an)))
which is equivalent, by De Morgan’s law, to the sentence
(3) #x(Hx & ((x = a1) $ (x = a2) $ . . . $ (x = an)))
Now, (3) is a close candidate to capture Peter’s suggestion, namely that the contrary of
the sentence ‘nullus homo est animal’ (on the determinate supposition reading) is the sentence
‘quilibet homo omne animal est’.
310 quod ] om. O 311 illa ] add. consequentia O 312 quia est ] om. O 312 et ] ly add.
O 313 non ] om. O 313 nisi ] ubi O 313 sua ] om. O 314 sua ] om. O 316 igitur ]
ideo O 317 quod . . . non ] negando quod iste O 321 est ] om. O 323 ex . . . significatione ]
om. O
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5.21. Et sicut dictum est de istis, ita dicendum est de istis relativis, si ponatur 325
quod in secunda parte illius ‘aliquod animal est et nullus homo est id’ ly ‘id’
supponat communiter non distributive, quod ille non contradicunt || ‘aliquis homo M 92rb
est id’ || et ‘nullus homo est id’, cum utraque sit vera, dato quod in utraque O 124va
supponat determinate: quia illa significatione data, ille convertuntur ‘aliquid est
et nullus homo est illud’ et ‘aliquid est et id nullus homo est’.220 330
Unde credendum est quod non potest bene contradictorium unius propositio-
nis cathegorice signari nisi terminus in uno eorum communiter et disiunctive vel
disiunctim supponens in alio copulative supponat. Neque valet consequentia illa,
retenta illa significatione et relatione illius termini ‘id’: ‘aliquis homo est illud seu
id, igitur non nullus homo est id’. Sed de hoc amplius dictum est.221 335
5.22. Item, ponatur quod subiectum in ista ‘aliquis homo est || quilibet homo’ P 73va
supponat confuse tantum, manente cuiuslibet alterius termini significatione et si-
gnificante illa propositione ex compositione suorum terminorum etc. Deinde pro-
ponitur illa ‘aliquis homo est quilibet homo’. Que si negatur, arguitur sic: quilibet
homo aliquis homo est, igitur aliquis homo quilibet homo est.222 Consequentia pa- 340
tet, quia ille convertuntur, cum omnes termini earum convertantur et pro eisdem
220 The argument is quite analogous to the line presented in the context of the previous sophi-
sm: modifying the properties of a syncategorematic term a!ects the mutual logical relationships
between sentences whose status is usually taken for granted.
221 I have not found a corresponding locus in the treatise.
222 Since the whole argument hinges on the mutual relations between the two terms, and
such relations depend on their positions relative to each other, it is reasonable to rephrase
the consequent to keep the structure of the sentence invariant throughout the sophism (I will
disregard minor variations that are found in the manuscripts, since the structure of the argument
is rigid and requires us to make the most plausible choice from the logical standpoint). The most
appropriate ordering of terms presumably is ‘aliquis homo est quilibet homo’: this is the sentence
whose concession is inconsistent with the propositum that has been previously denied.
325 est ] om. O 325 istis ] ista O 325 est ] om. O 325 istis ] terminis O 325 si pona-
tur ] supponatur O 326 id ] illud O 326 id ] ille 327 quod ] et O 328 id ] illud 328 id ]
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et eodem modo supponant. Ideo forte dicitur concedendo illam.
!Obj.1" Sed contra: non aliquis homo est quilibet homo, quia nec ille homo est
quilibet homo nec ille et sic de singulis; et isti sunt omnes homines; igitur non
aliquis homo est quilibet homo, quod est oppositum concessis.223 Consequentia 345
patet.
!Obj.2" Item, si aliquis homo est quilibet homo, igitur aliquod animal est quilibet
homo. Consequentia patet: contradictorium consequentis repugnat antecedenti.
Ista enim repugnant ‘aliquis homo est quilibet homo’ et ‘nullum animal est quilibet
homo’. 350
!Obj.3" Item, si aliquis || homo est quilibet homo et isti sunt omnes homines, V 79ra
igitur ille vel ille et sic de aliis est quilibet homo. Consequentia patet, quia ille
terminus ‘homo’ supponit confuse tantum in illa ‘aliquis homo est quilibet homo’
per positum. Et sequitur: iste vel ille homo et sic de aliis est quilibet homo,
igitur istud vel illud animal et sic de aliis est quilibet homo. Quo dato, sequitur 355
quod aliquod animal est quilibet homo tamquam ab inferiori ad suum superius.
Consequens falsum, || ut prius. L 74rb
M 92va
223 The right reading is ‘concessi’, as in O, because the sentence is the contradictory of the
first propositum, which in this part of the argument is supposed to be granted.
342 supponant ] supponunt O; Item quilibet homo est iste homo vel iste homo, demonstrando
omnes homines, ergo iste homo vel iste homo et sic de aliis est quilibet homo. Oportet illa con-
sequentia quia concessa omnino supponant termini antecedentis sicut termini consequentis cum
partes illius disiunctive supponant discrete manente sic in consequente cum illud disiunctim non
supponat sed parte illius disiunctim supponant add. BV 343 quilibet ] aliquis O 343 quia ]
om. O 343 homo ] om. O 344 nec ille ] om. O 344 nec ille ] E add. est quilibet homo
M 344 singulis ] aliis O 344 isti ] homines add. O 345 oppositum ] contradictorium MO
345 concessis ] concessi MO 345–346 Consequentia patet ] om. MO 348 Consequentia ] il-
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vel iste est quilibet homo add. O 352 aliis ] singulis O 352 patet ] tenet O 353 aliquis ]
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TRACTATUS OBLIGATIONUM 193
5.23. Ideo dicitur, in principio, admittendo casum. Et nego illam propositionem
‘aliquis homo est quilibet homo’.
!RObj.1" Et negatur ista consequentia ‘quilibet homo aliquis homo est, igitur 360
aliquis homo est quilibet homo’. Unde licet in ista ‘aliquis homo est quilibet homo’
ly ‘homo’ supponat confuse tantum, tamen quia ex ipsa sequitur falsum, ut quod
homo est omnis homo, ideo est neganda. Ita etiam hec est neganda || ‘semper O 124vb
homo omnis homo est’, quia ex illa sequitur quod aliquando homo omnis homo
est, et hec est concedenda ‘semper omnis homo || homo est’, quamvis termini pro B 101ra365
eisdem et eodem modo supponant et termini unius correspondentis cum terminis
alterius convertantur.224
224 The sophism has the following structure:
I Subiectum in ista ‘aliquis homo est quili-
bet homo’ supponit confuse tantum, ma-
nente cuiuslibet alterius termini significa-
tione et significante illa propositione ex
compositione suorum terminorum
A possible
1.1 Aliquis homo est quilibet homo N
2.1 Quilibet homo aliquis homo est; igitur
aliquis homo est quilibet homo
C valid inference
3. Non aliquis homo est quilibet homo, quia
nec ille homo est quilibet homo nec ille et
sic de singulis; et isti sunt omnes homines;
igitur non aliquis homo est quilibet homo
C ( valid inference; the con-
sequent is inconsistent with
1.1
4. Si aliquis homo est quilibet homo, igitur
aliquod animal est quilibet homo
C ( (cf. Obj.2)
5. Si aliquis homo est quilibet homo et isti sunt
omnes homines, igitur ille vel ille et sic de
aliis est quilibet homo
C ( valid inference (the sub-
ject term ‘homo’ in ‘aliquis
homo est quilibet homo’ has
been assumed to be in me-
rely confused supposition; cf.
Obj.3)
6. Iste vel ille homo et sic de aliis est quili-
bet homo; igitur aliquod animal est quilibet
homo
C (
The three objections focus on step 3–4 and 5–6 of the disputation, respectively. Either reply
(concession or denial) to the first propositum ‘aliquis homo est quilibet homo’ is apparently ruled
out. The solution to the sophism consists in the admission of the casus and the denial of the
first propositum ‘aliquis homo est quilibet homo’ put forward in the first place. There are some
problems, however. First, it seems that at some point of the argument some confusion arises as
to what is supposed to be the subject and what is supposed to be the predicate of the sentence
358 nego ] negatur O 358 illam ] illa O 358 propositionem ] om. O 359 aliquis . . .
homo ] aliquis est omnis homo O 360 aliquis . . . est ] est aliquis homo O 361 est . . . homo ]
omnis homo est O 361 quilibet ] omnis O 362 supponat ] stet O 362 falsum, ut ] om. O
363 ideo . . . neganda ] om.O 363 neganda ] quod add. O 363 semper ] om. O 365 et . . .
est’ ] om. O 366 supponant ] supponunt O 366 termini ] terminis O 366 correspondentis ]
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Et per hoc patet A et B propositiones esse similis quantitatis et qualitatis, et su-
biecta et predicata et copulas converti, et pro eisdem et eodem modo supponere, et
significata esse convertibilia illarum propositionum significantium ex compositione 370
illorum terminorum adequate, et unam esse necessariam et aliam impossibilem.
Ultra enim illa omnia, requiritur omnino similis ordo terminorum.
!RObj.3" Ad aliam etiam formam dicitur negando, sicut non sequitur ‘promitto
tibi istum vel istum denarium, igitur istum vel istum denarium tibi promitto’.225
in question. The reply is based on the denial of the consequence ‘quilibet homo aliquis homo
est, igitur aliquis homo est quilibet homo’ because the consequent is false and we want to reject
it. But why is the consequent false? It seems that Peter’s claim is that it would imply that
there is at least one man such that every man is that man. In this case, however, ‘aliquis homo’
would have become the predicate and ‘quilibet homo’ the subject of the sentence. Moreover,
it is unclear, how Peter can claim that the respondent is allowed to make such a move. The
antecedent of this consequence is reasonably true, since it just claims that every man is a man
(whereby no individual is specified). The consequent, as we have seen, is false, therefore there
must be something wrong with the inference, and this is what Peter seems to have in mind
when he says ‘et negatur ista consequentia’. The problem is that this is apparently incompatible
with the assumption that, in ‘aliquis homo est quilibet homo’, the first occurrence of ‘homo’ has
merely confused supposition, because from this assumption it just follows that there is a disjoint
term ‘h1 % h2,% . . . % hn’ such that the expression ‘every man (= ‘quilibet homo’)’ collectively
refers to what is meant by that disjoint term (it would simply be a statement about the identity
of two classes). But Peter seems to draw the conclusion that from this we can infer that there is
one individual man such that every man is that one.
The same holds for the other example which is based on the confusion that may arise between
the properties and the ‘roles’ (as subject or predicate) of the terms involved. The sentence
‘semper homo omnis homo est’ should be denied, because it implies the sentence ‘aliquando
homo omnis homo est’ which is false if it means that sometimes there is one man such that
every man is that man. By the same token, however, the sentence ‘semper homo omnis homo
est’ would be also eligible for denial, since it all depends on how we interpret the first occurrence
of ‘homo’ and in what kind of supposition. If the interpretation is the same for both sentences
(and I see no reason why it should apply in the second case but not in the first), then Peter’s
argument does not make perfect sense to me. Moreover, he claims that the sentence ‘semper
omnis homo homo est’ should be granted. This holds, I assume, if the sentence means that it is
always the case that every given man is a man (again, no individual being specified thereby). In
sum, therefore, some obscurity remains for the reader to pore over.
225 This remark should seemingly count as a reply to the second objection. Cf. supra, sec. 5.22.
The incorrect inference presented here, however, is not the one upon which the argument that
Peter wants to reject is based. In Obj.3 it is rather the converse inference which comes into play,
i.e. from the conjunction of singular terms (cf. above ‘istud vel illud animal’) to the corresponding
universally quantified a"rmative sentence. It is unclear therefore, how the counter-objection of
this paragraph is supposed to hit the target.
368 patet ] inc. add. O 369 supponere ] supponunt O 370 significata ] inc. O
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5.24. Item, ponatur quod iste convertuntur ‘deus est’, ‘nullus deus est’ una illarum 375
significante primarie sicut solet significare prima-||rie, puta quod deus est vel quod E Giiii+3vb
nullus deus est.226 Deinde proponitur ‘deus est’. Qua concessa, quia vera non
repugnans, proponitur ‘nullus deus est’.
!Obj.1" Si conceditur, contra: illa est || impertinens que extra tempus negaretur, P 73vb
igitur et nunc est neganda. Patet consequentia. 380
!i" Et arguitur antecedens quia non sequitur ‘illa convertuntur ‘deus est’ et
‘nullus deus est’; sed deus est; igitur nullus deus est’: quia extra tempus illa conse-
quentia non erat bona, quia antecedens fuisset possibile et consequens impossibile;
et casus non facit [ad] consequentiam; igitur et nunc non est bona. Ideo forte
dicitur quod illa consequentia non est bona. 385
!Ad i" Contra: consequens sequitur ex secunda parte antecedentis, igitur illa
consequentia est bona. Patet consequentia. Et antecedens arguitur, quia ille
convertuntur ‘deus est’ et ‘nullus deus est’.227
!Obj.2" Item, ex tibi dubio illa duo|| non convertuntur, igitur illa non est a te M 92vb
concedenda ‘nullus deus est’. Patet consequentia. Et arguitur antecedens, quia 390
ex tibi dubio tu admisisti impossibile, quia forte demonstrantur iste due mentales
‘deus est’, ‘nullus deus est’, que invicem converti non possunt.228
226 In the development of the argument it turns out that Peter assumes that it is the first one
to be proposed, namely ‘deus est’ with its original meaning (cf. ‘sicut solet significare primarie’),
that in the end a!ects the meaning of the other, as if one were to say that if William of Ockham
and Peter of Mantua were fellow countrymen, then Ockham would be Italian on the assumption
that (i.e. if we have already granted that) Peter is Italian. In support of this interpretation,
cf. infra sec. 5.25, where the relevance of the relative order, in which sentences of such a sort are
put forward, is explicitly regarded as the reason that justifies two di!erent pairs of replies.
227 The passage needs some clarification. Take the consequence ‘iste convertuntur ‘deus est’
et ‘nullus deus est’; sed deus est (= second part of the antecedent); igitur nullus deus est (=
consequent)’. It is argued that the following holds: if the consequent follows from the second
part of the antecedent, then the consequence is sound. But in this case the consequent does
follow from the second part of the antecedent, since ‘deus est’ entails ‘nullus deus est’ on the
assumption that the two sentences mutually convert.
228 It is unclear (as in other cases, in the treatise, where the reconstruction of the disputations
becomes tentative) whether this objection is supposed to be raised infra or extra tempus. I have
opted for the second alternative, since in the reply supplied in the next section there is no
unquestionable proof of the contrary (one could argue, though, that the claim ‘debet respondes
certificari que propositiones demonstrentur per ly ‘iste’ actually is a proof of this sort, to the
e!ect that the objection must be faced infra tempus. I will leave the issue open). Still, it
must be always kept in mind that it is very hard to establish beyond any reasonable doubt, in
Peter’s text, whether the occurrence of a sentence, or even of an argument, is included within
the disputation’s time boundaries or if it takes place beyond them. Caution is in order in such
375 convertuntur ] convertantur O 375 una ] illa add. O 376 primarie ] om. O
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!Obj.3" Item, una illarum propositionum est a!rmativa et alia negativa, igitur
ille non convertuntur. || Patet consequentia et maior. Sed minor arguitur quia illa V 79rb
‘nullus deus est’ est una propositio cuius verbum principale negatur, igitur illa est 395
negativa.229
assessments because, as I have recalled, there is a fundamental conceptual di!erence, in the theory
of obligations, between what the respondent says (and how he replies to arguments) within the
time, and what he says oustide the time. The weight of an objection and of the corresponding
reply may result in quite di!erent outcomes, according to the context in which they occur: just
recall the profoundly di!erent impact of granting infra tempus that one has replied incorrectly
(allowed move), and granting the same extra tempus (prohibited move which would entail defeat
for the respondent).
Generally speaking, there are at least two rough criteria that may help us find a way through
the problem. First, the occurrence of the explicit declaration ‘cedat tempus’, which goes the
whole hog. This is a decisive piece of evidence, but we cannot infer that whenever the declara-
tion is lacking, everything ends up to be taking place in the infra tempus-environment: this is
simply contrary to the factual practice, since sometimes Peter seems to be reasoning (by raising
objections or setting up arguments) outside the time, despite the omission of the clause ‘cedat
tempus’. A second type of evidence may be a clue to the definition of time boundaries, namely
the presence – normally to be looked for in those textual passages that contain instructions for
the respondent’s replies to the objections – of technical phrases such as ‘concedatur’, ‘negetur’
and the like, that may refer to sentences that can be identified as proposita. In these situations
we can be reasonably confident that the replies refer to a step of the argument that takes place
infra tempus.
229 Here is the structure of the disputation:
I Iste convertuntur ‘deus est’, ‘nullus deus
est’, una illarum significante primarie sicut
solet significare primarie, puta quod deus
est vel quod nullus deus est
A possible
1. Deus est C irrelevant and true
2. Nullus deus est C (
3. Illa est impertinens que extra tempus
negaretur; igitur et nunc est neganda
C valid inference
4. Non sequitur ‘ille convertuntur ‘deus est’ et
‘nullus deus est’; sed deus est; igitur nullus
deus est’
C irrelevant and true (cf. ‘ex-
tra tempus illa consequentia
non erat bona, quia antece-
dens fuisset possibile et con-
sequens impossibile; et ca-
sus non facit consequentiam;
igitur et nunc non est bona’)
5. Una illarum propositionum est a"rmativa
et alia negativa; igitur ille non convertuntur
C (
The arguments are against the concession of the sentence ‘nullus deus est’. The first objection
hinges on the claim that ‘nullus deus est’ is irrelevant and outside the time it should be denied
(according to the standard account that Peter rejects), therefore it should be denied within the
time as well, since no reply should be modified on account of the fact that we now are under an
obligation. From a general point of view, if one claims that the sentence should be granted, it is
393 propositionum ] om. O 393 alia ] reliqua O 394 Patet ] illa add. O
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5.25. Ideo dicitur in principio admittendo casum. Et conceditur illa ‘deus est’.
Deinde conceditur illa ‘nullus deus est’. Et si variaretur ordo proponendi, negaretur
utraque.
!RObj.1" Et ad formam, cum arguitur, dicitur !non" negando illam de forma.230 400
Sed negatur eius antecedens: illa enim non est || impertinens, sed sequens ex O 125ra
concesso. Et conceditur quod illa est bona consequentia ‘ille convertuntur ‘deus
est’ et ‘nullus deus est’; sed deus est; igitur nullus deus est’ quia iam verum est
quod consequens est necessarium. Et cum arguitur quod non, quia ante casum
illa consequentia non valebat, sed casus non facit consequentiam, igitur sequitur 405
quod et nunc illa consequentia non valet, dicitur quod sic, et precipue casus de
impositione qualis est iste.|| L 74va
!RObj.2" Ad aliam formam dicitur quod apud illum qui poneret etiam quod
mentalia, ultra id quod naturaliter significant, possunt ad placitum significare,
quod casus non est impossibilis. Sed apud illum qui poneret quod mentales 410
non possunt ad placitum significare ultra id quod naturaliter significant, debet
respondens certificari que propositiones demonstrentur per ly ‘iste’.
!RObj.3" Ad aliam formam dicitur negando consequentiam, scilicet ‘principalis
copula istius propositionis est negata, igitur ista est negativa’: sic etiam pars istius
propositionis ‘nullus deus est’ esset negativa. Sed bene sequitur ‘ista est propositio 415
cathegorica, et principalis copula huius negatur per signum quod est pars istius,
et ista adequate significat ex compositione terminorum, igitur ista est negativa’,
quod est negandum in illo casu, concesso antecedente illius consequentie.
because of its convertibility with ‘deus est’ (that has been already granted). The objector would
appeal to the fact that no casus of impositio makes a consequence sound. Unfortunately, the
discussion, from Peter’s viewpoint is fatally destined to stop here, because he exactly claims that
this is the case. It is noteworthy, in this respect, that an essential clause of Peter’s definition of
a valid consequence refers to impositio.
230 Presumably, an emendation is needed here. A ‘non’ should be supplied before ‘negando’,
as required by the sense of the argument, because the point is not denying the validity of the
inference, but rather the truth of the antecedent. The sentence ‘nullus deus est’ is in fact
sequentially relevant once we have granted the sentence ‘deus est’.
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5.26. Item, ponatur quod ‘bu"’ sit dictio bissillaba.231 Si negatur casus, contra:
possibile est quod ‘bub’ sit dictio monosillaba, igitur possibile est quod ‘bub’ sit dic- 420
tio bisillaba. || Patet consequentia, || quia non stat contradictorium consequentis M 93ra
B 101rbcum antecedente.232
Vel cedat tempus obligationis et arguitur quod in tempore negasti quod non
intellexisti, igitur male respondisti: quia in tempore non fuit ista propositio ‘bub
est dictio bisillaba’,233 || cum id quod ponitur pro subiecto illius verbi ‘est’ non P 74ra425
sit nec erat pars orationis, igitur non reddebat suppositum illi verbo ‘est’. Aliter
enim non posset dari vox litterata que non esset pars orationis: quia si proferatur
‘babu’, adhuc id est pars orationis, ut sequitur ex responsione, quia statim ista est
propositio ‘babu est vox bisillaba’.234
Ideo dicitur in principio non admittendo casum donec sciat respondens quid illa 430
vox ‘bub’ debeat sibi significare. Et ita de aliis.
5.27. Item, ponatur quod omne antecedens alicuius consequentie et oppositum
consequentis eiusdem sint similia, et omne consequens et oppositum antecedentis
eiusdem sint similia. Et sint gratia argumenti iste due consequentie ‘homo est,
igitur risibile est’, ‘non homo est, igitur nullum risibile est’, et || significent ille ex O 125rb435
231 The term ‘bu!’ is to be emended with ‘bub’ here, or ‘bub’ is to be emended with ‘bu!’ in
the rest of the sophism. In the manuscripts there is some confusion between the two terms, but
the argument is not a!ected by this fact.
232 One could be tempted to reply to this objection that the consequence is sound (with
modalized antecedent and consequent) but the problem is that the consequent is not the posited
sentence, i.e. ‘bu! est dictio bisillaba’, but rather ‘possibile est quod “bub’ sit dictio bisillaba’.
Is there anything that we have missed? I think the opponent would argue that this conclusion
forces the respondent to concede that the posited sentence “bub’ est dictio bisillaba’ is possible,
which is enough to say that it should have been admitted.
Be this as it may, the general point of the sophism is, once again, pointing out that one should
respond only to what one understands and nothing should be admitted unless (or until) this
condition has been satisfied.
233 A better wording would probably have been ‘quia in tempore ista ‘bub est dictio bisillaba’
non fuit propositio’. Properly speaking, the term ‘bub’ is ill-formed: as a result any sequence of
written or spoken signs that contains it, cannot count as a sentence. It may be useful to recall
once more, in this respect, that Peter also rejects material supposition and that he does not
regard strings of sounds or signs as tantamount parts of speech.
234 Cf. Tractatus de suppositionibus, [Peter of Mantua, 1492a, sig. Aiirb] “Tertia supposi-
tio: nulla propositio est, que habeat aliquam partem propinquam que non sit pars orationis
grammatice. Patet illa, quia illa non intelligeretur ab aliquo ut propositio”.
419 bu! ] EO bub BMV buf P 419 sit ] est O 419 bissillaba ] disillaba O 419–420 Si
. . . monosillaba ] om. M 420 bub ] bu! O 420–421 igitur . . . bisillaba ] om. MO 423 in
tempore ] intra tempus O 424 in tempore ] infra tempus O 424 non . . . propositio ] hec non
fuit propositio O 424 bub ] bu! O 425 id ] illud O 425 verbi ] om. O 426 illi verbo ] illius
verbi O 427–428 quia . . . orationis ] om. O 428 babu ] BMOV; ba buf P 428 est ] iam
add. O 429 bisillaba ] disillaba O 431 bub ] om. O 431 debeat . . . significare ] significet
O 433 eiusdem ] om. O 433 consequens ] alicuius consequentie add. O 433 oppositum ]
contradictorium O
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compositione || suorum terminorum. Deinde proponitur ‘homo est’. Quo concesso, V 79va
proponitur ‘nullum risibile est’. Si conceditur, cedat tempus et || arguitur: tu E Giiii+4ra
concessisti repugnans concesso in tempore, igitur male respondisti.
Item proponitur ‘hec est vera ‘homo est”. Qua concessa, quia vera non repu-
gnans, proponitur ‘hec est vera ‘nullum risibile est”. Qua concessa tunc sic: hec 440
est vera ‘homo est’ et hec est vera ‘nullum risibile est’; et iste adequate significant
secundum primarias significationes; igitur homo est et nullum risibile est.
Et si forte negatur illa propositio ‘homo est’, proponitur ‘illa est falsa’. Qua con-
cessa, proponitur ‘hec est falsa ‘nullum risibile est”. Quibus concessis, proponitur
‘he sunt vere ‘risibile est’, ‘non homo est” que contradicunt primis. Qua conces- 445
sa, arguitur sic: iste sunt vere ‘risibile est’, ‘non homo est’, adequate et primarie
significantes etc.; igitur risibile est et non homo est.235
235 The sophism has the following structure:
P Omne antecedens alicuius consequentie et
oppositum consequentis eiusdem sunt simi-
lia, et omne consequens et oppositum ante-
cedentis eiusdem sunt similia. Et sint gra-
tia argumenti, iste due consequentie ‘ho-
mo est, igitur risibile est’, ‘non homo est,
igitur nullum risibile est’, et significent ex
compositione suorum terminorum
A possible
1.1 Homo est C irrelevant and true
2. Nullum risibile est C ( inconsistent with 1.
3. Hec est vera ‘homo est’ C irrelevant and true
4. Hec est vera ‘nullum risibile est’ C irrelevant and true
5. Hec est vera ‘homo est’ et hec est vera ‘nul-
lum risibile est’; et iste adequate significant
secundum primarias significationes; igitur
homo est et nullum risibile est
C irrelevant and true
1.2 Homo est N
6. Illa est falsa [scil. ‘homo est’] C
7. Hec est falsa ‘nullum risibile est’ C
8. He sunt vere ‘risibile est’, ‘non homo est’ C
9. Iste sunt vere ‘risibile est’, ‘non homo
est’, adequate et primarie significantes etc.;
igitur risibile est et non homo est
C
436 proponitur ] proponatur O 437 proponitur ] proponatur O 437 et || arguitur ] om.
O 438 in tempore ] infra tempus et obligationis add. O 439 proponitur ] proponatur O
439–440 non repugnans ] et impertinens O 440 proponitur ] proponatur O 440 Qua con-
cessa ] om. O 440 sic ] si O 443 Et . . . propositio ] primo illa O 444 proponitur ] propo-
natur O 445 he . . . vere ] hec sunt vera O 445 que . . . primis ] quia contra dictorium scr. et
del. dicunt primis et est verum add. O 445–446 Qua concessa ] om. O 446 arguitur ] et
praep. O 446–447 adequate . . . significantes ] que adequate significant primarie O 447 etc. ]
om. O
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5.28. Ideo dicitur in principio, admisso casu, concedendo illam ‘homo est’ cum
proponitur. Et negatur illa ‘nullum risibile est’. Et cum proponitur ‘illa est vera
‘homo est”, conceditur. Et conceditur quod illa || est falsa ‘nullum risibile est’. M 93rb450
Et cum arguitur: illa est vera‘homo est’ || que est antecedens, igitur et con- L 74vb
sequens eius est verum, scilicet ‘risibile est’; et ultra arguitur: omne antecedens
alicuius consequentie et oppositum consequentis eiusdem sunt similia; sed iste ‘ho-
mo est’ et ‘nullum risibile est’ sunt antecedens et oppositum consequentis eiusdem
consequentie; igitur ista sunt similia; sed illa est vera ‘homo est’; igitur et illa ‘nul- 455
lum risibile est’; et ex alia parte illa est vera ‘risibile est’; igitur duo contradictoria
sunt simul vera, ideo huic dicitur negando illam consequentiam.
Sed oportet minorem sic sumi: ille due sunt vere ‘homo est’ et ‘nullum risibile
est’; et illa adequate significant quod homo est et nullum risibile est; igitur homo
est et nullum risibile est. 460
Sed negatur quod ista sit primaria significatio tamquam repugnans.
5.29. Si tamen in casu illo adderetur quod ille consequentie essent adequate si-
gnificantes ex compositione suorum terminorum, et quod illa ‘homo est’ adequate
significaret hominem esse, et illa ‘nullum risibile est’ adequate significaret nullum
risibile esse, negandus est casus. 465
449 Et ] om. O 450 homo est ] om. O 450 conceditur ] om. O 451 arguitur ] tunc
add. O 451 antecedens ] eius add. O 451–452 et . . . est’ ] illa est vera ‘risibile est’ que est
consequens O 452 et ] tunc add. O 453 alicuius consequentie ] om. O 453 iste ] illa O
454 est ] currit O 454 est ] currit O 454–455 eiusdem consequentie ] om. O 455 est ] ante
est scr. et del. currit O 455 et illa ] illa est vera O 458 sumi ] sumere O 458 et ] om. O
459 illa ] ille O 459 significant ] et primarie add. O 459 et ] quod add. O 459–460 igitur
. . . est ] om. O 461 Sed ] et O 462 adequate ] sic add. O
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6. On depositio
6.1. Sed nunc dicamus quod licita || depositio est obligatio qua obligatur re- P 74rb
spondens ad negandum sibi depositam propositionem et quodlibet antecedens ad
illam.
Ex descriptione patet, primo, quod deposita et bene admissa aliqua disiuncti-
va et proposita aliqua eius parte principali, ipsa est neganda. Deposita tamen 5
copulativa et bene admissa non continue, quelibet eius pars est neganda.236
236 The opening lines of the sixth – and last – section of the treatise are devoted to the de-
finition of depositio and to the formulation of a pair of special rules, in the form of corollaries,
that apply only to this subtype of obligation. The definition of depositio, as one may reasonably
expect, on the grounds of the duality between the two notions, is a mirror image of the correspon-
ding definition of positio given above, in sec. 1.9. In the present case, the respondent commits
himself to upholding the depositum as false and denying it, throughout the development of the
disputation, whenever it is put forward. In addition to that, it is explicitly required that the
respondent commit himself also to the denial of any sentence that logically entails the depositum,
a clause that was missing in the characterization of positio. At least explicitly: because, after
all, an analogous element is embedded in the first rule of positio which states that anything that
is entailed by the positum must be conceded, whenever put forward. To be pointed out, again,
is the duality between the two notions, now with respect to entailment: in the former case, we
must uphold the positum as true and grant it along with anything that follows from it, in the
latter case, we must uphold the depositum as false and deny it, along with anything from which
it follows.
There is a problem with the rules formulated after the definition. It may be reasonable to
suppose that, in the text of the edition, the terms ‘disiunctiva’ and ‘copulativa’ are mistakenly
inverted. From the logical point of view, what is said to hold of disjunction should rather hold of
conjunction and vice versa. Here are my reasons in support of the claim. The first special rule for
depositio is supposed to govern the behaviour of the respondent in the presence of disjunctions.
It says that if a disjunction is deposited, then whenever one (one, at least one or some = ‘aliqua
eius parte principali’) of its disjuncts is put forward, it must be denied. Likewise in the case of
conjunctions: if a conjunction is deposited, then any of its conjuncts must be denied, whenever
put forward in a disputation. Now, the former seems to be too weak a requirement for the
denial of disjunctions, whereas the latter seems to be too strong a requirement for the denial of
conjunctions. On a classical reading, depositing p % q is equivalent to positing ¬ p $ ¬ q, therefore,
if either p or q is put forward, it must be denied, because the falsehood of a disjunction entails
the falsehood of each of its disjuncts (it entails the falsehood of one, or some, of its disjuncts
only a fortiori, i.e. because it entails the falsehood of all of them). Therefore, as a rule, it should
be formulated with the requirement that any disjunct be denied, whenever it is proposed. In
the case of conjunctions, it is the other way around, since the falsehood of a conjunction simply
entails the falsity of at least one of its conjuncts, not the falsehood of all of them (in other words,
if ¬ ( p $ q ) it just follows that ¬ p % ¬ q). But Peter’s argument seems to require that ¬ p $ ¬ q,
when he says that any counjunct (= ‘quelibet eius pars’) must be denied, whenever it is put
forward. A first suggestion therefore might be keeping the rules as they stand and invert the
labels: what is ascribed to disjunctions should, in fact, count as a property of conjunctions and
vice versa.
There is however another way to look at these requirements, by strengthening the role of
2 negandum ] negandam O 2–3 et . . . illam ] om. O 4–6 Ex . . . neganda ] EL om.
BMOPV
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6.2. De qua primo depono tibi illam ‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’; et si-
gnificet illa adequate || quod alique propositiones non sunt vere. Deinde propono B 101va
illam ‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’. || Qua negata, quia deposita, propo- O 125va
nitur ‘omnes propositiones [non] sunt vere divisive sumendo’. Qua concessa, quia 10
contradictorium depositi, proponitur etiam ‘quelibet propositio est vera’. Qua
concessa tamquam sequente, quia bene sequitur: omnes propositiones sunt vere
divisive, igitur quelibet propositio est vera, et arguitur sic ultra: quelibet proposi-
tio est vera; et illa est propositio ‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’; igitur illa est
vera. Et ultra: illa est vera; et illa adequate significat || quod alique propositiones V 79vb15
non sunt vere; igitur alique propositiones non sunt vere. Et ex alia parte, omnes
propositiones sunt vere. || Igitur contradictio.237 M 93va
the depositio operator when it ranges over a compound sentence. The interpretation I have
proposed relies on the assumption that if a conjunction is deposited, what must be upheld as
false throughout the disputation is the conjunction itself and, in order for this to obtain, it is
su"cient that one of its conjuncts is false. But one might argue that, when a conjunction is
deposited, this must be taken in fact as equivalent to depositing both conjuncts at one and the
same time. In that case, the requirement that any conjunct be denied when it is proposed would
be correct (the same reasoning holds, mutatis mutandis, in the case of disjunctions, too, because
depositing a disjunction would actually be equivalent to depositing one conjunct or depositing
the the other, but not the disjunction as a whole). On this account the text would make sense
as it stands. Yet, there is a conceptual problem with this interpretation and it would get Peter
into much trouble (this is why I am also inclined to prefer the first explanation). Assume that
on this latter account a contradiction is deposited. It is an admissible type of sentence, for it
is not necessary (necessary sentences in the case of depositio have the same role that impossible
sentences play in the case of positio: both classes are non-admissible in principle). Now, if p $ ¬ p
is deposited, on the stronger reading, both of its conjuncts are deposited and consequently they
must be both denied, whenever proposed. As a result, one and the same sentence would have to
be granted and denied.
Finally, unclear is also the role of the clause ‘non continue’. It must be noted by the way that
the whole passage containing the rule for disjunctions and conjunctions is reported by only one
manuscript, namely L, besides the edition. We cannot exclude that some kind of problem in the
transmission of the text might have occurred at this point.
A treatment of rules for conjunctions and disjunctions in the same context is found in Strode,
who describes a variety of relations between members of conjunctions and disjunctions along with
the corresponding criteria of response. Moreover, in discussing the rule for disjunction, Strode
proves to be aware of the point made above in connection with the denial of disjunctions since he
claims “admissa ergo una disiunctiva, debet quelibet eius pars principalis negari, quia quelibet
antecedit ad ipsam depositam” [Ralph Strode, 1517, fols. 89va]. The printed text of Strode has
‘ad ipsam depositum’ which is incorrect. I wish to thank prof. Ashworth for the suggestion and
for pointing out to me that six mss. have the variant “ad depositum vel ad ipsam depositam”.
237 The text must be emended, removing the ‘non’, according to manuscripts B and O, that
both consistently have ‘omnes propositiones sunt vere’ (the edition itself, at later occurrences of
the sentence in the same sophism, reports the correct reading). The sophism is also found in
9–10 proponitur ] proponatur O 10 omnes ] ante omnes scr. et del. alique propositiones
O 10 non ] om. BO 11 contradictorium ] contradictoria O 11 proponitur ] proponatur O
11 etiam ] om. O 12 sequente ] sequentem O sequens MV 13 divisive ] sumendo add. O
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6.3. Ideo dicitur in principio non admittendo casum: repugnat enim quod omnes
propositiones sint vere divisim et quod illa ‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’
adequate significet quod alique propositiones non sunt vere. Verumtamen non 20
valet consequentia illa ‘omnes propositiones sunt vere, collective sumendo; igitur
quelibet propositio || est vera’, quia stat quod omnes propositiones sunt vere, col- E Giiii+4rb
lective, et quod aliqua sit impossibilis, et quod omnes sint false, collective sumendo,
et quod aliqua sit necessaria. Ut posito quod iste sint omnes propositiones, col-
lective, ‘deus est’, ‘nullus homo est asinus’, sic primarie significantes, tunc, quia 25
ille ambe sunt vere et ille sunt omnes propositiones, collective, igitur omnes pro-
positiones, collective, sunt vere. Et tamen aliqua est impossibilis, puta pars illius,
scilicet illa ‘homo est asinus’ que est pars illius || ‘nullus homo est asinus’. Et si ex
illo arguitur quod illa propositio ‘nullus homo est asinus’ est propositio necessaria L 75ra
et impossibilis, conceditur de copulato extremo.238 30
[Ralph Strode, 1517, fol. 89rb], albeit with a di!erent treatment.
238 The first sophism on depositio has the following structure:
D Alique propositiones non sunt vere A possible
1. Alique propositiones non sunt vere N by D
2. Omnes propositiones sunt vere divisive C contradictory of D
3. Quelibet propositio est vera C sequentially relevant (follows
from 2.)
4. Quelibet propositio est vera; et illa est pro-
positio ‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’;
igitur illa est vera
C sequentially relevant (valid
inference)
5. Illa est vera; et illa adequate significat quod
alique propositiones non sunt vere; igitur
alique propositiones non sunt vere
C sequentially relevant (valid
inference)
6. Alique propositiones non sunt vere C ( (incompatible with 2.)
On the basis of the replies given at steps 3–5, the conclusion put forward at step 6., namely
‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’ can be drawn, by iterated detachment. But it is incompatible
with 2., namely with the sentence ‘omnes propositiones sunt vere divisive’, that has already been
granted. Therefore the case is contradictory. As to the clause ‘divisive’, I assume that if p,
q, r, . . . , stand for sentences and ‘T ’ is a truth predicate, then the fact that all sentences are
true divisim can be expressed as follows: Tp $ Tq $ Tr. By contrast, the truth of all sentences
taken collectively is probably to be read, even if Peter does not make it explicit in this passage, as
T ( p $ q $ r ). According to Peter, 2. is incompatible with the depositum if 2. is taken divisively.
The rest of the argument appears to be intended at pointing out that the case is contradictory
only on this assumption, but not if we take 2. collectively. The grounds that Peter provides to
justify this claim, however, do not seem entirely convincing, from the logical standpoint. This
is the line he adopts: let us take two sentences p and q, both true and necessary, and assume
that q has the form ¬ r (in Peter’s words, r is a part of q). Now, T ( p $ q ) holds because p
and q are true collectively. This implies that the truth predicate applies to their conjunction
in an unanalyzed way. But, with an awkward move, Peter extracts r from q, by removing the
19 sint ] sunt O 19 divisim ] om. O 22 sunt ] sint O 22–23 collective ] sumendo add.
O 23 sumendo ] om. O 24 et ] tamen add. O 24 quod ] om. O 25 sic ] om. O
28–29 scilicet . . . propositio ] om. O 29 est ] iter. O 30 conceditur ] concedatur O
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6.4. !Obj.1" Sed forte arguitur removendo illam particulam, scilicet quod ista
‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’ adequate significet quod alique propositiones
non sunt vere et deponatur simpliciter ista ‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’.
Et sit A propositio una – quecumque sit non curo – que significet principaliter
quod alique propositiones non sunt vere. Et arguitur sic: A propositio est vera; 35
et A propositio significat adequate quod alique propositiones non sunt vere; igitur
alique propositiones non sunt vere. Et probatur quod A est verum, sicut prius
arguebatur de illa ‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’, quia quelibet propositio est
vera.
!RObj.1" Sed huic dicitur negando istum secundum casum sicut primum.239 40
!Obj.2" Sed forte contra arguitur deponendo illam ‘alique propositiones non
sunt vere’ et ponendo illam ‘omnes propositiones sunt vere divisive’, que est con-
tradictoria prime adequate significans sic, scilicet quod omnes propositiones sunt
vere.
!RObj.2" Sed huic dicitur adhuc non admittendo istum casum, quia est impos- 45
sibilis.240|| O 125vb
6.5. Item, depono tibi quod propositiones tam ad invicem repugnantes || quam que M 93vb
non sunt repugnantes non sunt similes, et quod || illa propositio ‘aliqua propositio P 74va
est sibi similis’ significet adequate quod aliqua propositio est sibi similis. Dein-
de propono ‘omnes propositiones sunt similes divisive’. Que, quia contradictoria 50
negation and makes it a member of the conjunction; then we would have T ( p $ q $ r ). But r is
impossible, since in the example it stands for the sentence ‘homo est asinus’. Therefore, in virtue
of this curious procedure, we obtain that the impossible sentence r, as a part of the content
of the conjunction taken in a collective opacity, would turn out to true. I have some di"culty
in understanding how exactly Peter can claim that this procedure has some logical plausibility.
The same holds also in the case of the final remark, when he contends that the sentence must be
considered as necessary and impossible ‘de copulato extremo’, i.e. it is to be seen as ‘necessary
and impossible’, where the predicate is a conjoint term.
239 The solution to the previous sophism amounted to a rejection of the case and it still holds
even if the terms involved are modified by removing the clause according to which the former
depositum meant that some sentences are not true. For it is su"cient to take any sentence p,
stipulate that its meaning is that of the removed clause and plug it into the same disputational
structure as above. It can be shown that p, too, is incompatible with the depositum ‘Alique
propositiones non sunt vere’ precisely in the same way, because from that depositum, the assertion
that all sentences are true divisively still follows; hence the contradiction is not ruled out.
240 Another variation on the same theme. Peter’s idea is that whenever the opponent presents
a sentence that in di!erent ways implies that all sentences are true, the respondent must refuse to
admit the case, since otherwise he would somehow be forced into a contradiction, as the examples
show.
31 illam particulam ] illa particula O 33 et ] quia O 34 sit . . . que ] illa propositio O
35 arguitur ] tunc add. O 36 adequate ] principaliter O 42–43 est contradictoria ] sunt con-
tradictorie O 43 prime ] om. O 43 sic, scilicet ] om. O 45 quia ] ille add. O 47–48 quam
. . . repugnantes ] om. O 48 aliqua propositio ] om. O 50 divisive ] divisim O 50 Que ] om.
O 50 contradictoria ] contradictorium O
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depositi, concedenda est. Deinde proponitur ‘quelibet propositio cuilibet proposi-
tioni est similis’. Que, quia sequens, est et!iam" concedenda. Deinde proponitur
‘omnes propositiones sunt false’. Si negatur, contra: omnes propositiones sunt
similes; et alique propositiones sunt repugnantes; igitur omnes propositiones sunt
false. Et tenet consequentia illa, quia verum non repugnat vero. || Deinde propo- B 101vb55
nitur ‘alique propositiones non sunt false’. Si negatur, contra: aliqua propositio
est vera, igitur alique propositiones non sunt false || divisim. Patet consequentia. V 80ra
Et arguitur antecedens, quia hec propositio est vera ‘aliqua propositio est sibi si-
milis’, quia aliqua propositio est sibi similis et ista adequate significat quod aliqua
propositio est sibi similis, igitur ista est vera. 241 60
6.6. Ideo dicitur in principio non admittendo casum.242 Pro quo est notandum
quod, cum deponitur aliqua propositio, pro faciliori responsione habenda, imagi-
netur respondens quod sibi ponatur contradictorium depositi nec advertat ad aliud
nisi ad propositionem quam imaginatur esse sibi positam. Ideo imaginandum est
– cum deponitur illa, quod propositiones tam invicem repugnantes quam non re- 65
pugnantes non sunt similes, et ponitur quod hec ‘aliqua propositio est sibi similis’
adequate significet quod aliqua propositio est sibi similis – quod hec copulativa
ponatur ‘omnes propositiones tam invicem repugnantes quam non repugnantes
sunt invicem similes, et hec propositio ‘aliqua propositio est sibi similis’ significet
adequate quod aliqua propositio est sibi similis’. Et patet quod illa copulativa est 70
impossibilis, quia ex prima parte sequitur quod omnes propositiones sunt false,
quia bene sequitur ‘omnes propositiones sunt similes et alique invicem repugnant,
241 This sophism covers another familiar topic in the obligational literature, namely the so-
called ‘de similibus’ and ‘de dissimilibus’. It is another important rubric belonging to the genre
and has attracted attention to various extents. Strode, for example, dismisses it, as well as
Buser does, because he thinks that it is some sort of puerile matter for those who master the
skills of the ars obligatoria; others, like Burley or Marsilius, or again Paul of Venice devote more
space to this subtype of obligation (or to put it better, of positio and depositio). Being similar or
dissimilar means in the obligational jargon having the same vs di!erent truth value(s). Similarity
is often used in the tradition to show some characteristic features of the standard approach of
responsio antiqua such as the provability of any false sentence compossible with the positum.
For instance if, immediately after positing a false sentence p, the opponent proposes ‘p and q are
similar [i.e. have the same truth value]’ where q is a false sentence compossible with the positum,
the respondent should grant it because it is irrelevant and actually true (p and q are similar,
since they both are false). But then, if q is put forward it will have to be granted as well.
242 The sophism has the following structure:
51 concedenda ] concedendum O 51 proponitur ] proponatur O 52 et!iam" ] om. O
52 et!iam" ] et E 52 proponitur ] proponatur O 54–55 et . . . false ] om. O 55 non ]
numquam O 55–56 proponitur ] proponatur O 56 false ] om. O 57 Patet ] hec add. O
60 vera ] aliqua propositio est sibi similis add. O 61 notandum ] advertendum O 64 nisi . . .
propositionem ] om. O 64 positam ] positum O 65 invicem ] ad praep. O 66 quod ] ante
ponitur transp. O 66 aliqua propositio ] inv. O 67–70 quod . . . Et ] om. O 72 similes ]
false O 72 alique ] propositiones add. O 72 invicem ] ad praep. O
TRACTATUS OBLIGATIONUM 206
igitur omnes || propositiones sunt false’. Et ex alia parte se-||quitur quod || aliqua M 94ra
L 75rb
E Giiii+4va
propositio est vera; igitur alique propositiones non sunt false. Et antecedens illius
consequentie sequitur ex casu. Ideo ex illo casu sequitur contradictio: ideo non est 75
admittendus.243
6.7. Sed forte, non ponendo secundam particulam244, deponitur illa solum ‘tam
propositiones invicem repugnantes quam non repugnantes non sunt similes’. Quo
admisso, proponitur ‘deus est’.
D Tam propositiones ad invicem repugnantes
quam que non sunt repugnantes non sunt
similes
A possible
P Illa propositio ‘aliqua propositio est si-
bi similis’ significat adequate quod aliqua
propositio est sibi similis
A possible
1. Omnes propositiones sunt similes divisive C contradictory of D
2. Quelibet propositio cuilibet propositioni est
similis
C sequentially relevant
3.1 Omnes propositiones sunt false N
4. Omnes propositiones sunt similes; et ali-
que propositiones sunt repugnantes; igitur
omnes propositiones sunt false
C ( valid inference (cf. ‘quia
verum non repugnat vero’)
whose consequent is inconsi-
stent with 3.1
5. Alique propositiones non sunt false N
6. Aliqua propositio est vera, igitur alique
propositiones non sunt false divisim
C valid inference
7. Hec propositio est vera ‘aliqua propositio
est sibi similis’, quia aliqua propositio est
sibi similis et ista adequate significat quod
aliqua propositio est sibi similis, igitur ista
est vera
C
It must be noted that in order for the argument to work properly, we need to understand the
sophism as being actually composed of a depositio (= ‘omnes propositiones tam invicem repu-
gnantes quam non repugnantes non sunt similes’) together with a positio (= “aliqua propositio
est sibi similis’ significat adequate quod aliqua propositio est sibi similis’). In addition to that,
two intriguing facts must be pointed out. First, the deposited sentence implies that all sentences
are false, only in conjunction with the background presupposition that a truth is never inconsi-
stent with another truth. Second, the point made at step 7. is also quite remarkable, since it
rests on the semantic principle: p and ‘p’ signifies that p, therefore ‘p’ is true.
243 The disputation is apparently bound to end up in a contradiction, since from the deposited
sentence it can be argued that all sentences are false, while from the posited sentence it follows
that at least one sentence is true. On account of this, one might be inclined to reject the casus.
244 Here is a variation on the theme: since in the previous ramified structure the contradiction
depended on the incompatibility between a deposited and a posited sentence, Peter explores the
consequences of removing the second clause. It will turn out that in this case the casus can be
admitted.
73 Et ] om. O 75 est ] om. O 77 deponitur ] deponatur O 77 tam ] om. O 78 invicem ]
ad praep. O 78 non2 ] om. O 79 proponitur ] proponatur et hec add.O
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!Obj.1" Que, si conceditur, arguitur sic: tu concedis istam; et ista est falsa nec 80
est sequens; igitur male etc.
Sed forte dicitur concedendo primam partem antecedentis propositam. Deinde
proponitur secunda.
!i"Que, si negatur, arguitur sic: illa est propositio et non est falsa, igitur est vera;
igitur alique propositiones non sunt false. Et ex alia parte, omnes propositiones 85
sunt false, ut sequitur ex contradictorio depositi. Igitur contradictio.
!ii" Item etiam arguitur, si forte negatur quod illa non est sequens, [si forte
dicitur quod illa est sequens] || quia necessaria.245 P 74vb
6.8. Ideo || dicitur, admisso illo secundo casu, concedendo illam ‘deus est’. O 126ra
!RObj.1" Et cum proponitur ‘tu concedis illam, et illa est falsa non sequens, 90
igitur male respondes’, conceditur consequentia. Neque dicatur ad antecedens ne-
que ad aliquam eius partem nisi secundum quod proponuntur propositiones per
ordinem: quia si primo proponitur prima pars antecedentis, conceditur et conce-
ditur etiam secunda, secundo loco proposita. Deinde si postponatur consequens,
negetur ipsum. Quo negato, negetur alia pars antecedentis, et conceditur quod illa 95
est sequens, non tamen quia necessaria, quia hoc repugnat. Et concedendum est
quod est falsa tamquam sequens.|| V 80rb
245 The sophism has the following structure:
D Tam propositiones ad invicem repugnantes
quam que non sunt repugnantes non sunt
similes
A possible
1. Deus est C
2. Tu concedis istam; et ista est falsa nec est
sequens; igitur male
C sequentially relevantvalid in-
ference
2.1 Tu concedis istam C (cf. ‘sed forte dicitur
concedendo primam partem
antecedentis propositam’)
2.2 Ista est falsa N
3. Illa est propositio et non est falsa, igitur est
vera
C ( valid inference whose con-
sequent is inconsistent with a
corollary of the denial of D
2.3 Ista non est sequens N
80 nec ] illa add. O 81 etc. ] respondes O 83 proponitur ] proponatur O 84 igitur . . .
vera ] om. O 86 ut ] et O 87–88 si . . . sequens ] EP om. MO in marg. L 88 quia ] illa est
add. O 89 secundo ] om. O 91 conceditur ] concedo O 91 consequentia ] consequentiam O
92 proponuntur ] proponantur O 93 quia ] et O 93 conceditur ] concedatur O 93 et ] om.
O 93–94 conceditur ] concedatur O 94 postponatur ] proponatur O 95 negetur ] negatur
O 95 negetur ] negatur O 95 alia ] tertia O 95 conceditur ] concedatur O
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6.9. Item, depono quod alique propositiones – tres vel quattuor – non sint dis-
similes. Quo admisso, proponitur ‘omnes tres aut quattuor propositiones sunt
dissimiles’. Quo concesso, quia oppositum depositi, arguitur sic: omnes tres vel 100
quattuor propositiones divisim sunt dissimiles; sed A, B, C, D sunt quattuor pro-
positiones, gratia argumenti; igitur A, B, C, D sunt dissimiles propositiones. Et
appello dissimiles propositiones quarum una est vera et alia non est vera; similes
vero quarum utraque est vera vel utraque est falsa. Consequens || autem est im- M 94rb
possibile, quia vel omnes ille sunt vere vel omnes ille sunt false vel due sunt vere et 105
due false vel tres false et una vera vel econtra. Sed sive sic sive sic, sequitur quod
non omnes propositiones sunt dissimiles in illo casu, immo in nullo casu non plu-
res quam due possunt esse propositiones dissimiles ad invicem, sic quod quelibet
cuilibet alteri sit dissimilis.246
6.10. Ideo dicitur in principio non admittendo || casum. Admittatur tamen ca- B 102ra110
sus, remota illa particula ‘tres vel quattuor’.247 Deinde proponatur ‘ille invicem
contradicunt ‘rex sedet’, ‘nullus rex sedet’, ‘deus est’, ‘nullus deus est”.
246 This sophism in turn is discussed in two versions: the first one which is in question here
contains two clauses, the second one is obtained by removing the second clause, namely the
explicit assumption that there are more than two dissimilar sentences. The structure of the first
version is the following:
D Alique propositiones, tres vel quattuor, non
sunt dissimiles
A possible
1. Omnes tres aut quattuor propositiones sunt
dissimiles
C Contradictory of D
2. Omnes tres aut quattuor propositiones sunt
dissimiles; sed A, B, C, D sunt quat-
tuor propositiones; igitur A, B, C, D sunt
dissimiles propositiones
C sequentially relevant (valid
inference)
The consequent of 2., namely the sentence ‘A, B, C, D sunt dissimiles propositiones’ is impos-
sible, since we have just two truth values at our disposal and there is no way to distribute four
elements (sentences in this case) in two classes (of truth values) without putting at least two of
them together in the same class. Since it can never be the case that three or four (in general
more than two sentences, if the number of truth values is set to two) sentences are all di!erent
in truth value with respect to one another, the original claim – that was deposited – is in fact
necessary. Consequently, it should be rejected. As in the case of positio one should never admit
an impossible sentence, conversely in the case of depositio it is the class of necessary sentences
that one should avoid to admit. From the logical standpoint, the two types of obligation are
symmetrical.
247 The second version, on the other hand, runs as follows:
98 depono ] tibi add. O 98 tres ] ante propositiones transp. O 98 vel quattuor ] om.
O; non est cura add. B 98 sint ] sunt O 99 omnes ] ante omnes scr. et del. alique O
100 Quo ] om. O 100 oppositum ] contradictorium O 100 tres vel ] om. O 103 alia ]
reliqua O 103 non est vera ] falsa O 104 vero ] autem O 104 utraque . . . falsa ] una est
vera et reliqua vera O 106 sequitur ] om. O 107 omnes ] inc. add. O 108 propositiones ]
om. O 111 invicem ] ad invicem O 112 deus . . . est ] om. O
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Si conceditur, tunc sequitur quod alique non sunt dissimiles, quia sequitur quod
illarum due sunt false et due sunt vere.
Si negatur, proponitur ‘alique illarum quattuor contradicunt’. Si conceditur, ad- 115
huc sequitur quod alique propositiones non sunt dissimiles. Si negatur, proponitur
‘ille due contradicunt ‘deus est’, ‘nullus deus est”.
!Obj.1" Si conceditur, arguitur sic, quod tres propositiones sunt: quia illa ‘deus
est’ et ‘nullus deus est’ et iterum illa ‘deus est’ que est pars illius ‘nullus deus est’.
Et per consequens alique propositiones non sunt dissimiles, quia bene sequitur: 120
tres propositiones sunt, igitur alique propositiones non sunt dissimiles.
!Obj.2" Item in illo casu, || concesso quod ille contradicunt ‘deus est’, ‘nullus L 75va
deus est’, proponitur ‘tu es obligatus ad istam ‘alique propositiones non sunt dis-
similes”. Si conceditur, arguitur quod tres propositiones sunt et per consequens
alique propositiones non sunt dissimiles. 125
6.11. Ideo dicitur admisso casu concedendo quod ille || contradicunt ‘deus||est’, O 126rb
E Giiii+4vb‘nullus deus est’.
!RObj.1" Et cum arguitur quod tres propositiones sunt, quia illa ‘deus est’ et illa
‘nullus deus est’ et etiam illa ‘deus est’, que est pars eius, est propositio, negatur
quod pars eius sit propositio tamquam repugnans. Et si proponeretur in illo casu 130
‘hec est vera ‘iste contradicunt ‘deus est’ et ‘nullus deus est”’, negatur tamquam
repugnans. Et si proponatur ‘hec est oratio ‘iste contradicunt ‘deus est’ et ‘nullus
deus est”’, conceditur; et negatur quod sit propositio tamquam repugnans.|| M 94va
P 75ra
D Alique propositiones non sunt dissimiles A possible
1.1 Ille invicem contradicunt ‘deus est’, ‘nullus
deus est’, ‘rex sedet’, ‘nullus rex sedet’
C ( (it would follow that some
sentences are dissimilar)
1.2 N




1.2.2.1 Ille due contradicunt ‘deus est’, ‘nullus deus
est’
C ( (there are three sentences:
‘deus est’, ‘nullus deus est’
and again ‘deus est’ as a part
of the second sentence)
1.2.2.2 C
1.2.2.2.1 Tu es obligatus ad istam ‘alique propositio-
nes non sunt dissimiles’
C ( (there are three sentences)
113 tunc ] om. O 114 sunt ] om. O 115 proponitur ] proponatur O 116 proponitur ]
proponatur O 117 due ] om. O 118 arguitur ] tunc add. O 118 quod ] om. O
120–121 quia . . . dissimiles ] om. O 123 proponitur ] proponatur O 124–125 Si . . . dis-
similes ] om. O 128 cum ] om. O 129 etiam ] iterum O 129 eius ] illius et ‘nullus deus
est’ add. O 129 est propositio ] om. O 130 proponeretur ] proponatur O 132–133 deus
. . . est ] om. O 133 et ] sed O
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!RObj.2" Et tunc ad aliud argumentum, cum proponitur, concesso quod ille
contradicunt ‘deus est’, ‘nullus deus est’, quod tu es obligatus ad illam ‘alique 135
propositiones non sunt dissimiles’, negatur tamquam repugnans concessis etc.248
248 The text of E, M, O and P break o! at this point. Mss. B, L and V have a short additional
part.
134 concesso ] concedendo O 136 concessis etc. ] Queritur utrum tantum propositio sit ob-
ligabilis vel res ad ? Prima suppositio: non sequitur ‘nomino Sor, ergo Sor nominatur’. Secunda:
non sequitur ‘nomino Sor currere, ergo Sortem currens est’. Tertio non sequitur ‘dico Sortem
currere ergo Sor curret/currens est’ et ‘dico Sor currere quia dicere Sor currere est nuntiare Sor-
tem currere. Quarto non sequitur ‘dico vel profero illam propositionem Sor currit, igitur profero
Sortem currere’. Quinto hec consequentia est bona terminis? ‘dico vel profero illam propositio-
nem Sortes currit que adequate scio significare quod Sor currit, ergo dico ‘Sor currere”. Sexto
non sequitur ‘concedo, nego aut dubito Sor currere, ergo Sor currens est. Septimo non sequitur
pono vel depono Sor currere ergo Sor currens est Octavo non sequitur ‘pono illam Sor currit,
ergo pono Sor currere et consequenter sumantur termini personaliter. Nono non sequitur profero
Sor currere ergo Sor currens est. Sicut per propositionem res ad extra complexe cognoscitur
complexioni distincta ita per propositionem res extra conceditur aut assentitur Item concedo
‘sequitur Sor currere, ergo aliqua propositio est’ quia non est concessio nisi per propositionem.
Queritur utrum omnis propositio sit concedenda neganda vel dubitanda, respondeatur quod non,




1. Obligo te ad istam ‘tu curris’ posito quod demonstrem te qui sedes. (Sec. 3.1,
p. 84)
2. Pono tibi utramque istarum [scil. ‘rex sedet’, ‘nullus rex sedet’]. (Sec. 3.4,
p. 88)
3. Pono tibi alteram illarum [scil. ‘rex sedet’, ‘nullus rex sedet’]. (Sec. 3.5,
p. 89)
4. Pono propositionem possibilem et nulli repugnantem quam habeo in mente
mea. (Sec. 3.7, p. 92)
5. Ponitur quod omne possibile sit tibi positum et a te bene admissum. (Sec. 3.9,
p. 94)
6. Ponitur quod propositio illa simpliciter impossibilis ‘homo est asinus’ sit tibi
posita et a te admissa. (Sec. 3.13, p. 97)
7. Ponat Sor istam tibi ‘homo currit’ adequate significantem hominem curre-
re; et ponat Plato tibi istam ‘non homo currit’ adequate significantem non
hominem currere contradictorio modo prime. (Sec. 3.14, p. 98)
8. Ponatur quod Sor teneat locum Platonis et ponat ipse utrumque. (Sec. 3.15,
p. 99)
9. Ponatur tibi haec copulativa ‘haec ‘homo currit’ est tibi posita et a te bene
admissa adequate significans hominem currere, et haec ‘risibile currit’ ade-
quate significans risibile currit est tibi deposita et a te admissa’. (Sec. 3.18,
p. 102)
10. Ponatur tibi sedenti illa ‘omnis homo currit’. (Sec. 3.20, p. 105)
11. Ponatur tibi sedenti ‘omne sedens est Sor’. (Sec. 3.26, p. 112)
12. Ponatur quod Sor non obligato proponatur illa ‘deus est’ quam tempore
concedat. Et proponatur Platoni eadem quam neget necessariam male re-
spondendo. Et Cicero dubitet illam male etiam respondendo. (Sec. 3.28,
p. 114)
13. Ponatur quod Sor eadem propositio proponatur a diversis, sed unus ante
alium proponat eam, sic quod sit falsa quando unus proponit et vera quando
alter proponit. (Sec. 3.31, p. 119)
14. Ponatur quod ad nihil sis obligatus. (Sec. 3.33, p. 121)
15. Ponatur quod nulla propositio sit. (Sec. 3.35, p. 123)
16. Pono tibi sedenti istam ‘omnis homo currit’ [bis ]. (Sec. 3.37, p. 124)
17. Ponatur quod omnis homo qui est albus currat et nullus istorum [scil. omnes
homines qui sunt albi] potest currere. (Sec. 3.39, p. 129)
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Section 4
18. Peto te concedere quod nullus deus est. (Sec. 4.3, p. 138)
19. Dubitetur a te ista ‘deus est’. (Sec. 4.5, p. 140)
20. Cedat enim omne tempus obligationis per quod est aut fuit obligatus aliquis.
(Sec. 4.8, p. 143)
21. Sit rei veritas quod numquam respondisti ad istam ‘celum movetur’. (Sec. 4.9,
p. 144)
22. Ponatur quod si rex sedet tu scias regem sedere et si nullus rex sedet tu scias
nullum regem sedere. (Sec. 4.11, p. 148)
23. Tu es obligatus donec proponitur tibi aliquod negandum. (Sec. 4.13, p. 150)
24. Ponatur quod tu sis obligatus quamdiu non proponitur tibi aliquod ne-
gandum aut quamdiu non est propositum aliquod negandum. (Sec. 4.14,
p. 151)
25. Tu sis obligatus quamdiu proponetur tibi aliquod negandum et non sis ob-
ligatus quamdiu non proponetur tibi aliquod negandum. (Sec. 4.16, p. 152)
26. Tu es papa vel rex sedet et tu curris. (Sec. 4.17, p. 153)
Section 5
27. Posito autem quod per totam istam diem iste terminus ‘Sor’ ita istum ho-
minem significabit quod nullum alium, sed cras imponetur ad significandum
alium hominem, est adhuc concedendum quod ille secundus non potest esse
Sor nec poterit esse Sor neque unquam erit Sor, ita quod ille secundus est
Sor. (Sec. 5.5, p. 161)
28. Posito autem quod aliquis alius fuerit vocatus ‘Sor’ aut quod nunc de pre-
senti vocetur ‘Sor’, concedendum est quod uterque illorum est Sor et uterque
istorum fuit Sor, illis duobus demonstratis. (Sec. 5.6, p. 163)
29. ‘Homo est asinus’ significans adequate deum esse. (Sec. 5.7, p. 164)
30. Ponatur quod respondebis ad illam ‘homo est asinus’. (Sec. 5.8, p. 166)
31. Posita et admissa illa ‘tu es obligatus’, cedente tempore obligationis, negan-
dum esset quod tu fuisti obligatus. (Sec. 5.8, p. 166)
32. Ponatur quod hec ‘homo est asinus’ fiat necessaria adequate significans deum
esse convertibiliter cum illa ‘deus est’. (Sec. 5.10, p. 169)
33. Ponatur quod ista ‘homo est asinus’ sit ad placitum significativa sicut una
propositio greca, sic quod non significat tibi latine; et sit propositio nec tu
intelligas grecum. (Sec. 5.10, p. 170)
34. Pono quod omne nesciens se esse A sit A. (Sec. 5.12, p. 172)
35. Ponatur quod predicatum in ista ‘omnis homo est animal’ supponat de-
terminate, cuiuslibet alteri termini manente significatione preter hoc quod
ly ‘omnis’ non confundat predicatum confuse tantum. Et significet illa
propositione ex compositione suorum terminorum. (Sec. 5.14, p. 176)
36. [Et sicut dictum est de ista ‘omnis homo est animal’ in casu illo, ita dicendum
est de ista] ‘aliquis homo est et quilibet homo est ille’, posito quod ly ‘ille’
supponat determinate. (Sec. 5.16, p. 182)
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37. [Et sicut dictum est de illa copulativa ‘aliquis homo est et quilibet homo est
ille’, ita dicendum est de illa] ‘aliquid est et nihil est illud’, posito quod ly
‘illud’ supponat determinate. (Sec. 5.17, p. 187)
38. Ponatur quod predicatum illius ‘nullus homo est animal’ stet determinate
cuiuslibet alteri termini significatione remanente et illa propositione signifi-
cante ex compositione suorum terminorum. (Sec. 5.19, p. 188)
39. Ponatur quod in secunda parte illius ‘aliquod animal est et nullus homo est
id’ ly ‘id’ supponat communiter et non distributive. (Sec. 5.21, p. 191)
40. Ponatur quod subiectum in ista ‘aliquis homo est quilibet homo’ supponat
confuse tantum manente cuiuslibet alteri termini significatione et signifi-
cante illa propositione ex compositione suorum terminorum. (Sec. 5.22,
p. 191)
41. Ponatur quod iste convertuntur ‘deus est’, ‘nullus deus est’, una illarum
significante primarie sicut solet significare primarie, puta quod deus est vel
quod nullus deus est. (Sec. 5.24, p. 195)
42. Ponatur quod ‘bub’ sit dictio bisillaba. (Sec. 5.26, p. 198)
43. Ponatur quod omne antecedens alicuius consequentiae et oppositum conse-
quentis eiusdem sint similia, et omne consequens et oppositum antecedentis
eiusdem sint similia. Et sint gratia argumenti iste due consequentie ‘homo
est, igitur risibile est’, ‘non homo est, igitur nullum risibile est’, et significent
ille ex compositione suorum terminorum. (Sec. 5.27, p. 198)
Section 6
44. Depono tibi illam ‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’; et significet illa
adequate quod alique propositiones non sunt vere. (Sec. 6.2, p. 202)
45. Deponatur simpliciter ista ‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’. Et sit A
propositio una que significet principaliter quod alique propositiones non sunt
vere. (Sec. 6.4, p. 204)
46. Arguitur deponendo illam ‘alique propositiones non sunt vere’ et ponendo
illam ‘omnes propositiones sunt vere’ divisive. (Sec. 6.4, p. 204)
47. Depono tibi quod propositiones tam adinvicem repugnantes quam que non
sunt repugnantes non sunt similes, et quod illa propositio ‘aliqua propositio
est sibi similis’ significet adequate quod aliqua propositio est sibi similis.
(Sec. 6.5, p. 204)
48. Deponitur illa solum ‘tam propositiones invicem repugnantes quam non re-
pugnantes non sunt similes’. Quo admisso proponitur ‘deus est’. (Sec. 6.7,
p. 206)
49. Depono quod alique propositiones – tres vel quattuor – non sint dissimiles.
(Sec. 6.9, p. 208)
50. Depono quod alique propositiones non sint dissimiles remota illa particula
‘tres vel quattuor’. (Sec. 6.10, p. 208)
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OBLIGATIONAL LOGIC SYMBOL LIST
Aa = admission (a admits . . . )
Ca = concession(a grants . . . )
Da = doubt (a doubts . . . )
Na = denial (a denies . . . )
G = being a (i) correctly admitted, granted or the negation of
a correctly denied sentence or (ii) a conjunction of such
sentences
P = being posited
R = being put forward
I = being imposed
Oa = obligation (a ought to . . . )
Ua = epistemic operator (a understands . . . )
Ka = epistemic operator (a knows . . . )
I use the subscript a to indicate the agent who is supposed to perform the act of
admitting, granting and so forth. The subscript is often omitted where the context
permits. All operators apply to sentences. O has the peculiarity that it applies to
sentences of the form Cp, Dp and the like in order to express the duty to perform
the corresponding act.
PROPOSITIONAL AND PREDICATE LOGIC SYMBOL LIST
p, q, r, . . . = propositional variables
& = formal (strict) conditional




T = truth predicate
! = possibility
" = necessity
( = contradiction or impossibility
# = universal quantifier
, = existential quantifier#n!1
i=0 = conjunction of n sentences
The symbols are also introduced in the text before they are used for the first time.
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[D’Ors, 2000] D’Ors, A. (2000). “Dubium Proponitur: Andrés Limos and the Treatise on Obli-
gations. In Angelelli, I. and Perez Ilzarbe, P., editors, Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain.
Acts of the 12th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Pamplona, 26-30 May
1997, pages 224–249, Hildesheim. Georg Olms.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 223
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[Moody, 1953] Moody, E. (1953). Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic. North Holland,
Amsterdam.
[Mullally, 1964] Mullally, J. P. (1964). Peter of Spain: Tractatus syncategorematum and selected
anonymous treatises. Marquette University Press, Milwaukee.
[Müller, 1994] Müller, P. (1994). Le Obligationes nella Summa logicae di Guglielmo di Ockham.
In Bianchi, L., editor, Filosofia e teologia nel trecento: Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi, pages
85–104. FIDEM, Louvain-la-Neuve.
[Murdoch, 1975] Murdoch, J. E. (1975). From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the
Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning. In Murdoch, J. E. and Sylla, E. D., editors, The
Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, pages 271–339. Reidel, Dordrecht.
[Murdoch, 1981] Murdoch, J. E. (1981). Scientia mediantibus vocibus: Metalinguistic Analysis
in Late Medieval Natural Philosophy. In Zimmermann, A., editor, Miscellanea Medievalia Bd.
13. Sprache und Erkenntniss im Mittelalter, pages 73–106. de Gruyter, Berlin.
[Novati, 1911] Novati, F., editor (1891–1911). Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati (Vol. III), Roma.
Forzani e C.
[Nuchelmans, 1982] Nuchelmans, G. (1982). The semantics of propositions. In
[Kretzmann et al., 1982], pages 197–210.
[Olsson, 2006] Olsson, E. J. (2006). Walter Burley’s Obligationes als Theorie kontrafaktischen
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[Yrjönsuuri, 1996] Yrjönsuuri, M. (1996). Obligations as Thought Experiments. In Angelelli, I.
and Cerezo, M., editors, Studies on The History of Logic, pages 79–96. de Gruyter, Berlin.
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